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Hasse鈥檚 unlikely ally?
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Message 1.聽
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 10th March 2011
Mark Solonin could be just the guy. Hasse, who I haven鈥檛 seen around here for a while, and I used to argue about the ramifications of the timing of Barbarossa launch. He particularly insisted that, even if Red Army General Staff鈥檚 plan Groza had been implemented first, Wehrmacht would repulse the Red Army offensive. The rarely, if ever, mentioned war between USSR and Finland 鈥 not the Winter War of December 1939 through March 1940, but the 2nd war of June 1941 through September 1944 鈥 鈥減rovides a unique possibility for observing the Red Army of 1941 under favorable conditions, whereas mobilized in advance forces launch combat operations at the time of their choosing in accordance with plans developed by their command and against the enemy equipped with comparatively inferior assets.鈥 The phrase in parenthesis is a snippet from a preface of Mark Solonin鈥檚 book 鈥楯une 25th. Foolishness or Aggression?鈥 This refers to disastrous attempts by Soviet air force to destroy Finnish air force on June 25-26 1941 and subsequent and similarly disastrous ground attacks launched by Northern Front of the Red Army on July 2, 1941 against Finnish positions. Meticulously analyzed by Solonin Directive of June 24, 1941, issued by the Red Army Stavka GV, effectively started the 2nd Soviet-Finnish war. This Directive 鈥渟temmed from tremendous incompetence, as well as amazing mix of paranoia and unfounded underestimation of the opponent.鈥 (M. Solonin). Yet, in my opinion, the analysis somewhat undermines the 鈥榩reface鈥 premise about favorable conditions, if only because of the severe shock of obviously unexpected Wehrmacht attack of June 22 and unraveling collapse of the Western Front.
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Message 2
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 12th March 2011
A couple of more fascinating quotes detailing this ill-advised and ill-fated offensive operation:
"Reports from 'trusted sources,' based on which mysterious directive by Stavka GvK of June 24 would be issued, came very far from Leningrad and Murmansk, where Northern Front and Northern Fleet staffs were. Simply put, the "trusted sources" were located in Moscow. Neither Northern Front command, nor Northern Fleet command traced non-existent in reality enemy ground and air forces build-up; and neither prepared to counter mythical attacks. Meanwhile, High Command demonstrates obvious professional inadequacy.鈥 (Mark Solonin, June25. Foolishness or Aggression?)
鈥溾n June 21, 1941 Politburo of Central Committee appoints General Meretskov its authorized representative on the Northern Front, and he immediately departs to Leningrad. On June23, 1941, on the second day of the war [with Germany], Stavka GvK [High Command Staff] is created. In addition to Stavka, the institute of 鈥減ermanent advisors to Stavka鈥 is created. Meretskov made the cut along with such trusted by Stalin people as Molotov, Beria, Shaposhnikov, Zhdanov, Kulik, Malenkov and Mehlis鈥 On June23 [on the same day, apparently] Meretskov is called back to Moscow, and, in several days (the precise date of his arrest is not known), he is turned over to NKGB thugs鈥 In September 1941,Meretskov is released and 鈥 straight from the prison cell 鈥 sent to Karelsky Front, again, as the Stavka representative. " (ibit) -
Message 3
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 13th March 2011
"Reports from 'trusted sources,' based on which mysterious directive by Stavka GvK of June 24 would be issued, came very far from Leningrad and Murmansk, where Northern Front and Northern Fleet staffs were. Simply put, the "trusted sources" were located in Moscow. Neither Northern Front command, nor Northern Fleet command traced non-existent in reality enemy ground and air forces build-up; and neither prepared to counter mythical attacks. Meanwhile, High Command demonstrates obvious professional inadequacy.鈥 (Mark Solonin, June25. Foolishness or Aggression?)
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Message 4
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 13th March 2011
"Reports from 'trusted sources,' based on which mysterious directive by Stavka GvK of June 24 would be issued, came very far from Leningrad and Murmansk, where Northern Front and Northern Fleet staffs were. Simply put, the "trusted sources" were located in Moscow.聽
This is a bit misleading. Soviet intelligence in Helsinki was good, with the diplomatic "charge d'affaires" doubling as NKVD resident. In April, he warned Moscow that German officers were talking of a coming German attack and "inevitable" Finnish participation in the war. In May, he had snippets of war plans which included joint operations between Finnish and German troops, and German attempts to recruit agents in the territories held by the USSR after the Winter War. In early June, his sources reported a partial Finnish mobilization and the arrival of large numbers of German troops. Later in the month, he received warning that Germans and Finns had signed an agreement on the planned attack. Moscow may not have forwarded this to local commanders, as Stalin systematically ignored all warnings, but some very useful intelligence was available.
And the local Soviet command cannot have been entirely unaware of the pending crisis. On June 20, Soviet intelligence noted that of the 36 intrusions by German reconaissance aircraft on that day alone, five had been across the Finnish border. The obvious message was that there were targets for attack on the Soviet side of the border. -
Message 5
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 13th March 2011
This is a bit misleading. Soviet intelligence in Helsinki was good, with the diplomatic "charge d'affaires" doubling as NKVD resident. ... Later in the month, he received warning that Germans and Finns had signed an agreement on the planned attack. Moscow may not have forwarded this to local commanders, as Stalin systematically ignored all warnings, but some very useful intelligence was available.聽
Actually, Solonin compares the Northern Front and Northern Fleet staffs' intelligence with the actual deployment of Finnish forces (there were practically no Wehrmacht forces in Finland at the time). These were by and large accurate, especially as it pertained to areas of their direct responsibilities. I'll get back with some details a bit later.
A key point is, that the Directive of June 24 forced the local command to conduct actions based on faulty intelligence contradicting their local intelligence, with disastrous consequences. Moreover, the air strikes of June 25-26 that were supposedly aimed at destroying Finnish air force and non-existent in Finland Luftwaffe assets were conducted - on Stavka orders - in small bomber groups, without fighter cover, in direct contradiction to the Red Army's own active standard operating procedures PU-39. -
Message 6
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 13th March 2011
Moreover, the air strikes of June 25-26 that were supposedly aimed at destroying Finnish air force and non-existent in Finland Luftwaffe assets were conducted - on Stavka orders - in small bomber groups, without fighter cover, in direct contradiction to the Red Army's own active standard operating procedures PU-39.聽
This is put so sloppily that it may be confusing. Let me modify this:
Moreover, the air strikes of June 25-26 were supposedly aimed at destroying Finnish air force and non-existent in Finland Luftwaffe assets;
and these air strikes were conducted - on Stavka orders - in small bomber groups, without fighter cover, and in direct contradiction to the Red Army's own active at the time standard operating procedures PU-39. -
Message 7
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 13th March 2011
In early June, his sources reported a partial Finnish mobilization and the arrival of large numbers of German troops.聽
Let's start with Luftwaffe, which would be both the main target and the main justification of the attack on Finland forced by the Stavka Directive of June 24, 1941.
"...on the territory of northern [Arctic part of] Finalnd - before June 25, 1941 - Luftwaffe deployed one fighter squadron and one long-range surveyor air craft - 13 active air-craft in all. This air force obviously could not subject Leningrad to "fierce bombardment" (which is what, according to Marshall Novikov, the Soviet command had expected). Not only because fighter planes aren't capable of carrying out such tasks. The distance from Loustari to Leningrad is 1,100 km along the straight line. Messerschmitt Bf-109E did not even have [enough fuel] to carry out a suicidal "one-way" raid..." (M. Solonin, Foolishness or Aggression?) -
Message 8
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 13th March 2011
For operation "Silberfuchs", the German attempt to attack from Finland in the direction of Murmansk and deny the USSR this vital port, the Germans deployed a relatively modest force: A corps of mountain troops, which in this area would have a harder time with the difficult terrain than with the opposition on the ground, although Dietl's men were trained for operations in the Arctic. It was supported by a small detachment from Luftflotte 5, which amounted to a squadron of fighters, bombers and long-range reconaissance units each, and a operational training unit of dive-bombers, for a total of 108 aircraft, of which indeed only 16 fighters. It seems logical that the long-range aicraft remained on bases in Norway. Anyway, they were badly outnumbered by the opposing Soviet force and indeed represented no threat to Leningrad: That wasn't their mission.
That said, the mountaineer corps and a smaller German force further south together amounted to over 40,000 men, obviously intending to move on the offensive. An air strike against the jump-off points of an enemy offensive is doctrinally sound. They had not had the same opportunity as their opponents to scout enemy positions before the battle, and the Soviet air offensive seems to have mostly missed its real targets. But given the perceived precedents of WWII, as they were understood at the time, it was logical enough for the VVS and Northern Fleet to want to get in the first blow. -
Message 9
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 14th March 2011
the mountaineer corps and a smaller German force further south together amounted to over 40,000 men, obviously intending to move on the offensive. An air strike against the jump-off points of an enemy offensive is doctrinally sound. 聽
By June 25, 1941, there were no Wehrmacht troops in southern Finland. Only on June 26th the lone 163th infantry division was ordered to redeploy from Oslo to Joensuu, and it actually crossed the border into Finland only on June 28, i.e., two days after VVS had opened up against its Finnish 鈥渢argets.鈥
They had not had the same opportunity as their opponents to scout enemy positions before the battle聽
I鈥檓 not sure I understand what you鈥檙e trying to say here.
and the Soviet air offensive seems to have mostly missed its real targets聽
That was easy to do, since most of those targets were imaginary.
But given the perceived precedents of WWII, as they were understood at the time, it was logical enough for the VVS and Northern Fleet to want to get in the first blow.聽
This is an interesting point. I鈥檒l quote Solonin again here:
鈥淥n June 23, 1941, instructions aimed at the longest possible postponing of combat actions sent to the Northern Front and Northern Fleet staffs were factually confirmed by orders 鈥渘ot to cross the border by air, nor on the ground; not to conduct any combat actions against Finland until further notice.鈥 [On June 24] somebody briefed Stalin about the information received from the 鈥渢rusted sources鈥 that enormous Luftwaffe force (600 combat aircraft, i.e., even more than those in its entire 1st Fleet) had deployed on Finnish air fields. This 鈥渟omeone鈥 managed to convince Stalin in the reliability of his mysterious 鈥渟ources.鈥 Perhaps, after what had happened on the Western Front on the morning of June 22, it would not be hard to convince Stalin. In the environment of widespread apprehension and chaos descended on Kremlin those days and hours, the decision to 鈥渃onduct a pre-emptive strike against enemy airfields in Finland鈥 was made.鈥 (Ibid) -
Message 10
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 18th March 2011
air strikes of June 25-26 were supposedly aimed at destroying Finnish air force and non-existent in Finland Luftwaffe assets; and these air strikes were conducted - on Stavka orders - in small bomber groups, without fighter cover, and in direct contradiction to the Red Army's own active at the time standard operating procedures PU-39.聽
I find these few things of particular interest:
"In all, apart from the airfields, 12 targets were attacked, particularly, large rail-road stations...; main Finnish Gulf ports...; Helsinki suburbs. If we compare this list to the pre-war Plan of mobilization and deployment cover operation for the Northern Front (aka Leningrad Military District), we'd immediately discover obvious similarity of targets and objectives... Apparently, having received the Directive of June 24 from Stavka GvK, Northern Front VVS command...retrieved pre-war plans from the safe and used those to draw orders for conducting the 鈥榝irst multi-day operation.鈥
... 鈥榯he first multi-day operation of the Soviet VVS鈥 was simply astonishing in its disorganization and non-effectiveness.
...Beginning the second half of May 1941 [or just a few weeks prior to the Wehrmacht strike, as well as the air-raids to Finland], high echelons of the USSR military leadership had been rattled by increasingly wide-spread avalanche of arrests under the so-called 鈥榓viators case.鈥 Over the course of two months, without a pause due to the war, the following personnel were arrested: 3 former VVS Chiefs...; Main PVO Chief of Staff...; Assistant Chief of the VVS Long-Range Bomber Command...; VVS Chief of Staff and his deputy...; Far East Front VVS Commander...; Leningrad Military District VVS Deputy Commander...; North-Western Front VVS Commander...; Western Front VVS Commander...; South-Western Front VVS Commander and his Chief of Staff...; Moscow Military District VVS Commander...; Orlovsky Military District VVS Deputy Commander鈥; Privolzhsly Military District VVS Deputy Commander...; Chief of Military Air Command and Navigation Academy...; Chief of VVS Scientific Research Institute...; etc." (Ibid)
This is especially interesting, since the mentioned air force command purge is never used as a red herring supposedly explaining Stalin's lack of readiness for war. It's always the Tukhachevsky, the Blukher and the 1937-38 purges. -
Message 11
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Saturday, 19th March 2011
This is especially interesting, since the mentioned air force command purge is never used as a red herring supposedly explaining Stalin's lack of readiness for war. It's always the Tukhachevsky, the Blukher and the 1937-38 purges.聽
The air force purge is a well-documented event, although less known to the general public. I think it isn't mentioned much as a cause for the unreadiness of the Soviet air forces because at this point in time, given the chaotic state of rearmament and the overall lack of training, it didn't really matter that much... It takes four to five years to (re)build a military force. There was some impact on readiness, of course, which is probably why Beria halted the arrests on June 19, although he did not return the arrested officers to their units.
In a way the reverse is true: The arrested officers were explicitly made scapegoats for the bad state of the air force, which according to the logic of the regime had to be the result of an "anti-Soviet conspiracy", as it couldn't be due to the errors of Stalin. (Officers and officials who had previously voiced criticism of the Kremlin's air force policy seem to have been high on the target list.) For example, the Politburo complained that pilots had "not mastered night and high-altitude flying, weapons firing, aerial combat, and bombing", so it relieved a number of senior officers of their commands. The problem was real enough, with less than 20% of pilots trained to fly at night or in poor weather, and virtually none to fly at high altitude. But that was a direct consequence of decisions late in 1940 to greatly increase the size of the air force while heavily cutting training hours. In the interest of reducing the number of accidents, fighter pilots no longer received aerobatic training...
Under the usual physical and mental pressures, officers in technical departments "confesssed" that they had conspired with the Germans to sabotage the re-armament of the air force. In reality they were of course stuck between two fires. If they criticised the design flaws and poor production quality of the latest output from design bureaus and factories, they delayed production and were vulnerable to such accusations. But if they did not, they could expect a further increase in the already appallingly high accident rate during training and in operational units (especially as training already lagged far behind delivery of modern aircraft) which would also rebound on them. The real problem was that the Soviet industry, after a period of being cutting-edge in the 1930s, had been alllowed to fall far behind international standards, and in this regard the 1936-1938 waves of purges are definitely a factor: While it it the officers corps hardest, the aviation industry was not spared. -
Message 12
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 19th March 2011
The air force purge is a well-documented event, although less known to the general public.聽
That's exactly what I'm saying, yes. The public has been fed Khruschev apparatus' developed stories about Tukhachevsky and Blukher.
I think it isn't mentioned much as a cause for the unreadiness of the Soviet air forces because at this point in time, given the chaotic state of rearmament and the overall lack of training, it didn't really matter that much聽
Well, if you still do not accept the well documented fact that - whether in the process of rearmament or not - VVS assets were all in all superior to those of Luftwaffe and certainly of those of Finnish air force, I'll find some time to go over the numbers and specs. Solonin provides tones of materials on this - he used to be an aircraft engineer, you know. What especially strikes me is that - whether on the Western, North-Western or Northern Fronts - VVS conducted actions contrary to its own doctrine. Instead of the prescribed massive bomber strikes under massive fighter cover, VVS sent bombers out in small groups, without any cover, to be mowed down like flies, basically. Apparently, this was done under orders signed by the legendary soon to be demoted RKKA Chief of Staff Zhukov. -
Message 13
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Saturday, 19th March 2011
Well, if you still do not accept the well documented fact that - whether in the process of rearmament or not - VVS assets were all in all superior to those of Luftwaffe and certainly of those of Finnish air force, I'll find some time to go over the numbers and specs.聽
I most certainly do not accept that as a "well-documented fact". It fits ill with the grim reality that the Luftwaffe, although overstretched by the sheer size of the new front, cut through VVS assets with ease. The VVS did have an impressive total number of aircraft, but it was desperately short of modern combat aircraft, trained pilots, and officer cadres. For the German veterans this indeed was a "target-rich environment".
What especially strikes me is that - whether on the Western, North-Western or Northern Fronts - VVS conducted actions contrary to its own doctrine. Instead of the prescribed massive bomber strikes under massive fighter cover, VVS sent bombers out in small groups, without any cover, to be mowed down like flies, basically.聽
Certainly in the first reaction to Barbarossa, orders were given that amounted to sending pilots on suicide missions, in desperate attempts to stop the German advance. French and British commanders in 1940 did the same, notoriously in ordering the costly and futile attacks on the bridges over the Meuse. By 1941, of course, it was more widely understood that fighter escort was necessary, but there still is a big difference between knowing that and being able to organize it. That was something that inexperienced forces always found extremely difficult to do, and the VVS had to learn under the worst possible conditions. Aircraft with a different speed and range, often operating from different bases and under a different command, are very hard to coordinate. The Luftwaffe had ample experience, but the VVS did not, and especially its fighter regiments had a serious shortage of officers.
Besides, "massive bomber strikes under massive fighter cover" are more a tool of long-range strategic attack than of tactical air operations against a rapidly advancing enemy. Doctrine tends to reflect more what an air force wants to be than what it needs to do. Admittedly, in the early 1930s the USSR did have a powerful heavy bomber fleet. But in 1941 it had very few modern bombers and those were short-range, tactical types such as the Pe-2. Even the old SB was more a light than a medium bomber, and they were equipped mostly with light bombs, too. Under the circumstances, this force was best employed in strikes against specific targets on or directly behind the frontline, with short response times that left little opportunity to assemble large forces. -
Message 14
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 19th March 2011
The VVS did have an impressive total number of aircraft, but it was desperately short of modern combat aircraft, trained pilots, and officer cadres. For the German veterans this indeed was a "target-rich environment".聽
We'll return to the apples to apples in a little while. But your argument immediatly raises two major questions.
The first question is, what exactly makes Luftwaffe pilots veterans compared to, or as opposed to those of VVS? It's as if RKKA was not involved in high intensity combat in Mongolia and Finland between August 1939 and March 1940, barring relatively uneventful for RKKA invasions of East Poland, Lituania, Latvia, Estonia, Bessarabia and Bukovina. However, many RKKA pilots, including command staff, had been quite succesfully fighting in Spain even before those.
The second question, what about the Finns? You certainly aren't going to claim that they had better assets and more experianced pilots, let alone the sheer numbers, or the lack thereof rather. Yet, it was the Finns - not Wehrmacht - who showed themselves the most effective fighting force against RKKA both on the ground and in the air. -
Message 15
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 20th March 2011
As promised, a bit more detailed response on The VVS did have an impressive total number of aircraft, but it was desperately short of modern combat aircraft, trained pilots, and officer cadres聽 is this:
鈥淏y June 22, 1941, [Luftwaffe deployed]鈥bout 600 new [Messerschmitt fighters] of series F and about 250 of older series E. Of these, combat ready were just under 700. Two-motor multi-functional 鈥淢e-110鈥 (two groups ZG) could be also counted as fighters. In all, Luftwaffe had about 950 fighters on Eastern Front.
[although, as Mutatis M rightly mentioned in his post above, VVS fighter fleet rearmament incurred many hurdles] 鈥y the start of the war, VVS of the five western districts and three fleets (yet, without fighters in the 6th PVO corps at Moscow) already included about 950 of 鈥淢ig-3鈥 and 110 of 鈥淵ak-1鈥. As we see, the number of the 鈥渘ewer types鈥 of Soviet fighters somewhat outnumbered Luftwaffe fighters of ALL types on Eastern Front.
鈥y the start of the war with Germany, over 3 thousand Soviet pilots had personal combat experience鈥︹ (Mark Solonin, Crush 1941)
I don鈥檛 have the number for Luftwaffe pilots with combat experience, but taking into account its to-date war casualties of 18,533 pilots; 1,951 students killed in flight training; and up to 15% of fighter planes in some squadrons crashed on take-off on the very morning of June 22, 1941, the Luftwaffe personnel 鈥渆xperience factor鈥 seems to have been built up as yet another red herring. -
Message 16
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 20th March 2011
The first question is, what exactly makes Luftwaffe pilots veterans compared to, or as opposed to those of VVS?聽
There certainly were a number Red air force pilots with combat experience. But ironically, the wave of arrests in the spring of 1941 targeted many veterans of the Spanish Civil War, removing them from command positions at a vital time. Probably having served abroad automatically made them suspect, especially as the war had not ended well. This despite the role many of them had played in the Soviet success in the short clash with Japan in the Far East. For example, Grigory Shtern had been chief military advisor to the Spanish Republican government, had fought the Japanese at Kalkhin Gol, had commanded an Army in the war with Finland, and had finally been promoted head of the Air Defense organization: He was arrested on June 7 -- A too vocal critic of the failings of Stalin's aviation policy. He was finally executed in October.
The problem was made much worse by the crash expansion in the last year before the German attack, which far outstripped the availability of experienced cadres. Although the rate of training of new aircrew was only a third of what had been planned, for example 60% of the pilots in the Leningrad area had less than a year of service. The result was that virtually anybody with a bit of experience needed to be promoted to a command role. Of the 58 division commanders in the VVS, 53 had been in their posts for less than half a year -- and 21 divisions did not have an appointed commander at all. Of the 16 regional commanders, 9 had less than six months of experience. Purges, of course, tended to hit mainly the higher ranks.
The second question, what about the Finns? You certainly aren't going to claim that they had better assets and more experianced pilots, let alone the sheer numbers, or the lack thereof rather. 聽
I have my doubts about the Finns
I don't know whether Finnish claims of success in air combat have ever been thoroughly investigated. It is well know that in the stress and danger of combat, over-estimating enemy losses is the norm rather than the exception. While the Finns certainly fought bravely and acquitted themselves well against a numerically superior opponent, their claims are far too high to accept them at face value. Probably Finnish air intelligence was not too rigorous in checking claims, in the light of their obvious propaganda value. -
Message 17
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 20th March 2011
鈥y the start of the war, VVS of the five western districts and three fleets (yet, without fighters in the 6th PVO corps at Moscow) already included about 950 of 鈥淢ig-3鈥 and 110 of 鈥淵ak-1鈥. 聽
These were indeed the basic numbers of modern aircraft available in the West, to which a few LaGG-3 fighters might be added. The problem is that they are misleading as to fighting strength, because they don't take into account the number of trained pilots. Most VVS units were understrength, having fewer pilots than aircraft, but when it came to pilots transitioned to modern fighters the situation was dramatic. The Western military district on paper had 230 MiG-3s, but it had only 64 pilots who were combat-qualified on the type. In other regions it was even worse. One of the reasons for the loss of so many MiGs in the first days was that several units that had just received new fighters, had to leave them on the ground while they went to war in their obsolete I-16s and I-153s.
The MiG-3 itself had been rushed to the front before it was fully developed, and it had some dangerous handling characteristics and serious manufacturing quality problems, which among other problems resulted in failures of the engine and undercarriage. Performance also deteriorated because pilots flew the type with the cockpit canopy open or entirely removed (this component was of poor quality and had a tendency to jam) or lacked the skill to handle their engines properly. A general shortage of spare parts didn't help and made it impossible to sustain a high pace of operations. And the MiG-3 was inferior even to the Bf 109E except at high altitude, where it was superior; unfortunately for the VVS most combat was at low and medium altitude.
The Yak-1 was a better fighter and a more reliable aircraft, nearly the equal of the Bf 109F. (The M-105 engine still gave its share of problems.) But the number in the hands of trained pilots in June was still pitifully small -- and most were in the hands of the PVO instead of the VVS. The real value of the Yak-1 was in its rapidly accelerating production in the next months, while its better handling and the existence of a two-seat trainer version (Yak-7-UTI) helped to build up strength. The production of the MiG-3, in contrast, was phased out in favour of the Il-2.
German accident rates were indeed high, especially later in the war when training was cut unrealistically short. However, the VVS certainly was not any better. Even before June 22 it lost one or two aircraft in accidents every day; for example 138 aircraft and 141 aircrew in the first three months of 1941. -
Message 18
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 21st March 2011
There certainly were a number Red air force pilots with combat experience. But ironically, the wave of arrests in the spring of 1941 targeted many veterans of the Spanish Civil War, removing them from command positions at a vital time.聽
First of all, the arrests were carried out in the second week of May through mid-summer of 1941, which is quite different from 鈥渢he spring of 1941.鈥 Secondly, the arrests mostly affected VVS high command level, leaving over 3 thousand pilots with combat experience 鈥 a significant number 鈥 available for combat. The purge and its timing is important in that it gives a hint as to why so outrageously wrong tactical orders were given across all the fronts. But I鈥檒l get to the hard data explaining root causes for the crushing defeats of 1941 a bit later.
I have my doubts about the Finns I don't know whether Finnish claims of success in air combat have ever been thoroughly investigated. It is well know that in the stress and danger of combat, over-estimating enemy losses is the norm rather than the exception.聽
The following is the sample data analysis for the 2nd Soviet-Finnish war pertinent to the summer of 1944, NOT 1941, in other words, to the time when RKKA momentum was the most favourable in the entire war:
鈥淎ccording to Finnish data, from June 9 through July 18, pilots of [Finnish air force groups] LLv-24 and LLv-34 carried out 2,168 sorties and shut down 425 Soviet air craft. At that, the Finns lost only 18 Messerschmitts, of which only 10 were lost in combat with Soviet fighters. The results of combat work carried out by LLv-26 fighters were much humbler 鈥 15 Soviet air craft kills. Granted, one needs to take into account the fact that the group was equipped with Brewsters made in 1939. Having repeatedly surpassed their useful life, these were only valuable as decommissioned scrap metal, according to any air force鈥檚 standards but those of the Finnish one 鈥. At first glance, these phenomenal numbers appear to be unhinged 鈥榟unting stories鈥. However, the official [Russian] publication 鈥淒eclassified鈥 informs that VVS losses suffered during the Vyborgsko-Petrozavodskaya operation amounted to 311 air craft鈥. Even taking into account 鈥榮tandard鈥 for WWII dogfights three-fold exaggeration of the claimed kills over the real one, it turns out that FOR ONE FINNISH AIR CRAFT LOST, EIGHT SOVIET AIR CRAFT WERE SHUT DOWN.鈥 (M. Solonin, June 25. Foolishness Or Aggression?) -
Message 19
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 26th March 2011
So, with some hard data at hand, The Western military district on paper had 230 MiG-3s, but it had only 64 pilots who were combat-qualified on the type. In other regions it was even worse. One of the reasons for the loss of so many MiGs in the first days was that several units that had just received new fighters, had to leave them on the ground while they went to war in their obsolete I-16s and I-153s.聽
鈥淭he addition of all available bits of information 鈥渇rom the Soviet side鈥 suggests that fighter regiments of three divisions (11th, 9th and 10th SAD) in the the Western Front VVS first echelon lost from 30 to 40 air craft in combat [on June 22]. No more. Luftwaffe fighters from [the group] JG-51 claimed 12 Soviet fighters; pilots from III/JG-53 and I/JG-53 claimed 20 and 5 air craft respectively (taking into account that III/JG-53 operated at the overlap of the Western and North-Western Fronts, some of the claimed kills belonged to the VVS of the NW Front)鈥. In all, accounting for at least two-fold exaggeration of the claimed kills over the real ones, the mentioned Western Front VVS losses of 30-40 fighters appear realistic, if not exaggerated. [Luftwaffe] lost 15 fighters for good, with another 8 damaged on the same day.
鈥iven the advantage of the 鈥渇irst strike,鈥 the best [Luftwaffe] aces selected to the 2nd Fleet would not settle for anything less. In any case, 1 to 2, or even 1 to 3 ratio does not necessarily spell out 鈥榯he beating of inadequate amateurs.鈥
鈥On June22, 1941, 11th, 9th, and 10th SAD] lost 5 to 6 percent of air craft鈥and, at the very worst,] less than 9 percent of their pilots (40 of 460). Yet, these 3 divisions were completely destroyed and disappeared from all the reports and operational briefs of the [RKKA] staffs in a day or two鈥.the lightening fast annihilation of the first echelon of the Western Front VVS occurred not in the air, but on the ground.
鈥ccording to the report signed by the Chief of RKKA VVS Staff Operational Command Lieutenant-General Zhuravlev on August 1, 1941, 鈥渦naccounted [VVS] losses鈥 amounted to 5,240 air craft! Retroactively, this giant mass of abandoned equipment would be written off as the result of 鈥渢he sudden strike at air fields.鈥 (M. Solonin, Crush 1941) -
Message 20
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Saturday, 26th March 2011
Your long and rather tedious quotes from Solonin's book fail to answer the very reasonable point made by Mutatis Mutandis.
MM, speaks for many when he notes (message 18)
I have my doubts about the Finns I don't know whether Finnish claims of success in air combat have ever been thoroughly investigated. It is well know that in the stress and danger of combat, over-estimating enemy losses is the norm rather than the exception. 聽
Long quotes from Finnish sources hardly validate their claims, however plucky their aircrew were, at that time.
Your long (33 line) post contains only 7 words of your own.
If we wish to read Solonin we can go to his original. What do you gain by releasing his texts as a series excerpts, with so little of your own input?
This is close to plagiarism, unless you have his express permission for such long selections. -
Message 21
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 26th March 2011
This is close to plagiarism, unless you have his express permission for such long selections.聽
Let me do you a favor. Instead of embarrass yourself with such an infantile stalking, just go straight to Solonin's web site and post a formal complaint about my plagiarism. That'll show me. Here's the link:
-
Message 22
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Monday, 28th March 2011
Let me do you a favor.聽
Somehow I doubt the sincerity of that offer.
post a formal complaint about my plagiarism.聽
Well, at least you agree that copying large chunks from someone's book, with only seven words of your own thoughts, could be seen as a form of plagiarism.
Of greater relevance to this board, to post such a large chunk of someone else's work, with so little of your own (just 7 words), demonstrates a desperate lack of both confidence and originality.
infantile stalking聽
If there is any stalking going on here, it is by you.
Check out the OP of this thread:
A thread which you started which was aimed specifically at me, remember?
You seem to have stopped posting to that thread but the issue is not settled there.
You recently made a very serious attack on Norman Finkelstein's parents, by calling them "Kapos". You said that you had evidence that they were Kapos. You have yet to produce any evidence for your charge against them.
Until such time as you do offer evidence that issue is still unresolved, unless you withdraw the false accusation, of course. Such a withdrawl would show some integrity; the choice is yours.
If you don't like interacting with me on these boards (discussion boards provided by an organisation, the 麻豆约拍, for which you have open contempt), then the escape route is self evident.
Don't post here.
But if you post lies (about Finkelstein) and vicious innuendo (your attack on Chomsky), I reserve the right to expose your falsehoods. -
Message 23
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 28th March 2011
If there is any stalking going on here, it is by you.
Check out the OP of this thread:
www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mb...
A thread which you started which was aimed specifically at me, remember?
You seem to have stopped posting to that thread but the issue is not settled there.
You recently made a very serious attack on Norman Finkelstein's parents, by calling them "Kapos". You said that you had evidence that they were Kapos. You have yet to produce any evidence for your charge against them.
Until such time as you do offer evidence that issue is still unresolved, unless you withdraw the false accusation, of course. Such a withdrawl would show some integrity; the choice is yours.
If you don't like interacting with me on these boards (discussion boards provided by an organisation, the 麻豆约拍, for which you have open contempt), then the escape route is self evident.
Don't post here.
But if you post lies (about Finkelstein) and vicious innuendo (your attack on Chomsky), I reserve the right to expose your falsehoods.聽
And this individual thinks - and said so - of self as a proud representative of the 麻豆约拍 community, with the breadth and depth of knowledge.
Outstanding forensic historian, no less. -
Message 24
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Wednesday, 30th March 2011
Outstanding forensic historian, no less.聽
You flatter me.
I'm certainly not 'outstanding', nor am I a 'forensic historian'.
But I suppose I was just about good enough to expose your lies. -
Message 25
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 30th March 2011
I'm certainly not 'outstanding', nor am I a 'forensic historian'.聽
Don't be so hard on yourself. Paraphrasing 麻豆约拍's own internal memo on terrorism coverage, one person's outstanding forensic historian is another person's - or even institution, and ideologically friendly institution at that ,- academic fraud.
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