Ancient and Archaeology聽 permalink
Boudica ad61: No final ambush?
This discussion has been closed.
-
Message 1.聽
Posted by Herewordless (U14549396) on Monday, 31st October 2011
Following on from TheodoricAur's great and informative thread about Paulinus & Boudica's campaigns of ad61, I have been reading a few sources and thinking about Boudica's tactics which largely employed ambush (and siege?) as a winning strategy until the end, in which she seems to have ditched her winning strength and opted for a disastrous pitched battle?
This has been excused over time as over-enthusiasm due to being flushed with victory or the geographical terrain at that last battle which necessitated a head-on assault only?
But in order to take on Paulinus in that last doomed pitched battle, why didn't Boudica send a large force of local foot warriors to ambush, or harass, the Roman rear?
Ambush was a tactic which had served the Britons well against Roman armies under Caesar and Scapula, and latterly the IXth Legion under Cerialis?
It didn't have to be a full-blooded and serious attempt to cut through the Romans in a true pincer attack, but with overwhelming numbers it would serve to distract Paulinus's comparatively tiny army, or perhaps spread fear as a psychological factor?
Boudica had the vast numbers to do this and, no matter where the battle was actually fought, some of her inter-tribal army would have known the terrain very well- hunting, etc? Examples where ambush or psychological panic routed armies were;
* Pharsalus - the sudden revealing of Caesar's charging infantrymen behind his cavalry routed Pompey's cavalry under Labienus? Similarly, Hannibal used ambush twice in his battles of 218-7bc?
* Hastings - the effect upon the indomitable Normans when the word spread that 'William had fallen'? Then later in the same day, Harold!
* Agincourt- the effect of near-panic upon the English when word of their baggage train in the rear was being raided by the French? It actually wasn't in huge numbers, but the effect galvanised the desperate English, fearful of losing a desperate battle on two fronts?
If the woods and shrub were as dense as Tacitus and some scholars suggest, making the use of throwing weapons awkward (hindered by woods and trees), then why not at least do it for fear value?
It's not so much the actual firepower (or lack of) from the woods behind the Roman lines, but the sheer psychological effect upon the opposing force's ability to function/focus when suddenly presented with the enemy to the rear, even if tactically it is not threatening?
Surely not ALL tactical command had totally broken down by the time Boudica and her chieftains had sacked Colchester, London, St.Albans (and Staines and Silchester)?
Or, as many before me have suggested, was Paulinus's ravaging of British sacred groves/sites so successful that it made the furious British 'hoarde' lose their military sense? -
Message 2
Posted by TheodericAur (U14260004) on Wednesday, 2nd November 2011
Hi Hereword
By this time in the Roman occupation of Britain it had been proved time and again that to be forced to fight the Roman Army once they were organised in Battle Formation was to be defeated.
Also they were past masters at sieges themselves so to be 鈥渉oled up鈥 against them also inevitably led to defeat.
This is proven in the previous campaigns in Britain. As far as we know not one Brythonic Army whatever the makeup of the tribes managed to defeat the Romans in a pitched battle.
As you say it was always ambush and sieges where 鈥渙ne to one combat鈥 not 鈥渢eam combat鈥 could prevail. The Celtic strength was as a Warrior not a soldier organised as part of a machine, something that the Roman Army was the best at.
So why did Boudica attack? Why didn鈥檛 she just wait within her borders for Seutonius Paulinus to attack her on her own ground where she would have the advantage?
In the first place I think that is what she possibly did. If attacking London was in the original plan she would have been in London at least a week maybe two weeks before the Roman Army even if we assume that Seutonius came down with only his mounted forces 鈥 his cavalry and some of the Batavians (already speculation I鈥檓 afraid but there is not a lot to go on).
The Tribes would have known he was coming down Watling Street so he could have been ambushed there but he wasn鈥檛, possibly because the farmers were still harvesting their crops but also perhaps because they had already laid ambushes nearer the Iceni homelands.
Perhaps they wanted him to invade their territories but were not sure which route he would take? Logically if he was going to attack them he would have created a pincer movement coming in at the North with the 2nd Legion coming up from London.
As we know there was no 2nd Legion so he was possibly forced to carry on to London hoping to meet up with them.
When he got to London there would have been no troops, they were dead in Colchester; the Procurator and probably any rich people had already fled (as the rich always do) taking the ships with them and already the majority that were left would have been looking to their Roman allies or countrymen to have defended them if the worst happened.
Seutonius must have realised almost immediately that if the Iceni (and possibly other tribes) attacked he and his men would have been slaughtered as he was so outnumbered.
I have to say that I am coming around to the idea that gradually many of the tribes were starting to get rebellious feelings and that much of the country were seeing their occupiers as at least being able to be beaten after the sacking of Colchester and the destruction of part of the 19th Legion..
It must have been quite a shock for all the tribes when the Roman Army left London with not so much as a whimper apart from destroying the military equipment, food and infrastructure as they left with the majority of the remaining inhabitants.
As with any civilian city with no troops everyone would have left unless they were totally immobile or decided not to leave. It would not have been many. You only have to look at today鈥檚 war zones to see who remain, those who have no transport, are immobile or are very old and perhaps their families but typically people flee conflict.
The way refugees act is the same now as it ever was, away from the potential threat and into the West with Paulinus.
From Boudica鈥檚 and her Army鈥檚 point of view this must have been a dreadful shock.
All the plans that they had were now in disarray but on the other hand they were no worse off now than they were before or was that really the case?
Kind Regards - TA -
Message 3
Posted by Herewordless (U14549396) on Wednesday, 2nd November 2011
Thanks, TA
I agree that it was folly to face Rome in open battle, but my thoughts are- if to face them at all, why not use some of your massive numbers to harass the enemy's rear, even if only for psychological value, as in the examples I listed?
I've learned alot more about this great era which I hadn't previously tried to work out, thanks for that. -
Message 4
Posted by TheodericAur (U14260004) on Friday, 4th November 2011
Hi Hereword
So why would the Brythons attack Seutonius Paulinus?
What could have been the provocation? Or could this have just been an opportunity too good to miss?
Dio states that 鈥淗owever, he (Seutonius Paulinus) was not willing to risk a conflict with the barbarians immediately, as he feared their numbers and their desperation, but was inclined to postpone battle to a more convenient season. But as he grew short of food and the barbarians pressed relentlessly upon him, he was compelled, contrary to his judgment, to engage them鈥
This is a statement full of information:
1. He wanted to postpone any fighting to the next season, which means that this was probably towards the end of September.
2. He was re grouping and falling back to a secure base.
3. He was growing short of food.
4. That he was being followed or harried by the local populace.
5. He only engaged the Armies of Boudica because he had to, they brought him to battle rather than the other way around.
I think that we have to tear ourselves away from the idea that the Brythons did not have good intelligence.
Although the Romans refer to the Tribes as being Barbarians we already know of their highly developed culture in a number of spheres.
So if we take on the concept that Seutonius Paulinus only had horse mounted troops with him (perhaps some of the Batavians and Cavalry 鈥 perhaps a force of 3000 troops) it is likely that they would have known the make up of Seutonius Paulinus force and have realised that it was weak. The Roman writers confirm this.
As the 9th had been defeated (we think half the legion of some 2,000 men) Seutonius Paulinus would have realised that whatever the size of Boudica鈥檚 forces, or those that could be called upon, they could defeat 3000 men easily.
Perhaps Boudica and the Trinovantes felt that they had a great chance against the Governor of the Province only supported by three thousand troops.
When they realised that he was not going to attack and was leaving, that this was the best chance of defeating him.
This would answer the point of why Boudica left the Iceni homeland and started to harry the Roman Army.
Kind Regards - TA -
Message 5
Posted by Seamus an Chaca (U14844281) on Friday, 4th November 2011
Good explanation of the campaign, but what Hereward is asking is- why Boudicca didn't also launch a surprise rear attack when facing the Romans at that last battle?
I think it could have harassed the Romans, lined up to fight, but was more down to sheer bravado and over-confidence that they didn't need to? Maybe she didn't have time?
Also, we don't know exactly what the terrain actually was, despite Tacitus's description. -
Message 6
Posted by TheodericAur (U14260004) on Friday, 4th November 2011
Hi Seamus an Chaca
Tacitus states categorically that Seutonius Paulinus was very particular about his chosen position ensuring that there were no enemy to his rear and only to the front.
Certainly a forest would have prevented chariots or horses from attacking from the rear during the battle although infantry might have got through.
There would have been no surprise though and it was in the surprise of an ambush where the Brythons tactics worked well.
Where the Roman Army could deploy in the open in their proven echelons there was no match at all and the Brythons would have know that they were likely to get beaten.
Also perhaps there was over confidence........
Did Boudica and the associated Tribal Army only think that they were attacking 3000 mounted men and refugees rather than 3,000 mounted men and 6,500 legionaries with some archers?
Kind Regards - TA -
Message 7
Posted by Seamus an Chaca (U14844281) on Friday, 4th November 2011
I take your point re the woods, no surprise after clambering over noisy shrubland and branches? Also, emerging from a wood in dribs and drabs would be...not good.
Also the warrior culture of individual glory demanded a full dash for battle honour, especially if their sacred sites had been destroyed- on top of their queen Boudicca, the incarnation of Andraste being whipped like a slave and daughters violated, thus their gods such as Andate insulted?
As for what the Britons expected- they surely knew that the IInd (whom they didn't know would not be fighting), XIVth and XXth were somewhere, even part-legions, as well as the IXth cavalry, so there's no doubt they were expecting to fight c.20,000 men.
Good thread. -
Message 8
Posted by TheodericAur (U14260004) on Friday, 4th November 2011
Hi Hereword
Hopefully we have established that Seutonius Paulinus went to the West because he was likely to have got cut off by the Trinovantes or Iceni if he went North with the refugees.
His problem now was to slow down the following Army from catching him and in fact to deter them from pursuing him altogether.
Firstly he burnt London (or parts of London) so there was no food there. Perhaps he encouraged some form of resistance by the people who couldn鈥檛 leave to delay Boudica but I am not convinced of this.
The Brythons had not planned for this at all. This was pure opportunism and therefore they would have got enough forces together quickly and charged off down to London but Seutonius Paulinus was long gone and when they got there, there was no food.
The bridge to the South had been destroyed so they coudn鈥檛 get any from Kent and if the Roman Army had adopted a 鈥渟corched earth policy鈥 any surviving grain stores in the vicinity would also have been destroyed 鈥 this may even apply to St Albans which is only 22 miles north of London.
St Albans has routes to the West if a small force had been sent to burn the granaries they could have easily turned West and joined up with Seutonius Paulinus.
Logistically Boudica was stuck. She had to have food for the 鈥淪trike Force鈥 that she had assembled. There was only one place where she knew there were supplies and that was in her homelands.
She would have to send for it and that was going to delay her considerably.
This was (in my opinion) what Seutonius Paulinus wanted.......hoping for her to give up altogether for now until the next fighting season.......
Yet as we know the Iceni, Trinovantes and others perhaps thought they were on a roll and sent for food (the most direct transport link from Norfolk / Suffolk would have been the Icknield Way down to St Albans.)
The tactics of the Romans gained them a considerable amount of time......although the Brythons were to pursue Seutonius Paulinus....... until he stood and fought.
Kind Regards - TA -
Message 9
Posted by Seamus an Chaca (U14844281) on Friday, 4th November 2011
I'm Seamus!! Lol it was Hereward that started this post! I'm more of a Celt sympathiser.
So where do you think the battle was?
If Mancetter, then Paulinus had to go west in a large loop and pick up the Fosse Way north somewhere- minus the IInd who refused to march, and if ther area was hostile then Paulinus would have been quick?
If in the South somewhere, in friendly lands, why didn't the IInd march to fight? -
Message 10
Posted by Herewordless (U14549396) on Friday, 4th November 2011
TA, it was Seamus latterly?
But I was indeed musing on the possibility of why a large force wasn't sent around the Roman rear to cause confusion, via woodland no matter how dense?
But it's likely you two have answered this, a rear ambush via dense woods may have caused concern, but easily dealt with when they emerged piecemeal? Nothing like the panic at Agincourt? -
Message 11
Posted by TheodericAur (U14260004) on Saturday, 5th November 2011
Hi Hereword and Seamus
My apologies for the confusion.......
Regarding the attack from the rear through the woods.
Of course we have no real idea of woodlands 2000 years ago but when you think of the size of these armies I think we are talking of an extensive amount of forest.
If we assume that there was the majority of the Fourteenth Legionaries (5000 men) and they were deployed in a tight formation of 3 lines the front for them alone would have been about a mile wide and that is without the other 5,000 troops.
If it was a large forest it would probably have been both deep and wide so progress of a large amount of infantry through it would have been slow.
Also if Seutonius Paulinus was concerned that there were no Brythons there he would have made some type of plans to be aware of any incursions 鈥 so probably no panic.
The battle site is traditionally placed somewhere along Watling Street but this seems to be based around the premise that Seutonius Paulinus rushed back to his forces.
Of course this doesn鈥檛 explain taking the refugees with him, there was no chance of him rushing back at all, also he risked being cut off by Boudica on his way back.
If he was intending (according to Dio) to regroup perhaps he would have gone to his strengths.
He had half a Legion (9th) up north watching the Brigantes. He had 3,000 men with him and there were Legions in Exeter(2nd) and Usk (20th) and then the 14th somewhere on Watling Street.
So if he moved the 14th south he would have around 30,000 men in the West which he could call on and also sort out the problem with the 2nd. He could do this over the winter period (perhaps basing himself at Gloucester) and then take on the tribes.
So perhaps if he went West towards Gloucester he could bring the 14th down Fosse Way to meet him there.
It is probably not entirely true that the far South West was necessarily that friendly to Rome (Durotriges), otherwise why would you have a Legionary fortress based at Exeter?
So it may well be that the 2nd were either under siege or felt that Seutonius Paulinus could not win and therefore had their own plans. There are signs of a fight at one oft he local hillforts around this time so perhaps the Legion was split with the Commanders dealing with the uprising and the officer left in charge of the Fortress had been toild to stay put. (all complete speculation).
It seems to me that there are implied indications that much of the Province was in turmoil, although the Atrebates were friendly and as it looked like Rome was in retreat possibly the Tribes would have started to have confidence to rebel.
Kind regards - TA -
Message 12
Posted by Herewordless (U14549396) on Sunday, 6th November 2011
Hi TA,
I'm coming round to the idea that Paulinus didn't move up Watling St after London, but - wherever the battle was (Mancetter or Wilts/Berks/Hamps)- what could have been his route?
Sure, Paulinus could have moved off West and dumped the refugees off at Silchester, then a great walled town, which seems to have been targetted by Boudica anyway? Then where? It all depends whatever was going on in that region? As you suggest, the true story of the IInd and Posthumus isn't fully revealed by the Romans?
If the battle-site was at Mancetter, Paulinus would have had to dash about in a huge arc west & North, probably through increasingly 'hostile' territories? If it was around the Silchester area, then the XIVth and any vexillations would have had a major foot-slog from the north?
I wondered, though, why you think that the remainder of the IXth were watching the Brigantes? In ad61 the [later] anti-Roman rebel Venutius was then said by Tacitus to be 'loyal' to his pro-Roman wife - Queen Cartimandua (a few years later was when the Brigantian trouble between them started), who herself had confirmed her loyalty to Rome only 11yrs prior by handing over Caratacus? -
Message 13
Posted by TheodericAur (U14260004) on Monday, 7th November 2011
Hi Hereword
Regarding the Ninth Legion, it is generally thought that only half was down south and this half was destroyed by Boudica.
This assumption is based on the fact that when re-inforcements were eventually sent to Seutonius Paulinus only 2,000 legionaries were sent to replace losses incurred during the uprising and as (according to Tacitus) only 400 legionaries were lost in the battle with Boudica this would be about right. (Also sent as re-inforcements were 1,000 cavalry and 4,000 auxilliaries).
The problem is then where were the other 3,000 legionaries? It has been supposed that they were based up north to keep an eye on the Brigantes so that Seutonius Paulinus would not have to worry about any attacks from there during his campaign in Wales.
Although Queen Cartimandua was a Client of Rome, the military mind did not trust Client Kings and Queens totally (see AD47 and the Iceni uprising put down by Scapula) and it would have been a prudent move on the behalf of Seutonius to keep the Ninth Legion guarding the north when he was down south.
I would concur with your idea that Seutonius Paulinus went to Silchester (a town in a friendly state) which was the hub of a road network with links to Winchester, Dorchester, Exeter, Bosham, St Albans, London, Bath and Cirencester (and the Fosse Way) etc.
This would have been ideal as the refugees could be refreshed and sent on their way. He could ensure that the southern ports were put on alert and he would have access to supplies when he needed them, and he could make his way to meet up with the Fourteenth at Cirencester and regroup all his forces in the South (Silchester to Cirencester is 55 miles).
If the Fourteenth were to meet with him at Cirencester it was 215 miles from Bangor (Anglesey) down Watling Street and then the Fosse Way which at a steady 20 miles a day would have taken them less than 2 weeks.
Would he have stayed at Silchester to be surrounded by Boudica鈥檚 host?
Probably not.
Was the battle at Mancetter? Well it is anyone鈥檚 guess but looking at the topography of the place it seems unlikely.
Although there is a valley of sorts with a wood at the rear like a giant horseshoe it is not long enough to contain the Roman Army and bring in and contain an army of 80,000 Brythons (let alone a larger army) so that they are so crowded in that
they cannot turn around.
Also apart from the wagons 鈥渁t the edge of the plain鈥 (not at the edge of the battle field) there was nothing to stop the Brythons just separating to the right and left.
Also if the Roman Army charged out of the valley they would have been engulfed as the whole area is flat apart from this small valley and 10,000 men would have been surrounded by the larger host, which was why the valley was supposedly chosen in the first place so they couldn鈥檛 be outflanked.
Watling Street has been chosen as a battle site by historians with no factual base whatsoever apart from St Albans having been burnt by someone (assumed to be Boudica but could equally have been the Roman Army).
Kind Regards - TA -
Message 14
Posted by P_Trembath (U8273536) on Wednesday, 9th November 2011
This may be slightly off topic, but I have always wondered why Boudica did not just torch the woods.
Unless it was a sacred site.
It would surely have spread panic amongst the Roman soldiers, giving the Britons the upper hand.
Or is the mental picture I have of the Romans being surrounded on three sides by dense, impenetrable woodland, wrong? -
Message 15
Posted by TheodericAur (U14260004) on Wednesday, 9th November 2011
Hi P_Trembath
That is a really good question....
The battlefield is dexcribed as follows:
"For this purpose he chose a spot encircled with woods, narrow at the entrance, and sheltered in the rear by a thick forest. In that situation he had no fear of an ambush. The enemy, he knew, had no approach but in front.An open plain lay before him. He drew up his men in the following order: the legions in close array formed the center; the light armed troops were stationed at hand to serve as occasion might require: the cavalry took post in the wings. "
That certainly fits your understanding but the desciption itself could be interpreted in a number of ways.
If the battle site was indeed at Mancetter there is no reason (apart from religious considerations) why the woods could not be set on fire and they could have just waited for the Roman Army to burst out and then surround them.
It seems improbable that Seutonius Paulinus would have chosen a spot where he was trapped with no way out so perhaps the description of the site is too simply described.
Kind Regards - TA
: -
Message 16
Posted by Herewordless (U14549396) on Wednesday, 9th November 2011
Maybe ALL nature and woodlands were sacred to Celts, who had Gods representing virtually everything?
Maybe a fire would have threatened nearby villages? Maybe it would take too long when all her (by now uncontrollable) warriors wanted was to get at the Romans? -
Message 17
Posted by TheodericAur (U14260004) on Wednesday, 9th November 2011
Hi Hereword
It also brings back one of your points about the Druids and what was important to the Brython's beliefs.
Where were the saced places to the Druids concentrated in Britain?
If, and it is a big if, Seutonius Paulinus wanted to get the Brythons to meet him in a pitched battle where he had a chance of winning he would need to pick a place that gave him a chance but also would ensure that the Brythons would attack him.
It would seem that there were two ways, firstly to seem that he was weaker than he was and therefore beatable in a battle, secondly that his army was a threat to sacred places.
Kind Regards - TA -
Message 18
Posted by Herewordless (U14549396) on Wednesday, 9th November 2011
Hi TA
The Britons were very religious about all of nature, and thus everything- water, trees, woodland glades, animals, the elements, sky, soil, planets etc, with sacrificial offerings to the gods. Also for good harbests and victory in war.
The tree was a natural symbol of the three domains, with branches that reach into the sky, its body in the earth, and roots reaching deep into the sacred streams below the earth.
Wiki (yes, I know, but still it seems to have become more scholarly in recent years) says;-
"At times they worshipped in constructed temples and shrines, evidence for which have been unearthed across the Celtic world by archaeologists, although according to Greco-Roman accounts, they also worshipped in areas of the natural world that were held to be sacred, namely in groves of trees. Across Celtic Europe, many of the constructed temples, which were square in shape and constructed out of wood"
I did once read about a couple of sites firmly named (I'm unsure of their archaeology) as Brythonic sacred sites in the same vein as the Anglesey druidic groves.
So Paulinus could, realistically, have sacked anywhere near to any chosen battle-site to lure his quarry? -
Message 19
Posted by TheodericAur (U14260004) on Thursday, 10th November 2011
Hi Hereword
I expect that you know more than I do regarding the sacred habits of the Brythons.
We do know that the word Druid is related to the ancient word for Oak Tree and mistletoe taken from the oak was a mystical action according to the Druids.
Even today probably the quintessential tree that you would associate with Britain is the Oak. (apart from the Yew for longbows and the Willow for cricket bats).
I think that you could say that many races were highly superstitious, including the Romans and had many Gods to appease.
I expect that there were local holy places but also a few highly prized religious spots which for milennia had attracted various religions.
Central southern Britain certainly has an abundance of these sites that are still visible today.
Kind Regards - TA -
Message 20
Posted by Herewordless (U14549396) on Saturday, 12th November 2011
I agree, although I understand that oak wasn't originally one of the first sprouting trees in these isles?
Sacred sites are there to be desecrated, unprotected and (though usually 'hidden' in woodlands etc) exposed to attack - especially on the intell of pro-Roman tribes?
I was reading Graham Applebury's "The Boudican Revolt: Countdown to Defeat", in which he proposes a few new theories, but mostly ones which I don't think add up.
鈥 He insists that Cerealis and his IXth legion/vexillation managed to get the 77m from their fortified camp at Longthorpe to between Colchester/London (nearer the latter) only to be overrun (in pitched battle?) by Boudica?
鈥 That Silchester has 鈥渘o evidence for destruction levels鈥 and that 'local' revolts sprang up?
鈥 He theorises that Boudica, once she ravaged St. Albans (for grain supplies), turned towards home -N.E along Icknield Way and towards Norfolk, only to be faced 2 days later by a blocking army under Paulinus with XIV & XXth (and IXth survivors met them) in pitched battle along that road, at Arbury Banks, Ashwell.
But what were Boudica's aims- surely she couldn't have expected to oust Rome completely, given the above theory? Why just go home after such serious provocations?
Did she know other revolts were springing up elsewhere? -
Message 21
Posted by TheodericAur (U14260004) on Sunday, 13th November 2011
Hi Hereword
I was quite surprised that Graham Applebury's "The Boudican Revolt: Countdown to Defeat鈥 declares that there is no 鈥淪ilchester destruction layer鈥 which other experts certainly are supporting.
When you take into account the destruction of Staines as well during this time a move westwards by Boudica or Seutonius Paulinus does seem at least possible.
The total disregard of Tacitus鈥 and Dio鈥檚 account about the causes of the revolt does seem to be a little unusual but does allow for the revolt to be a 鈥渒nee jerk鈥 reaction to Boudica鈥檚 treatment rather than planned.
The idea that the remnants of the Ninth Legion joined Seutonius Paulinus are not mentioned anywhere at all.
The timelines that are mentioned are a trifle optimistic:
The following shows the timeline by Graham Applebury:
Day 1 Revolt Begins
Day 2 / 3 Destruction of Colchester
News of the rebellion received by Cerealis
Preparation for a movement of a detachment of the Ninth Legion
Day 3 News reaches Paulinus who disengages from campaigning in North
Wales and prepares to march eastward.
Day 4 鈥 9 Cerealis defeated between Colchester and London retreats to
Longthorpe and sends message to Seutonius Paulinus
Day 6 鈥 7 Fourteenth increases marching speed. Paulinus uses small cavalry
force to reconnoitre the advance on Londinium
Day 8 鈥 9 Destruction of Londinium, Paulinus unable to bring Fourteenth and
Twentieth forward quickly enough
Day 10 鈥 12 Iceni advance on Verulamium
Day 13 Destruction of Verulamium
Day 14 / 15 Intelligence indicates Iceni progressing along the Icknield Way
Day 15 Paulinus positions Fourteenth and Twentieth in defensive position
Day 16 Final Battle
Roman cavalry travels at about 30 miles per day and infantry at about 20 鈥 25 miles per day, certainly for the distances mentioned, with a baggage train this would have been at maximum 15 mile per day.
Messengers travel at about 50 鈥 60 miles per day with fresh horses at the way stations. So Seutonius Paulinus could not have heard about the uprising at Colchester for 4 days after the trouble had begun.
He would then have had to disengage the army, set an occupation force for Anglesey and arrange to have the Legion to travel south. This would have taken at least two days and probably longer.
So if we say that Seutonius Paulinus leaves with a reasonable force of mounted troops including his cavalry at the earliest he would (if travelling at 30 miles per day) arrive in London on Day 13.
He would have then reconnoitred around London obtained any grain that was available, destroyed the warehouses, assembled the refugees and have left.
This would have taken at least 3 days
We are now on Day 16 and Boudica still hasn鈥檛 arrived in London.......let alone Ashbury Banks.
It also rather destroys the idea that Cerealis was stopping Boudica marching on London because if that was the case she would have been there before Seutonius Paulinus and Tacitus states she arrived after Seutonius Paulinus left.
Finally the Roman Army travelling at this pace could only carry enough food for a week.
It is unlikely that Seutonius Paulinus would risk his army running out of food before going into battle.
Regarding the thoughts of Boudica, who knows?
It is possible that after the Roman capital in Britannia was destroyed, part of a legion defeated and one of the Legions in retreat that the tribes unfriendly towards the Romans may well have risen up.
Kind Regards - TA -
Message 22
Posted by TheodericAur (U14260004) on Monday, 14th November 2011
Hi Hereword
Regarding your other points:
鈥淏ut what were Boudica's aims- surely she couldn't have expected to oust Rome completely, given the above theory?鈥
鈥淲hy just go home after such serious provocations?鈥
鈥淒id she know other revolts were springing up elsewhere?鈥
I suspect that the Druids wantedRome ejected from the country but I am sure that this was not a universal feeling throughout the tribes.
Certainly the Royal Houses of the Brigantes, Atrebates, Dubonni, probably the Demetae, Cantiaci and Catuvellauni were friendly to Rome as were the Iceni before Prasatugus died and the Trinovantes before their tribal lands were taken by the settlers at Colchester but there were other tribes that were not.
These might have been the Durotriges, Cornovii, Coritani, Silures, Ordovices and more obviously during the troubles the previous Roman allies the Trinovantes and Iceni.
It shows a huge amount of incompetence by the Roman Administration to manage to offend two groups of people who had been Clients of theirs originally.
Attacking Anglesey would have offended many of the tribes anyway especially once the stories of the wholesale slaughter of the inhabitants and Druids was relayed to the populace.
If what Caesar says is true about the Druids, it would have been like destroying a combination of a University and a Religious Centre and all the students in one crazed buthchery. (Seutonius Paulinus was not known for his compassion)
As Tacitus says Seutonius 鈥渕arched amidst a hostile population to Londinium鈥
This would imply that locals were unhappy.
Obviously the more successful a war leader is, the more people they attract to their banner.
As you know I don鈥檛 think that the original plan was to leave East Anglia at all but the shock that Seutonius was withdrawing and the consequent increase in support from other tribes (or parts of tribes) dragged everyone into an eventual confrontation.
Destroying the Governor of a Province would have been a major blow against the Roman Empire and may have persuaded more and more tribes to fight against the Romans.
She didn鈥檛 have to fight him directly if he was retreating, she could easily start to pick off the stragglers (especially if she thought he was slowed down with refugees).
I would expect that Boudica knew what was happening in the rest of the country and her and her advisers had decided crush Seutonius Paulinus and his army between them, perhaps even driving him into an ambush.
Once Seutonius Paulinus realised that Boudica was not going to stop pursuing him (according to Dio) he had to act and turn and fight.
It is here that we perhaps see his genius in that he changes the odds against him by the picking of the battle site that would look like he was trapped and weak but that in fact gave him a huge advantage once battle was joined and it was too late for the Brythons to disengage easily.
If he had been caught out in the open I expect that he could have been surrounded and destroyed.
The geography of the battle site was critical to his and his army鈥檚 survival.
Kind Regards - TA -
Message 23
Posted by Herewordless (U14549396) on Monday, 14th November 2011
Hi TA
There's no doubting Suetonius's military ability, hugely outnumbered and encumbered upon his 'escape' from London, he was under intense pressure to safely ditch that commercial town's refugees (somewhere), then link up with his XIVth and part-XXth (IF they weren't with him already) and then choose a suitable defensive battle-site (somewhere)?
Perhaps he solved two, or all, of these issues in one swoop? It all depends upon where that final battle actually was, but which the different site theorists may never know or agree upon- a bit like the many different battle-site theorists for Brunanburh in 937?
I am still torn between a battle-site either west of London (logical to avoid enemy tribes, IF they spread that far West?) or the traditional theory of Mancetter (I can't relate to many of Graham Appleby's theories), the latter of which a number of respected historians and experts fancy- Guy De La Bedoyere, Michael Wood and (I think) Adrian Goldsworthy amongst them.
I am swaying more towards Mancetter again after reading about the Roman Fort of Lunt, near Coventry, which was dug many times since before WWII and artefacts have been dated to c.60-1ad, a hurriedly-built 25 acre fort and soon a post-revolt compacted 4.5 acre fort- with a granary store and a gyrus for breaking in horses!! Iceni horses?
Was this fort, not too far from Mancetter - itself the site of pre-Boudican revolt Roman activity, a re-supply and training springboard for Paulinus's revenge campaign into E.Anglia against the Iceni and Trinovantes?
I still like the logic of Paulinus moving off (slowly) Westwards from London to evade possible Boudican forces, but maybe they weren't anywhere near the region then, but 'celebrating' and sacrificing captives between Colchester/London, and Paulinus might have been able to nervously 'squeeze' North-West up Watling St from a constant stream of intell supplied by a screen of his cavalry outriders? -
Message 24
Posted by TheodericAur (U14260004) on Monday, 14th November 2011
Hi Hereword
Thanks for your insights
Of course you are absolutely right and there are many theories that can be attached to this whole period.
You are also right that many experts have come down on the side of Mancetter as the battle site and no doubt they have their reasons although as I have mentioned before, to me the topography looks wrong.
Of course the last battle for Boudica was not the end of the war and many Brythonic warriors escaped to fight another day and Seutonius Paulinus kept his troops on active service through the winter period with 7,000 extra troops added to his forces from outside Britannia and on into the next year.
Regarding the horse training building at the Lunt, of course the fort is almost guaranteed to be part of the Roman solution to the re-settlement of the Brythons but of course this wasn鈥檛 the only fort that was built after the war was over and a number of others were built such as at Chelmsford, Bayhlam House Suffolk, Ixworth Suffolk, Great Casterton Leicestershire, all on or near the borders of the Iceni with the exception of Chelmsford which was a control on the Trinovantes.
Seutonius Paulinus policy on destruction of the rebels was draconian, in fact he almost exterminated the Trinovantes and Iceni.
Although he never managed to get the Province working again he did subdue the Brythons in the South and East (but was replaced as Governor by a diplomat (Turpilianus) who managed to get the Province back on its feet slowly financially).
So wherever Boudica鈥檚 final battle was, the subsequent forts aren鈥檛 necessarily indicative of the battle place.
But 鈥 the uncertainty and lack of actual definitive proof leaves everything wide open and there is still much to be answered 鈥 which is what makes it all so interesting.
Kind Regards - TA -
Message 25
Posted by simple answers (U14432735) on Tuesday, 6th December 2011
Mancetter and Arbury Banks don't really have the topography to cut it as candidates. The Church Stowe theory seesm the best one doing the rounds at the moment. Google "Battle of Watling Street Church Stowe" and you'll find it.
Link;
-
Message 26
Posted by TheodericAur (U14260004) on Saturday, 10th December 2011
Hi Paulinus
Many thanks for the link.....
This certainly seems to be a better location than the others and could fit the description by Tacitus.
That is if course if you think that the battle was fought off Watling Street.
I have reservations about the valley sides being a rampart, they are not that sheer and wouldn't act as a protection.
Also the horseshoe shape of the site with quite a wide entrance (and exit) doesn't seem to act as much of a pinch point.
Also the plain being flat and quite wide would seem to allow for a comparatively easy escape in a "rout situation" even if the wagons were "parked" close to the river.
But a very interesting site.....
Kind Regards - TA -
Message 27
Posted by Herewordless (U14549396) on Sunday, 11th December 2011
Paulinus, an excellent document there!
It's possible that Paulinus got this far, met his troops (from the N.West) and quickly arrayed for battle?
But it's surely a bit close to Boudica's army- why Theodoric believes that Paulinus didn't go N-West but went West from London in the first place?
Plus, if so close, where would Paulinus have safely ditched the London refugees?
Regards -
Message 28
Posted by simple answers (U14432735) on Monday, 12th December 2011
The rampart thing is interesting, the ridge is a very odd shape having the same angle of slopes on both sides, it's certainly too steep to run a chariot up, and any run along the ridge would be obstructed by the triple ditch sequence. The geology is also interesting, the valley bottom and lower slopes are a particularly sticky Lias clay whilst the top is a nice free draining Iron stone, so approach and ascent would be pretty hard.
There is a distinct pinch point part way up the valley so that would be my bet for the wagon barricade, all beyond the 400m Scorpio range from the ridge top emplacements.
It would be interesting to see some cores from around the site, the tributaries of the Nene all but surround the site, they are now all canalised/ditched but if they were river marsh 2000 years ago that would make a pretty effective barrier to retreat.
I'm starting t think the Brits had a rallying point before and after the battle, Hunsbury Hill would seem a good candidate, might explain the cache of arms and quern stones that have been found there. -
Message 29
Posted by simple answers (U14432735) on Monday, 12th December 2011
@ Hereward
Thanks
It would be bizarre for the Romans not to have put up camps of some sort, but they may have existed already, the area is a great strategy position as evidenced by the development of Weddon Barracks. So I'm betting this was a known and prepared RV for the Romans, possibly they had up to a couple of weeks to prepare for the Brit assault.
West of London there is no evidence of this, not good strategically better to be in a position to hit at Iceni territory. I assumed that was all about raising Silchesters profile with no evidence but a town fire.
Safely ditching refugees, I doubt he would have waited for them, if they could keep up, fine if they couldn't they would have headed to south or west to effect an escape, i doubt London or St Albans put up a fight and could have been taken down by a few hundred rioters.
But this is all pointless speculation, Radio 4 will be revealing the truth on New Years Eve at 14:02 hrs (Punt PI)
About this Board
The History message boards are now closed. They remain visible as a matter of record but the opportunity to add new comments or open new threads is no longer available. Thank you all for your valued contributions over many years.
or 聽to take part in a discussion.
The message board is currently closed for posting.
The message board is closed for posting.
This messageboard is .
Find out more about this board's
Search this Board
麻豆约拍 iD
麻豆约拍 navigation
麻豆约拍 links
麻豆约拍 漏 2014 The 麻豆约拍 is not responsible for the content of external sites. Read more.
This page is best viewed in an up-to-date web browser with style sheets (CSS) enabled. While you will be able to view the content of this page in your current browser, you will not be able to get the full visual experience. Please consider upgrading your browser software or enabling style sheets (CSS) if you are able to do so.