Wars and ConflictsÌý permalink
first world war & american civil war
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Message 1.Ìý
Posted by Sidpickle (U14495445) on Saturday, 13th November 2010
I find it difficult to understand after the carnage of the American civil war, why the generals had not learnt lessons and totally changed battle strategies and fighting methods by the time of the first world war 50 years later. The changes in sea warfare in these 50 years had evolved beyond recognition due to advancing technology, but fighting methods on land continued to rely on winning with high attrition rates and stalemate as seem half a century before.
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Message 2
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Saturday, 13th November 2010
It could be suggested that all the western countries involved in the Great War, with the exception of the British in South Africa had not really fought a real war since the American Civil War. They had fought natives armed with bows arrows and spears, or in the case of the US, native Americans using hit and run tactics. Even when they were beaten, they found excuses. Wrong ammo boxes. Greedy white men selling Winchesters to the native Amercans while the blue coats struggled with single shot rifles. By the time the US entered the war, all of the senior officers who had fought in the Civil War were mostly dead. One suggestion I heard which was not so long ago, and it should have applied to the Great War. At the start of any war, all senior officers should be retired, because they will fight this war using the same tactics as they used in the last one. Hence the use of cavalry at the begining of the Great War.
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Message 3
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 13th November 2010
Fred Hence the use of cavalry at the begining of the Great War.Ìý
Cavalry was the most decisive military arm during the Russian Civil War and the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, both being very mobile and radically different from the static WWI type of coflict - tactically much closer to the WWII than WWI. -
Message 4
Posted by Eliza (U14650257) on Sunday, 14th November 2010
"Cavalry was the most decisive military arm during the Russian Civil War and the Soviet-Polish war of 1920,"
That's very interesting. Is it because the war ranged over a wide area, rather than just along a single front?
What I've assumed usually about the First World War was that there was a lack of synchronisation between advances in weaponry and advances in manouvrability.
ie, weapons had advanced dramatically since the heydey of cavalry - ie, machine guns, shell-guns (not sure what the right word is - basically, canon that had retractable cylinders on springs, so the whole gun carriage didn't have to roll back and forwards on recoil like old fashioned canon!).
But the manouvrability still relied solely on horses or not-very-fast-or-powerful unprotectable motor vehicles.
The result being that the weaponry simply could mow down cavalry and destroy motor vehicles.
It wasnt' until the tank finally arrived that manouvrability of an army was finally synchronised with its weaponry.
But maybe this is (a) wrong or (b) simplistic! -
Message 5
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Sunday, 14th November 2010
Even after seeing their men cut down like wheat, some generals clung to the idea of cavalry charges late into the 30s. Massed ranks of horsemen against machine guns are just dead meat. ask the Poles who charged German tanks armed with lances. Mind you the British senior officers who gave the orders to charge in massed ranks during the Great War, either on foot or on horse were never close enough to hear the bullets or the screams.
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Message 6
Posted by Vizzer aka U_numbers (U2011621) on Sunday, 14th November 2010
The story of the 'the Poles who charged German tanks armed with lances' in 1939 is legendary ... literally. At best it's apocryphal.
The sight of dead Polish cavalrymen with their lances juxtaposed against German tanks parked nearby following the Battle of Krojanty, resulted in international reporters arriving on the scene misinterpreting what had occurred. And so a myth was born and has lived on ever since.
The myth, however, proved useful for many parties on all sides during and after the Second World War - not least by the Germans themselves. German propaganda used the incident (or should that be non-incident) to demonstrate the formidable power of the German military machine. For the London Poles and the UK government it was used to emphasise the concept of the 'gallant Poles'. For Stalin and the Soviet Union it was used to illustrate the recklessness of the irresponsible 'capitalist and crypto-fascist' Polish government of 1939.
And it's unlikely that this myth will ever really disappear from popular history. I remember reading a child's picture book in the 1970s which included a painting of Polish cavalry charging German tanks. It's a classic case of a non-fact becoming a legend and then the legend being printed. -
Message 7
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Sunday, 14th November 2010
" fighting methods on land continued to rely on winning with high attrition rates and stalemate"
Part of the problem was that the generals did NOT rely on this, but still hoped for fluid movement, sweeping advances, etc. -- the cavalry were moved up close to the front at the Somme in 1916, to be ready to 'exploit the breakthrough' when it happened! Nobody could really believe that the new technology had bogged the whole thing down completely, and that breaktrhough was impossible with the methods and available to them, so they kept on trying 'something new' each time, and slowly learning which of the new things were better.
Far from 'relying on high attrition', the British especially continued to try new methods, (tanks, creeping barrages, air strafing, etc) throughout the war, so that the Army of 1918 was a very professional technologically advanced force, a far cry from the raw recruits of 1915. It took a lot of lives to learn the lessons, but they were learned eventually.
As pointed out earlier, none of the Generals had any experience of a 'real' war, and all the stuff they had learned was of any use when faced with a situation they had never seen before. OK, a study of Grant and Lee's battles at Richmond might have told them a lot, but the European Professionals regarded that as a sideshow, run by amateurs, and not representative of the 'real' world of European soldiering!
Sacking all the old generals at the start of each war looks like a good option, but usually the younger generals were trained and taught the same things and methods, so they have to get a few bloody noses as well before they learn that the old ways no longer work. -
Message 8
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 14th November 2010
Even after seeing their men cut down like wheat, some generals clung to the idea of cavalry charges late into the 30sÌý
"Among rare exceptions was Brusilov offensive. In the summer of 1916 South-Western Front under the command of cavalry general Brusilov broke in the enemy defenses along the front of 550 kilometers wide and 60-150 kilometers deep. ...it was necessary to immediately pour masses of mobile forces into the created break-in....But Brusilov did not have enough cavalry. Not his fault. His superiors should have provide for the mobile forces." (V. Suvorov, Crash).
Sounds a bit ironic here. -
Message 9
Posted by rhmnney (U14528380) on Sunday, 14th November 2010
Seems as if very little that is learned in battle is retained to use again, not actual battle tactics but basic common sense, In the American War for Independence, the farmer soldier would shoot from cover, the British very obliging wore rifle targets on their chests, the common crossed white straps, and lined up as in shooting gallery. Much lauded in American history of that war, however when the Americans organized an army seems they dressed their troops the same, (just seems unable to drop the allure of those brazen broad white straps across the chest, "I Dare You?).
A battle tactic practiced throughout the ages seems seldom to fail, one force in full retreat, opposing force takes advantage of it and charges, however breaking formation, retreating forces take advantage of the situation and wins the battle. Last such known battle in the USA was American forces against Mexican in southern California,seems the Mexicans won that battle. Last noted in Vietnam, Viet Con. suckered a larger better armed American force to chase them, ended very poorly for the Americans. -
Message 10
Posted by Sidpickle (U14495445) on Sunday, 14th November 2010
I am sure the battles of the Amercan civil war were studied by officers in training at Sandhurst before the first world war. Sherman's tactics I understand had some influence on the concept of the Blitzkrieg in the second world war, so there must have been some lessons to be learnt . And Stonewall Jackson must have been an inspiration to many officer cadets.
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Message 11
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Sunday, 14th November 2010
but fighting methods on land continued to rely on winning with high attrition rates and stalemate as seem half a century before.Ìý
It's a little harsh to say the American Civil War relied on attrition rates. Whilst it's true that attrition happened and greatly benefitted the north, it certainly wasn't the intention of the generals. Grant, for instance, famously hated war and abhorred the casualty rates. Ironically, Grant was laterly condemned (probably unfairly) as being the most callous with his soldiers' lives.
The US Civil War generals hoped to force a single great battle which would knock the enemy out of the war. Weapons, circumstances, cautious generals and resilient soldiers prevented them.
Attrition, for all the part it played in the South's defeat was a by product of trying to fight a Napoleonic style war with modern rifles, not the intent. -
Message 12
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 14th November 2010
It took a lot of lives to learn the lessons, but they were learned eventually.Ìý
In a way, but perhaps not as fully as is sometimes claimed. When British forces took over a sector of the front in early 1918, there were dismayed to find that the French (who had learned a lot from the Germans) had arranged it as a defense in depth, organized as a network of reinforced points of resistance with the reserves held well back. The British 5th Army immediately set about digging lines of continuous trenches. The German offensive of March 1918, based as it was on much improved infantry tactics, easily broke through that thin defensive screen, and forced 5th Army into a rapid retreat. Confusion at headquarters sent British forces in retreat towards the north, breaking contact with the French and creating a dangerous gap in the center of the allied lines.
It was not, a that point in the war, a great demonstration of tactical or operational skill. -
Message 13
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Sunday, 14th November 2010
Yes - not the brightest move, but I think the 5th army was commanded by General Gough, who was not the brightest of the Brits! Thinking of defense was 'not the done thing, old bean' - showed a 'lack of offensive spirit', perhaps!
I was thinking more of the attacking methods, with tanks, artillery support, etc, which had improved a good deal by 1918 - some of which was of course learned from the very German attack that almost destroyed the 5th Army in March.
Even then, the more open warfare cost a lot more lives than the trench warfare had done. The static trench system was a steady drain of casualties, but nowhere near as expensive as the mobile phases that preceded it in 1914, and followed it in 1918. -
Message 14
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Sunday, 14th November 2010
As pointed out earlier, none of the Generals had any experience of a 'real' war, and all the stuff they had learned was of any use when faced with a situation they had never seen before. OK, a study of Grant and Lee's battles at Richmond might have told them a lot, ! Ìý
Depends what you mean by a "real" war I suppose. Few had experience of a modern war (except Russians who'd fought Japan in 1905). Though some were old enough to have fought in the Franco-Prussian war or Russo-Turkish war. The Balkan armies had had very recent experience, but with armies poorly equipped with artillery or machine guns compared to the big countries, so the lessons were limited.
but the European Professionals regarded that as a sideshow, run by amateurs, and not representative of the 'real' world of European soldieringÌý
Snobbery did lead many European generals to ignore lessons from the American Civil War, but Europe provided the same lessons for France, Austria, Germany, and Russia. Britain got her lesson in the Boer War. Unfortunately for most of these the lesson was that strongly defended positions could be out-flanked. The American Civil War also taught the same lesson.
What really made the difference was such vast amounts of heavy artillery - which no-one had seen before. -
Message 15
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Sunday, 14th November 2010
In the American War for Independence, the farmer soldier would shoot from cover, the British very obliging wore rifle targets on their chests, the common crossed white straps, and lined up as in shooting gallery.Ìý
If any substantial number of Americans had been armed with accurate rifles rather than the vastly more common smooth-bore musket, this could have been a problem. Well, briefly it could have been, after 3-4 volleys the unit would have generated enough gunpowder smoke that aiming was pretty much impossible.
The main "succcess" of this tactic was the battle of Lexington-Concord where it took all day to kill 70-odd British. Though some of those were inflicted by close order musket fire.
The problem with the myth of the skirmishing American rifleman versus the stupidly arrayed British redcoat was that the skirmishing simply wasn't an effective tactic. It could not hold ground, nor prevent a British column from reaching it's objective. It even lost its brief use of ambushing once the British deployed their own skirmishers.
Lining up in close order and using volleyfire was the only way to beat the British. And in the smoke of battle, the coloured uniforms were more necessary for generals to identify their own troops than any sort of hinderance for the soldiers being visible to the enemy. -
Message 16
Posted by Sidpickle (U14495445) on Monday, 15th November 2010
As the First World War was before the advent of modern communication such as radios, any fast advance or breakthrough could have left the advancing troops exposed at their rear unless support could be called up quickly. Pigeons and runners still used for communication and wires needed for morse or telephones? So perhaps the generals did not encourage officers to take initiatives when they were presented with an opportunity of breaking out? Was this another reason for moving forward a bit and digging in?
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Message 17
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Monday, 15th November 2010
There were big problems with a 'breakthrough'!
This was pre-motor, so 'fast' was a good infantry pace, whereas the enemy could bring up his reinforcements by train to plug the gap. Hence the 'need ' to have cavalry near the front, to exploit the break, which unfortunately never came.
Then there was the problem of the 'front' - if you did break through, your cavalry, artillery, supplies, communications, etc, had all to come across miles of tortured wasteland, with no roads or buildings left, and often mud so deep that horses and men simply disappeared into it.
Hence the 'Bite and Hold' tactics - grab an area within reach of your own guns, and blast the enemy when he tries to take it back. Expensive in lives, but a lot less expensive than carrying on the attack beyond the reach of your own artillery, and getting slaughtered by the counter-attack. -
Message 18
Posted by Stoggler (U14387762) on Monday, 15th November 2010
<quote>There were big problems with a 'breakthrough'!
This was pre-motor, so 'fast' was a good infantry pace, whereas the enemy could bring up his reinforcements by train to plug the gap. Hence the 'need ' to have cavalry near the front, to exploit the break, which unfortunately never came.
Then there was the problem of the 'front' - if you did break through, your cavalry, artillery, supplies, communications, etc, had all to come across miles of tortured wasteland, with no roads or buildings left, and often mud so deep that horses and men simply disappeared into it.
Hence the 'Bite and Hold' tactics - grab an area within reach of your own guns, and blast the enemy when he tries to take it back. Expensive in lives, but a lot less expensive than carrying on the attack beyond the reach of your own artillery, and getting slaughtered by the counter-attack.
</quote>
I think this one post sums up much of the tactical issues on the Western Front so well in such a short passage. Excellent post.
<quote>tortured wasteland...>/quote>
Excellent turn of phrase!
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Message 19
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Monday, 15th November 2010
As the First World War was before the advent of modern communication such as radios,Ìý
Some radios were available. The Germans intercepted Russian transmissions prior to the battle of Tannenberg which allowed Germany to concentrate forces against individual Russian armies. But in general, the reliance on wires certainly slowed advancing troops and hindered being able to exploit breakthroughs.
Not sure why radios weren't more common - perhaps they weren't capable of two-way communication?
So perhaps the generals did not encourage officers to take initiatives when they were presented with an opportunity of breaking out? Was this another reason for moving forward a bit and digging in?Ìý
The Germans were also developing grab and hold and infiltration tactics from the end of 1914 (much earlier than the allies). Also, Geman officers were encouraged to take the initiative at much lower levels than allied officers.
I'm not sure I should bring up John Mosier's controversial book "The Myth of the Great War", but a couple of points he makes seem relevant. It was the first war where more casualties were caused by artillery than by rifle fire. The Germans were streets ahead in 1914. German heavy artillery was controlled at the divisional level, rather than the army level for the allies, so commanders had better access to heavy artillery at the local level so could support breakthroughs or repel allied attacks more readily. Also the heavy German artillery was physically much lighter than equivalent allied pieces and was more readily brought up to support the attacking troops. He also argues that the main French guns were very inefficient at indirect fire (having limited angles of fire), whilst their heavy howitzers lacked the recoilless mechanism which meant a battery had to be positioned and aimed with every shot. -
Message 20
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Monday, 15th November 2010
Thanks, Stoggler - as a non-soldier and non-historian I appreciate that!
I have always tried to see past the 'Sky Documentary / Sun Editorial' viewpoint that everyone is either a Genius / Saint or an Idiot / Villain. -
Message 21
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 16th November 2010
giraffe47,
As pointed out earlier, none of the Generals had any experience of a 'real' war, and all the stuff they had learned was of any use when faced with a situation they had never seen before. OK, a study of Grant and Lee's battles at Richmond might have told them a lot, but the European Professionals regarded that as a sideshow, run by amateurs, and not representative of the 'real' world of European soldiering! Ìý
I agree. A generally assumed contempt among the European military establishments, magnified by distance - "well, it didn't happen here!" - kept all but the seriously interested junior officers from taking any notice beyond anything Robert E. Lee or Stonewall Jackson did, and even then it was mostly to compare them to applicable European precedents. Not until after WW1 did the European militariat - what was left of them - take an interest enough to send junior officers to visit some of the old battlefields.
Which isn't to let the US military off the hook. The ACW generation never truly digested the lessons learned - there was no military school for that and, besides, they didn't expect another large scale war within their lifetime. The mess that was the Spanish-American War alerted them enough to reorganize their top command into a staff system but at the tactical level they were just another army. Even when they finally joined WW1, they failed - indeed, patently refused - to take lessons in tactics from their experienced Allies. Thus, they had to learn the hard way yet again.
Which isn't a uniquely American habit. The British Army failed to learn lessons from the Boer War. Redvers Buller virtually invented the earliest 20th Century tactics in South Africa but lost his reputation in the process. The lessons had to be learned all over again. -
Message 22
Posted by Sidpickle (U14495445) on Tuesday, 16th November 2010
How the Americans ever agreed to join in the First World War amazes me.
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Message 23
Posted by Stoggler (U14387762) on Tuesday, 16th November 2010
You're welcome giraffe. Just wish I'd formatted that post better!
How the Americans ever agreed to join in the First World War amazes me.
Ìý
Actually, that's a good question - how did the Americans, who in 1914 were adamant they wouldn't get drawn into a European war, end up declaring war against Germany in 1917?
Was it a case of mistakes by the Germans, and a number of incidents piling up against them, such as with the Lusitania, and culminating in the Zimmerman telegraph? -
Message 24
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Tuesday, 16th November 2010
It might have had something to do with the fact that, as from January 1917, German submarines were sinking American merchant ships on sight and the German government was offering a large part of US territory to Mexico. A fairly significant casus belli, I would have thought.
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Message 25
Posted by Stoggler (U14387762) on Tuesday, 16th November 2010
Sort of shot themselves in the foot then!
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Message 26
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Tuesday, 16th November 2010
Very much so. America declared war in April 1917, and over the next seven months Britain suffered devastating losses to the u-boats (at one point there was less than a month's supply of grain in the country) the French Army was half-paralysed by mutiny, and Russia dropped out of the war. Had the Jerries not "torpedoed" themselves, they would have won for certain.
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Message 27
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Tuesday, 16th November 2010
Had the Jerries not "torpedoed" themselves, they would have won for certain.Ìý
This overlooks why the "Jerries" opted to resume unlimited U-boat warfare: Because they saw no other hope for victory. Food shortages may have threatened Britain in the spring of 1917, but they already were a stark reality in Germany. For Germans the winter of 1916-1917 was the "turnip winter" because that was about all food left; bread made from wheat was very scarce and the potato harvest had failed. Meat was extremely scarce: Pre-war the Berliners had eaten about 25,000 pigs a week, but this number was down to 350 in 1916 and a mere 17 in 1919 -- For the Allies continued the blockade after the armistice of November 1918. Militarily that perhaps made sense, but in 1919 it resulted in a new-born infant mortality of 25% to 30% in Germany and Austria.
Hindenburg and Ludendorf knew that they could not hope to win a decisive victory on the Western front, and that the country soon would no longer be able to continue the war. Using submarines to interrupt the flow of supplies to Britain was the aggressive part of the U-boat campaign, but for many Germans an U-boat campaign also seemed to be the only way to break the Allied blockade that was starving them. -
Message 28
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Tuesday, 16th November 2010
Surely the lesson of the US Civil War was that the side with the greatest industrial strength won, and it is generally regarded as the first truly industrialized war.
Going along with the triumphs of Prussian arms within the context of a rapidly industrializing German region, operating protectionist policies, and the Darwinistic idea that life was a struggle for the survival of the Fittest, along with the almost worship of dinosaur monsters like Tyranosaurus Rex, there was a great tendency to think that sheer power to smash and destroy the enemy was the secret of success. And this meant industrialzation which the USA, Germany and Russia all undertook in the decades down to 1914.
Thus the arms races before 1914 were very much connected with what Lord Clarke called the "Heroic Materialism" that, in fact, the First World War failed to totally shatter. During the Stalinist Industrial Revolution, and then the Chinese Revolution the trend towards prestige gigantism persisted, and persists..
Much of all this power display was more apparent than real. But the belief systems of the time- that endure- were still inspired by the same idea that Matthew Boulton said to Boswell when he visited the Boulton and Watt works. "We sell what everyone wants-power"..
But the sheer application of brute force- as for example has been demonsrated by boxers and cricketers who specialise in sledge-hammer blows- is that -given that each action has an equal and opposite reaction- the heaviest-hitter needs a really firm and solid base so that the explosive "kick-back" retort of the forward thrust can be coped with. Hence, for example, in the First World War the great German artillery super-gun "Big Bertha" could only be moved and operated on a system of railway lines. This was typical of the way that an age of gigantism in technological and engineering advance favoured defence which had greater effective fire power than attack.
However in the British case there was also another factor, as has been noted. In the Crimean War Lord Raglan was given command because he had served with Wellington over forty years before, and no-one since had experienced large-scale land battles like Waterloo. The Crimean War was followed by an enquiry and a major shake up of the Armed Forces, but "General Gordon" for example was a mercenary who gained this title when he organised and ran "The Ever Victorious Army" for the Chinese Government.
The young Winston Churchill out of Sandhurst seems to have tried and succeeded to get into the action- the Sudan, the Khyber Pass and the Boer War- but it was only after the signing of the Anglo-French Entente that Britain realised that, in addition to more than matching every possible threat by sea, it might be required to have a small professional "Expeditionary Force" to help in the event of a German offensive through Belgium.
The Kaiser, who knew all about his Uncle's military, called this "A contemptible little army".. And as we know it, along with the French forces, was not successful in preventing a German invasion deep into France..
Kitchener's call "Your Country Needs You" then resulted in more volunteers than the Army really knew what to do with, or how to use, or in fact could truly believe in. History books over the last few decades had spelled out how England had been conquered by the French in 1066 because of the indiscipline and poor soldiering of the "Fyrd" at the Battle of Hastings and the professional soldiers seem to have had no real confidence in the fighting ability of the quickly trained and more or less totally inexperienced volunteers at the Somme- the greatest slaughter in a single day in the History of the British Army.
As veterans from the Sheffield Pals recalled in old age, they were ordered not to charge across "No Man's Land" but just walk across as if on a Sunday stroll. They were also ordered to carry their guns pointing up into the sky in order that they would not shoot their own side.. And-of course- when they were given the order to go "over the top" they had officers at their backs ready to shoot dead any of these men who had volunteered to fight if they hesitated to follow the order to attack.
Perhaps it should also be stressed that books had already been written that argued that in this industrial age ,and in the light of the terrible carnage in the US Civil War - immortalised in the poem "The Wound Dresser"- , no major war would be winnable.. There was great resentment, therefore, over the militarism and war-worship within the Prussian tradition that tended to dominate Germany, especially it seems in the ambitions of the Kaisar to prove himself worthy of the Prussian tradition. .
Cass -
Message 29
Posted by Sidpickle (U14495445) on Wednesday, 17th November 2010
The supply of weapons and munitions to an army during a war often involves buying them from neutral sources as well as producing your own. This appears to be the reason that neutral America ended up fighting in the First World War. They were more than willing to sell guns and ammunition to both sides but insisted that the Germans come and collect theirs. Obviously with the Royal Navy blockade the German surface merchant ships could not do this. So the American output predominantly ended up supplying Britain/France. To stop this flow the Germans used the U-Boats to sink ships carrying these cargos which sucked neutral America into the conflict.
The parallel from 50 odd years earlier is that neutral Britain supplied weapons to both sides of the American Civil War (ACW). However, at this time neither side wanted to sink British shipping because it would have had hugely damaging consequences. On one occasion during the ACW a British ship (the Trent) was actually stopped by a Union vessel and two Confederate officials removed. This resulted in the British almost going to war against the Union side, but common sense prevailed and the two officials were returned.
During the ACW, the Union ships had Confederate commerce raiders to contend with in the North Atlantic which was probably the equivalent of the German submarines in the First World War. Two of the most successful of these had been built in neutral Britain and ‘carelessly’ released into Confederate hands. This proved very costly to the Union cause and resulted in America taking the British government to court and eventually securing a large compensation payment after the war. -
Message 30
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Wednesday, 17th November 2010
Well many of the techniques used in WWI were not even 19th century ones.
Trenches were used in the sieges of Vienna in the 16th and 17th centuries by Ottoman troops, in particular their Jannissaries, who had once also tried to dig tunnels to enter the city from below!
Still in the Ottoman EMpire, trench-like static warfare accompagned by volley fire and charge-attacks was conducted by the Greek rebels who used the natural terrain (which did not exist in flat western Europe where the trench was indicated) and who immobilised the much larger and better armed Ottoman armies. In one occasion, 117 rebels barricaded in a hacienta like hotel having a walled yard they managed to round-fire creating a volley of fire that stopped for 1 day the repeated charge attacks of 8,000 Ottoman troops who suffered about 400 dead, and other 600-800 seriously wounded & incapacited, so much that the Ottoman general with some 15% of its army out had to cancel his whole campaign!
The true first modern war (and a prelude to a World War was the Crimean war in 1853 – 1856. Many things we would see in subsequent wars were there including the use of trains, steam ships, telegraphs, photography, journalistic coverage, efforts to nurse the wounded in a more organised manner, but above all the trench warefare, the blind large-distance shelling, carpet bombarding etc.
The American civil war 10 years later had comparatively less innovations - the most noted out of which was the first metal-covered steam ships.
In anyway I personally do not esteem that the WWI tactics were any obsolete. With the means of the times and the terrain in Western Europe, there was nothing better to do in the case Germans did not wish to go back but to stay and push little by little. Otherwise the war would have to be having armies moving around mainly on foot and horse (as there were not enough cars and not enough petrol to move them around anyway) and attack here or there but all players esteemed this risky: both France and Germany wanted to stay wth their holdings trying to push bit by bit - France even more given it was fighting for its territories. -
Message 31
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Wednesday, 17th November 2010
Sidpickle
Very interesting thoughts.. I think that your OP suggested that you have been recently studying the American Civil War.. so I am interested in your comments about shipping.. One of the, if not THE, major impacts of the Civil War on the UK was the "Cotton Famine" that had such an impact upon the Lancashire cotton industry- and very significantly on Gladstone. The North placed a blockade on the Southern ports in order to prevent the export of Cotton- a major source of Southern wealth, and cause of the exploitation of slave labour.
From what you have written this was a targetted blockade that allowed British imports in but prevented Southern exports. Is that what you are saying?
Interestingly the 1928 Economic History of GB that I am currently reading makes the point that the British Naval Blockade, which had been so important as ever in the recent 1WW was not a total blockade aimed at depriving an enemy of much needed resources, but a blockade that forced the enemy- or dependent territories- to continue to buy its goods from Britain thus keeping the British economy strong.
Gladstone- whose family fortune had been made from slavery and sugar- was appalled that the Lancashire cotton barons called for British action to break the Cotton Blockade, while the cotton workers bore lack of work, and presumably the scant relief they could get in the age of the workhouse, with stoicism out of sympathy with the slaves. It convinced him of the moral justification of the extension of the franchise, and other Liberal measures.. Quite probably in view of what that book refers to as disturbing "the Irish influx" into Lancashire during the crucial phases of the textile revolution it also impacted on his ideas about the issue of Â鶹ԼÅÄ Rule for Ireland.
Cass -
Message 32
Posted by Sidpickle (U14495445) on Wednesday, 17th November 2010
Cass
I think that British exports to the South during the Amercan Civil war were dropped of at places like Burmuda and then the very fast specially adapted steam driven blockade busters (priavateers I think) took over. Many if these had been made in Britain specifically for this. Large cargo capacity, shallow draught and the fastest vessels on the sea. Very profitable whilst you got away with it. One British observer on one of these runs wrote of the excitment of being on board one of these vessels during the run for shore and the chase. From distant memory I think some got caught on the first run and others made 13 before being captured. These boats when captured often became Union navel vessels.
You can imagine the Union crews wanted to capture these blockade busters and not sink them as the prize money must have been fantastic. -
Message 33
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Wednesday, 17th November 2010
Sidpickle
Thank you for that.. It makes sense...We have to remember that the scuppering of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow was probably motivated by the long-standing tradition of "turning" captured naval vessels and adding them to your own fleet.
And the smuggling route was also how the Continent defied Napoleon's Continental System.
Do you mean "privateers" in the eighteenth century sense of people holding letters from the British Government authorising them to make private profit from exploiting a war situation on Britain's behalf? Or just bucaneering private enterprise?
Cass -
Message 34
Posted by Sidpickle (U14495445) on Wednesday, 17th November 2010
Cass
I understand that the Blockade Busters were privateers sponsored by 'friends of the South' and literally were just merchantmen. They did not even arm the boats or carry arms because if they were captured they would have been treated very differently from ordinary merchant sailors.
I think Rhett Butler’s fictional character in Gone with the Wind was a blockade buster. -
Message 35
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Wednesday, 17th November 2010
Surely the lesson of the US Civil War was that the side with the greatest industrial strength won,Ìý
There a lot ot be said for that comment Cass. Though I think the utter dominance of the north in every aspect made it more certain. They had more industry, more soldiers (as the war went on), total dominance at sea and the ability to blockade the south, better run finances to pay for the war, etc. The only area where the south dominated was in export earnings. If the US navy had been as stuffed full of pro-secession officers as the army, then the south could have been supplied by European arms manufacturers and paid for it with cotton exports.
Equally, a dominant southern navy could have strangled northern imports/exports - in the early stages many Union troops were suppplied with British manufactured rifles.
Perhaps it should also be stressed that books had already been written that argued that in this industrial age ,and in the light of the terrible carnage in the US Civil War - immortalised in the poem "The Wound Dresser"- , no major war would be winnable.. Ìý
I'm not sure what you mean by winnable, - the numbers of dead meant that all nations lost emotionally. But politically, the American Civil War was won by the north and on the battlefield too. Union armies decisively beat the Confederacy in the western theatre.
The French and Italians beat the Austrians in 1859-60 (in a modern war).
The Prussians decisively beat Austria and subsequently France. French insurgents meant that Germany couldn't fully conquer France, but they did force a generous political settlement.
None of these were fought with the scale of manpower that the first world war was, perhaps that was the difference? Individual battles were of comparable size, but the number of fronts were limited, and armies could still manouvre unlike the Great War where the front stretched the length of the entire frontiers. -
Message 36
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Wednesday, 17th November 2010
cloudj
But things had moved on from the wars you mention.. Nobel's invention of dynamite along with the Krupps developments in artillery amongst other factors, including the Dreadnoughts that made every previous battleship obsolescent-- almost it seemed like the Bismarck in the 2WW [my ex-neighbour now dead intimated that the mood on the RN mine sweeper on which he served, on receiving the order to close in on the Bismarck, was pretty grim.. If they got there first and alone they were pretty well done for- even though the B appeared to be slightly impaired].
I have had a quick skim through a biography of JM Keynes where I think I read about the reaction of the Apostles to the major work before 1914 that argued that a modern war would now be unwinnable.. But have so far failed to track it.. Was it "The Great IIlusion" ? Or was that later?
I do recall, however, that a piece about History written in the aftermath of the Agadir Crisis reflected a belief/hope that Germanic thinking, both in History and Current Affairs had now been found wanting..and that the future would be with the art of living rather than the various sciences which tend to eliminate considerations of Humanity as a matter of course.
Cass -
Message 37
Posted by rhmnney (U14528380) on Wednesday, 17th November 2010
cloudy, what I tried to point out regardless of the outcome of the American War for Independence was the mind-set of the military, disregarding many of the lessons learned in war, why ever did the new American army adopt the white crossed straps which they found detrimental for the enemy? In 1946 saw how an artillery round could be on the way to the barrel of the mortar that had just fired, when the mortar bomb had not even landed. They said that the dot on the radar screen represented the centre of the mortar's firing pin, and a screen showing azimuth and range. However during the conflict in Serbia they claimed they could not find the source of the mortar, the same in Iraq and Afghanistan of mortar bombs dropping on army camps.
Of opposing forces using natural surroundings to inflict losses on enemy, should be tried in Afghanistan. Without air support no coalition force could get out alive, a repeat of Britain's adventures in Afghanistan. Another Vietnam? -
Message 38
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Wednesday, 17th November 2010
Hindenburg and Ludendorf knew that they could not hope to win a decisive victory on the Western front, and that the country soon would no longer be able to continue the war. Using submarines to interrupt the flow of supplies to Britain was the aggressive part of the U-boat campaign, but for many Germans an U-boat campaign also seemed to be the only way to break the Allied blockade that was starving them. Ìý
The blockade certainly made life unpleasant, but didn't stop Germany fighting on for a further two years after the decision for USW was taken. And insofar as it got tighter in the latter half of the war, this was in large part a result of US intervention, which made it far easier to "ration" supplies to the neutrals adjoining Germany. The blockade hurt Germany, but wasn't even close to being a war-winner.
H&L were indeed desperate, but not primarily due to the blockade. They felt that 1916 had been a military "annus horribilis" and that 1917 promised to be even worse, with a bigger and more experienced British army, and a better-armed Russian one. They could not forsee that Russia would collapse into Revoluton in a couple of months (Russia had been "on the brink" of revolution as long as anyone could remember, but it never seemed to happen) while Britain faced a financial crisis and the French army mutinied.
The whole thing was very close run. Had the First Russian Revolution come in October 1916, or even perhaps December, the decision for USW might well have been delayed or even cancelled. Assuming the Bolsheviks still seize power a few months later, by Spring 1917 Russia is probably leaving the war, while America still remains neutral. The Allies are up the creek, sans paddle. -
Message 39
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 17th November 2010
They could not forsee that Russia would collapse into Revoluton in a couple of months (Russia had been "on the brink" of revolution as long as anyone could remember, but it never seemed to happen)Ìý
Being on the brink of revolution - that could be said just about every European country at the time. For all intents and purposes, Nicolas did everything possible to discredit the monarchy, the last straw being the Rasputin scandal. Obviously, the revolution that followed in February of 1917 was not something the Germans had been looking forward to, since the Provisional Government would be a steadfast Entente ally. Yet, according to the "Parvus papers," the Germans knew very well who was who; they had been and would be working with the Bolsheviks until the latter would dislodge the Kerensky government and collapse the front in November 1917. -
Message 40
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Thursday, 18th November 2010
[quote]Being on the brink of revolution - that could be said just about every European country at the time. For all intents and purposes, Nicolas did everything possible to discredit the monarchy, the last straw being the Rasputin scandal. Obviously, the revolution that followed in February of 1917 was not something the Germans had been looking forward to, since the Provisional Government would be a steadfast Entente ally. Yet, according to the "Parvus papers," the Germans knew very well who was who; they had been and would be working with the Bolsheviks until the latter would dislodge the Kerensky government and collapse the front in November 1917. [/quote]
No doubt. My main point, though, was that however sure the Germans might be that a Russian revolution was coming, by Jan 1917 it was far from clear that it would come in time to do Germany any good. A Revolution in, say, October 1917 would be cold comfort to a Germany defeated in August. of the same year.
Irojnically, the German submarine campaign, and resulting US belligerance, turned this into a self-fulfilling prophecy. -
Message 41
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Thursday, 18th November 2010
We have to remember that the scuppering of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow was probably motivated by the long-standing tradition of "turning" captured naval vessels and adding them to your own fleet.Ìý
To be honest Cass I think the RN saw it as a blessing in disguise despite all the protestations.They certainly had little interest in using these ships in any role apart from experimentation and trials,which was SMS Badens fate.I believe the French may have had more of an interest,but to be honest I don't think it would be easy to integrate a foreign dreadnought into your fleet,unless you had a vast array of spares and ammunition.From memory I think that the French received 2 dreadnoughts as reparation - the austrian dreadnought Prinz Eugen and german Thurigen,both were used as targets.If they hadn't have scuttled those ships the net result would be that their would have been even more scrap metal available to the various yards who flourished around the country in the post war years.
I think that the scuttling was more akin to controlling their own destiny and giving the Allies the two fingers at the same time.
The whole thing was very close run. Had the First Russian Revolution come in October 1916, or even perhaps December, the decision for USW might well have been delayed or even cancelled. Assuming the Bolsheviks still seize power a few months later, by Spring 1917 Russia is probably leaving the war, while America still remains neutral. The Allies are up the creek, sans paddle.Ìý
I think that t had turned into a bit of a race - could the U Boats knock out the UK before the Americans could arrive.One hell of a gamble,but I think that Germany was fast running out of options - Jutland had convinced them that the much vaunted HSF despite its gallant performance could not beat the RN.The one weapon they had got which could be their ace in the pack was the U-Boat.
But it would then be a case of ,ahem " crap or bust".
Regards Vf -
Message 42
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 18th November 2010
No doubt. My main point, though, was that however sure the Germans might be that a Russian revolution was coming,Ìý
No argument there. The Bolshevik revolution was far from being a certainty. Moreover, in June of 1918, just days before being murdered, the German envoy to Moscow Mirbach reported to be expecting the imminent collapse of the Bolshevik rule in Russia - or rather in the few Russian cities controlled by the Bolsheviks at the time.
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