Wars and ConflictsΒ permalink
Soviet War Scare 1983.
This discussion has been closed.
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Message 1.Β
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Monday, 3rd May 2010
Saw yesterday the documentary from Henry Chancellor: Soviet Scare 1983 UK 2007 on ARTE 7+ in French, but it also exists in German. (if Thomas want to see it, he has only some days remaining). BTW: I think it was a film from Channel 4...
As I understand it, it was more dangerous than the Cuba crisis. And I had never heard about it.
Has anyone more information on it or comments?
Kind regards,
Paul. -
Message 2
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Tuesday, 4th May 2010
I'd never heard of it either, but then, us plebs wouldn't would we?
Remember the old Infantry saying, when the bullets are whizzing past -
"You never hear the one that gets you . . ." -
Message 3
Posted by Poldertijger (U11154078) on Friday, 7th May 2010
Hello Paul,
I’ve seen the documentary that you’ve mentioned and though I agree that the Russian tension had grown pretty high I don’t think that the situation of 1983 can be compared to the Cuba missile crisis. In 1983 the Russian system analysts that were controlling US military efforts were determined not to alert the Kremlin unless they were sure that the US had fired missiles. Of course, the US was engaged in military exercises and had no intention to fire missiles, so in that sense the World has never been in danger.
The Cuban Missile Crisis was far more serious; this is probably the one time that one of the enemies could have made a move that would make the other think not to have any other option left but to fire nuclear devices first. During the Cuban Missile Crises the effect of MAD wasn’t assured.
Regards,
Poldertijger -
Message 4
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 1st September 2010
They were the World War II generation, forever conscious of how Hitler had fooled Stalin and launched his savage Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union in 1940 under the pretext of an exercise. In the war that followed, 25million Soviet citizens died and the Motherland came close to caving in. To allow history to repeat itself would be unforgivable.Β
So much misinformation in just one paragraph?
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Message 5
Posted by DL (U1683040) on Thursday, 2nd September 2010
Is this not related to the Able Archer '83 scare?
This was an exercise which simulated a nuclear conflict between the USSR and NATO, which for some reason the Politburo started to think was a cover far a nuclear first strike. -
Message 6
Posted by DL (U1683040) on Thursday, 2nd September 2010
Ah hang on, it is the same one. How come the Daily hateMail neglects to mention the background behind it?
Shoddy journalism....
wiki article on this also mentions Petrov by name.
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Message 7
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Thursday, 2nd September 2010
Was not aware of it. I am not either convinced of the whole narrative as both countries had full procedures of how engaging in case of alerts including the possibility of false alerts. The game was never played in the seconds as people think since the bulk of strategic nuclear launch sites were immune to nuclear explosions while especially the USSR had more strategic nuclear on submarine than the US. Hence the widely thought idea of a rush to hit first was not as important as people tended to think, since the one hit had always immense capacity to deliver a similar hit (and in the case of USSR a slightly greater hit). All the game played was in how to deal with the hit, be it first or second and there was nothing much for it, nor that is there anythig about it today after 30 years of "star wars".
Why am I not convinced of:
1) nuclear alert being solely due to clouds...
2) Korean plane "accidentally" losing orientation...
etc. etc. -
Message 8
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 2nd September 2010
Shoddy journalism....Β Judging by the paragraph with historical background, basic fact-checking is not a priority there.
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Message 9
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 2nd September 2010
the USSR had more strategic nuclear on submarine than the US....immense capacity to deliver a similar hit (and in the case of USSR a slightly greater hit). All the game played was in how to deal with the hit, be it first or second and there was nothing much for it, nor that is there anythig about it today after 30 years of "star wars".Β I'm not sure that you got it right, Nik. The USSR might have had more warheads, but I'm not sure if it had any advantage in delivery capabilities, and that's the key. As far as SDI, the word was that just a thought of it scared the living lights out of Akhromeyev, then the Chief of the Soviet General Staff.
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Message 10
Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Friday, 3rd September 2010
Radio 4 covered this - in 2008, IIRC.
The only thing I believe in the Daily Wail is the date - provided I can get independant confirmation. -
Message 11
Posted by Stoggler (U14387762) on Friday, 3rd September 2010
Judging by the paragraph with historical background, basic fact-checking is not a priority thereΒ
Welcome to British tabloid journalism! Not the best group of people known for getting simple facts correct! -
Message 12
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Saturday, 4th September 2010
Stoggler,
True, but what a pity that so many still believe what they read in that rag. How soon will what is printed be subsumed as the truth? -
Message 13
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Saturday, 4th September 2010
suvorovetz,
Welcome back! Keep spreading the word! -
Message 14
Posted by JB on a slippery slope to the thin end ofdabiscuit (U13805036) on Saturday, 4th September 2010
The KAL flight was part of a systemic problem on Korean Arilines at that time. When a senior captain made an error, it was socio-culturally impossible for his subordinate to correct him, despite that being the reason he was there.
Add to that the ossified Soviet command structure of the time whereby a pilot looking out of his window who can see a civillian airliner had to work to orders from a flight controller in Moscow who couldn't see anything.
What a good thing we trust our officers in the field in the West to exercise judgement, we thought, until the Vincennes incident when a civillian airliner was marked hostile because it had 'switched off' its military IFF which it did not have, but that really is one whole other story.
There was another close thing in October 73 when the Sovs threatened to send 'peacekeepers' to impose a ceasefire in the Arab-Israeli war, and the US responded with discreet but very escalatory threats that came mainly from Kissinger since Nixon was by this time doing a Howard Hughes impression and metaphorically passing the urine bottles out of the oval office. -
Message 15
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 4th September 2010
suvorovetz,
Welcome back! Keep spreading the word!Β
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Message 16
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Saturday, 4th September 2010
In October 1973 Nixon placed all US forces on a very public 'nuclear alert', the stage next to a 'first strike' option in an effort to deter the intervention of Soviet forces in the Yom Kippur War. This and the airlift of much-needed military supplies to Israel helped resolve the crisis in favour of the West.
Contrary to left-wing myth, far from Nixon being out of the loop he was very much in control and directing US policy at this time, a fact confirmed by Dr Kissinger in his account of these events. Nixon's resolution and clarity in dealing with this crisis must rank among the greatest of his contributions of his period in office. -
Message 17
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 4th September 2010
Alan This and the airlift of much-needed military supplies to Israel helped resolve the crisis in favour of the West.Β You got this one backwards. "...while Kissinger and Schlesinger were playing games with Israeli resupply, Al Haig was stripping every TOW missile off the eastern seaboard of the United States and from Germany and shipping them to Israel....Al Haig's missiles arrived in time to blunt the next Egyptian offensive...[at] the Milta and Gidi passes in the Sinai...The opening of the final Egyptian assault on Israel turned into a rout as the Arabs' tank force was cut to ribbons. Haig had saved Kissinger's reputation by giving Israel TOWs...The American arms authorized by Kissinger had arrived too late to help...before the first official US airlift had even started to unload weapons on Sunday, October 14, the crucial defensive battle in the Sinai was all but over." (The Secret War Against The Jews, Loftus and Aarons)
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Message 18
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Saturday, 4th September 2010
Suv
I think you make my point about the importance of Nixon. Haig, who was Nixon's Chief of Staff at this time, would only have acted with Nixon's direct authority. I think the situation mirrored the one eight and a half years later when Reagan and Weinberger decided to equip Royal Naval ships with Sea Wolf missiles and give transcripts of Argentinian intelligence to the British in their bid to recover the Falklands against the advice of members of the administration such as UN Ambassador, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and, curiously, Al Haig, who was then Secretary of State.
I think you make the point far better than I that, in any event, US military aid was decisive in the conflict (along with Sharon's armoured breakout to the Suez Canal). -
Message 19
Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Saturday, 4th September 2010
Sea Wolf was British designed and British built. It was neither necessary nor possible for any American to "give" the Royal Navy Sea Wolf. Perhaps you mean Sidewinder AIM-9L?
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Message 20
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Saturday, 4th September 2010
Allan D
I think you do Al Haig a diservice. Although as Secretary of State he tried to come up with a solution that would protect the USA's relationship with both the UK and Argentina, he made it clear to his colleagues that if it came down to a choice, it was no contest - the US must back the UK.
This position was rather different to the position of Jean Kirkpatrick and the other "ultras" of the Administration's Latin America lobby, who felt that the USA should actively back Argentina's claim.
Unfortunately, in the early days of the developing crisis, it was the Latin America State Department officials who were responsible for presenting the Administration's position to Galtieri and friends.
Haig's position was informed by his experience as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) from 1974, when he had to deal with the consequences of the US favouring Israel's interests over NATO's deterrence stance by transferring the war reserves of missiles. An awful lot of reassurance of the European NATO memebers, particularly Germany, was required. One consequence was that a second Deputy SACEUR post was created, to be filled by a Bundeswehr officer. Up to that point, there was a single Deputy, a Brit.
LW -
Message 21
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Saturday, 4th September 2010
Yes, Urnungal, you're right.
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Message 22
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 5th September 2010
Alan Haig, who was Nixon's Chief of Staff at this time, would only have acted with Nixon's direct authority.Β Loftus claims that Haig acted on his own initiative, without Nixon's approval. Now, Loftus himself had served in Fort Benning, Georgia, where he had personally been involved in training Israeli military personnel to use the said TOWs. Of course, at the time, he probably would not be in the position to verify the chain of command. I believe that his stance on this stems from interviewing some people in the intelligence community.
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