Wars and ConflictsÌý permalink
Hitler's Air Force
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Message 1.Ìý
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Sunday, 18th April 2010
What is your opinion of the Luftwaffe during WW2? To me, it seems to have been remarkably ineffective. What particular shortcomings, in your opnion, caused the Luftwaffe to be weak?
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Message 2
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Sunday, 18th April 2010
The Luftwaffe was built to supply close air support to the army. While fighting in Poland and then France, it worked. After that it needed long range bombers. Every other country had them on the drawing board, but as far as Germany was concerned, that was as far as it really went. The only really long range aircraft they had was the FW 190 Condor which wasn't a bomber but a converted air liner.
GF -
Message 3
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Sunday, 18th April 2010
Did you ask many RAF or USAAF bomber crews about how effective they were?
Not sure if the lack of long range bombers was so vital - the possession of thousands of them was certainly a big help for the Allies, but ultimately not as decisive as they expected them to be.
In the end, I think, the Luftwaffe's quality was swamped by the sheer quantity of it's opponents. The veteran pilots were slowly killed off, and the replacements seldom lived long enough to become more than merely competent.
Too many Mustangs and Thunderbolts 'horsing around' over Germany in 1944/45! -
Message 4
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Sunday, 18th April 2010
Re: Message 2.
Grumpyfred,
it was exactly that what I wanted to say but you said it that much better. I think we discussed it already in the thread: the Battle of Britain: a German approach.
Kind regards,
Paul. -
Message 5
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Monday, 19th April 2010
Please enlighten me as to why the Germans needed a long range bomber.
I am of the opinion that bombers are of little use against military targets. The allied bombing was extremely wasteful of resources, and though it succeeded in levelling houses, it had little impact on German war production. -
Message 6
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Monday, 19th April 2010
fascinating,
War is rarely a matter of correct and incorrect. So it is with total war/strategic bombing/unrestricted submarine warfare/napalm or cluster bombs, right down to commandeering a farmer's food or their horse. To defeat the enemy is the prime object of strategy. The strategic bombing offensive 1939-45 achieved much more than destroying housing.
Regards,
Spruggles. -
Message 7
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Monday, 19th April 2010
Like what for instance?
I still don't know why the Germans needed a long range bomber. -
Message 8
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Monday, 19th April 2010
F Germany tried to bring the war the GB using the bombers designed for ground support. Yes the result was frightening, but would have been worse with heavy bombers. When they invaded Russia, their bombers couldn't attack factories well behing the lines, and therefor the supplies kept coming. Again Heavies could have dropped more supplies into Stalingrad via their bomb bays. (Although the end result would have been the same)
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Message 9
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Monday, 19th April 2010
"...I still don't know why the Germans needed a long range bomber..."
It is not JUST range, it is also carrying capacity. Range does matter, of course, as the Soviets realised when they shifted production to the Urals, safe from German bombs .
A single heavy bomber carries more bombs to its target than, depending on exact design, several smaller types. On a shorter trip, fuel can be swapped for extra bombs.
As has been pointed out, the Luftwaffe was well designed to provide close tactical support to ground troops. At that job, it performed very well indeed.
But, as so often happens, the job changes. After the summer of 1940, the job becomes city busting. Medium bombers are not much good at this. Of course, lots of factors come in to play. We had the not so slight advantage of US production on our side, so we were well ahead in production rates.
To break a city required lots of large bombers. The Germans simply could not produce them in quanitity, even if they had wanted to. They simply had too many challenges in too many areas. -
Message 10
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Monday, 19th April 2010
I don't understand what you say about taking the war to the GB. Do you mean heavy bombers to bomb our cities and flatten them? If so, I say that would have little effect militarily, just as the huge amount of bombing of German cities had little effect militarily.
If you are thinking of bombing factories east of Moscow, you really are talking long-range bomber there aren't you, being some 1000 miles from Germany. But I disagree with the whole premise, I think it would never have been feasible to locate, target, and hit, the factories of the Soviet Union.
Using aeroplanes for supply is an entirely different matter, and much more sensible if you ask me. -
Message 11
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Monday, 19th April 2010
TimTrack, what do you mean by breaking a city? What is the point of doing that?
To my mind wars are won and lost in the field. Thinking of the Kursk tank battle, it seems to me that air superiority on either side would have swung it (I think the common opinion is that the battle was basically a stalemate, though worse for the Germans strategically because they would henceforth be on the back foot). Was the Luftwaffe able to give support and help destory Soviet tanks? -
Message 12
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Monday, 19th April 2010
"...TimTrack, what do you mean by breaking a city? What is the point of doing that?..."
Ah, now, you have just started an argument, probably. There are moral dimensions, but I shall stick to cold war winning, if only for simplicity.
'Citybusting' is about eliminating the total producive capacity of a city and its supporting environs. This is 'total war', without pity towards civilians.
Any given city has numerous industrial elements in it. All of them have transport links, road and rail, and all of them have workers.
The US and the UK were able to flatten entire cities. Workers were de-housed, and made less productice. Economic units were destroyed and could not be replaced. Additionally, the allies were able to strike at entire industries across a region, specially fuel production, or other strategic assets.
Because bomb aiming technology was comparatively poor, the simplest way was to flatten the city.
Germany never came close to doing that. They severely damaged London's docklands, but, unless you can come back and do it again and again, damage gets repaired. Germany lacked that capacity.
If you can add this dimension to your war effort, it is a huge assistance to the conventional battle efforts. -
Message 13
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Monday, 19th April 2010
I agree with you - we now have a full on argument.
The bombing policy was as you describe, several cities were bombed to blazes, but German war procuction continued to rise right up to late 1944. Destroying cities had little effect. What did have effect were armies engage German troops in the field, and navies fighting German ships in the sea. -
Message 14
Posted by FormerlyOldHermit (U3291242) on Monday, 19th April 2010
The Bombing did have an impact on German War Production though. Speer reported to Hitler after the Hamburg Raid that 2 or 3 similar raids within the next 3 months of it would bring Germany to its knees.
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Message 15
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Monday, 19th April 2010
But the fact remains that the Germans DID continue to increase their production until very late, up to the point where actual armies went onto its territory. I think someone said on these boards that they were able to move certain factories away from cities, and anyway many of the factories would have been in small towns in the first place, beneath the Allies' radar, so to speak.
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Message 16
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Monday, 19th April 2010
fascinating
The Luftwaffe was effective in the first part of the war. It remained effective on the Eastern Front until almost the end (one of the reasons Wehrmacht formations transferred from the East got caught out by Anglo-US air attack was that they had experienced weight of attack on the Eastern Front, thanks to Luftwaffe air superiority). It was, however, overwhelmed in the West.
Two things contributed to this. The first was a failure to prepare a training programme that would meet the needs of a long war, so the Luftwaffe suffered from a lack of adequately trained pilots as the war progressed. The second was a failure to link development of new aircraft types with production; aircraft numbers were only kept up by running on older types, although excellent new types were available, but could not be produced in the necessary numbers.
I would agree a heavy bomber force would not have been a decisive advantage for the Germans, unless it had existed in early 1940. However, the Allied Srategic Bomber Offensive did impact on the Luftwaffe. It did affect production (although not as decisively as the RAF and USAAF hoped it would), and it forced the Luftwaffe onto the defensive, with emphasis on the production of fighters (old models, at that) and anti-aircraft guns instead of bombers,. Ultimately, the attacks on oil grounded the Luftwaffe.
Wars are not won exclusively on the battlefield. Battles can only be won if the resources are there to force a decision. The great battles of the Eastern Front were won because Allied production far outstripped Germany's, and the Russians had more men to expend, and the willingness to expend them. -
Message 17
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Monday, 19th April 2010
"...But the fact remains that the Germans DID continue to increase their production until very late..."
This only tells party of the story.
As the war progressed, Germany was forced to put ever more effort in to maintian its war. Slave labour was ramped up, and every other method was used. That, however, does not tell us what productivity would have been without the bombing effort. It is simply naive to think that the bombing effort had no effect.
If the Germans thought that such heavy bombing had no effect, why did they put so much effort in to destroying British cities ? The answer is that they knew it worked, they simply lacked the weaponry. -
Message 18
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Monday, 19th April 2010
fascinating
On the specific point of production.
Germany did not mobilise its war production to the same extent as the UK and USSR in the early part of the war.
Thus, when Speer began his expansion in 1943, he had more slack in the system to take up, he was not having to create new production from scratch. Speer himself reckoned that the Allied bombing offensive caused an overall reduction in his expansion plans. Given that Germany was facing an overwhelming comparative disadvantage in production against the Allies, this was a vital point.
The dispersal of factories in itself caused delays, as materials had to be moved around Germany, and then to the Fronts, which slowed down deliveries and complicated supply chains.
Speer also had the breathing space from April to October 1944, when the focus of the bomber offensive switched to support to D-Day (although strategic targets were still attacked), which allowed him time to rebuild - something Harris and Spaatz complained about at the time.
Further, while production increased in 1944 over earlier levels, much of it (including 60% of optics, for instance) was dedicated to defensive needs such as anti-aircraft guns and fighters, rather than tanks and bombers.
The Bomber Offensive was not a failure merely because it did not achieve the results its advocates claimed it would, anymore than the NW Europe campaign was a failure because it did not end the war by the end of 1944 (which was its planning goal). -
Message 19
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Monday, 19th April 2010
F Suppose instead of bombing Liverpool etc, the Germans went back every night without fail and bombed London. The effect would have been our ability to wage war would have been reduced. Would you stay or work in a city knowing that every night you stood a greater chance of dying than a soldier on the front line. Then as the nights drew in, those working in London but living outside would be wanting to leave before the bombers arrived. That is if they could. After all nightly bombings would reduce public transport to almost nothing. Bus drivers could find themselves worrying about being attacked as they drove. Churchill would be faced with the urge to move all AA defences south, but then it would only need one raid on another city and the cry would go up that the country has been abandoned for the sake of London. Oh, during the Blitz,the Lord Mayor of one major city decamped to his country home and refused to return until the bombing raids stopped. It did not become known though until after the war. If that story had spread how long would it had been before the workers decided if it was good enough for him, it was good enough for their families.
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Message 20
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Monday, 19th April 2010
It cannot be right to suggest that the bombing of cities worked, otherwise the Germans would not have done it. Manifestly German area bombing of cities (as opposed to specific targetting of things like rail yards and shipyards) had almost no effect other than to galvanise the people's wish to hit back harder.
I don't say that the bombing campaign against Germany, had no effect on production, it must have done, and of course it drew significant resources into air defence, but I must repeat that the campaign's contribution to winning the war must be a very small percentage in comparison to the invading armies.
Remember I am actually trying to establish why people say that the Germans needed a long range bomber. I say - what would that have done? Can anyone seriously argue that such a bomber, even if they had thousands of them, that could reach the Urals, would have cut Soviet production by more than a few percent? I merely stated, as an example, that the Allied bombers basically failed to achieve that, despite their huge resources. -
Message 21
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Monday, 19th April 2010
"...Can anyone seriously argue that such a bomber, even if they had thousands of them, that could reach the Urals, would have cut Soviet production by more than a few percent?..."
Given the nature of the war, a few percent drop in production might have been the difference between victory and defeat.
"...I merely stated, as an example, that the Allied bombers basically failed to achieve that, despite their huge resources...."
It is generally agree that the allied bombing offensive had a huge impact, specially in fuel producyion. It was no mere side show. -
Message 22
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Monday, 19th April 2010
This is what I find on the internet
"The German oil supply was tight throughout the war, and was a controlling factor in military operations. The chief source of supply, and the only source for aviation gasoline, was 13 synthetic plants together with a small production from three additional ones that started operations in 1944. The major sources of products refined from crude oil were the Ploesti oil fields in Rumania and the Hungarian fields which together accounted for about a quarter of the total supply of liquid fuels in 1943. In addition, there was a small but significant Austrian and domestic production. The refineries at Ploesti were attacked, beginning with a daring and costly low-level attack in August 1943. These had only limited effects; deliveries increased until April 1944 when the attacks were resumed. The 1944 attacks, together with mining of the Danube, materially reduced Rumanian deliveries. In August 1944, Russian occupation eliminated this source of supply and dependence on the synthetic plants became even greater than before."
In other words, fuel deliveries increased until April 1944, after one source of supply was merely reduced, not eliminated until August.
None of this indicates a need for the Germans to have heavy bombers. Note how the Allies could only reach Rumania very late in the war, in daring raid, which only reduced supply. I cannot see that the Germans could have, at any stage, used a heavy bomber to pinpoint and destroy oil field 1000 miles distant. -
Message 23
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Monday, 19th April 2010
"...These had only limited effects; deliveries increased until April 1944 when the attacks were resumed..."
In other words, the bombing worked once it could be done properly.
You are still missing the point of what production would have been like without bombing across the totality of German industry.
"...I cannot see that the Germans could have, at any stage, used a heavy bomber to pinpoint and destroy oil field 1000 miles distant..."
The targets for German heavy bombers would not have been oil supplies. In the West, it would have been London, and other British cities or Atlantic shipping. In the Soviet Union, it would more likely have been factory complexes.
The German V1 and V2 programmes were, largely, an attempt to make up for the lack of heavy bomber, Again, scale was Germany's problem. Germany was un-able to produce enough V1 and V2s to seriously damage any city. -
Message 24
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Monday, 19th April 2010
In other words, the bombing worked once it could be done properlyÌý
"Properly" meaning targeting specific and especially vulnerable industry, not attempting to bomb cities wholesale in the hope of hitting factories as one effect.
You are still missing the point of what production would have been like without bombing across the totality of German industryÌý
Can you provide any evidence of what the volume of production would have been without the carpet bombing strategy? And what would production have been like if they had instead used smaller numbwers of smaller, faster, bombers to target the most important factories, like oil refineries, earlier in the war?
The targets for German heavy bombers would not have been oil supplies. In the West, it would have been London, and other British cities or Atlantic shipping. In the Soviet Union, it would more likely have been factory complexes.
Ìý
Now we are going round in circles again. I asked why the Germans needed heavy bombers and it was said that they would use them to hit Soviet industry. I expressed doubts that they could have done that, and you replied that the Allies were successful in hitting German industry, particularly fuel supplies. I think I have shown that the fuel supplies were not badly hit until very late in the war.
Now you are saying that the bombers would have been used to target ships and cities. I say that heavy bombers would have been unsuccesful against ships, because their aim is nowhere near good enough, and that hitting cities is almost useless because it has little effect overall on the ability to fight the war. -
Message 25
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Monday, 19th April 2010
Yes, the Allied bomber effort only became really effective from 1944 onwards, by which time Germany was already in deep trouble. The huge effort the Allies expended on aircraft and aircrew was not decisive, so why would a heavy bomber have been decisive for the Germans?
Yes, the bombing had a huge effect on German industry and oil, but by then the Russian Army steamrollering all before it. The Allied air power was probably more decisive in Normandy and the Battle of France, but that was largely done by the Tactical AF, not the heavies.
The Luftwaffe did what it was designed to do extremely well, but the Allies learned to do even that (tactical support) better than they did by 1944. They did not learn adapt as fast as the Allies, and were eventually swamped by sheer numbers and better aircraft. -
Message 26
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Wednesday, 21st April 2010
fascinating,
Try to imagine if you will what effect the bombing on London during 1940 would have achieved if the Germans had had the use of a genuine heavy bomber fleet instead of the mass formations of medium bombers. It is likely that given the paucity of British defences they could have continued their attacks during the daylight hours, thus making the raids far more effective.
The original object of the German High Command was not only to destroy our shipping lanes but also ports and to overcome our air defences thus soften the island for invasion if a diplomatic solution could not be forced upon us. What if these heavy bombers attacked at say 40,000 feet? How would our early warning system have coped?
Also try to imagine what would have been the consequences had not the strategic air offensive commenced. All the defences, manpower, and logistics that the Germans were forced to employ against the 'Round the Clock' bombing campaign might well have been then been turned on their closest enemy. And as has already pointed out, the use of heavy bombers to destroy the infrastructure of the Russian not 1,000 miles away from Berlin but from advanced airfields in Eastern Europe might well have swung the balance. It might even have allowed Hitler to reach the Crimea and those oil fields, and destroy Stalingrad simultaneously, etc, etc.
Not knowing where your enemy is going to strike next is a fundamental strategy of warfare. Heavy bombers roaming all over your territory, bombing cities, factories, lines of communication, dams, and oilfields while tactical medium, light and fighter-bombers interdict at lower levels cause disruption on many levels.
Kind regards.
Spruggles. -
Message 27
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Wednesday, 21st April 2010
The German mediums did a far better job on London, Coventry, Liverpool and even Belfast in 1940 that the RAF 'heavies' managed to do to any German city until 1942 or 43! Again, 40,000 ft was way beyond the capabilities of the best RAF and US heavies in 1944, never mind the level of technology in 1940.
Yes, if the Luftwaffe of 1940 had the equivalent of the 1944 RAF/US bomber fleet, it would have been a big problem, but this is not a realistic situation. Such aircraft did not exist anywhere in the world, and the technology to build them was only coming off the drawing board, in GB and the USA. The effort needed to produce such a bomber fleet, econonic and otherwise, in the 1930s would have meant the German Army would have been struggling to invade Denmark, never mind France and Britain!
It is all about mindset - they went for Army + TacAir support, and they were good at it. GB/US went for strategic bombers, and slowly became good at it. They learned from the Germans the value of TacAir, and became even better at it! -
Message 28
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Wednesday, 21st April 2010
giaffe47,
You are of course presupposing that the Germans, given a different strategy in 1930 would have started from the same point as the Allies. The altitude mentioned was an exaggeration just to illustrate my point and was intended to be taken quite as literally, but not totally beyond their ingenuity. The Junkers 188, first flight 1940 had a service ceiling of 33,000 feet, for example.
The effectiveness of the Blitz in 1940 was aided, as I am sure you are aware, by the proximity of our cities to occupied Europe. Not so the German cities to our chaps. That's one reason why we needed the heavies of course.
I agree about the mindset. They were of course heavily committed to a standing army and a tactical air force ... but without the foresight to see that it would be insufficient to deal with the vast territories that they later intended to invade.
Mind you, they might have saved some money by not investing in capital ships, and such posh uniforms.
Kind regards,
Spruggles -
Message 29
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Wednesday, 21st April 2010
giraffe47,
Sorry, a bit wayward that last post of mine. Please insert a 'not' between the words '... 'was' ... and 'intended'....'. Note to self; must read missive before posting. -
Message 30
Posted by Idamante (U1894562) on Wednesday, 21st April 2010
Try to imagine if you will what effect the bombing on London during 1940 would have achieved if the Germans had had the use of a genuine heavy bomber fleet instead of the mass formations of medium bombers.Ìý
Funny, I thought the conventional view was that Germany's big mistake in the Battle of Britain was switching from military targets like airfields to cities & factories. Attacking those cities & factories with strategic 4 engine bombers would just have amplified that mistake, surely?
Strategic bombers wouldn't have helped against US and Soviet factories unless they'd been designed to travel huge distances (and unless escort fighters with equally huge range had been available). Whereas Allied bombers based in Britain had no problem reaching their targets.
So even if you assume that the Allied bomber offensive 'worked', that doesn't mean it would have been a good idea for the Germans to do the same. -
Message 31
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Wednesday, 21st April 2010
That's the way I see it Idamante, particularly the final sentence.
I dont think heavy bombers at 40,000 feet would do anything of great strategic value, because bombing from that height was very inaccurate, and would mostly have missed the factories, though a lot of houses would have been destroyed. It can be argued that the bombing of German cities by the Allies was valuable in that it caused redirection of significant German resources toward air defence, but I don't think anybody can say that the Germans could have mounted such a bombing strategy against Britiain, even if it had wanted to. The allies had the means to make thousands of heavy bombers and mount raids daily and nightly; it was extremely costly in men and resources, and Germany would not have had such resources, and even if it did, I would argue that they could have been better spent elsewhere.
I am also not convinced that the Germans could have used bombers to pinpoint and destroy Soviet factories. It could be that they might have been able to attack Soviet air fields - that is one instance where, I think, a heavy bomber might have been useful.
Possibly long-range supply planes, containing many tonnes of supplies, might have been able to keep the Germans supplied at Stalingrad, or drop fresh troops as paratroopers.
I think the luftwaffe's most crucial lack was in planes that could reliably destroy Russian tanks. -
Message 32
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Wednesday, 21st April 2010
One problem was that the German Airforce was still fighting in 1945 with mostly aircraft it entered the war in 1939. Some were upgraded such as the ME 109, which was a tricky aircraft even for the best of pilots. The narrow undercart made landing and take off interesting. The JU 87 (Stuka) was due for replacement in 1940 but it never happened. Jets that could have swung the balance or at least made the allies think twice as their losses mounted were delayed, in some cases by Adolf who decided to turn them into bombers or in the case of the HE jet sidelined as the company went out of favour with the powers that be.
On the allied side, the only aircraft to still be in service from 1939 to the end of the war was the Spitfire,but the spitfife of 1945 was nothing like the Spitfire of 1939.
Gf -
Message 33
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Wednesday, 21st April 2010
If the Luftwaffe would have had a long-range bomber force to deploy over the USSR, its most rational use would have been to target the transportation network. Factories could be moved to the Ural and dispersed, but a basic problem, difficult to solve for anyone, was that European Russia had few transport links. Many of the roads could not be used during the 'muddy periods' and there were few railway links. The rivers often ran perpendicular to the supply line of the armies. Perhaps a limited number of bombing raids could have stemmed the flow of ammunition and equipment from the factory to the front.
Of course the Germans had similar transport problems, which famously helped the ensure the destruction of the 6th Army in Stalingrad. I think a good case could be made that IF there had been enough industrial capacity, fuel and pilots for a fleet of large aircraft, the sensible thing would have been to invest in modern transport airplanes rather than bombers. The Wehrmacht depended on mobility to hold the line against its numerically superior enemies, and its lack of flexible transport capacity was a serious handicap. (The aircraft that Eisenhower mentioned among the war-winning tools of WWII was not the B-17, but the DC-3 aka C-47.) The shortage of transport also tended to have a very negative effect on pilot training, as the Ju 52 aircraft and instructors of the multi-engined flying schools were deployed for emergency transport missions.
That aside, we also have to consider the possible Soviet response to a German bomber offensive. On the positive side for the attackers, there was no comprehensive radar network to track intruders -- significant gaps existed well into the Cold War. But the available radars were mostly of American manufacture and more could have been supplied if necessary. The USSR also maintained, despite the lack of German bombing, the core of an air defense organization against such attacks; among others the MiG bureau continued to work on high-altitude fighters and Lend-Leased P-63 Kingcobras (featuring Allison engines with two-stage superchargers) were also reserved for use as high-altitude interceptors.
The Germans did not have a good long-range escort fighter, and given the high demand for interceptors and fighter-bombers, would have found it difficult to put one into production. Therefore it seems likely that if the Luftwaffe would have embarked on missions deep into Soviet territory, these would have suffered heavy losses. -
Message 34
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Thursday, 22nd April 2010
Idamante/fasinating,
I'm sure that you know the oft quoted reasons for Hitler's change in tactics during the BofB. It was a mistake only in respect that the attack was shifted when it came close to fruition. The effect of the change gave the RAF and our defences a chance to regroup and allowed more time for our fighters to engage the enemy bombers while their fighter escort was hampered by the extra range it faced with that decision.
I have already mentioned that the distances faced by the Germans was not as great as you supposed. They were not handicapped by the distances faced by the American in the Pacific for example where B-29's had a round trip of some eighteen hours to reach Japan ... and even then, when they got there, what do you suppose were their targets? Where were the two atomic bombs dropped - on military targets?
The summer of 1940 was very clement as was the visibility both for high altitude bombing and photo-reconnaissance - thus high altitude bombing would not have been a problem, especially with the aids that they had already developed. I speculate that given Hitler did not have the war forced upon him too early(ref: suvoretz)and that he might have contemplated attacking England as central to his plans of European domination, then attacking our capital city with heavy bombers would have been far more cost effective than the aircraft he did use.
Whilst on the subject could I point out that cities have always featured strongly in the military mind. The strategic situation, as seats of government, the wealth contained withing the walls and the concentration of the population ripe for a deal of rape and pillage has always been a temptation for the warlord. Boudicca is supposed to have sacked Colchester and London; William 1 is reputed to have launched corpses over the walls of recalcitrant cities. Napoleon marched into Russia and his prime objective was?
In WW1 the German fleet bombarded our coastal towns and attacked our capital city with Zeppelins and then Gotha bombers - for what purpose?
I have no real understanding of the Soviet military mind during the cold war but if I drew the correct inferences from the training us kids received while engaged in the defence of the GB, then the majority of the intended targets of the Soviet ICBM, were our cities. Not Coltishall, why waste a ten kiloton thermonuclear device on a piddling little airfield when there are great big juicy cities around where maximum damage really does count? I have this sneaky suspicion that likewise we targeted Soviet cities.
Unfortunately we are dealing not with morality here but the concrete military mind.
Regards, -
Message 35
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Friday, 23rd April 2010
Mentioning Boudicca is going back a bit! The British rebellion seized Colchester probably because there was an imperial cult there, and a contingent of military veterans of the hated Roman army, who could be easily overcome because of their small numbers. More important was the destruction of the ninth legion, which was coming as a relief force. I think the common opinion is that the rebels ought then to have advanced and found some strategic, easily defended position, and engaged with Roman troops asap. Instead they had some time looting London, and by the time they got around to fighting again, they engaged the Romans by a road, with their enemy having the strategic advantage.
In former times cities had walls, thus when captured they could be used as fortresses, so they had definite military advantage.
Going back to WW2, we can see that Hitler became rather obsessed with Stalingrad, and lost sight of the main objective which was the Baku oilfields.
The important thing in a war is first and foremost to impose control by force of arms, in particular to get control of the enemy's own armed forces. Once you have beaten them, you can take the whole country, countryside and city. It may be possible to bleed them to death by destroying factories and transport links, but these things may not be in cities. Just bombing cities wont get rid of factories and railways etc. The example of Nagasaki and Hiroshima is wholly exceptional, this was a demonstration of an unprecedented weapon of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons are not about the taking of cities, but the utter annihilation of them.
I don't see what you mean about the distances in Russia. The factories were mainly east of Moscow were they not?
High altitude bombing, even if the skies had been clear all the time would have been like using a sledgehammer to kill flies, it would be unweildy and you would probably miss the flies anyway. -
Message 36
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 23rd April 2010
Going back to WW2, we can see that Hitler became rather obsessed with Stalingrad, and lost sight of the main objective which was the Baku oilfields.Ìý Stalingrad was the result of Group Army South's drive toward the oil fields.
The factories were mainly east of Moscow were they not?Ìý By the end of 1941, Stalin lost 85% of his entire industrial production capacity - especially, undoubtedly the best in the world at the time tank producing factory at Kharkov, Ukraine. -
Message 37
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Saturday, 24th April 2010
fascinating,
Cities, especially modern ones also contain factories, many of which are vital for war production. In 1940 the facilities for transporting the workers to these factories was not well developed, therefore industries remained close to the workforce, ergo close to or within the conurbation.
Whilst you are correct in your observations concerning the destruction of the opposing forces, modern warfare is also about propaganda and subterfuge. It is also about forcing your opponent to do what you want him to do with either hammer blows or subtlety. It is about weakening your opponents morale and resolve to continue hostilities.
The city that contains factories and the workforce can then be seen by the stagiest as ideal for aerial bombardment. You destroy factories and if you miss killing the workforce at least you make them homeless, thus reducing their will to work in dangerous places and ultimately continue the war; or so it is at least postulated.
You also force the enemy to defend his city from attack; the heavier the attack the bigger the defence required. Have a look at the defence band that surrounded Berlin in 1944 if you do not believe me. And if these attacks are persistent and varied then either the factories have to be moved(and the workforce and with them all the infrastructure - which includes a ready and sufficient access/egress to the factories)or/and they are forced to defend more and more cities.
Cities usually have major transport links with other cities. Destroy one and you immediately effect others. All this employs time, money and organisation which also effects production.
Hitler was imbued with the strategy of tactical warfare and to begin with this strategy worked. This was because he was fighting a land battle at his dictation. But he also bombed cities if it was part of his campaign - but because his object was a quick violent attack rather than a long bitter slogging match he limited his forces and weapons to that form of attack; therefore, his greatest mistake was to attempt too much with his limited forces, especially his attack on the Soviet Union.
The Soviet conduct of their defence is way beyond a few lines here, but suffice to say that their leader was way above Hitler for cunning and subterfuge and Hitler, or rather his forces, paid a heavy price for his incompetence.
Hitler's opponents, the Allies, eventually forced him to fight the war on their terms and integral to this strategy was the strategic air offensive. Hitler was faced with a growing arena of battle and diminishing resources while the Allies had huge and virtually undamaged industrial potential to fall back on.
Regards,
Spruggles. -
Message 38
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Saturday, 24th April 2010
The strategy of bombing cities was tried against Germany, but only the actual invasion by ground forces, of the whole territory of Germany, and the physical investment of the city of Berlin with soldiers, brought an end to the war.
We are discussing the Luftwaffe, and what could have been to improve it to give Germany a better chance of winning. Let's say it is just after the lifting of the seige of Stalingrad, so it is apparent that there is a possibility that Germany will lose the war, and let's surmise that you are the fuhrer of Germany. What kind of Luftwaffe would you need to fight the Soviets who are now marshalling vast forces against you? Are you saying that making a heavy bomber would be exactly what was needed, so that it could be flown to destroy Soviet cities and thereby stop the factory production? I don't think that would work, just as round the clock bombing did not stop, or even reduce, German production - it kept increasing. -
Message 39
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Saturday, 24th April 2010
Hello again,
It is true that the German production increased as the war went on. One reason for this was that they had a sound industrial base to begin with and having been able to snaffle the best of the industry of the conquered territory was a plus. The Soviets suffered the exact opposite I think you'll find. Even so, as has been pointed out already, the quality of the German manufactured goods, the material and the standard of aircrews all fell away due to the losses accrued and the costs naturally increased exponentially.
To discuss the failings of the Luftwaffe is another matter. Procurement of aircraft or rather the haphazard way in which aircraft entered service shows the failings of the Nazi regime. For example, it is common knowledge that the fighter aircraft which came out on top during trials was the Heinkel He 112 but was not chosen because Willy Messerschmidt had friends in high places and it, the Bf 109, was allowed to remain in service far beyond its sell-by date(to use a modern idiom).
I dislike speculation but if I was to placed in the boots of the Fuhrer, I can promise you three things.
1- I would not have invaded the Soviet Union unless I could guarantee that my support could sustain a campaign of at least a year of advancement and consolidation.
2 - I would make sure that I had at my disposal a flexible bomber force capable of long range and a similar air transport system. One example of their failing was that they had to stitch two He 111s together in an effort to produce a aircraft powerful enough to tow their Gigant glider, which in turn was their attempt to fill a great gap in air transport(they produced some fine weapons but they also made some real dross).
3a -I had sacked Goering in 1939 and - 3b I would insist that my troops were kind to the Georgians, the Lithuanians and the Estonians.
Regards, as always,
Spruggs -
Message 40
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Saturday, 24th April 2010
On number 1, remember I presented to you the scenario where you took over after the battle of Stalingrad.
On point 2, what would you do with your long range bomber?
On point 3b, what have you got against the Latvians? -
Message 41
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Saturday, 24th April 2010
Interestingly the Â鶹ԼÅÄ today slot states that on this day in 1942 the German Airforce started bombing UK cultural centres. I wouldn't have classed Hull as a centre of culture. York Bath and Oxford yes.
-
Message 42
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Saturday, 24th April 2010
For example, it is common knowledge that the fighter aircraft which came out on top during trials was the Heinkel He 112 but was not chosen because Willy Messerschmidt had friends in high placesÌý
I hope this is not common knowledge, as it is wildly at variance with the truth.
If Messerschmitt had some friends in high places, he also had some powerful enemies, significantly including the RLM's Erhard Milch. His entry in the fighter competition was both late and as an outsider, BFW having no background as a military supplier. But the Bf 109 won the first round in the competition convincingly -- the original He 112 was just a too conservative design, too heavy and too slow. To be fair to Heinkel and the brothers Guenter who were the chief designers, this was largely the result of an overly conservative specification. While the He 112 had more docile handling characteristics, the Bf 109 was significantly faster and more agile.
Heinkel responded by completely redesigning his aircraft, producing the He 112B, which had only a superficial similarity with the original He 112. Arguably the He 112B was in some ways superior to the Bf 109, but it took to the air in July 1937, long after the decision in favor of the Bf 109 had been made. The Bf 109B was already entering service, and the Luftwaffe and RLM saw no point in starting a second production line for a fighter which offered only small advantages over the existing one.
and it, the Bf 109, was allowed to remain in service far beyond its sell-by date(to use a modern idiom).Ìý
Yes, although the upgraded Bf 109K was still a reasonably competitive fighter even in 1945. The real problem was the failure of the Me 309 project. This looked good on paper -- more powerful engine, tricycle wide-track landing gear, high aspect-ratio wing -- but it ran into problems and failed to show significant progress over the Bf 109G. -
Message 43
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Sunday, 25th April 2010
fascinating,
Now look here, if you insist that I metamorphose into one of the nastiest men in history, then I insist on choosing the time!
But after Stalingrad you say ... well in that case I would immediately bomb the Soviets into submission with my squadrons of jet bombers using my new invention, the atomic bomb. Please bear in mind that I am raging sociopath with delusions of grandeur with my grip on reality fading. Seriously, I have no answer for you really, because I know, with hindsight, that the war was already virtually lost and apart from extolling my forces to fight to the bitter end, I am surrounded by cowards and incompetents.
What would I do with my long range bomber - don't tempt me!
I have nothing against the Latvians nor the Ukrainians that I also forgot to mention not to mention and etc, etc.
As ever,
Kind regards. -
Message 44
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Sunday, 25th April 2010
M-M,
Yes, I apologize for that bit. I conjured it up from one of those dark recesses of the mind which should have been remained unstirred. The origin must have been something I once read but cannot now quote the source.
Regards,
Spruggles -
Message 45
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Sunday, 25th April 2010
GrumpyFred,
Hull not a culture centre? Have you forgotten the breakfast kipper ceremony? -
Message 46
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Sunday, 25th April 2010
Spruggles, forgive me for forgetting such an important ceremony. I will of course withdraw from the group holding my head in shame. This would also explain the heavy bombing of Liverpool. They were not after the docks, but trying to destroy the School of Science, or as it known today, Everton Football Club.
-
Message 47
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Monday, 26th April 2010
Could not a force of say 200 Stukas have been able to destroy enough Soviet tanks at Kursk to ensure that the Germans won the battle?
-
Message 48
Posted by RedGuzzi750 (U7604797) on Monday, 26th April 2010
Ah but a force of 200 Stukas in tank busting form may have been shot out of the skies by Yak 3s! By that time at low level the soviet fighters were getting very good.
-
Message 49
Posted by Steelers708 (U1831340) on Monday, 26th April 2010
For the Germans to have been successful during Operation Zitadelle would have/did involve more than just knocking out Soviet tanks, but going with your theory how many do you call 'enough'?
For the German offensive phase the Soviets had available 5,128 tanks of which they lost 1,614.
For the Soviet Orel offensive they had 3,324 tanks and lost 2,586.
For the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive the Soviets had 2,439 tanks and lost 1,864.
So from the Soviet side they committed 7,360 tanks to operations around Kursk, and lost 6,064.
So how would another 200 Stuka's have made a differance?
What may have made a differance for the Germans would be another 10-15 infantry divisions they could commit to the operation. -
Message 50
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Monday, 26th April 2010
If the Wikipedia article on the battle of Kursk is anything like accurate, the basic problem that the Germans had was that they were out-numbered by about three to one, in terms of infantry and tanks. It must also have been critical that the Germans had extremely long lines of supply, whereas the Soviets, fighting in their own territory, were able to build up more local supplies, particularly of fuel.
It seems that the Soviets took far more casualties than the Germans did, but they were able to readily raise scores of divisions of reinforcements. German armour made amazing progress against stiff resistance, but eventually they were slowed down. Apparently the decision not to press home the attacks was taken by Hitler, who wanted to use some of the tanks in the Mediterranean. Having lost the initiative, and with more and more Soviet men and materiel flooding into the area, the battle as such ended and the Red Army was able to push West, and the Nazis were henceforth on the back foot right up until the end of the war.
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