Wars and ConflictsÌý permalink
It is January 1943...
This discussion has been closed.
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Message 1.Ìý
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Friday, 13th May 2011
.. the battle of Stalingrad has been won by the Russians and lost by the Germans. You have been appointed adviser to Hitler. What strategy do you suggest?
If you suggest surrender, you will be shot. -
Message 2
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 13th May 2011
.. the battle of Stalingrad has been won by the Russians and lost by the Germans. You have been appointed adviser to Hitler. What strategy do you suggest? Ìý
Immediately pull out the entire Army Group South westward across Don and count your lucky stars. This would be promptly done just in the nick of time, by the way. Stalingrad was likely designed as a diversionary operation to allow Zhukov's forces an ill-conceived drive toward Rzhev. The latter wound up as a horrendous waste of time, life and assets. If Zhukov attacked Rostov instead, many in both OKW and RKKA General Staff would later agree that the Army Group South could be sacked and Wehrmacht front could completely collapse. -
Message 3
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Friday, 13th May 2011
What will you do when you pull back to the Don? Wait for Soviet forces to build up and then hit you with a hammer-blow? Or do you expect to stregthen the German army and renew the offensive?
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Message 4
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 13th May 2011
What will you do when you pull back to the Don? Wait for Soviet forces to build up and then hit you with a hammer-blow? Or do you expect to stregthen the German army and renew the offensive?Ìý
Short of developing some super weapon - like nuclear bomb, for example - ahead of the allies, there was nothing Wehrmacht could possibly do to reverse the fortune. Hitler had begun the campaign under the most favorable circumstances, with the near complete collapse of RKKA in June - October of 1941. Yet, with Stalin's regime managing to stay on - partly because of Hitler's own hateful ideology - it would be all downhill from there. -
Message 5
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Friday, 13th May 2011
The historical response was a move towards greater mobilization of the German economy and streamlining of the production efforts -- despite their reputation, the Nazis were notoriously inefficient and wasteful in their armaments production. Among other things, Hitler doubled the already high targets for tank production. This did meet a real need, as the Panzer divisions on the Eastern Front had been badly reduced by attrition. There was also an increase in the production of combat aircraft.
But bad news rarely comes alone... In the spring, the axis suffered another defeat in Tunisia (which resulted in the loss of as many men as Stalingrad), and even more crucially, Doenitz had to admit defeat in the Atlantic and withdraw his U-boats. The RAF heavy bomber force finally had acquired the strength and technology to hit hard against industry targets in the Ruhr, and in the second half of 1943 they managed to halt the increase in German armaments output, although they did not actually decrease it. To make it even more complicated, German planners now had to prepare for an Allied invasion of Western Europe as well, which could be expected in 1944.
In the circumstances, the only realistic option left to the Wehrmacht was to switch to a defensive posture behind a shorter front line, and await Soviet offensives with mobile forces behind the lines, trying to counter-attack at the moment of their highest vulnerability. Giving priority to the conservation of their armed forces, instead of the conservation of territory, would have been sensible. However, such a plan would have angered Hitler nearly as much as a proposal to surrender, and it would have achieved only a temporary stabilization of the front. That also applies for the necessary concentration of aircraft production on fighters for the defense of Germany against the Allied bomber offensive, which he resisted for another year.
Certainly operation Zitadelle, the German offensive against Kursk, was a massive blunder, as the forces that had been built up at high cost were thrown into an operation that would consume them through heavy attrition. And that at a time when it became increasingly difficult to replace them. -
Message 6
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Saturday, 14th May 2011
The brilliant general Guderian expressed disapproval of the Kursk operation, and Hitler actually seemed to agree with him saying "I know, it makes me sick to the stomach". However had this been successful it would have pinched off a huge bulge in the Russian lines and maybe captured millions of prisoners. In fact it ended not in defeat for the Germans but a kind of stalemate (amazing considering how outnumbered the Germans were) and Hitler called it off, the broader outcome being that Germans failed to stall the Russian advance.
In a situation where you are outnumbered and trying to play for time (and Germany was developing new weapons, as Hitler said, such as the V2 and the jet fighter) I would say that the only way is to set up a series of strongpoints, on high hills (if there are any in Russia) maybe based on dense cities, supplied from the air. If dug in, it can take a huge amount of time and energy to overcome such strongpoints. I give the example of Monte Cassino. The Germans held on to that for fully 4 months, and the allies could only overwhelm it at the price of 55,000 casualties, 3 times as many as the Germans suffered.
There would have been a need for a lot more aircraft to ensure the strongpoints were supplied.
Air transport could have been important on the front line. Where there are 2 opposing armies arrayed either side of a front line, the side that can move its forces around quickly can have the advantage, because it can quickly build up force numbers at one point and punch through the line and go round in a loop back to its own line and capture enemy forces Making gliders and using paratroopers might have been the cheapest way of moving soldiers around. -
Message 7
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 14th May 2011
Making gliders and using paratroopers might have been the cheapest way of moving soldiers around.Ìý
This kind of tactics can only work with substantial air superiority, which Luftwaffe had effectively lost for good by 1943. Add to the mix Hitler's hopeless situation in terms of strategic supplies. In fact, Hitler's Munitions chief Dr. Fritz Todt had said that the war was lost in economic terms as early as at the end of 1941. -
Message 8
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Saturday, 14th May 2011
Monte Cassino indeed was a serious obstacle, but conditions on the mountaineous spine of Italy were very different than those in the plains of Russia, were there were some obstacles (and a shortage of good roads) but otherwise plenty of room to manouevre. The problems with a series of strongpoints are insurmountable. Hitler advocated it in some form, or at least he advocated holding on to "fortified" (usually on paper only) major cities for prestige reasons, but it didn't work.
The German army simply wasn't large enough to built a chain of strongpoints across the front that would have been both strong enough to defend themselves and closely enough spaced to deny the Russians the ability to maneuver through the gaps. The forces holding such a strongpoint would have little mobility, because mobile forces in such a position would have been impossible to supply and frankly wasted, and that also means that the strongpoint did not represent much of a threat to the enemy rear and could be safely bypassed. The Russian first echelon could move on, leaving the mopping-up to the second echelon. The German army, weakened by the absence of the units trapped behind enemy lines, then still faced a major battle.
The French did something similar in the summer of 1940, in the final phase of the battle for France, by organizing fortified positions that would be held on to by an all-round defense even if bypassed. While the men that held these positions fought bravely, that didn't stop the German tanks from racing past and going wherever they wanted.
Hitler was notoriously negligent in logistics, but even if he had cared more about it, there is no way Germany could afford the fleet of transport aircraft needed to supply such positions for a significant time. As experience at Stalingrad demonstrated, airfields in a small pocket are under enemy artillery fire, while airdrops were a too inefficient method of supply. And even if the Germans had had enough fighters, which they didn't, it would have been extremely difficult to convoy a mass of slow and vulnerable transport aircraft, over entirely predictable routes, to a goal behind the enemy lines.
As for Germany developing new weapons -- don't forget the B-29, Gloster Meteor, P-80, and the nuclear bomb. And the Allies had the means to produce these in significant numbers, the trained men to operate them, and the fuel to run them. Too many people have been misled by the mystique of the V-weapons: Hitler was deluding himself by thinking that time would return the technogical advantage to the Nazis, after they had unwittingly done so much to lose it. -
Message 9
Posted by SDG (U2050287) on Monday, 16th May 2011
Negotiated Withdrawal from France and negotiate a Deal with the western Allies about jointly combating Communism.
After all we don't dislike the French the way we despise the Soviets. France is an old a worthy enemy (future ally fingers crossed) the soviets on the other hand are .....................
In return Assist the USA and Britain in securing an End to the Pacific Campaign against the Japanese. (hopefully negotiated they are an ally after all).
And hope and pray it works.
NB.
It is widely accepted that the main reason the Nazis Launched The Ardennes Offensive/ Von Rundstedt Offensive commonly called the Battle of the Bulge, was to try and force a ceasefire in the West in order to concentrate on the Eastern Front. -
Message 10
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 16th May 2011
Negotiated Withdrawal from France and negotiate a Deal with the western Allies about jointly combating Communism.Ìý This course of action was actually the intention by SS General Karl Wolff who engaged Allen Dulles in order to negotiate a deal of the kind. I don't think Hitler could possibly be in on this, though.
After all we don't dislike the French the way we despise the Soviets.Ìý That is debatable, as far as Hitler is concerned. If - as is the popular belief here - Mein Kampf is the guide, Hitler explicitly named France the enemy number one. -
Message 11
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Monday, 16th May 2011
As the Western Allies would not have been prepared for an invasion for at least another year, it might possibly have been practical to remove most forces from the West to the Eastern front, and dressed it up as a diplomatic "expression of goodwill" to the West. Of course, it would have been virtually impossible to persuade Hitler to do this. His happiest memory was probably the taking of the French surrender in the rail car. At the same time, the Nazis, with their stupid and evil racism, did regard the Russians as inherently beneath contempt, sub-human. This was probably one factor in their ultimate defeat. When the Germans entered Soviet Russia there were subjects of Stalin who were ready to fight for the German side, until they saw their wanton cruelty. The Nazi ideology explains why they invaded Russia, and why they were defeated.
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Message 12
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Monday, 16th May 2011
fascinating
I am not sure just how practical it might have been to remove the bulk of German forces from France - for economic rather than purely military reasons..
As at the end of the 1WW the Armistice terms became something of an issue. In the summer of 1940 the French had little option- but they signed up to Armistice terms that they seem to have assumed would not last long- hence exasperation in some quarters that the British were intransigent and would not negotiate with Hitler on any terms.
So the French were treaty bound to "hire" a German occupying force of something like 200,000 men (?) and to supply Germany with a whole list of foodstuffs, goods and materials on an ongoing basis as long as the war went on.
Withdrawing the German troops would have been an indication that Germany accepted that they were no longer necessary- and therefore that it would be unreasonable to make the French pay for a "service" that they did not need. And just how much of the "payment in kind" the French would have produced in the absence of the German forces is difficult to calculate.. The French were not famous for hard work when unsupervised and -overseen. And the attack on the Soviet Union had totally reversed the position of the French Communists, so important in "organised Labour"- and those kind of policies and practices that were associated in Britain with the career of Ned Ludd.
Cass -
Message 13
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 17th May 2011
fascinating:
I would say that the only way is to set up a series of strongpoints, on high hills (if there are any in Russia) maybe based on dense cities, supplied from the air. If dug in, it can take a huge amount of time and energy to overcome such strongpoints ...
There would have been a need for a lot more aircraft to ensure the strongpoints were supplied.
Air transport could have been important on the front line. Where there are 2 opposing armies arrayed either side of a front line, the side that can move its forces around quickly can have the advantage, because it can quickly build up force numbers at one point and punch through the line and go round in a loop back to its own line and capture enemy forces Making gliders and using paratroopers might have been the cheapest way of moving soldiers around.Ìý
Goering promised Hitler he could resupply the Sixth Army in Stalingrad. -
Message 14
Posted by slippybee (U14590417) on Wednesday, 18th May 2011
Agreed.
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Message 15
Posted by SDG (U2050287) on Saturday, 21st May 2011
That is debatable, as far as Hitler is concerned. If - as is the popular belief here - Mein Kampf is the guide, Hitler explicitly named France the enemy number oneÌý
Hmmm.
The French were enemy number one because Hitler was of the mindset that the Germans were unfairly treated after the end of the Great War (WW1). And so the defeat of France can be viewed as a righting of a past wrong.
It may also be seen in the context of a threat to Britain and its Empire as France was widely percived at the time to have one of if not the best Army(s) in the world.
Whereas the battle with USSR and Eastern European peoples was Ideologically and Racially motivated. -
Message 16
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Saturday, 21st May 2011
SDG
The Franco-German hostility went back at least to the Thirty Years War when French intervention in German affairs was a direct cause in the estimated death or injuring of 30% of the population of the German plains.. It left a legacy that made Frederick the Great and Prussia Britain's ally in the wars against Bourbon France, and the invasion and conquest of much of Germany by Revolutionary France was one of the most important "kick-start" motives for the Prussian Revolution that produced a resurgent Prussia whose forces were co-victors at Waterloo.
It was in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles that the existence of a new German Empire was proclaimed after the Prussian led forces had humiliated France in the war of 1870-71 and really ended French claims to be the ascendant power on the European mainland.. By 1914 the French had been waiting for a "re-match" for over 40 years, in order to "put the record straight".
As for Russia, Hitler's scheme for Lebensraum placed the people of the Soviet Union on the same level- in Hitler's scheme of things- as the "inferior peoples" whose "wide open spaces" in the wider world had been seized by other Western Imperialistic powers- and Germany until it lost its quickly acquired overseas Empire at the Versailles Treaties.
What we can see from the German extermination policies of French Black regiments like the Senegalese was that the German policy was not to treat such people as "enemies" . Rather like the Jesse Owens situation in the Berlin Olympics, such people should have not been any kind of competition for a German Master Race. But, of course, both the Anglo-Saxons and the Franks were Teutonic races- and therefore a more serious long-term proposition- should they ever overthrow the diseases of decadence that had undermined German greatness- until the Nazi Revolution.
Cass -
Message 17
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Monday, 23rd May 2011
Hitler's scheme for Lebensraum placed the people of the Soviet Union on the same level- in Hitler's scheme of things- as the "inferior peoples" whose "wide open spaces" in the wider world had been seized by other Western Imperialistic powers-Ìý
Hitler's beliefs and policies were much worse than that of the Western imperial powers. He did not only believe that Russians (Slavs) were inferior, he called them unterminchen which I think means "sub-human" ie not quite human. His policy was to exterminate those people to give the Germans space to live. Though Western imperialists sought to seize land and rule their subject peoples, there was rarely a government policy of actual outright extermination (though people on the ground, for example in Australia, might act to do that). -
Message 18
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Monday, 23rd May 2011
fascinating
Yes. I think that we are very much in agreement..
Hitler seems to have taken many of his ideas from the magazine "Ostara" written by Dr Lanz that was popular with German troops on the Western Front..
Lanz argued that mankind was not descended from the apes, apes were descended from the pure creation that started with Adam. So the "tree of evolution" as designed by late Victorian racist evolutionists was too optimistic... There was no real progress merely the reverse: and Western Civilization was making the mistake of trying to treat the "inferior races" as potential equals to be enlightened.
They were not to be simply exterminated but rather worked to death, as Nazis could argue had been done to the Amerindians by the Spanish Empire, and then African slaves in the Americas- and in late nineteenth century Imperialism- the races in the wider world.
Even the Jews were to be worked to death- until the Thousand Year Reich looked like not lasting that long- and the decision was made to speed up the Final Solution.
Cass -
Message 19
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Monday, 23rd May 2011
They were not to be simply exterminated but rather worked to death, as Nazis could argue had been done to the Amerindians by the Spanish Empire, and then African slaves in the Americas- and in late nineteenth century Imperialism- the races in the wider worldÌý
The Nazi policy was different, it was to eliminate the population, many would have been worked to death but many not. Slavery has been present in many societies for thousands of years and of course involved working individuals to death, but the intention was not to eliminate those races, and anyway slavery was abolished in 1832. -
Message 20
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Monday, 23rd May 2011
fascinating
I did say that the Nazis could say that-- not that is was true.. They would probably have argued that they were doing it better, with a clearer objective- that of saving Western Civilization- and were doing it much more scientifically.. By the mid-thirties neutritionists had worked out how many calories were needed for different kinds of lifestyle, and the Nazis made sure that those that they chose to work to death were fed just enough- at the appropriate expense- to make sure that the Reich could extract what useful Labour that it could out of them.
But the Amerindians were so nearly exterminated that it was necessary to find another source of Labour. And the abolition of the slave trade and slavery had very little to do with saving Africans and African-Americans from extinction.
Cass -
Message 21
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Tuesday, 24th May 2011
The French did something similar in the summer of 1940, in the final phase of the battle for France, by organizing fortified positions that would be held on to by an all-round defense even if bypassed. While the men that held these positions fought bravely, that didn't stop the German tanks from racing past and going wherever they wanted.Ìý
I'm sure I read somewhere that had this been implemented earlier then it would probably have been a successful counter to the blitzkrieg tactics. The French strongpoints were close enough together to support each other and cut off the logistics of the German tanks which could be isolated from their infantry and supplies.
What killed the hedgehog defence tactic was the inability of the French to organise the counter-attacks against the German tanks or to properly garrison and equip the strongpoints.
The Germans did in fact have limited success with it against the Russians
though again only on a limited front. Not something which the Germans were capable of running across the entire front. -
Message 22
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Tuesday, 24th May 2011
Cass, you are evidently trying to claim that Nazi ideology was a logical extension of certain practices that had been a feature of Western Civilisation. I think you are wrong. If the Nazis claimed they were protecting Western Civilisation, I would view it as empty propaganda, their policies were self-serving, more than anything, that is the key to understanding what they did. It could well be argued that Nazi activities were not that much different than, say, the activities of certain rulers in the past eg emperor Hadrian who oversaw the wholesale destruction of Israel. However there are other instances throughout history of such widespread violence, including non-Western civilisations.
The treatment of the native Americans does not fall in the same category because at least there was some provision for extensive reservations, very different from a policy of extermination. And the slave trade was abolished to prevent cruelty and death. -
Message 23
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 24th May 2011
Cass,
But the Amerindians were so nearly exterminated that it was necessary to find another source of Labour. Ìý
Although many Amerinidans in both North and South America died from European diseases, British colonists and their American descendants never used them as slave labor. -
Message 24
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Tuesday, 24th May 2011
The treatment of the native Americans does not fall in the same category because at least there was some provision for extensive reservations, very different from a policy of extermination.Ìý
Hitler himself remarked that in the conquered east, the German immigrants would "look upon the natives as Redskins." Actually it was not that simple, as centuries of migration and immigration in Eastern Europe had mixed populations that had never been very dissimilar in the first place, and Nazi "scientists" thus struggled to racially classify the people of the conquered territories. The vastness of the area and the shortage of German immigrants encouraged even Hitler to consider "re-Germanizing" suitable Ukrainians and Russians. A complex adminstration complete with appeal courts was set up to "classify" candidates (not always voluntarily) according to their level of Germanness, on a scale from 1 to 4.
As for the remaining "non-Germanic" population, even radical Nazi theorists were daunted by the practical problems of exterminating such a large population, and usually preferred to think in terms of large scale deportation, shifting 40 to 50 million people into Siberia...
Various Nazi institutions projected competing plans for the German settlement of the east, one more grandiose and absurd than the other. Some plans envisaged the total ethnic cleansing of the conquered areas, others imagined the subjugated populations working under SS control to produce food and materials. Even within the SS, critics pointed out that the plan to fill this vast space with German farming settlements (Himmler and Speer spent a lot of time on the design of model villages) was as impossible as it was anachronistic. The big irony was that as the regime struggled to find German settlers for the east, it was simultaneously importing large numbers of non-German slave labourers into Germany, highlighting the absurdity of the concept of a racially pure state. -
Message 25
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Tuesday, 24th May 2011
Thanks MM, that is really quite informative.
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Message 26
Posted by George1507 (U2607963) on Wednesday, 25th May 2011
In the spring, the axis suffered another defeat in Tunisia (which resulted in the loss of as many men as Stalingrad)
Ìý
This isn't really true. The British and western allies have talked up the victory in the Western Desert. In reality, the Germans lost 750K of their best troops at Stalingrad, either killed, severely wounded or captured. Tunisia was another decisive defeat for the Axis, but it was nowhere near as decisive as Stalingrad. The allies captured 275K Axis troops - many of them Italians.
Stalingrad was arguably the turning point of the war in Europe, both psychologically and militarily. That can't be said of Tunisia. -
Message 27
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 25th May 2011
In reality, the Germans lost 750K of their best troops at StalingradÌý Wehrmacht forces destroyed at Stalingrad contained significant Italian, Hungarian and Romanian contingents - not the most reliable forces to hold the line under the circumstances by a long shot. Arguably, the best Wehrmacht troops and the best assets had been initially assigned to the Army Group Center mounting the main thrust of the Barbarossa campaign.
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Message 28
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Thursday, 26th May 2011
Wehrmacht forces destroyed at Stalingrad contained significant Italian, Hungarian and Romanian contingents - not the most reliable forces to hold the line under the circumstances by a long shot. Ìý
The Soviets knew this and specifically targetted them during the initial stages of Operation Uranus. Some German officers on the spot thought Romanian soldiers were actually quite good, but very badly led and hopelessly equipped. -
Message 29
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Thursday, 26th May 2011
Wehrmacht forces destroyed at Stalingrad contained significant Italian, Hungarian and Romanian contingentsÌý
And besides those, also a contingent of locally recruited "volunteers" (Hilfswilligen), perhaps 20,000 strong.
Anyway, I think it is entirely reasonable to add to the about 275,000 men encircled in Stalingrad (of which perhaps 240,000 Germans) also the forces destroyed during the Soviet counter-offensive (Operation Uranus), which struck at the relatively weak armies that held the flanks. But 750,000 seems too much -- that would imply the loss of the entire Axis strength in the region. -
Message 30
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Sunday, 19th June 2011
Having thought about it again, I consider that the most important thing for Germany to do in January 1943 was to realise how desperate the situation had become. On the other hand, D-day was still over a year away and so there may have been some scope to withdraw forces from the West and send them to the East, also do a new call up in Germany and maybe raise half a million more men, if possible. I believe this might have been enough to make all the difference at Kursk, for example. That would not have been sufficient to prevent the ongoing build up of Soviet forces, the Wermacht was doomed to a lingering defeat unless it could actually renew its offensive, that's why it needed to find more armed forces from somewhere, to produce a new blitzkreig which would take Moscow - a tall order.
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Message 31
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Sunday, 19th June 2011
Replying to a couple of points addressed to me:
(a) The recent post started by Shivfan explores the continuities between Nazism and the thrust of Western Civilization in the period 1870-1914. Whatever the view of Hitler there already existed a strong conviction within Germany before 1914 that Germany was ripe for world leadership- and after all Marx was a great example of Germanic Historicity- and the rise of the Nazi government in Germany in the midst of world chaos of 1932-33 that threatened to bring down Western Civilization into a new Dark Age was portrayed at least by the Nazis as Germany mapping out a future that avoided the traps of the "Judaio-Christian tradition".
The whole idea of a "Master Race" was predicated on that belief that had developed in nineteenth century Germany that really the times called for Supermen and not just men, if the human race was to survive. Hitler and the Nazis were particularly obsessive about the disproprtionate role and importance of Jewish writers, intellectuals, academics, "professionals", and artists in a Western Civilization which had not only seen a great boom in all of those, but along with that a great amount of financial speculation and boom and bust, leading to suspicions of market manipulation by financial institutions in which national interests often suffered- but the international connections of Jewish bankers- a natural consequence of the Jewish diaspora, and the cultural traditions that kept it alive- seemed to guarantee that in this game of winners and losers somewhere Jewish financiers would always come out OK.
These points are all- to my mind- relevant food for thought as we try to navigate our way through the new threat of descent into World Chaos and find very powerful grass-roots movements that are very hostile to the current financial system and "bankers". As I have written elsewhere, as we face the threat of massive populist social and economic unrest it is interesting to look back from 2011 to 1911.
(b) My remark about the extermination of the Amerinidian populations and the resort to African labour referred to the period when the colonisation of the Americas was a purely Iberian affair. By the time that the NW Europeans began to plant colonies in North America that change had already happened: and there were many factors in the very different and smaller-scale nature of that Imperialism- not least the absence of great empires with sources of bullion wealth that encouraged the replacing of existing large empires with a European dominated one in order to exploit the gold and silver mines.
But the whole story of the "Pilgrim Fathers" was greatly facilitated by the fact that they were approached in Cod Bay by an Amerindian who had been captured as a slave, as sometimes happened with the European boats that visited the region. In his case "Tisquanto" had been brought to Elizabethan England and had a reasonable oral command of the English language, and, morevover- back in his native land- feelings about the English that made him attach himself to the would be colonists and teach them how to survive with local knowledge. He stayed with them as an invaluable aid, especially in dealing with the surrounding Amerindian tribes, until his death.
Cass -
Message 32
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 19th June 2011
D-day was still over a year away and so there may have been some scope to withdraw forces from the West and send them to the East, also do a new call up in Germany and maybe raise half a million more men, if possible. I believe this might have been enough to make all the difference at Kursk, for example.Ìý
The real and crippling problem for Hitler was ever dwindling strategic supplies at the time. Practically all supply routes by sea were cut off by the allies. It meant increasing shortages of oil, first and foremost. Germany managed to produce synthetic fuel for tanks, but Luftwaffe needed high octane fuel that could only be extracted from natural oil. To visualize the effect of that, at the end of the war, allies observed hundreds of fighter planes piled up next to production lines unable to fly anywhere. -
Message 33
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 19th June 2011
There was sufficient awareness in Berlin that the situation was bad, and the historical reaction was in line with what you propose they should have done. In January 1943, the regime reorganized the industry to boost the war output and ordered registration of the entire population in labour exchanges. Part of the resources were funneled into the "Adolf Hitler Panzer Program", which essentially aimed to double armour output, to rebuild fighting strength on the Eastern front. To a minor extent this was to be achieved by increasing tank output, but the largest increase was expected from the tripling of the planned production of "Sturmgeschutze" and other turret-less armoured vehicles, which were easier and cheaper to build. While not all goals were achieved, this effort enabled the build-up of the German forces before the battle of Kursk: Armoured vehicle production increased by 94% in 1943. However, even that was not enough to keep up with the Soviets. Guderian and Speer, who were accountable for this effort, both opposed the offensive at Kursk on the grounds that the battle would result in the loss of much of the regained strength.
There were limiting factors which prevented a more rapid build-up, of which the most fundamental one was steel production, which in turn was dependent on coal. By diverting resources away from the civilan economy, armaments production could be and was increased, but German production capacity was still fundamentally limited by availability of coal and ore, and the occupied countries could contribute little because they had mostly been net importers. The absurd choice German planners had was between making guns or ammunition; they could not produce both in sufficient quantity. (Hence by early 1944 nearly half the artillery was captured foreign equipment.) The quality of the output was also adversely affected by the shortage of metals needed to make high-strength alloys, such as nickel and manganese. A further handicap was the proximity of the Ruhr to England: In March 43 the RAF began a bombing offensive that lasted throughout the summer and caused a serious shortfall in steel output.
Under these circumstances, even an all-out production effort could not match Soviet production. Another, and more avoidable, problem was created by the callous attitude displayed, primarily by Hitler, towards the units already at the front. To maintain their strength, it was essential to be able to take them out of the frontline on a regular basis to allow the men some rest, to absorb new materiel and recruits, and to give proper attention to maintenance. Instead the high command displayed a tendency to "burn up" divisions to complete destruction, in the worst case by ordering them to hold surrounded, so-called fortified positions. Besides combat losses, lack of transport equipment and spare parts forced units to abandon or cannibalize equipment. Replacement units, lacking sufficiently experienced cadres and enough training, would erode away even faster. That then lead to a permanent shortage, which then made it nearly impossible to take units out of the frontline. -
Message 34
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Sunday, 19th June 2011
MM, thanks for that, you obviously know the subject better than me - do you think that they could have moved men and materiel from the West, sufficient to make a difference in the East?
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Message 35
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 19th June 2011
Germany managed to produce synthetic fuel for tanks, but Luftwaffe needed high octane fuel that could only be extracted from natural oil.Ìý
That is not entirely accurate... Throughout the war most German aviation fuel was also synthetic, extracted from coal by the Bergius process. The biggest production plants were at Leuna and Poelitz. Romanian oil refineries also produced some aviation fuel, but 80% to 90% of aviation fuel supplies were synthetic. Considerations of fuel quality actually drove the Luftwaffe towards the use of synthetic fuel, as well as the desire to be independent of imports.
It may be true that lack of natural oil sources resulted in the bulk of the available fuel being B4, of 87 octane only, with only a modest supply of high-octane C3.
On the other hand, the Luftwaffe seems to have been slow to understand the benefits of higher octane fuels, crucially slower than the RAF. -
Message 36
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 19th June 2011
It may be true that lack of natural oil sources resulted in the bulk of the available fuel being B4, of 87 octane only, with only a modest supply of high-octane C3Ìý As far as I know, with the existing at the time technology, synthetic fuel was produced in stages: first, liquid fuel with 40-45 octane from coal; and then the addition of significant proportion of tetraethyl lead increased octane to 70-74. To increase octane beyond that range, they'd probably have to mix it with the light oil products. And for the latter, they'd have to import oil or the said light oil product in any case.
-
Message 37
Posted by Michael Alexander Kearsley (U1675895) on Sunday, 19th June 2011
It turned out that Germany had been developing a V3 that would have had a much longer range than the V2, Germany was getting closer to developing an ICBM. The only thing they could do really was frustrate the Allied attempts at landing in Normandy to give them time to develop the V3, Hitler insisted on D Day on holding back the Panzers with which he could have driven the Allies back into the sea.
Possibly Germany at that point needed to invade Italy, if they could stop the Allies landing in the west then that relieves the pressure diverting from the Eastern Front. Once the Allies landed in the South and West they were able to race across to Berlin. Then again once the US developed atomic bombs they would have used them mainly against Germany, development was slow but a couple of atomic bombs a fortnight would have had quite a devestating effect, Germany's only response ICBMs with conventional warheads, maybe Germany could have fitted them with chemical or biological warheads. Maybe Germany could have delayed defeat into 1946, perhaps Admiral Donitz taking over could have negociated a ceasefire on the Western Front in exchange for purging the Nazis and trying and executing those involved in running the Final Solution and in other acts of genocide, allowing them to focus on the fight against the USSR in the East and maybe accept a return to pre-war German borders in exchange for a ceasefire on the East. Japan would have been defeated anyway. -
Message 38
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Monday, 20th June 2011
As far as I know, with the existing at the time technology, synthetic fuel was produced in stages: first, liquid fuel with 40-45 octane from coal; and then the addition of significant proportion of tetraethyl lead increased octane to 70-74.Ìý
That, apparently, is correct as far as the Fischer-Tropsch process is concerned; which is why these plants could not produce aviation fuel. But the Bergius hydrogenation process produced an output with a 78-79 octane rating. Besides addition of TEL (Speer remarked that the Allies failed to target the vulnerable ethyl plants), the Germans blended this with synthetic iso-octane and later with alkylates to produce aviation fuel.
A large volume of interesting documents can be found at . Look in Primary Documents, Government Reports, for the results of the wartime and post-war studies of German fuel production... The reports from the "Ministry of Fuel and Power" appear to contain most technical detail. -
Message 39
Posted by rhmnney (U14528380) on Monday, 20th June 2011
In the USA in early 1955 I read that the US government had sued the Standard Oil Company to divulge the German patented process of producing high octane gasoline, the government sued on or around the start of WW2.
A Columnist was trashing the Standard Oil Company of past business practices. The article stated that US pursuit aircraft at that time were at a disadvantage, as their engines were operation at a compression ratio of about 8.4 to 1 whereas with the new 'Cracking' process the compression could be raised much higher thus increasing their speed.
Standard Oil refused as that would violate the patent rights, and they could be sued by the patent holder.
During WW2 in Britain a popular German song was being commercially played in Britain and the British government collected the copyright fees for same. Many people were disgusted, the Germans being enemies, however the British government honored the German copyright.
Good Business Ethics?
This was all news to me, but it seemed Standard Oil was producing high octane gasoline at that time, but the article did not state for whom. -
Message 40
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 20th June 2011
A large volume of interesting documents can be found at www.fischer-tropsch..... Look in Primary Documents, Government Reports, for the results of the wartime and post-war studies of German fuel production... Ìý Thanks. Good stuff.
-
Message 41
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 20th June 2011
In the USA in early 1955 I read that the US government had sued the Standard Oil Company to divulge the German patented process of producing high octane gasoline, the government sued on or around the start of WW2.Ìý This looks a bit strange to me. 'Trading with the Enemy Act' was on the books, and, as far as I know, FDR was not shy using it.
-
Message 42
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Monday, 20th June 2011
surorovetz
I assumed that this story involved the complications associated with a multi-national corporation.. During the French Revolutionary War the firm of John Wilkinson of "Iron Mad" fame, made ordinance in England for the British army and navy, while the Wilkinson plant in France did so for them.
Actually going back to questions of German atomic research, Jacob Bronowski, who was in the know about these things, as his daughter's recent TV programme showed, includes in "The Ascent of Man", details about Leo Slizard's involvement in the research project, both initially in Germany and then in Britain. JB ascribed to Slizard's authorship the letter that was sent under Einstein's signature to the White House with evident inside information about the successful "following in the footsteps" that was being accomplished with Nazi occupied territory, with the very real prospect that the explosive potential of atomic research might be realized by the Germans before the Allies. The letter urged that such essential research should not be left to the financial limitations of university science departments. And it was successful.
A subsequent letter sent once the War in Europe had been won without recourse to the A Bomb- urging that its use was no longer necessary- was less successful leading to the controversy over its use against the Japanese when the Japanese were no longer really capable of threatening foreign countries with such "vengeance weapons".
Cass -
Message 43
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 20th June 2011
I assumed that this story involved the complications associated with a multi-national corporationÌý I understand this, Cass. But language in the Act is pretty strong, granting the government sweeping powers in this regard. Moreover, FDR in particular was not known for conservative - or should I say, cautious - interpretation of his legal authority.
-
Message 44
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Monday, 20th June 2011
The story appears a bit unlikely to me, and not just because in wartime the US government could override patent law. (In WWI it did this for the aviation patents of the Wrights and others, thus forcibly ending a long dispute.)
Daniel Whitney in "Vees for Victory", his excellent history of the Allisson V-1710 engine, writes that catalytically cracked fuels were already in use prior to Pearl Harbour -- in US cars. It was not in used in aircraft, but that was because the authorities rejected it for aviation use, not because the oil companies would not sell it. The problem was that the large fraction of aromatics in it attacked the aircraft's fuel lines and self-sealing fuel tanks: Some re-engineering was required to make fuel systems fully compatible.
And that "cracked" fuels were not in use does not mean there was no 100 octane, just that all of it (including the fuel supplied to the RAF before the Battle of Britain) was produced by blending gasoline with additives. Jimmy Doolittle is credited for influencing Shell to start producing 100-octane fuel, when he managed their aviation fuel department before WWII. But that was a more expensive process that could not generate enough fuel for the rapidly expanding USAAF.
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