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What made the Alies win the war
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Message 1.Â
Posted by JPYNON (U14460164) on Monday, 10th May 2010
I think it is intrasting about how the under dogs won the war
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Message 2
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Monday, 10th May 2010
Numbers and superior intelligence
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Message 3
This posting has been hidden during moderation because it broke the in some way.
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Message 4
Posted by Vizzer aka U_numbers (U2011621) on Monday, 10th May 2010
I think it is intrasting about how the under dogs won the war What underdogs are you referring to ?Â
Good question. And - moreover - what war is being referred to? -
Message 5
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Monday, 10th May 2010
I think it is intrasting about how the under dogs won the warÂ
Were the allies the under-dogs?
In 1939 the British and French empires out numbered the German and Italian. Their navies were much superior to the Axis, their tank forces were as good as the German's in 1940 too.
Even with the fall of France, Britain still had allies from the commonwealth and volunteers from eastern Europe.
Britain still possessed a huge navy and had fought the battle of Britain on pretty even terms. British industrial capacity out-produced Germany in aircraft at a rate of 3:1 during summer 1940.
The Britsih Empire could finance the war and draw on American finance. The US also pushed the limits of neutrality to breaking point in the North Atlantic even before the US officially joined the war.
Once the USSR was attacked, the allies gained a vast num ber of soldiers. Soviet industrial capacity came back on line and by 1943 was turning out tanks faster then the Germans.
The addition of Japan did little to favour Axis war efforts and guaranteed the involvement of the USA. The fearsome Japanese navy was quickly matched and surpassed by America shipyards and 80% of the Japanese army was bogged down in China (another massive source of soldiers for the Allies). -
Message 6
Posted by LairigGhru (U14051689) on Tuesday, 11th May 2010
cloudyj,
I feel that the picture you paint is far too rosy, and the reality was that our success was in fact a very close-run thing. Remember our comical little Matilda tank that was in service at the start of the war?
My answer to the OP would be: (a) Technology, e.g. Bletchley Park and radar, (b) the U.S.A.'s eventual joining in. (c) Hitler's stupidity in launching Operation Barbarossa.
Consider just one difference brought about by Bletchley Park - the role it played in bringing about the Battle of Matapan. Had that event not taken place, Italy's navy would have changed the game plan of everything that subsequently occurred in the Mediterranean - including our North African campaign. -
Message 7
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Tuesday, 11th May 2010
If I remember correctly, Patton once made a statement to the extent that "fuel is the pink blood of war".
I think no single factor was more determining for the outcome of WWII than the availability of fuel, either from oil or coal. As the axis powers were not self-sufficient, they were dependent on shrinking stocks and small amounts of synthetic fuels. Their strategy was often determined by their thirst for fuel, in the form of Hitler's attempt to conquer the oil fields of the Caucasus and Japan's determination to grab the oil sources of South-East Asia.
Hitler's defeat in front of Moscow, the submarine warfare against Japanese tankers in the Pacific, and Allied bombing of the German oil industry in 1944-1945 were decisive. So was the failure of the German attempt in 1941-1942 to halt Britain's imports by the U-boat offensive. This was the original War for Oil.
The impact was far-reaching. German industrial capacity throughout the war was restricted by shortages of coal, and the inability to provide the steel industry with a sufficient supply to reach the ambitious production goals. Italy, dependent as it was on Germany supplying scarce fuel, was unable to build a modern war industry. (The occupied countries of Europe were all net importers.) Japan's Navy saw its large pre-war stocks dwindle at an alarming rate and by 1944 was no longer able to maintain the fleet in home waters.
Also in tactical terms, fuel shortages contributed greatly to the Axis' weakness in tactical and strategic mobility and their increasing vulnerability on the battlefield. It also decided the air war for the Allies, as the Axis powers lost the ability to provide their aircrew with an acceptable level of training. On the debit side for the Allies, the fuel shortages triggered by a rapid advance and a failure to open the port of Antwerp prevented victory in 1944. -
Message 8
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 11th May 2010
A firmly defined goal of unconditional surrender.
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Message 9
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Tuesday, 11th May 2010
I think it is intrasting about how the under dogs won the warÂ
Because Hitler (and his Japanese friends) kept adding on more and more Allies till they weren't the underdogs any more. -
Message 10
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Tuesday, 11th May 2010
LairigGhru The Matilda was a good as many of the German tanks of 1939/40. It's armour good stop most A/T shells. The problem was like most of the allied armour it was used wrongly. The Germans perfected the use of close support using tanks and aircraft. The British tankers seemed to think they had changed their horses for tanks and acted accordingly. The Matilda went on to give stirling service in North Africa until it was finely outgunned out armoured and replaced. My late Father in Law was taken off Matildas in North Africa and given Honeys. Now they were C**p. They soon dumped them for Grants then Shermans.
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Message 11
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Tuesday, 11th May 2010
LairigGhru,
I feel that the picture you paint is far too rosy, and the reality was that our success was in fact a very close-run thing. Remember our comical little Matilda tank that was in service at the start of the war?Â
It certainly was a rosy picture and hides many, many allied weaknesses which the Axis took advantage of. French morale and command being a major failing during the campaigns in 1940. British and French tanks suffered from lack of radios for instance. But whilst we had Matildas and the French their equally comic H35s, the Germans had their PzIs and the old Czech tanks which were out of date by May 1940. And although the Royal Navy was vastly superior to the German and Italian navies, it had a lot of sea to cover and the Italian navy made a serious threat in the Med. Conversely, the large Italian army had little more morale than the French, many of the conscripts having absolutely no desire to fight for a fascist government.
My point is that on paper, at least, there was an argument for the Axis to be seen as the under-dog, not the allies.
Bletchley Park was a huge asset for the allies, no denying that. The allies suffered badly in the Atlantic whenever Germany cracked allied codes! Intelligence was crucial to both sides and the allies certainly took the edge.
And, as someone else said, the Axis had the knack of giving allies to the allies. Swelling the numbers of allies to overwhelming odds. -
Message 12
Posted by vesturiiis (U13688567) on Tuesday, 11th May 2010
Maybe just maybe the Allies won because they had moral fibre on their side. What happened to the 1000yr Reich even though it seemed invincible in 1941, did it last 15years.
North America slow to develop their armed forces were really rolling by the later part of the war.
The French Maquis as an example had become a real problem for the Germans by 1944.
Tyranny just doesn't last! -
Message 13
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Tuesday, 11th May 2010
Maybe just maybe the Allies won because they had moral fibre on their side.Â
Really?
I don't intend to belittle the sacrifices of allied servicemen, but how far does moral fibre go when your opponent has all the tanks, planes, ships and men? And what determination did the Japanese soldier lack?
German tank production peaked in 1944 at about level with that of the US and less than 2/3 of the USSR's. That's over 5 tanks for every two German tanks. Nor was the average German tank technically superior.
The Japanese navy managed to launch 18 aircraft carriers to 31 US carrier. Despite the loss of allied shipping to U-boats, there was a greater tonnage of merchant ships afloat in 1943 than in 1939. The Japanese were unable to replace their losses. -
Message 14
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Wednesday, 12th May 2010
In addition to the point made by Lairig and Mutatis's points in posts 6 and 7, I would add the English Channel as a reason that Britain held out. If a land bridge 20 miles wide had existed across the channel, things would have been different.
Also, I think what Vesturiiis was trying to say with reference to 'moral fibre' was really about 'moral right', ie, we were right, the Germans and Japanese were wrong. And, more than that, they were outright barbarians.
Tyranny does not last if enough people stand up to it. Enough people did. -
Message 15
Posted by vesturiiis (U13688567) on Wednesday, 12th May 2010
Thank-you TimTrack, that is exactly what I meant, I was going to rewrite that it was a probably the most maralistic conflict we can imagine. Not only the Allies service people but picture those at home helping with the war effort, kids collecting scrap mtal, farmers going all out, Grandma fixing care packages, trappers walking miles in from the bush to give a hand. The collective Allied effort was awesome. I realize the Axis powers had their go but it seemed to be a downward slope.
Also it is mentioned that 80% of the Japanese army was tied up in China-can that be true?
thanks IAN -
Message 16
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Wednesday, 12th May 2010
Thanks for expanding your comment Ian. Though a moralistic campaign only really applies to the western powers. The Soviets, whilst fighting one evil were determined to impose one almost as repugnant, as were the Communist Chinese. Some Indian nationalists found little reason to fight for the British Empire.
The British goverment mobilized the country for war very early on and waged a huge propoganda campaign to keep spirits up - the railings for Spitfires collections being one. Spitfire were made of aluminium (not in short supply). At the end of the war vast quantities of scrap metal were found. And the British Communist Party opposed the war effort consistantly between September '39 and June '41. And the French were even less determined to fight.
Also it is mentioned that 80% of the Japanese army was tied up in China-can that be true?Â
I too was astonished when I read this:
"the Japanese had mobilised 6 million men, five-sixths of those deployed outside the home islands had been stationed in China" The Second World War, p 479 - John Keegan.
I'm with Turenne who said "God is on the side of the big battalions". And those of the allies were huge.
I know wikipedia has its limitations and some of the content here contradicts itself, but the figures here speak volumes:
Apart from numbers of submarines, there's scarely a wepon where the allies didn't outnumber the Axis by 5:1! -
Message 17
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Thursday, 13th May 2010
"the Japanese had mobilised 6 million men, five-sixths of those deployed outside the home islands had been stationed in China" The Second World War, p 479 - John Keegan.
I did not know the exact numbers, but a map and a bot of knowledge of population numbers will tell you where Japan had to place its numbers.
The problem is that the US tells its Pacific campaign story so well, and so often, that the rest gets rather shut out so that everyone assumes the US faced the bulk of the Japanese. The current mini-series 'Pacific' being another go, though less wholesome and hearty than usual in that it shows the grime, the grot and the downright viciousness of it all. -
Message 18
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Thursday, 13th May 2010
I referred to it above but it's apparently lost in the traffic. This time I'll be more specific:
FDR's firm, declared demand for the Axis' unconditional surrender.
You can have all the big battalions and battleships you want; they'll keep you in the war but they won't necessarily win the war for you. If you don't make up your mind what you want from the war then you'll never get it. To wit, FDR's war aim in WW2 v. LBJ's war non-aim in Vietnam. -
Message 19
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Thursday, 13th May 2010
The problem is that the US tells its Pacific campaign story so well, and so often, that the rest gets rather shut out so that everyone assumes the US faced the bulk of the JapaneseÂ
It's hard to find anything to the contrary which isn't the "Burma and nothing else"! I was trying to find a book on the general war in the east and they're few and far between. Even book about Chinese history often treat the conflict as a footnote in the rise of Mao.
The point still remians that the Axis tended to acquire alliances which brought their own problems, and often even more resources for the Allies.
WhiteCamry, a firm goal helps, but something other than bloody-mindedness has to achieve that goal. Hence the battalions and battleships. Incidentally, I think General Giap would have disagreed that the US had the big battalions in Vietnam - a huge technological edge, but Giap was playing a long game with generations of Vietnamese, not just an army. -
Message 20
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Friday, 14th May 2010
cloudyj
WhiteCamry, a firm goal helps, but something other than bloody-mindedness has to achieve that goal. Hence the battalions and battleships. Incidentally, I think General Giap would have disagreed that the US had the big battalions in Vietnam - a huge technological edge, but Giap was playing a long game with generations of Vietnamese, not just an army.Â
Ho Chi Minh played the long game; Vo Nguyen Giap was his top player. But the fact that he played the long game is proof positive that "bloody-mindedness," as you call it, is indispensable to winning a war, regardless of battleships, big battalions or technology - or lack thereof. Unlike his opponents throughout his life, Ho knew what he wanted from a war and knew how to get it.
Compare it with FDR's own demand for Axis' unconditional surrender. The US was the last of the Big Three into the war, yet neither of the other two had yet set any terms for victory beyond "we shall never surrender." The UK hadn't the resources; the USSR had but Stalin had his doubts about the West, not to mention a history of making his own deals with Hitler.
FDR also knew there could be no lasting peace as long as the Germans and Japanese governments were around. He realized he was in a position to set the terms of victory and thereby membership in the Alliance, which is what he did at Casablanca. -
Message 21
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Friday, 14th May 2010
FDR also knew there could be no lasting peace as long as the Germans and Japanese governments were around. He realized he was in a position to set the terms of victory and thereby membership in the Alliance, which is what he did at CasablancaÂ
More to the point, he probably knew that such a disparate bunch of Allies could never come up with an armistice or peace deal acceptable to all, so that there was nothing to do except fight on until they met in the middle, and then hope for the best. -
Message 22
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Monday, 17th May 2010
Mikestone8
More to the point, he probably knew that such a disparate bunch of Allies could never come up with an armistice or peace deal acceptable to all, so that there was nothing to do except fight on until they met in the middle, and then hope for the best.Â
FDR knew Hitler's rise was founded on the "stab on the back" myth, namely that Germany would have won in 1918 but, supposedly, for certain people in German society - people whom the Nazis found useful to blame. With unconditional surrender there'd be no room for that again. -
Message 23
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Monday, 17th May 2010
FDR knew Hitler's rise was founded on the "stab on the back" myth, namely that Germany would have won in 1918 but, supposedly, for certain people in German society - people whom the Nazis found useful to blame. With unconditional surrender there'd be no room for that again.Â
Did it particularly matter what FDR thought?
He had no power to decide on what basis the war would end. It was Stalin, commanding the biggest Allied armies, who would determine that. There was nothing much for FDR (or Churchill) to do except say ditto. -
Message 24
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Monday, 17th May 2010
Mikestone8,
Did it particularly matter what FDR thought?
He had no power to decide on what basis the war would end. It was Stalin, commanding the biggest Allied armies, who would determine that. There was nothing much for FDR (or Churchill) to do except say ditto.Â
Stalin indeed commanded the biggest armies but he didn't demand unconditional surrender. Indeed, he was doubtful of the Western allies to the point of paranoia - as he was of everyone else. Could he have won the war on his own, anyway? Most probably, but who knew he wouldn't have made his own Armistice with Hitler?
Only after FDR sealed the Alliance with his Casablanca demand did Stalin decide how much of Eastern Europe he could hold.
Churchill wasn't above making an Armistice if Hitler could have been deposed in the process; without FDR's demand and if the July 20 plot succeeded, who knows?
So, yes, what FDR thought mattered to all concerned. -
Message 25
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Monday, 17th May 2010
Let's be clear, if there was an underdog in WWII, it was Germany, a nation of less than 70 million, which, by the foolish decisions of its Fuhrer, fought a host of nations with a combined population of over 500 million. Hitler's most idiotic mistake was to attack the Soviet Union, and that one enterprise ended up consuming 80% of Germay's military resources.
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Message 26
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Monday, 17th May 2010
Ho Chi Minh played the long game; Vo Nguyen Giap was his top player. But the fact that he played the long game is proof positive that "bloody-mindedness," as you call it, is indispensable to winning a war, regardless of battleships, big battalions or technology - or lack thereof. Unlike his opponents throughout his life, Ho knew what he wanted from a war and knew how to get it.
Compare it with FDR's own demand for Axis' unconditional surrender. The US was the last of the Big Three into the war, yet neither of the other two had yet set any terms for victory beyond "we shall never surrender." The UK hadn't the resources; the USSR had but Stalin had his doubts about the West, not to mention a history of making his own deals with Hitler.Â
Lacking the will to fight a war can certainly lose it, but does wishful thinking really win wars unless the enemy lacks the will to win?
Having said that, I'm coming round to the benefits of the clear and determined vision. I wonder if the fact that FDR declared the aim is important. If Petain had determined it in 1940, I suspect it wouldn't have made the difference. FDR had the resources and allies to deliver his goal nor, crucially, was that goal really in doubt if the US stayed the course. -
Message 27
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 18th May 2010
cloudyj,
Lacking the will to fight a war can certainly lose it, but does wishful thinking really win wars unless the enemy lacks the will to win?Â
LBJ had a wish - mostly to not lose; Ho Chi Minh had the will to win.
Having said that, I'm coming round to the benefits of the clear and determined vision. I wonder if the fact that FDR declared the aim is important. If Petain had determined it in 1940, I suspect it wouldn't have made the difference.Â
DeGaulle had even less to work with, as did Ho Chi Minh. Without the will to win material resources mean nothing; with the will to win, material, recruits and allies may be found eventually.
FDR had the resources and allies to deliver his goal nor, crucially, was that goal really in doubt if the US stayed the course.Â
To borrow a hack '60s cliche, if you don't know where you're going then you'll end up somewhere else. Until FDR spoke up, the possibility of an Armistice was in the back of everybody's mind. Of course, the Allies could expect to keep fighting until they could get better terms. But no one dared say out loud what those terms could be or when they could begin negotiations. When FDR demanded unconditional surrender the terms and destination were set. -
Message 28
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Tuesday, 18th May 2010
Without the will to win material resources mean nothing; with the will to win, material, recruits and allies may be found eventually.Â
But without the material resources, the will to win means nothing either.
The North Vietnamese Army, after the initial period was actually quite well resourced by Russians and Chinese (including initially large amounts of ex-American equipment captured in Korea. -
Message 29
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Wednesday, 19th May 2010
cloudyj,
But without the material resources, the will to win means nothing either.
The North Vietnamese Army, after the initial period was actually quite well resourced by Russians and Chinese (including initially large amounts of ex-American equipment captured in KoreaÂ
Which demonstrates my point. -
Message 30
Posted by vesturiiis (U13688567) on Tuesday, 25th May 2010
Hi WhiteCamry
Some feel that the Allies demanding unconditional surrender prolonged the war in that German hierarchy (sans Hitler) may have really seen the need to give in as their forces were at apoint of no return.
Would the Allies have been reticent to peace terms or were they just going to mow the enemy down whatever the cost?
thanks IAN -
Message 31
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Tuesday, 25th May 2010
They didn't really have a choice.
Had hostilities ceased with Germany still unconquered, Stalin would have feared a coalition of Germany and the West against him, whilst the Western Powers would have similarly feared a revival of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Pressing on until they met in the middle was the only option on which they could all agree. Anything else would have risked the break-up of the Allied coalition. -
Message 32
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Wednesday, 26th May 2010
"...Some feel that the Allies demanding unconditional surrender prolonged the war in that German hierarchy (sans Hitler) may have really seen the need to give in as their forces were at apoint of no return..."
The problem here is that the Nazi hierarchy never was sans Hitler, or the other leading Nazis, unfortunately. Even if the bomb plot had succeeded, the allies would still have to decide how to react to any offer from the Germans. It would still be difficult to see any policy other thab unconditional surrender.
Why would the allies allow the possibility of a resurgent Germany under new Nazi leadership ?
How would the public react when they realised what was going on in the camps ?
Also, Mikestone is correct. How would the western allies react if the Soviets carried on attacking ?
What if the Soviets attempted a separate peace (not that I think they would have by 1944) ?
In any case, the unconditional surrender policy does not mean refusal to take a surrender. On the contrary. It just demands that the enemy hand themselves over. It happened throughout the war, in small numbers. So it would not entail mowing Germans down regardless. It means mowing them down until they stop shooting at the allies. Not un-reasonable, given the actions of the German military. -
Message 33
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Wednesday, 26th May 2010
Good points, TT. Although there were some informal contacts with the German Resistance during WWII Churchill ordered all official contact with it to be broken off for fear that, if Stalin found out, he would assume, or pretend, Britain was prepared to conclude a separate peace with Germany and use that as an excuse for making his own separate deal with Hitler which would have seriously undermined the war effort, to say the least.
Whilst Churchill was certainly caught by surprise by FDR's statement which was delivered to an informal press conference at Casablanca without any prior consultation with Curchill (FDR seemed heedless of the implications, especially regarding the post-war governance of Germany) the main intention seems to have been to send a message to Uncle Joe (who was, of course, not present at Casablanca) that the Western Allies would not contemplate doing a separate deal with Germany.
Both leaders had been members of their respective wartime administrations when the Bolsheviks had signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 and were constantly aware of the catastrophic implications for the West if the Soviets pulled out of the war. -
Message 34
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Wednesday, 26th May 2010
vesturiiis
Some feel that the Allies demanding unconditional surrender prolonged the war in that German hierarchy (sans Hitler) may have really seen the need to give in as their forces were at apoint of no return.Â
Let "Some" post his/her own opinion on the subject.
Would the Allies have been reticent to peace terms or were they just going to mow the enemy down whatever the cost?Â
Before the Casablanca Conference the Allies only terms had been Churchill's pre-Battle-of-Britain declaration "we shall never surrender." Which is all very well when on the defense. But by the time of the Conference all the Big Three Allies were in the war and on the offense; the Soviets at Stalingrad and the Western Allies in Tunisia.
In short, it was time to think in terms of winning. Stalin, paranoid as ever, mistrusted the Western Allies. Plus, he'd once negotiated a surprise treaty with Hitler; why not a second time?
Both Churchill and FDR knew - as did the rest of the planet - the importance of the Soviets in the war. However, Churchill mistrusted Stalin enough to entertain notions of negotiating with anyone who overthrew Hitler, but who knew if that would ever happen no matter how much the Allies closed in? Thus, both Churchill and Stalin would have had cause to negotiate an armistice if the circumstances arose.
Both Churchill and FDR had watched the rise of Hitler from the beginning. Both agreed there could be no peace as long as Hitler was around. Both knew that Hitler's rise was founded on the "stab-in-the-back" myth, that Germany would have won the first war but for "certain elements." But FDR was willing to go further than Churchill because he had the resources to do so.
Like everyone else, FDR had seen what a pointless sham the League of Nations was, much of it due to the US refusal to join. He wanted to put a more effective organization in its place, one which would succeed where the LN had failed; that meant US membership. Unlike in 1919, in 1943 the US was in a position to set terms for membership in any new organization. Which meant setting terms for membership in the wartime Alliance. Which meant setting the terms of victory. Which meant no armistice and thus no room for a new "stab in the back" myth. Which meant Germany's unconditional surrender.
That it meant leaving the Soviets in charge of Eastern Europe was a given. FDR showed little interest in the fabled European "balance of power" on which Churchill was raised. Yes, he said he "could handle Uncle Joe" Stalin but that was one of his trademark optimistic smokescreens for his critics; he later confided to an aide that he knew Yalta was a bad agreement but that it was the best he could do. -
Message 35
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Wednesday, 26th May 2010
Camry, I think your contribution is very cogent.
I would like to know what was going through Churchill's mind. The whole reason Britain declare war on Germany was because Germany had invaded Poland. Polish people spoke to Churchill who gave them assurances that their country would be freed (or words to that effect). Yet he seems to have fully accepted the fate of Poland, along with the whole of Eastern Europe, which was to become almost imperial possessions of the Soviet Union. Did Churchill expect that Stalin would really allow Polish independence? Or did he feel that, to strike an agreement with the Soviet Union (an absolutely vital ally) he had to cave in and let Stalin grab half of Europe? -
Message 36
Posted by vesturiiis (U13688567) on Wednesday, 26th May 2010
Hi all
Thank-you for the enlightening posts, my thoughts on what unconditional surrender means is clearer.
However in Japan's case did the Allies persue meaningfull negotiations before dropping the Bomb.
Some say it did not have to go that far that the Japanese were on the cusp of surrendering.
thanks IAN -
Message 37
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Wednesday, 26th May 2010
Fascinating "...The whole reason Britain declare war on Germany was because Germany had invaded Poland...."
I would suggest that Poland was, more less, a pretext for war. Britain (and France) would have loved to preserve Polish freedom, but that was a secondary to other consideratins.
The actual reason was stopping the growth of German power. If we did not stop Germany when they invaded Poland, it might well have been too late, and we may have been next. Actually, it very nearly was too late.
By the end of the war, the situation on the ground had changed. The Soviets were the new rising power, but they, like us, were exhausted in 1945.
Both the declaration of war in 1939 and the awful settlement of 1945 were acts of pragmatic, and tough, political decisions. -
Message 38
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Wednesday, 26th May 2010
Yes, Tim, pragamtism usually rules in the long run. I hope we can depend on our politicians to always do 'what is right', and to ensure 'what is right' coincides with what is realistic at the time!
I think 'everyone' knew that there was very little we could realistically do to aid Poland in 1939, and even less we could do in 1945, unless the Yanks did what Good Ol' Georgie Patton wanted, and 'Jest keep on driving all the way to Moscow' when Hitler was beaten. Not an option, I think, with Japan still very much active, and the whole of Europe on it's knees after years to slaughter. -
Message 39
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Wednesday, 26th May 2010
I would suggest that Poland was, more less, a pretext for war.Â
It was Hitler who provided the "pretext" for war not the West. Britain and France had bent over backwards, far too far in my view, to accommodate German expansionism and Hitler's ambition before 1939. Once he resorted to force of arms against a country to whom the Allies had given a solemn guarantee there was no other alternative but to go to war, ill-prepared for it though we were. The situation was no different, as far as Britain was concerned, in 1939 from what it had been in 1914. -
Message 40
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Thursday, 27th May 2010
Morning all,
It was above all the Allies that had the ability to respond rapidly to the the developments and twists of the war that was the true winner plus the industrial power to meet those challenges.
Whilst the German was losing his way by concentrating on design quality the mass production of the Americans(copied by Stalin) reached unparalleled statistics, where for example they could not only keep up with but overtake the Atlantic shipping losses. The amount of Liberty ships built was quite phenomenal and quite undreamt of by those industrialists who were nurtured in the ways of pre-war productivity.
Not to forget the rapid advances by the Allies of radar - both airborne and surface to surface which helped to defeat the submarine. And when the Nazi's came up with the Snorkel we devised Hedgehog and the 'sniffer'.
Just a look at the total Allied war production of lorries, jeeps, gliders and so on is truly mind stretching.
Then there were Liberator bombers rolling off the lines at one an hour. The P.39 swarming the skies over Germany to be joined later by the squadrons of P.51s, a fighter that could go to Berlin and back was way beyond the capability of the Nazi war effort particularly as they were harassed day and night by the Allied air effort.
The Tiger tank, King Tiger and the Panther were great but fortunately for the Allies the technology was just a little too advanced for the abilities of the Nazi production methods.
They may have outclassed the T.34 and the Sherman but again the logistics of the Allies was too great and they did not have the time or the resources to rectify those faults - they were swamped. As I believe Stalin himself said 'Quantity has its own quality.'
Added to all this the Nazi's were occupying vast areas which required constant effort to control - a war on three fronts and with a Commander that was rapidly losing control of his mental powers but supported by a corrupt, ruthless hierarchy.
One other point - perhaps the Allies ability to mobilise their womenfolk had quite a bit to do with the ultimate victory too? -
Message 41
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Thursday, 27th May 2010
Allan D,
Absolutely. As I see it the main principle behind the guarantees offered were as a preventative to hostile acts and when that and the neutrally of nations were violated - then there was no other choice open to the British. -
Message 42
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Thursday, 27th May 2010
"...One other point - perhaps the Allies ability to mobilise their womenfolk had quite a bit to do with the ultimate victory too?..."
This is an interesting point in itself.
Nazi political theory of women as the domesticated home maker clashed with the desire to increase the workforce.
However, other realities also interrupt this flow of thought. Germany had access to massive numbers of slave labour. Why inconvenience the home front by calling up the women, thusly damaging morale, to the factories when you have all those free, expendable claves ? -
Message 43
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Thursday, 27th May 2010
vesturiiis,
However in Japan's case did the Allies persue meaningfull negotiations before dropping the Bomb.
Some say it did not have to go that far that the Japanese were on the cusp of surrendering.Â
As I said above, let "Some" post his/her own thoughts here. Speak for yourself.
The Allies didn't pursue "meaningful negotiations" with Japan; they wanted Japan's unconditional surrender "or face prompt and utter destruction" as was written in the Potsdam Declaration. The Japanese openly rejected this.
Battered as they were, the Japanese weren't "on the cusp of surrendering." Instead, they sent out peace feelers via the USSR with whom they were still neutral, hoping to negotiate what the Allies had repeatedly said was non-negotiable. -
Message 44
Posted by vesturiiis (U13688567) on Thursday, 27th May 2010
Gosh White Camry
I was using "some say" in the colonial dialect meaning
"to surmise but don't assume you know everything"
Sorry I won't use it any more as I think it boosts your BP(blood pressure)by a good 20points and I have a feeling that is a little dangerous, for you.
And on the topic of Japenese surrender what were they going to do at this stage (late 1944) invade Canada?
thanks IAN -
Message 45
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Friday, 28th May 2010
TimTrack,
I suspect that the use of unwilling, half starved slaves are not as efficacious as volunteer women who have the benefit of morale on their side and/or the conviction of ultimate victory(as you intimated, the very opposite may have been the case for the German woman).
Then there's the matter of slave transport(administration, guards etc) The weaker the slave the greater the need to replace them. Sabotage by slaves - guards needed to prevent same.
I wonder if anyone has ever compiled statistics or a comparison study? -
Message 46
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Friday, 28th May 2010
Spruggles,
"...I suspect that the use of unwilling, half starved slaves are not as efficacious as volunteer women..."
Well, no, not on one to one basis, but by the millions, the equation changes.
"...The weaker the slave the greater the need to replace them..."
Indeed. But working the slave to death was not seen as much of a problem to the Nazis. Actually, it was part of the concept. A sick 'two for one' deal. Get some work, eliminate the enemy. The forced labour were cheap precisely because they went un-fed, un-clothed and un-heated. Actually, the SS charged private enterprises for their use as a matter of course.
"...Sabotage by slaves - guards needed to prevent same..."
I would welcome comments from others on this matter, because I am by no means sure, but I suspect that sabotage was much rarer than we might now hope. The prospect of immediate and un-trammelled retaliation being quite an effective deterrent. Remember, the Nazis might not just kill the saboteur, but also his whole work detail, possibly his whole family.
I am not saying that women should not have been more effectively used, just that the overall equation needs to be considered. -
Message 47
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Friday, 28th May 2010
vesturiiis,
Gosh White Camry
I was using "some say" in the colonial dialect meaning
"to surmise but don't assume you know everything"
Sorry I won't use it any more as I think it boosts your BP(blood pressure)by a good 20points and I have a feeling that is a little dangerous, for you.Â
Thank you.
And on the topic of Japenese surrender what were they going to do at this stage (late 1944) invade Canada?Â
No. -
Message 48
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Saturday, 29th May 2010
TimTrack
Agreed. Time to ponder. Was Albert Speer ever questioned on the use of slave labour, economics of? -
Message 49
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Saturday, 29th May 2010
At the Nuremberg Trials where he was sentenced to 20 years in Spandau Prison.
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