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A Big Mistake
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Message 1.Â
Posted by youngjerry (U7266788) on Thursday, 24th June 2010
What was the main reasons for the sudden Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour? (A big mistake if ever there was) Wouldn't they have been better off to stay right out of WW2 and leave the Americans alone?
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Message 2
Posted by Catigern (U14419012) on Thursday, 24th June 2010
The Japanese knew they were bound to get a pasting from the British Empire in the end, so they thought they'd attack the Yanks so they had a 'soft' front where they could send raw recruits and men who needed a break from the real war.
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Message 3
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Friday, 25th June 2010
The Japanese knew they were bound to get a pasting from the British Empire in the end,Â
Why would we have pasted the Japanese? What possible reason did Britain have to attack Japan? We'd stood aloof when Japan kicked off the Second World War (despite the atrocities). And had no strategic interest in any of Japan's Empire.
Or are you suggesting that Japan could have attacked merely the British Empire and Commonwealth, and the Dutch East Indies (whilst fighting a huge war in China) yet sat down and thought "we'll make this easier by adding in a country with one of the most powerful navies on the planet"?
so they thought they'd attack the Yanks so they had a 'soft' front Â
Soft front? US naval power in the Pacific was far superior to British. THe Washington Naval Treaty in 1923 was born out of a British realization that we couldn't compete in a naval arms race with the USA and Japan.
where they could send raw recruits and men who needed a break from the real war.Â
The idea that any battlefield is somehow a "break" is a strange concept. Smacks a little of Nancy Astor's comments about D-Day Dodgers. And by "real war" I assume you mean that in China? -
Message 4
Posted by Catigern (U14419012) on Friday, 25th June 2010
Au contraire, cloudyj...
Why would we have pasted the Japanese? What possible reason did Britain have to attack Japan? Â
Because they proved themselves to be Absolute Rotters in China.
US naval power in the Pacific was far superior to BritishÂ
Superior in tonnage, perhaps, but hardly so in *character*!
I reckon fighting the cry-baby Yanks would be a break after facing our Brave Boys!
China was certainly a real war, but, wot with me being a Brit an' all, I was thinking of the Indo-Burmese front. Then again, that was the scene of Errol Flynn's famous victory...
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Message 5
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Friday, 25th June 2010
Having watched Pacific, I found out that strangely (Although the US don't publish the fact as it would ruin their We beat the Japs single handed attitude) that Japan fielded 6 million men (In all their armed forces) during WW2 of this 5 mil were tied up in China. Of the remaining one mil. a large number were tied up fighting on the Burma India front and fighting against the Australians in the south. Even more would be tied up as garrison troops in the likes of Malaya. So just how many did the US have to face?
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Message 6
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Friday, 25th June 2010
Because they proved themselves to be Absolute Rotters in ChinaÂ
So, for those 4+ years of rotterdom in China between the 1937 and Japan attacking us, we were just biding our time?
Superior in tonnage, perhaps, but hardly so in *character*! Â
I really hope that's tongue in cheek. Not wishing to disparage our undoubtedly brave sailors. The Royal Navy's results in this conflict weren't great. The USN did achieve notable victories over the IJN. So "character" aside, tonnage did matter.
I reckon fighting the cry-baby Yanks would be a break after facing our Brave Boys!Â
You probably do reckon that. But have you any evidence (other than jingoism) to prove it? -
Message 7
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Friday, 25th June 2010
I found out that strangely (Although the US don't publish the fact as it would ruin their We beat the Japs single handed attitude) that Japan fielded 6 million men (In all their armed forces) during WW2 of this 5 mil were tied up in China.Â
Don't the US publish this? It's not in their popular history, but it's not in our popular history either.
I'd be very surprised that US history books don't mention it.
And as Catigern said, we think of Japan as either Burma or Holywood's version. So it's not just the US blowing their own trumpet. -
Message 8
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Friday, 25th June 2010
youngjerry,
What was the main reasons for the sudden Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour? (A big mistake if ever there was) Wouldn't they have been better off to stay right out of WW2 and leave the Americans alone?Â
Pearl Harbor was Isoroku Yamamoto's idea to, as he predicted, give the Japanese six months to consolidate their grab of the East Indies and assorted Pacific islands before the Americans began to counter-attack. Aside from being a tactical masterstroke, it was the child of the gambler's desperation that pervaded the Japanese militarist government.
But then, ever since the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05 Tokyo and Washington had eyeballed each other over the fate of the Western Pacific. War would have broken out eventually; the collapse of the European colonial powers was but a catalyst. -
Message 9
Posted by Poldertijger (U11154078) on Friday, 25th June 2010
Hello jerry,
The reason that the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour had to do with the lack of a vital good that the Japanese empire could not produce: oil for the Japanese navy.
The wars that had been ravaging Eastern-Asia had made Japan dependent on its navy. To protect Japan its navy needed oil and lots of it. The Japanese conquests up till the middle of 1941 didn't retain oilfields, which left the Japanese dependent on the imports of oil from the Dutch-Indies.
The Roosevelt administration had the political support to put an end to the Japanese aggression. It imposed an export ban that had little effect initially, because American export to Japan was negligible. Because of the German occupation of the Netherlands the Dutch government of the Dutch East-Indies couldn't rely on support from Europe if the Japanese were to attack the Dutch-Indies, so it felt it had to join the Americans in their export ban in order to be assured of American military support in case of a Japanese attack on the Dutch-Indies.
This tipped the scales. The Japanese had the choice either to engage in diplomatic talks with the Americans and accept a humiliating pull-out of Eastern Asia or attack the Dutch East-Indies. Such an attack would not be possible without the American fleet at Pearl Harbour having been destroyed first.
It was the Dutch government of the Dutch East-Indies that forced the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbour.
Regards,
Poldertijger -
Message 10
Posted by rhmnney (U14528380) on Friday, 25th June 2010
Poldertijger an excellent post. It has not been told frequently enough or if mentioned, mostly as an add-on, but the day of the raid on Pearl Harbor the whole American Pacific Fleet was expected to be at harbor, but as events turned out for the Allies, the Carrier Fleet had been at sea doing exercises and the weather turned to storms and because there were no emergencies they delayed the return. Had they been there they would have suffered severe damage. Even at that date the effectiveness of the large Battle Ships was in question. However aside from the Warship that was left as a Memorial all the rest were shortly put into service. The raid on Japan by a land based Bombers taking off the deck of an Aircraft Carrier was quite a shock to all concerned.
I well remember the event, quite a joy, enjoyed by many of the citizens of the Allies. Not quite sure but I believe the bombing took place just 4 months after the US declared war on Japan. -
Message 11
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Friday, 25th June 2010
Nontheless it has to be noted that US forces had already harassed Japanese forces while Japanese had taken pretty much every action to avoid resorting to war against a nation that was multiple times bigger in population and with 20,30 & 40 times more military production than it had. The Japanese attack in Perl Harbor was not a sneaky attack, it was rather a desperate act to show their teeth wishing that Americans would somehowe be convinced by force to be more compromising. What Japanese did not count is that US would not feel sorry for the money spent and men lost in that war as it was their standard wish to extend their presence in western Pacific, i.e. well inside in the Japanese neighbourhood. US had been for years pursuing that policy and the practically forceful annexation of Hawai lying in the middle as well as a number of other islands to be used as bases was inscribed in that policy.
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Message 12
Posted by rhmnney (U14528380) on Friday, 25th June 2010
cloudyj thanks for your intelligent posts they are so true to the actual events. On American TV unless for a specific program all War history refers to the Allies, every where, regardless of location. In the Pacific taking the islands its a "Allies," such as, "The Allies attacked the island etc". even where the British were not involved even by a long stretch. I am puzzled by so many British who are very hateful to America and Americans and I firmly believe without due cause. I lived in those times so have knowledge of events plus understanding. When Hitler attacked Russia there was a great sigh of relief in Britain, later when Pearl Harbor occurred a bigger relief. After Dunkirk (many could add quite a lot to that, the mean type) in Britain there were cries of, "Why arn't the Americans helping us?" At that time America were violating International by rules by aiding a belligerent, said belligerent was Britain.
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Message 13
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Friday, 25th June 2010
Soft front? US naval power in the Pacific was far superior to British. THe Washington Naval Treaty in 1923 was born out of a British realization that we couldn't compete in a naval arms race with the USA and Japan.Â
Interesting thing about the Washington Treaty,a lot was made about Japanese indignation and the nifamous "Rolls,Rolls,Ford" agreement (5:5:3).Japan was spending 40% of its GDP on the navy alone,which was sending them towards bankrupcy.Depsite all the noise coming out of Tokyo,in actual fact the government was probably relieved that the treaty came about.I also think that there was a certain amount of bluff involved.Technically the US could probably outbuild the UK ,but there was absolutely no gaurantee that congress would sanction the construction of these leviathans.The UK's finances were in a parlous state and the idea of constructing another expensive battlefleet probably gave the Chancellor of the Exchequer nightmares, but if push came to shove....But as Eric Grove commented the nations got together and said "do we want another arms race reallly?"
THe US were the big winners out of the treaty in retrospect they obtained parity with the RN without a costly building programme,it put the nail of the coffin of the Anglo/Japanese treaty and they edged out the British in terms of having more ships with the lessons of the war incorporated.The RN signed off two centuries of supremacy and was lumbered with ships that were predominantly pre-war designs.They also had less ships now to cover a vast empire spread around the globe in almost all the seas and oceans.Traditionally the RN would have had anumber of second line ships to cover far off stations,that was no longer an option.
The Japanese attack in Perl Harbor was not a sneaky attack, it was rather a desperate act to show their teeth wishing that Americans would somehowe be convinced by force to be more compromisingÂ
I'd disagree,it was sneaky but the Japanese had "form" in these situations.They attacked the Russians in harbour before any actual declaration of war.Unfortunatley for them they completely misjudged the reaction America would take.Its ironic that just as the West sterotyped the Japanese for being short and myopic Japan took the the view that the US would lack the resolve or the stomach to fight.
An intersting "what if" is what would have happened if the IJN had actually took action against the UK and the Commonwealth only.The RN was concentrated in the Atlantic and Mediterranian (as can be seen from the size and compisition of "Force Z")and would have been in no position to fight the Japanese.The US may have sailed from Pearl Harbor but at what cost? Its doubtful that,if located by the IJN that the US Battleships would have faired any better,indeed the difference may have been that they would have sunk in 3000 feet of water as opposed to 30 feet.Agressors tend to be better prepared and equiped than those who were at peace.If say the Japanese had managed to take Malaya,Burma and Borneo would they have been at any more disadvantage than the plan they actually took by taking both on with a pre-emptive strike at Pearl? Certainly the Japanese may have not met the full fury of American wraith as the did when they attacked Pearl and not suffered near anihalation by 1945.
US had been for years pursuing that policy and the practically forceful annexation of Hawai lying in the middle as well as a number of other islands to be used as bases was inscribed in that policy.Â
Not unique to the US.The West had been colonising various islands for the previous two centuries.I was under the impression that both the Japanese and American took possession of ex German islands during and after WW1.The problem for the Japanese was that they had joined the party far,far too late,they were powerful,but not powerful enough to stamp there authority in a way they may have been able to do say 70 years previously if they had had the strength. -
Message 14
Posted by Triceratops (U3420301) on Saturday, 26th June 2010
A quick follow up on VF and Poldertijger's excellent posts.
Japan was running out of gold and foreign currency reserves and would have been unable to purchase oil by the Spring of 1942. The US embargo brought this crisis to a head sooner.
Late 1941 found the IJN in its strongest position vis-a-vis the USN. The American building programmes would provide the USN with a superiority in every class of warship. By 1944,the IJN calculated it would be at 30% of the strength of the USN.They either made their move now or not at all.
One other thought. Having invested so heavily in a war to secure the raw materials from South East Asia, the Japanese were totally unprepared to provide their merchant ships with the protection required to transport these materials to the Â鶹ԼÅÄ Islands and their merchant fleet suffered severely from Allied submarine attacks. -
Message 15
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Saturday, 26th June 2010
What Japanese did not count is that US would not feel sorry for the money spent and men lost in that war Â
That's a rather spiteful comment Nik. Have you any evidence that the USA didn't care for it's war dead?
it was their standard wish to extend their presence in western Pacific, i.e. well inside in the Japanese neighbourhoodÂ
As did all imperial powers. But the Americans had just as much right to be in that neighbourhood as the Japanese. And at least, by 1937, the Americans weren't holding "how many heads can you chop off" competitions and making the winner front page of the army's magazine. -
Message 16
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Saturday, 26th June 2010
The internal divisions among the Japanese were particularly sharp. The Washington and London naval treates divided the Japanese naval officers in a "treaty faction" and a "fleet faction" that were barely on speaking terms. This reflected political divisions between fierce nationalists and more moderate politicians, which in the 1930s resulted in terrorism and murder. While the treaty faction and allied politicians pointed out the treaties were a better deal for Japan that it could ever to hope to get from an arms race, the fleet faction insisted on a balanced fleet of six battleships and six battlecruisers, and regarded 60% of US Naval strength as below the safety limit. They felt cheated by the treaties, and they had a point -- American negotiators had been reading the Japanese diplomatic correspondence, thanks to code-breaking efforts.
The naval treaties generally played into the hands of the extremists, who manage to mobilise popular support in their wake. In 1932 the prime minister was assassinated by junior officers, and although their attempted coup was suppressed, the power of the military increased.
A big part of the problem was the Meiji constitution, with its provision that the heads of the Army and Navy reported directly to the emperor. Tradition and political caution prevented the emperor from getting involved too much in politics: The Meiji emperor himself had repeatedly rejected suggestions he would act as the head of government as well as head of state. So in practice, this meant that the Army and Navy were accountable to no-one. Worse, the practice in the late 1930s of having serving military officers as the ministers of Army and Navy, effectively gave the military forces the power to bring down the civilian government any time they liked, by ordering these ministers to resign.
All this directed Japanese politics towards an ever more aggressive nationalism. Japanese nationalists wanted that their country would become a great power, and in the 1930s that meant a colonial power. Unfortunately most of the potential colonies had already been taken by the Western powers. The display of racial prejudice against the Japanese by these Western powers helped to build Japanese frustration.
For all that, it must be said that the Japanese were fairly scrupulous in respecting the limitations of the 'mandate' they held from the league of nations over former German colonies in the Pacific. Then and later, rumours circulated in the US and elsewhere that the Japanese were illegally fortifying and creating military bases on these islands, but they were not.
Part of the Japanese problem was that they lacked the resources to do so. In late 1941, Japanese planners assumed that after the first strike against Pearl Harbour, they would have time to fortify the new empire that they wanted to carve out in the Pacific, moving along interior lines of defense to beat off any US attack. This turned out to be a rank illusion: The long Pacific frontline was vulnerable to attack at every point, and the Japanese could not compete with the flow of American reinforcements. They could barely support the forces they already had deployed. -
Message 17
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Sunday, 27th June 2010
Re: Message 16.
Mutatis mutandis,
I have read already a bit about Japan in that period, but it is the first time that I see such a concise and clear survey of that time and that place brought in simple and easy to read paragraphs. In one word: nearly perfect.
Kind regards and with great esteem,
Paul. -
Message 18
Posted by Poldertijger (U11154078) on Monday, 28th June 2010
Re: message 14.
Hello Triceratops,
You write: Japan was running out of gold and foreign currency reserves and would have been unable to purchase oil by the spring of 1942.Â
So the government of the Dutch East-Indies did not have much to loose when it decided to join the American embargo.
Do you know whether the problem of the lack of foreign currency was taken into account when the Jaqpanese made the decision to attack China in 1936 1937?
Regards,
Poldertijger -
Message 19
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Monday, 28th June 2010
Poldertijger,
It was the Dutch government of the Dutch East-Indies that forced the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbour.Â
A fine and informative post - I'd never looked at the Pacific theater through Dutch eyes before. My one quibble is with the quote above. I can see the Dutch decision finally tipping the balance for the Japanese to go to war but not necessarily for the Pearl Harbor attack specifically.
Japan and the US had contended for dominance in the western Pacific since 1905. Every year they each table-wargamed a major surface-fleet naval battle occurring near the Philippines. FDR's shiftng the US Pacific Fleet from San Diego to Pearl in 1940 had this in mind - he saw it as giving the fleet a 3000-mile head-start.
Isoroku Yamamoto saw this move as a fighter sees his opponent leading with his chin. From there, events took their course. -
Message 20
Posted by Triceratops (U3420301) on Monday, 28th June 2010
Hi Poldertigjer,
Do you know whether the problem of the lack of foreign currency was taken into account when the Jaqpanese made the decision to attack China in 1936 1937?Â
I'm afraid I don't.The information was taken from "Pearl Harbor",by H P Willmott,and it makes no mention of earlier economics.
The only other book I've got about this is Volume 3 of the official US Navy History of WW2 by Samuel Morison, which does say a little about Japanese oil just prior to the attack on Pearl.For the year ending 31 March 1941, Japan imported 22,850,000 barrels of crude and 15,110,000 barrels of refined oil.Domestic and synthetic oil produced another 3,100,000 barrels.About 80% of these imports came from the US.
Roosevelt signed an executive order on 26th July 1941,freezing Japanese assets in the US.
Japan's crude oil reserves which stood at about 20,000,000 barrels on 1st April 1941 had shrunk to 15,000,000 barrels by 30 September.By this time it was not a question if Japan attacked but when.
Pearl Harbor was not the first Japanese attack on an American warship.The river gunboat USS Panay was attacked and sunk by Japanese aircraft on 12th December 1937 on the Yangtse at Nanking. If the US had reacted this, and the Nanking Massacre which followed,with an oil embargo,the Pacific War would have started in 1938. -
Message 21
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Monday, 28th June 2010
I see that someone has finally got around to introducing the fact that the Japanese were already involved in a major war. There has been a recent trend for "World Historians" to point out that the Second World War in many ways did not start in 1939. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the setting up of the puppet state of Manchukuo had led to League sanctions and to Japan deciding to sever its relationships with the new mechanism that was supposed to settle conflicts by peaceful negotiation. That really left the other way..or purely regional negotiations, as happened with Appeasement in Europe.
The subsequent attempt at a full-scale invasion of China- a daunting task by any standards- raised up serious questions of essential supplies fo Japan. Hitler's Blitzkrieg of the spring of 1940, and his invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, were also tied to the reliance of modern warfare upon resources like iron and oil. And,as has already been stated, the USA had announced economic sanctions that were aimed at Japan's reliance on imports of oil.
Moreover, just as there was the International Brigade fighting against Franco in Spain, so there were freelance US pilots already fighting against the Japanese in China. Knowing the US attitude to "body bags" and the way that the USA finally got into the First World War, there was some logic in the Japanese thinking that the only way to succeed was to use the idea of the pre-emptive strike.
Does history give examples of this actually proving a decisive strategy? The "singeing of the King of Spain's beard" perhaps bought England a little time, but probably not enough to really reduce the potency of a Spanish Armada. The Spanish weaknesses exposed by that particular "Holy Wind " [kami kaze] seem to have been endemic, according to traditional versions.
Cass -
Message 22
Posted by wollemi (U2318584) on Tuesday, 29th June 2010
There's a very different way of looking at WW2 in much of Asia,... the usual starting point for WW2 is taken as July 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge incident.
The idea of a 'Pacific War' is more accurately seen as an 'Asia Pacific War', with Pearl Harbour as a late, though significant, episode in that war.
The perception is that China was on its own for years before the entry of other combatants, though it did receive aircraft from the US, as well as aircraft and crews from Russia in this period.
So the attack on Pearl Harbour is best seen as an episode of an existing war, a war which Imperial Japan expected to last 20 years before it fully dominated the region with its Co Prosperity Sphere. The attack on Pearl Harbour was to protect these plans - or so they thought -
Message 23
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 29th June 2010
CASSEROLEON,
Knowing the US attitude to "body bags" ... Â
A tad anachronistic there, Cass. Body bags didn't come into US general military usage until the late '40s.
Which isn't to say the Japanese warlords didn't think the Yanks were soft. Despite what Yamamoto and the rest of the Navy had told them about the US industrial capacity, the Army convinced themselves that any country without a militarist tradition and which had to debate before passing a one-year draft wouldn't matter militarily. A fairly Prussian attitude. -
Message 24
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Tuesday, 29th June 2010
White Camry
I used "body bags" for a brevity.. thinking that it would be understood..
As for general attitudes among the US to fatalities, one of the points that comes out of Monty's Memoires is that he felt that he built his plans around the principle of keeping British casualties low, while the US Generals were more profligate with those (and other resources).. Possibly reflecting an American tendency to think in extremes..
I recall growing up in that culture in which the world was either "Happy Days" or so terrible that it would be worth wiping out almost the whole of Humanity. As Curtis le May said to have a nuclear holocaust that wiped out all the Commies and left a few new Adams and Eves would be victory.
But General MacArthur had encouraged people to think little of Old Soldiers in the "Buddy can you spare a Dime" thirties by referring to the Bonus Marchers as "a rabble".
But in Vietnam US soldiers were equipped with the wherewithal to make themselves a nice cup of coffee in the midst of battle sheltering behind a hedge or bush. Hardly the Samurai tradition.
Cass -
Message 25
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 29th June 2010
CASSEROLEON
But in Vietnam US soldiers were equipped with the wherewithal to make themselves a nice cup of coffee in the midst of battle sheltering behind a hedge or bush.Â
Civil war soldiers, too.
But we've digressed far enough.
Here's a thought: how differently would the Pacific theater have gone had there been no attack at Pearl Harbor? The Japanese attacked the Philippines per many pre-war plans when they expected a surface battle vs. the USN. Presumably, the US Pacific Fleet would have gone west according to their own pre-war plan. After the big battle, then what? -
Message 26
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Tuesday, 29th June 2010
My gut instict WhiteCamry is that the Japanese if it came to a big battle would either.
1/ Use a plan that was overly complex and relying on diversions and such like
or
2/Still pushed and taken the Phillipines but would have had to have held the line whilst beating off the US.By that I mean that any push would against Malaya or the Dutch East Indies would be put on hold until the Pacific fleet was beaten.
I still think that the IJN would initially have the edge over the Pacific Fleet,they have battle experienced pilots and agressors (I believe) are always better prepared.
I still think that there biggest mistake was not to go for Britain and the Commonwealth alone.Undoutably the Americans would respond,the question is how,and would the situation been any worse?If the Japanese were quick enough,probably not. -
Message 27
Posted by Poldertijger (U11154078) on Tuesday, 29th June 2010
Re: messages 19 and 20.
Hello Triceratops,
Thank you for the pains you've taken to respond to my question.
Hello WhiteCamry,
Be it understood that I'm not a navy expert; I take my tune from others. This is what I think is their reasoning.
If the Japanese hadn't had to fear an American attack than the Japanese navy would have had no difficulty to bring over the Japanese army to invade the Dutch East-Indies. But the Japanese could not possibly assume American non-intervention: there was a silent agreement between the Dutch and the Americans that the Americans would protect the Dutch East-Indies if the Japanese were to attack the Dutch East-Indies.
As long as the Japanese navy were busy helping the Japanese army invading the Dutch East-Indies the Japanese navy would be extremely vulnerable to an American attack that would be sure to come.
There was no way around: the American navy at Pearl Harbor had to be destroyed before the Japanese would be able to invade the Dutch East-Indies. The main targets were the American carriers. Although the American economy must be regarded to far exceed the Japanese economy in their capability to build new carriers, the Japanese rightly assumed that this would take so much time that Japan would have won the war before the new American carriers were taken into commission. This was unlike the situation in regard to planes or conventional ships: the Americans were rightly thought capable of substituting any plane or conventional ship they would loose within a short period of time.
The reasoning of the Japanese would be something like this: lack of oil => invasion of Dutch East-Indies => knock out blow of American navy => destruction of American carriers.
The Battle of Midway proofed that the Japanese had failed to deal the Americans with a knock-out blow. Japan lost the war on 8 December 1941 when it failed to destroy the American carriers. And they knew they had lost!
Regards,
Poldertijger -
Message 28
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Tuesday, 29th June 2010
But in Vietnam US soldiers were equipped with the wherewithal to make themselves a nice cup of coffee in the midst of battle sheltering behind a hedge or bush. Hardly the Samurai tradition.Â
In some ways, that was the mentality that won the war in the Pacific for them. While life often was very hard for US soldiers on the Pacific islands, they nevertheless were better supplied and equipped than their Japanese counterparts, with better food and better health care. When fighting on tropical islands, that could be a decisive difference.
Japanese planning often assumed, if only for a lack of alternatives, that their soldiers were so though that they would endure the most difficult circumstances, eating a little rice and whatever they found in the woods and fields. While the endurance and resilience of the Japanese soldiers was indeed remarkable, the result was often enough that they died of starvation and disease at a shockingly high rate, and a mere handful was capable of combat. Even their commanding officers were trembling with fever. -
Message 29
Posted by Triceratops (U3420301) on Tuesday, 29th June 2010
In the 1920's the Japanese envisioned that the US Fleet would move forward from the central Pacific and give battle in the area of the Bonins and Honshu. In the early 30's,this defensive posture was changed to what was called "The Strategy of Interceptive Operations",in which the operating area was moved southwards to include the Marianas and the Caroline Islands.
The battle would begin off Hawaii with attacks by submarines on the US Pacific Fleet.As the Americans moved westwards,the submarines would be supported by shore-based Mitsubishi G4M (Betty)bombers.Next the Japanese aircraft carriers,deployed in independent divisions forward of the battleline, would engage the American carriers to sink them or smash their flightdecks.With American air cover gone,Japanese fast battleships and heavy cruisers would sweep aside the enemy screening forces and then light cruisers and destroyers would launch massed torpedo attacks.
By this point, the Japanese expected to have inflicted 30% losses on the Americans and the scene would be set for the final gun battle between battleships.
....................
Admiral Nagano was opposed to the Pearl Harbor attack,suggesting that the offensive be only against the European colonial powers.If America itself hadn't been attacked,could Roosevelt have persuaded the American public to go to war over Malaya and Borneo? -
Message 30
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
Admiral Nagano was opposed to the Pearl Harbor attack,suggesting that the offensive be only against the European colonial powers.If America itself hadn't been attacked,could Roosevelt have persuaded the American public to go to war over Malaya and Borneo?Â
Personally I think he had a valid point. -
Message 31
Posted by Poldertijger (U11154078) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
Re: messages 26 and 29.
Hello VF,
You write My gut instict WhiteCamry is that the Japanese if it came to a big battle would...
... push and take the Phillipines but would have held the line whilst beating off the US.By that I mean that any push would against Malaya or the Dutch East Indies would be put on hold until the Pacific fleet was beaten.
I still think that there biggest mistake was not to go for Britain and the Commonwealth aloneÂ
How would the Japanese have been able to go for the Commonwealth without oil?
Hello Triceratops,
You write:
If America itself hadn't been attacked,could Roosevelt have persuaded the American public to go to war over Malaya and Borneo?Â
And VF writes:
Undoutably the Americans would respond,the question is how,...Â
The Americans regarded the Pacific as their back-yard. In 1941 the Japanese had won too much territory for the Americans not to intervene. This feeling was shared by Democrats and Republicans alike. Make no mistake about it; the American export ban was meant as a first step for the USA to wage war against Japan. The only fear that was holding the Roosevelt administration back was the possibility to become bogged down in a war in the Pacific while the strategically far more important fighting was done in Europe. Hitler solved this dilemma for the US administration with his declaration of war.
Regards,
Poldertijger -
Message 32
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
Perhaps one should also mention the whole question of Asian immigration into the USA.. I seem to remember quite a lot of racial antipathy to the large numbers of immigrant Chinese labourers into California in the 1880's when China-towns started emerging. Chiang Khai Sheks wife was, I seem to remember, US born Chinese.
This question of "yellow peril" also seemed to be part of the background to the "Ten Pound Pom" scheme that my parents were looking at c1954. Australia was proud of being one of the "White Dominions" and looked with some trepidation at the overcrowded Far East.
A line clearly needed to be drawn somewhere near the Philippines.
Cass -
Message 33
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
<quote>How would the Japanese have been able to go for the Commonwealth without oil?<quote>
Hi Poldertijger
Well if its a "Commonwealth only" strategy Id say they would have enough.My reasoning would be that Japan had enough oil historically to use seperate fleets to tackle Pearl Harbor,Malaya,Dutch East Indies and the Phillippines.If they are as lightning fast in taking Malaya and Borneo in this scenario as they were historically they could have captured the Dutch oil fields before any meaningful retaliation.The US force at Cavite was not particually large (largest vessels being cruisers) so any attack or support has to come from either Hawaii or San Diego and it has to sail into the Japans backyard.One of the problems Ive always felt with histoical Japanese action was that the defence line was too thin,too far apart and too far away from home ground.Let the Americans come to you ,rather than sailing across the Pacific,augment your carrier power with land based aircraft.
IMHO it would be close,but not impossible.As for the Phillipinnes?Well I think that given a collapse of Malaya/Dutch East Indies etc I think that they would be just as vunerable and difficult to defend as per history.If you sent the US Pacific Fleet to Cavite they are vunerable and a long way from home
<quote>The Americans regarded the Pacific as their back-yard. In 1941 the Japanese had won too much territory for the Americans not to intervene. This feeling was shared by Democrats and Republicans alike. Make no mistake about it; the American export ban was meant as a first step for the USA to wage war against Japan. The only fear that was holding the Roosevelt administration back was the possibility to become bogged down in a war in the Pacific while the strategically far more important fighting was done in Europe. Hitler solved this dilemma for the US administration with his declaration of war.</quote>
The thing is,its a big,big backyard and Japan would be unwise to fight it to close to the USA's back door.Stretch them out rather than the other way round.The big problem with Pearl Harbor was that as a result there was no chance of anything but unconditional surrender.No chance of negotiated peace,no chance of "talks",it was "all or nothing" (excuse the battleship pun!).I do not think for one moment that the Japanese could have beat the US in the long run,but I do have a sneaky suspicion that initially they could have held their own in 1942/3 Pearl Harbor or no Pearl Harbor.The problem for the Japanese is that simply could not outbuild or out produce the US.The loss of those battleships at Pearl was more symbolic than an actual crippling of the US Navy.They were all at least 20 years old,not fast enough to work with carriers and given what happened to POW and Repulse unlikely to survive a coordinated attack unless covered by decent air cover.
Regards
Matt -
Message 34
Posted by wollemi (U2318584) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
#32
Cass
The Ten Pound Pom scheme was part of a much larger migration scheme to increase the population of Australia immediately after WW2.
As a consequence of the Pacific War there was a 'populate or perish' ideology, the idea that a much larger population was needed for self defence
Race restrictions on immigration originated earlier, more as a consequence of the 19th Century movement of Chinese in particular, Canada, NZ Australia and the US all had restrictions on certain racial or ethnic groups - either as 'poll taxes' or exclusion, or the national origins act
If anything, the Pacific War precipitated the decline of these restrictions -
Message 35
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
VF
Was the idea of honourable surrender and negotiated terms within the Japanese mindset, especially the military one, before 1945? I am aware that there is speculation that the Japanese might have surrendered before Hiroshima had they recieved assurances that Hirohito could remain as Emperor, which of course he did.
One previous poster has pointed to the Japanese admiration for things German in the aftermath of the Meiji revolution/restoration. The Japanese Constitution seems to have borrowed more from that of new Germany in 1871 than any other source; and it could seem that the Sammurai and Hun traditions could marry quite well.. It is easy, however, to exaggerate just how genuinely such traits flow all the way through any population.
One interesting aside that is perhaps relevant to points raised on the British Empire thread, is that Mountbatten used Japanese military prisoners of war to help to re-establish law and order in Sarawak, for lack of allied soldiers.
Cass -
Message 36
Posted by youngjerry (U7266788) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
Many thanks to everyone who has made this a most interesting thread.
CASSEROLEON...With ref to your last post above...
I somehow cannot see any lasting marriage between the Third Reich and the Japanese during or after the 1940's.
Surely not with Hitler's racial views would he ever had permitted the Japanese to be equal marriage partners with the 'Master Race'?
Or any other sort of 'partner'? -
Message 37
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
Was the idea of honourable surrender and negotiated terms within the Japanese mindset, especially the military one, before 1945Â
Cass,
Probably not.What I would say is that there was zero chance after Pearl Harbor. -
Message 38
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
wollemi
I did place it in the mid-fifties, but it seemed very much in keeping with the late nineteenth century North American fear that these new continents were a solution to Maltusian problems of "war, famine, disease" etc in various parts of Europe... Geography lessons on Australia in the late Fifties stressed an anxiety that the development of its vast interior was not going to be by means of massive Asian immigration: and the treatment of the Hong Kong "Boat People" much later was definitely "no nonsense".
I can understand that the Pacific War impacted on these things, but I thought that this thread was looking at the wisdom of the attack on Pearl Harbour and just what US attitudes to Japan were previous to that.
I noticed a few years ago in glimpses of Neighbours that Australia is now rather different. In fact the son of some good friends met his Japanese wife over there and that is where they call home.
Cass -
Message 39
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
youngjerry
I was thinking of the late Nineteenth Century German revival that seemed to inspire not only the Japanese but others (including the British Labour Movement) with visions of just what raw militaristic power in the service of "Realpolitik" could achieve.
As for the Nazis treating them as equal partners, why should they had done that any more than they did with the Italian or Spanish Fascists? I think, however, that we too easily dismiss Hitler as just a mad man. In 1940, following the fall of France, the British Cabinet were very worried that France and other countries would accept a German proposal to create some kind of Common Market- as the small states of Germany had done a hundred years before- with naturally Germany taking its rightful leading position-- as it is doing once more.
As for events in the Far East there is the interesting case of Subhas Chadra Bose, the Indian who became his own version of a "Feuhrer" or "Duce", and who made his way to Berlin during the War. The Germans arranged for him to be taken by U-boat to meet up with the Japanese after the fall of Singapore.. There he and the Japanese launched an "Asia for the Asians" initiative based on an "Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" in which the over-arching role of the Western Imperial Powers would be assumed by Japan.
Subhas Chandra Bose helped to recruit a Nationalist Indian Army amongst Indian prisoners of war, and they fought alongside the Japanese in Malaya. Bose died in a plane crash, but some of the others were tried for treason after the war. The trial was set probably with an eye on history for 5 November-- "remember remember the Fifth of November Gunpowder Treason and Plot". But they were defended by some of the leaders of Congress- like Gandhi British educated barristers- who turned them into national heros.. I would imagine that this too played on the minds of those who were trying to arrange for a smooth transition to Independence.
As I understand it those who were "turn-coats" and fought against British India now receive pensions, while those who stayed loyal to the Allied cause do not.
Perhaps someone will be so kind as to correct me if I am wrong.
cass -
Message 40
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
VF
I think we are agreed.. But that "burning bridges" aspect of the plan would surely have appealed to some sections of the Japanese military. Sometimes you just have to have a "do or die" spirit in order "to change the course of history". Are there not examples of commanders of invading forces destroying the boats so the men know there is no turning back? Burning bridges too.
Cass -
Message 41
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
Sometimes you just have to have a "do or die" spirit in order "to change the course of history". Are there not examples of commanders of invading forces destroying the boats so the men know there is no turning back? Burning bridges tooÂ
Cass,
I think that the problem was the "Banzai" spirit itself! Sometimes discretion is the better part of valour and playing the long game a more sensible move. I think half the problem the Japanes had is that the had "Banzai" and nothing else,no plan B.
The problem with Banzai is that once the enemy had got used to the initial shock and learned to deal with it the Japanese ended losing far more of their troops than the enemy without achieving the objective.You also lost the cream of your armed service which couldnt be replaced in any hurry.There is a famous action against the Americans at Guadalcanal where the Japanese charged bayonets fixed accross a well defended creek,not just once but repeatedly until they ran out of men.Crazy.
Bushido may have helped the Japanese gain early victories but in the end it resulted in them being "hoist by there own petard". -
Message 42
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
VF
I absolutely agree..
An exchange today with Thomas B had reminded me that the history project that I did in my early teens based on Marlborough's Blenheim Campaign was probably one of the most formative experiences in my childhood..
And one of the great lessons for an angry young "working class kid" fed up with histories in which great generals won battles- fought by their troops, was the great care that Marlborough took to provide munitions and look after his men on that audacious strike right across the heart of Europe.
The qualities that scared the French at Blenheim, as the "British and Allied" infantry marched across the normally marshy flats in formal military order, advancing without firing in accordance with orders from the officer who said that they could not fire until his sword actually touched the French ballustrades, was only really achievable when the men understood that their General had cared for them and was not prepared to throw their lives away unnecessarily.
I remember my older sister once bringing home a Yank who had fought in I think Korea. He had been appalled by the low value apparently placed on human life in the Orient, retailing gory scenes that he had witnessed in the interrogation of prisoners.
Further to my earlier coffee point,in a lyric about the making of an English peace I wrote a verse:
"And when the tide of violence rose in a mighty flood
Drug-eyed mounted dragon men swooped for gold and blood.
In common cause subject and king made the Viking cease
And accept an English Danelaw would be defined by English Peace.
Then successive English Kings like Harold Bill and such
Had to learn that the great men of war still must keep a common touch."
In the machine age it is all too easy to think that the technology is going to dominate, or people just working as extensions of technology-- but some of us still believe that our greatest asset as human beings is our humanity.
Cass -
Message 43
Posted by Triceratops (U3420301) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
Japan's idea of negotiated terms were adopted at an Imperial Conference presided over by the Emperor on 6th September 1941. In summary, Japan's minimum demands and maximum concessions were:
1)United States and Great Britain must let Japan settle "China Incident",must close Burma Road and give no more assistance to Chiang Kai-shek
2)There must be no increase of British or American military forces,even in their own possessions
3)No interference with Japanese-French relations as to Indochina
4)American co-operation for obtaining needed raw materials,by restoration of free trade and assisting Japan "to establish close economic relations with Thai and Netherlands East Indies"
5)Japan will not use Indochina as a base of operations against any country except China and will evacuate Indochina "as soon as a just peace is established in the Far East"
6)Japan will guarantee the neutrality of the Phillipines.
These minimum demands surfaced as Proposal B which Ambassador Nomura was instructed to present to the US on 5 November 1941. -
Message 44
Posted by Triceratops (U3420301) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
A link about the various talks prior to 7th December;
-
Message 45
Posted by rhmnney (U14528380) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
CASSEROLEON. that's a bit rich---"the way the USA finally got into the First World War", you think the USA is a hand maiden of Britain. There are more Americans of German ancestry in the USA than English so why should the USA favor Britain? Before and after Dunkirk the cry was, "Why aren't the Americans here to help us. Easy you nut-head Britain declared War against Germany not the USA, I was there when they shouted it. Shut the odds to the Germans get a bloody nose and squeal like a pig and ask why aren't the Americans here to help them.
The greatest isolationists before WW2 were the British who had emigrated to the USA before WW1 and WW2, and they lead the way to keep America out of the War in Europe, they spoke the truth, the Europeans have been at War for over a thousand years so if they can't live together let them fight their own battles. We moved here to the USA in 1955 and have four sons born here, my wife and I would never allow either of them to fight for the British regardless of in any army.
I was an Infantryman in WW2 and the last two years of service was to help deny self determination to 600,000,000 people in India and Britain saying they were fighting for Freedom. The British government promised India that they would leave them to be free at the end of the War, it took the Labor government to do it that was their promise if elected. British finally leaving in 1947. I carried an Enfield No.4 .303 for four and a half years, now I have one in a cupboard as a memento. -
Message 46
Posted by wollemi (U2318584) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
#35
.. Mountabatten used Japanese military prisoners of war to help to re-establish law and order in Sarawak, for lack of allied soldiersÂ
Cass, I think this refers to Vietnam postwar not Sarawak, and remains something of a scandal
It was to control the population until the French arrived to re-establish colonial rule and prevent an insurgency for independenc from that rule
French IndoChina had been Vichy, and Ho et al had fought against the Japanese on the side of the allies, As Japan surrendered, he made a plea to the US for support for an independent Vietnam free of the French
It's really the origins of what later became the Vietnam War -
Message 47
Posted by wollemi (U2318584) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
The Pacific War had a subtext that the Japanese used very effectively - to free the Asian region of European colonial rule.
There was also considerable collaboration with the Japanese because of this subtext, though the Japanese rather damaged their cause with their cruelty in the occupied countries -
Message 48
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
rhmnney
You seem to have read all kinds of things into my remark.. The US entry into the First World War indicated just how difficult it was for a such a country to stay out of a war fought on such a scale. The sinking of the Lusitania suggested that, but it was the telegram to Mexico that tipped the balance. All I was suggesting was that the Japanese might calculate from that past that something similar might happen again.
I thus never expressed any view that the USA should have been involved in the war. Britain's political circles decided that our Treaty Obligations to Belgium were not only a legal and moral obligation, but ones taken on in the national interest. The USA had no cause to fight for Belgium.
As for before and after Dunkerque, I was not around, but I have been drawing on over the last couple of days on the part of Field Marshall Montgomery's Memoirs in which he deals with the need to drastically tackle the question of physical, mental and moral fitness in Britain when he was given his first command after Dunkirk. Before the IWW he had come from Tasmania to board at St Paul's with a "colonials" fitness, and, having never played rugby or cricket before, within a couple of years was captaining his school teams in both. That says much about him, but also much about the other boys.
D.H. Lawrence wrote scathingly of the men of the twenties, Lord Chatterly's wheel-chair bound condition somehow summing it up. And Seebohm Rowntree in his 1936 edition of "The Human Needs of Labour" prefaced with the fact that the Government had just discovered the appalling state of fitness in the country and had instituted a programme to improve on it- in case Appeasement failed.
So I can well-believe that, rather like the feeble English football team, there were many people looking around- as you say- for "the US cavalry" to come along and "save the day".
Cass -
Message 49
Posted by CASSEROLEON (U11049737) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
wollemi
You may well be right.. I have looked in "The White Rajahs of Sarawak" where I expected to find what I had read.. Not there- though I found the Japanese attrocities against civilian populations that may have linked that information to that place in my mind.. Not in the Mountbatten chapter in "Eminent Churchillians" either.. I may have picked it up from an interview with Lord M on TV.
Cass -
Message 50
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Wednesday, 30th June 2010
Mountabatten used Japanese military prisoners of war to help to re-establish law and order in Sarawak, for lack of allied soldiersÂ
Im almost 98% certain that I remember Mountbatten being interviwed and he commented that to keep law and order in Singapore and Malaya the Japanese Army were instructed to carry on and keep the peace until the British army arrived. I think that was int "The World At War" but I would have to check my copies and or check my copy of Mountbattens biography to be sure.
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