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Having followed the twists and turns of the US/Iraqi attempt to negotiate legal agreements governing the future presence of American troops in that country, I have been using any time I have left after reporting the Mumbai crisis to go through with a fine toothcomb .

First things first - it is quite an achievement that two countries locked in such a difficult relationship should have managed to achieve this treaty, something that even as recently as September senior officials did not think would be possible, prior to the expiry of the United Nations mandate for Coalition Forces on 31st December this year.

In the end two separate agreements, one on the future status of US forces, the other dealing with the strategic relationship between the two countries, have been rolled into one. It sets a timetable for the withdrawal of American forces "from Iraqi cities, villages, and localities" no later than 30th June 2009. Its statement that "all of the United States Forces shall withdraw from Iraqi territory no later than 31st December 2011" seems straightforward enough.

However, when one reads Article 27 of the agreement, headed "Deterrence of Security Threats", it is apparent that the two governments have kept open the possibility to respond to any threat to the security of Iraq by "diplomatic, economic or military measures, or any other measure, to deter such a threat". This is precisely the kind of open invitation for future security cooperation that many in Iran tried to thwart through their allies in Baghdad.

Article 27 furthermore also sets out, "cooperation in training, equipping, and arming the Iraqi security forces"; a task that experts predict might require the presence of many thousands of US 'advisors'.

All the same, the new agreement is not entirely the stuff of Iranian nightmares, because, among other things, it forbids the use of Iraq for attacks on neighbouring countries. Similarly, American military concerns have been accommodated to some extent, in severely limiting Iraqi legal jurisdiction over US military personnel.

In a key concession however, there is no suggestion that the US withdrawal should be 'conditions based', although it does suggest that it might happen faster than the 2011 deadline. This marks a cave-in on the part of the Bush Administration, US military commanders, and even some elements within the Iraqi coalition government - all of whom wanted to avoid rigid timetables. It is also very convenient for the since it sets a firm date for withdrawal, lets him accelerate that if he wants, but still allows Washington to reverse that process if, under Article 27, the two governments jointly agree on some future threat.

The agreement is then a key milestone that looks likely to reduce drastically the US profile in Iraq within months, and to eliminate that presence altogether within three years. It says this has been made possible by the, "dramatic and positive developments in the country" - a reference to the marked decline in violence in the past year.

In a sense though, the fact that the two sides have worked through their political differences, dealt with what are for many Iraqis such sensitive issues, and have done it all before the expiry of the UN mandate is perhaps the best testimony to date of political progress in Iraq.

We journalists often regard press officers and media managers as the opposition. But one of the most striking things about the Indian authorities' handling of the Mumbai terrorist attacks has been their inability to put together any sort of joined up media plan.

Those reeling from the possibility that loved ones might be caught up in the mayhem can hardly have been comforted by the constant flow of speculation, rumour and outright misinformation that has surrounded these events. Different security chiefs have claimed four or five times that the Taj Mahal hotel had been cleared of terrorists, only to have explosions shatter any confidence of this fact soon afterwards.

Similar uncertainty has surrounded events at the Jewish centre. In each case the bangs or 'shooting' going on inside may represent no more than commandos room clearing with explosive entry devices and stun grenades. The terrorists may all be dead and not firing back at all.

What has been lacking in all this is a press briefing, once or twice daily, featuring security chiefs and the chief minister. If all of the kingpins in the operation had gathered in this way there would at least have been the sense that all agencies were agreeing to a certain view (for example that the terrorists all arrived by sea) or all declined to comment for the record on a particular allegation. Instead there has been a welter of rumours, many of them harvested by local journalists ringing their mates in the police or army.

I never thought I'd be longing for a system of briefing of this kind, but like many features of our own democratic system, it's one of those things you don't necessarily appreciate until you see what life is like without it.

The idea of switching troops from Iraq to Afghanistan seems deceptively simple. In fact the problems of re-deploying Britain's over-stretched army will pose the main constraint on how many more soldiers can be sent if, as expected, President elect Barack Obama mobilises Nato countries to send reinforcements to Afghanistan.

Although ministers are still vague about the timetable of Britain's exit from Iraq, I have been told that it is intended that it will be complete by July 2009. The main period of withdrawal will be during May-June.

By the end of May, headquarters and support elements will have been run down and British combat troops will, for a few weeks, come under the command of an American general. During June the last of the UK battle groups should leave, and under current planning, all of them will be gone by July.

Currently there are around 4,000 servicemen and women in Iraq and 8,000 in Afghanistan. Current planning assumes no combat units would be left in Iraq after July, and even training teams limited to two small units - one working with the Iraqi navy and the other at their officer training school.

The timing of this drawdown is important because military chiefs feel that any reinforcement in Afghanistan needs to be in place in time for that country's elections in September. The MoD does not plan to send the same soldiers (except perhaps the odd truly unfortunate one...) from one theatre to the other, but it cannot mount a significant increase of the garrison in southern Afghanistan unless it can move key items of equipment from one place to the other.

Things are so overstretched in the Army, for example, that there are insufficient sets of up to date body armour to send even one more company (around 120 troops) to Afghanistan, without taking the gear from troops in Iraq. In addition to personal equipment, heavily armoured vehicles will need to be shipped from Iraq in time to be available for the reinforcements in Afghanistan.

These logistic considerations militate in favour of any decision to commit the reinforcement to be made early next year. That decision may follow a major review of the Afghan operation being conducted by US General David Petraeus, which is expected to report in February.

There is though still an argument to be had within the British government about whether switching troops in this way is desirable. Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, Chief of Defence Staff, recently warned against any idea that troops taken from Iraq could easily be sent on other operations. Some senior army officers believe that the Army has been so stressed by 'running hot' on simultaneous operations there and in Afghanistan that it must bank the reductions in Iraq rather than sending more men and women to Afghanistan.

All of this makes it quite unlikely that the forces will simply shift 4,000 posts from operations in one country to the other. Instead, some of those involved in the process think that the Afghanistan commitment would be allowed to grow from its current 8,000 to a symbolically important 10,000. What kind of improvement the net reduction of 2,000 troops on operations would make, in terms of reducing the stress on the forces, is open to question.

The Government is cutting its Defence Intelligence Staff, despite warnings that doing so could make a repetition of the Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction saga more likely. The Ministry of Defence is moving to eliminate 122 posts in the DIS, more than one fifth of its strength.

In 2004, an inquiry into the intelligence that led Britain into the Iraq war chaired by Lord Butler, former head of the civil service, argued that DIS should be strengthened. His report called the DIS "crucial", said it needed to be integrated "more closely" with the intelligence community in order to serve "wider national priorities". If that required more money from central funds, argued Lord Butler's team, "we would support that". The government said at the time that it accepted the Butler recommendations.

During the run up to the Iraq war, the DIS proved to be the only part of the government machine that seriously questioned the way that the case was being argued. Brian Jones, a senior defence intelligence analyst and key witness at the Hutton inquiry, has told Newsnight that the cuts show that lessons have not been learned from the Iraq saga. They have also been criticised by John Morrison, formerly Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence and advisor to Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee. He has told Newsnight that the cuts are "extraordinary" and make a repetition of the mistakes in Iraq intelligence more likely. You can see more of their thoughts in the report at the end of this post.

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Watching Gordon Brown's speech at the Guildhall in the City of London, it revealed an unmistakable concern about the effect global recession might have on America's willingness to provide global leadership.

Naturally the PM did not want to spoil the feel good that has accompanied Barack Obama's election, which he described as a, "source of hope and inspiration", words which earned him the only spontaneous applause of his speech. President elect Obama also makes a natural political bedfellow for Mr Brown in that he shares the 'progressive' agendas extolled under the vaulted ceiling of the Guildhall.

There were however repeated warnings against isolationism, and references to the Great Depression of the 1930s. Mr Brown said his "central argument" was that Britain or the EU and America "can and must provide leadership" in heading off the threat of a prolonged global slump. By why should he ever doubt it?

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