Category: World Service
Date: 29.05.2005
Printable version
In an exclusive interview for Â鶹ԼÅÄ World Service's The Interview on Sunday 29 May at 0030 (rpt at 0730 and 1430, all UK time), Owen Bennett-Jones talks to General Moshe Ya'alon, as he prepares to step down as Israel's Chief of Staff on 1 June.
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The Israeli government's decision not to extend Ya'alon's tenure to four years has been controversial and widely criticised in the Israeli press.
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A new Chief of Staff will be taking over just two months before disengagement from the Gaza Strip and there has been speculation that both Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz feel that General Ya'alon was not fully behind the disengagement plan.
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Ya'alon told the Â鶹ԼÅÄ that if attacks were launched on Israel from Gaza following disengagement, the Israeli army would go back in.
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Disengagement
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Owen Bennett-Jones (OBJ): You've often said in the past that nothing should be given by way of a concession to violence. Is this a concession to violence?
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General Moshe Ya'alon (GMY): It depends. Disengagement plan is not something objective. It should be subject to what will happen before the implementation of the disengagement plan, the way it will be implemented and what will be after the implementation of the disengagement plan so the question at the end is how the Palestinians will see it and how the two organisations will see it in the future is still on the table and I'm not sure.
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OBJ: That's quite equivocal. Presumably you would accept that some Palestinians are likely to argue that they have fought and they have gained with giving no concession in return a unilateral withdrawal.
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GMY: But there are still some Palestinians who see it as a conspiracy or the way that they are going to pay - so I'm not sure what will be at the end.
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OBJ: How do you see it?
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GMY: It depends what will happen. I can talk about risks, I can talk about opportunities when we are talking about disengagement plan but the main question is still on the table - it depends what will happen from now till the day after and the days after the disengagement plan.
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OBJ: In those days afterwards and weeks afterwards, if there are attacks on Israel will the army have to go back in?
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GMY: No doubt that yes. If the only way to protect our citizens will be to go back to the Gaza Strip we'll do it. Of course we might face violence in the West Bank, not only in the Gaza Strip. If it will happen in the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian Authority will not be able or wouldn't have the will to stop it, we shall do it.
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OBJ: Are you trying to strengthen Mahmoud Abbas's hand?
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GMY: As far as the Palestinian leadership wants to be responsible, accountable, effective, talking about the implementation of one authority, one law, one weapon we will help them. If they will prefer the gang system, we will fight them.
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OBJ: Did you recommend disengagement?
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GMY: It's not an objective situation... it is now very sensitive because this is an Israeli political decision. I had the opportunity to raise my case and to talk about the risks and opportunities when it had been discussed in the government. Now this is the decision. My mission now is to enhance the opportunities and minimise the risk.
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Other excerpts from the interview...
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His approach to the intifada when he became chief of staff in 2002...
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GMY: I understood that we are not going to win this war by knockout - but by points. I understood that we wouldn't be able to use our power and we should find a way to deal with the terrorists surgically and to enable the Palestinians who are not involved in the terror attacks to live their life... it's very easy to say it's quite difficult to implement. As a commander you are in a dilemma, when to impose a closure, when and where to act and how to act in order to hit surgically the terrorists and to avoid non-involved casualties. And this was the main challenge of the IDF [Israel Defence Forces] in this type of war...
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His account of the controversial assassination of Hamas military commander Saleh Shehadeh in 2002 (civilians, including children, were killed at the same time)
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GMY: Saleh Shehadeh was the head of all the Hamas terror cells either in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank. He was responsible for the death, the murder, of dozens of Israelis. We followed him for about six months, trying to arrest him or hit him, what we call targeted killing operation, we prefer to arrest in order to interrogate, get more information, but especially in the Gaza Strip the terrorists use civilians, Palestinian civilians as human shields and Saleh Shehadeh did it by living in high populated urban area and we found most of the time he was wife his wife and daughters and we couldn't find the opportunity to hit him alone. And of course as time is running Israelis were murdered and we came on July 2002 to the point that we decided to hit him with his wife. We found that in certain opportunities it was possible to find him only with his wife and without his daughters. That was the dilemma - whether to hit him with his wife or not - and the decision was to hit him with the wife. It was the only case in the armed conflict that we decided intentionally to hit someone who is not involved... at the end unfortunately because of an intelligence mistake when we hit him we destroyed another building that we knew would be destroyed but according to our information we understood that at that time it should be empty. Unfortunately two families were there and this was the main loss - tragic loss - of non involved Palestinians...
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OBJ: That's illegal... did you take legal advice?
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GMY: Of course of course in the decision making process we use legal advisers - up to our attorney general...
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On why the army takes its officers to Auschwitz as part of their training
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GMY: We found that this is the best way to educate our officers - to make decisions in a better way - on one hand we shouldn't be murderers. On the other hand we shouldn't be victims. And this is the main dilemma for any Israeli, Jewish commander. And it is better than any other story or book - to go there, to see it, to witness it.
