Wars and ConflictsΒ permalink
About D-Day and the landing beaches
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Message 1.Β
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Wednesday, 7th April 2010
The invasion that took place on June 6, 1944, was a nearer-run thing than most people today are aware of. It has been claimed by many that it was a carefully-planned, yet surprisingly uncertain event, that succeeded mainly because of deception -- in fact many historical observers feel that deceit was critical to success. The British and Americans went to great lengths to hide the location of the attacks right up to the day of invasion and at this they were remarkably successful. Hitler and many of his general staff were convinced that the Normandy landings were a feint and that the main attacks would come at Calais. There has been little doubt expressed that if Hitler had released his panzers immediately to Rommel and/or von Rundstedt the invasion might well have failed.
However, one of the problems with such secrecy was the lack of initial bombardment support from a huge force of warships off the coast of the invasion beaches. So bent were the allies on secrecy that the bombardment, according to some critics, was tragically inadequate, hence cost a lot of lives. Certainly it failed to neutralize the defences on Omaha Beach and troops landing on Sword beach also may have suffered unnecessarily for the same reason.
The fault, say some, lays at the feet of Bradley and Montgomery. They had control of the tactical planning, and they decided to ignore what one well-informed critic calls ''solid military and naval doctrine on the need for more powerful and sustained bombardment'' and opted instead for a short and diffuse series of attacks from the air and from the ships at sea. In the American sector, the naval bombardment lasted a mere 40 minutes before the troops went in.
The feeling is that considering the total command of the sea and air enjoyed by the allies, and keeping in mind the enormous firepower of the heavy cruisers and battleships that was available, it would have been better to advertise rather than obscure the location of the attack by subjecting the area to a one- or two-day-long bombardment. The feeling is that had this been done, the landings would have been accomplished more rapidly and with fewer casualties. A firm beachhead could have been established earlier than actually happened and the success or failure of the landings may not have dangled on such a slender thread.
Any comments/criticisms of these after-the-event analyses? -
Message 2
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Wednesday, 7th April 2010
Erik
Have you just read Adrian Lewis's "Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory" by any chance?
In answer to your question, the decision to go for a short immediate bombardment was the right one. In the Pacific island battles, a long bombardment was tactically correct, because the Japanese defenders did not have large mechanised reserves to move to the threatened areas.
In Normandy, the vital thing was to get ashore before the German mobile reserves could react. The longer the preliminary bombardment went on, the more time to react. To put it in context, what would have been the result if 12 SS Panzer had arrived in the invasion area while the initial waves were coming ashore, rather than at the end of the day?
The problem was not the shortness of the bombardment, but that some of the bombardment (air or naval) landed in the wrong place, and that could have happened however long the preliminaries had gone on for.
It should also be borne in mind that the "preliminary bombardment" had started as lonmg ago as April, with the air forces attacking key invasion targets with increasing weight as the day grew nearer.
Omaha was a desperate battle at first, but there is a grave risk of overemphasising the danger. The 116th had severe problems and were lucky they had Brig Gen Cota with them, but the veteran 16th made better progress and the assault troops were off the beach before mid-day. The legend of "Bloody Omaha" only really kicked off with the movie "The Longest Day".
Arguably the weather and the resultant heavy seas and high tides were as much a factor in slowing down the assault as unsuppressed defences.
Given all the things that could have gone wrong, D-Day remains a brilliant vindication of the planners and the moral courage of the commanders who took the key decisions.
LW -
Message 3
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Thursday, 8th April 2010
In point of fact I have not read that book, Long Weekend, altho' it was referred to by two of the authors I did read. Neither was critical of Lewis or his statements preferring, I imagine, to leave it up to the readers to determine their value.
Omaha was very nearly a failure. Bradley definitely considered withdrawing his troops from that beach and diverting them instead to Utah, so it was closer to a disaster than you suggest. Had it been deserted it would have left a gap in the beachhead that presumably could have been exploited by the Germans had they found it -- and I suspect they would have since they'd have seen the landing craft withdrawing the troops.
Von Rundstedt himself has stated that the fire from the ships off-shore were a major factor in preventing his panzers from halting the invasion in its tracks. He noted that a single 16-inch shell put 3 of his panzers out of action at one point.
I'm playing Devil's Advocate here... I do not necessarily support the idea that a longer, more sustained bombardment might have made the job easier. I merely put forth the suggestion and hoped to stimulate some discussion. So far, you're the only one who's offered an opinion. -
Message 4
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Thursday, 8th April 2010
Erik
It is a very intriguing and frustrating book. Lewis has done some very thorough and detailed research, and for those deeply interested in D-Day it is worth owning just for that. But the research actually supports the opposite argument to his own.
His argument is pretty chauvinistic. Everything is the fault of the Brits. So the loss of DD tanks off Omaha was not the result of them being dropped too far offshore in marginal sea conditions, but because they used the British DD system, not the US "Boat hull" system (which was not in fact ready for use during the war). And so on.
I agree Bradley had to consider whether abandonment of Omaha was necessary. Progress ther was slower than on the other beaches (much slower than the Canadians of course, who made the deepest penetration on the day) and there was in fact a double decision to make if the assault was abandoned; whether to switch to Utah, whether to abandon both (give how exposed Utah would be) and put US Forces into the British/Canadian beach head). But Dempsey was making the same assessments for the Second Army beaches (although he had no similar problem).
All of these contingencies had been covered in the planning. Bradley's decision point for evacuation was actually in the early afternoon, and the situation on Omaha had stabilised well before then.
I agree the naval gunfire was a major factor in beating off counter-attacks. But in support of my argument about timing, I would note that one of the problems early in the day was coordinating direct naval gunfire support (as opposed to pre-programmed bombardments) properly. By the time 12 SS arrived in the evening, the system had had time to shake itself out and was functioning more smoothly (and the troops had their anti-tank gun screens out). It might well have been a different story had the panzers arrived earlier.
I'm sure someone out vthere must disagree with me.
LW
p.s. a propos of nothing, really, my daughter has taken to watching the original star Trek episodes, which are airing on a CBS satellite channel. James Doolan, (Scotty), of course was a Royal Canadian Artillery officer on D-Day; an observation officer, I think. -
Message 5
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Thursday, 8th April 2010
So Scotty (Doolan) was a Canuck? I didn't know that. My brother landed with the Canadian contingent on Juno that day and fought all through the remainder of the war with the Canadian forces, up through Holland and down into Germany -- all in a Sherman tank. I'm damned if I know how he survived when so many of those blasted tanks were destroyed, but obviously some must have since there were plenty left at war's end.
I have thanked every god available many times that I was too young to participate in that war. Im not at all sure I'd have survived had I not been.
I wish a few other war critics would toss in their two bits worth. -
Message 6
Posted by stalti (U14278018) on Thursday, 8th April 2010
d day succeeded because it was a suprise - unbelievable but true
using the naval power 2 days before would have shown where the attack was going to happen
it would have been the same as the somme - overwhelming power against a prepared enemy = slaughter - the germans would have found someway to get troops in place to meet the attack
it was a close run thing even with suprise
airpower turned the day - not so much its use on the day - but what it did before - panzer divisions couldnt move in daylight - naval power couldnt force that
st -
Message 7
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Thursday, 8th April 2010
Erik
Doohan, not Doolan, my mistake. His parents were Irish, but Roddenbery liked his Scottish accent better, so he was cast as a Scot. And then had to put up with a lot of episodes in which American actors put on very, very bad Irish accents. William Shatner was originally Canadian, as well.
Doohan was less lucky than your brother; didn't even get off the beach before he was wounded. (Roddenbery, incidentally, was a USAAF bomber pilot in the Pacific, and Deforest Kelly ("Bones") was an enlisted man also in USAAF, The other principals were too young for WWII.)
The Canadians on Juno took the highest rate of casualties in the British sector but also made the deepest penetration. The general media fixation with Omaha, and the British tendency to focus on the critical Orne flank tends to lead to the two central beaches being neglected (not in Canadian histories, of course). This warps the overall picture of D-Day, which is a pity.
Cheers
LW -
Message 8
Posted by englishvote (U5473482) on Friday, 9th April 2010
In answer to the initial questions of the possible effectiveness of a longer bombardment of the German defences before the assault of allied forces in Normandy it is clear that the idea has many faults.
I find it surprising that the essential element of surprise has been so correctly pointed out to be a very important part of the success of the operation but then it would be completely removed by an elongated bombardment.
Another major contribution to the operations was the airborne assault, the consequence of a day long bombardment would have left the airborne troops isolated and would certainly have meant their complete destruction.
The 3 airborne divisions could not have been landed after any lengthy bombardment because the defenders would have been on alert and prepared for attack rather than dispersed and shocked by the sudden appearance of allied forces.
A delay in landing the assault troops would also have allowed the defenders to organise their forces and bring up reinforcements, especially if the bombardment would have lasted all day and thus allowed the Germans to use the cover of night to bring up fresh units.
Finally the idea that a lengthy bombardment would have devastated the defences simply is not borne out by evidence of other bombardments.
The entire idea is based on WW1 tactics and could only have resulted in the same heavy casualties for the attackers.
The main reason for the high casualties on Omaha beach was the strong defences, unfortunate errors in the air bombardment and initial sea bombardment. But also the failure of the US commanders to heed advice and swamp the defences with as much armour as possible.
The lack of specialist tanks on the US beaches led directly to high American casualties and the reliance of infantry attacks rather than massed armour assaults would continue to lead to very high US casualties in the rest of the Normandy campaign. -
Message 9
Posted by englishvote (U5473482) on Friday, 9th April 2010
Gene Roddenberry flew a B17 called `Yankee Doodle' of the 395th BS 5th BG in the Pacific
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Message 10
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Friday, 9th April 2010
"..I wish a few other war critics would toss in their two bits worth..."
I suspect that there is not that much of great importance to add to message 2. -
Message 11
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Friday, 9th April 2010
If a long bombardment had been planned, would the bad weather on the 5th have meant the invasion would have been postponed until August?
The real problem with the bombardment was that much of it simply missed, and subsequently there were huge problems in co-ordinating forward observers. Neither of which could have been improved by a longer initial bombardment. -
Message 12
Posted by vesturiiis (U13688567) on Friday, 9th April 2010
LongW...
For me the quinessential D-Day image is of (I believe the NorthNovas on Juno Beach) as the troops are offloading and one pats his buddy good luck. He turns , half smiles and they depart as you can see shells hitting the water and the beach seems a long ways off.
I always wondered how these fellows made out, they sure were in the thick of things.
The Canadians penetration could have been further but they were halted in land (10miles or so)
thanks IAN -
Message 13
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Friday, 9th April 2010
englishvote
The lack of specialist armour was felt very much on Omaha, but to fair to the US Army, it wasn't entirely true that they refused it outright.
The Americans did recognise the need for armoured support on the beach - the problem at Omaha was that the bulk of the DD tanks did not make it in.
The British AVREs were, of course, based on the remarkable Churchill, indeed the bulk of them were new-build Mk VII hulls with very thick (by Western standards)armour. In addition to its protection, the Churchill was comparatively roomy and had an escape hatch low in the side which allowed the crew to disembark in relatively safety if necessary. The Churchill was also remarkably nimble; it could turn in its own length - indeed skilled drivers could manipulate the steering system to turn it almost in its own length.
But there were not enough Churchills to go round, even for the British and Canadians. To provide enough for Normandy, deliveries to Italy were suspended (so the Churchill regiments there had to become hybrid regiments, with at least one squadron re-equipped with Shermans). Even in 21st Army Group, battle replacement Churchills were often the older variants.
Unfortunately, the US Army did not have a Churchill equivalent. The Americans would have had to use the Sherman. But it was not as heavily armoured. Its hull stood higher than the Churchill's, and though faster, it couldn't manoeuvre as well in tight spaces.
Some Churchill AVREs were offered in the end, but not enough to meet all needs. Also, using the Churchill would have required retraining and complicated supply and maintenance.
LW -
Message 14
Posted by bandick (U14360315) on Friday, 9th April 2010
I find it rather odd that thus far not one mention of the two mulberry harbours assembled within three days of D Day⦠pretty amazing in itself. Or do you think it just added to the confusion?
regards bandick... -
Message 15
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Friday, 9th April 2010
Well, they didn't help with the problem of getting off the beach on the Day itself.
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Message 16
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Friday, 9th April 2010
My brother said several times that he wished he were in a Churchill and then again, equally often, he was glad he was not. According to him, the Churchill was awfully slow because of its heavy armour and its turret was too weak to mount a gun powerful enough to kill a Tiger.
As for quick egress from the Sherman, he told me that there was an escape hatch in the bottom of the Sherman that was not unlike a manhole cover, and the crews would usually take that cover off and throw it away, leaving the bottom gaping wide open. He said it did make them a little more vulnerable to mines, but he added that if they were hit, it also gave them a way out that they otherwise would not have had. Shermans burned so quickly that the crew would never have the time to open that manhole cover and still get out.
The one advantage the Sherman had, he tells me, was its speed, and this is something the Churchill didn't have. They used this speed to advantage. He said they'd often see a Tiger or Panther parked in woods beside a roadway, hopefully camouflaged by the German crew, but that he and his mates had seen so many of them that they usually could see through the camouflage. They'd get everything ready, and then rush down the roadway full speed, past the German tank. He said one huge disadvantage the Tiger and Panthers both had was that their turrets traversed very slowly, and if the Shermans went past them at full speed, the turret couldn't rotate rapidly enough to keep up with them. They'd speed past, and then swing in behind at full throttle and quickly blast away. He said he was surprised at how often that worked for him and his crew,and often for other tanks in his regiment. The rear armour of the Tiger wasn't thick enough to stop the Sherman's 75mm AP shell from punching through and they usually got their gun firing sooner than the German tank could lock onto them.
He and the crew were awarded a mention at one point during Monty's charge down from Holland into Germany because their tank managed to knock out 4 German tanks in one morning. Evidently that technique worked.
Please remember, I was not in that tank nor was I ever involved in fighting one. These accounts were told me by my brother who was not noted for exaggeration. I can vouch for Bruce... I cannot vouch for the Sherman tank or its performance. -
Message 17
Posted by cmedog47 (U3614178) on Saturday, 10th April 2010
The main advantage of the Sherman I suppose was that there were so damned many of them. The US high command made the decision in most areas to go to war with what they already had and could rapidly increase production rather than creating delays or shortages by producing the highest quality equipment of which they were capable. It is hard to argue with the final result: an enemy overwhelmed by quantity if not by quality. The mulberry habors and other stategies to inject men and material into Normandy far faster than the Germans imagined that they might or could defeat was naturally a necessary part of that overall strategy.
But at certain times and places, it was a strategy that killed a lot of GI's, and guess the failure to have armour that they could effectively get ashore that day was one of those times perhaps.
I was told that the failure to pass down to the operational level the presence of troops of greater strength and experience defending the Omaha sector was one of the problems as well. I have known two people there that day. One says he thought all was lost and was anticipating and order to evacuate. The other cursed the lack of adequate naval bombardment.
Given that Hitler's stubbornness about it being a feint persisted for several days, I wonder if, inretrospect, a 48 hour shellacking by the navy would have did any harm to the element of surprise after all. It may have only reinforced his conviction. We can never know. We can only thank God and the men who were there for the victory. -
Message 18
Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Saturday, 10th April 2010
I'm with Rskill on the bombardments - he suggests that the Germans were ready to credit naval gunfire as more influential than it really was because it absolved them from a considerable portion of the blame.
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Message 19
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 11th April 2010
Erik
The Churchill was slow. The Churchill tank regiments also had the problem that, unlike the Cromwell and Sherman armoured regiments, they did not have 17lbr-equipped Fireflies (or Challengers). They got round this in part by retaining some 6lbr-armed tanks - the 6lbr had better armour-piercing performance than the 75mm (which was essentially a bored-out 6lbr) and improved ammunition gave a reasonable chance at least against Panzer IVs and Panthers.
The insurmountable problem was simply that the allies were winning, and therefore attacking, so they were the ones who had to expose themselves. when the Germans counter-attacked, they lost just as heavily despite their better armour.
PRoduction was a factor. Two M4 Shermans could be produced and shipped for the same logistic effort as one M36 Pershing. The Germans went for heavier tanks, but couldn't produce as many, so were eventually faced with running out of any tanks at all.
Even with the triumph of US production, there were still shortages. After the Japanese 1944 offensive in China against the US airbases, the Americans asked (demanded, really) Shermans in Indiabe diverted from delivery to 14th Army and be sent to China. These were never replaced, which is why some regiments finished the war still operating M3 Lee/Grants.
The same thing happened in NW Europe after the Bulge battles (which shows how heavily the US armour suffered). It was less of a problem there as the British were introducing the Comet and in any case, with Fireflies available, were less interested in the 76mm equipped Shermans that were then being delivered (the 75mm had better HE capability than the 76mm).
I share your admiration for tank crews. Having been inside a few, I have never understood how the crews exist, let alone fight, in such conditions.
Cheers
LW -
Message 20
Posted by Triceratops (U3420301) on Sunday, 11th April 2010
Norman Cota suggested landing before dawn to get his troops onto and across the beaches while it was still dark.
This is a photo taken by USS Texas about mid-day on June 6th.The smoke in the centre is over the Vierville Draw,where the Douvre reaches the sea.Dog Green Sector is to the left of the draw,Charlie Sector to the right. C company 2nd Rangers landed at Charlie. D,E & F companies landed at the Point du Hoc further west. A & B companies plus 5th Ranger battalion were supposed to follow onto the Point du Hoc after it was secured but for some reason the message the Point had been taken was never passed to them, so A & B 2nd Rangers landed at Dog Green, 5th Rangers at Dog White.
The church tower of Vierville can just be seen above the smoke.
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Message 21
Posted by Mike Alexander (U1706714) on Monday, 12th April 2010
No-one's mentioned the key role of Ultra yet. Intelligence from Station X provided the allies the precise whereabouts of almost all Panzer divisions ahead of the landings. It wasn't just that the allies had attempted to deceive the German high command - it was that they *knew* the deception had worked.
The mulberry harbours were truly a brilliant feat of engineering (there are some great working models at the museum at Arromanches). They might have had even more impact were it not for the unexpected and unusually brutal storms that wrecked Mulberry A at Omaha. -
Message 22
Posted by hotmousemat (U2388917) on Monday, 12th April 2010
There has been little doubt expressed that if Hitler had released his panzers immediately to Rommel and/or von Rundstedt the invasion might well have failed. Β
I go with message 6. There was a continual cover of aircraft waiting to make mincemeat of the German armour as soon as it moved. Since it didn't, we tend not to hear of it in the histories.
In terms of the larger picture, the allied surprise was not that the Germans did not put enough effort into preventing an early allied advance but rather that they put in too much. Given the successful initial landing and the continual air dominance, the Germans were never going to push the Allies back into the sea, so what was the point in trying to hold the line they did? The constraint on the Allied build up was one of cross channel supplies, not of how many acres of Normandy they controlled and it wasn't as if the German line was defending any useful harbours.
The Germans did an excellent tactical job of holding things up; it mucked up the Allied expected advance lines. But when the collapse came, as it had to, it only made it the more complete, thus there were little resources left for further resistance on the more substantial defensive positions and the Allies were thus soon back on schedule.
Fixed defensive lines on the French frontier were obsolete in 1939. They were equally obsolete on the French coast in 1944. And using up your scarce mobile forces to support a fixed defensive lines of no strategic importance was even more of a waste of resources. -
Message 23
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Monday, 12th April 2010
Allied fighter-bombers couldn't operate at night, which is when the panzers would have moved if the bombardment had begun 48 hours in advance, as in the Pacific. And they couldn't be called into the airspace over the beachead on a cab-rank basis because it was full of naval shells - which is why the problems of fire co-ordination in various places at the start of the assault caused problems.
Trying to knock the invasion back into the sea was the right approach, if it could be done on the first day. If Eisenhower had been forced to evacuate, it would have taken time to reorganise for another attempt and prepare a new assault area. The Cross-channel invasion might have had to be postponed for another year, or even abandoned altogether, with major implications for Allied strategy (and the risk of the Red Army getting to the Rhine, if not further).
Even if there had been a remounted invasion, it would have been further West, therefore that much further away from Germany and a result in itself (the Germans won the first battle of D-Day in 1942 at Dieppe, when the Allied planners were conviced the Pas de Calais with its ports and shorter route to the Rhine was a non-starter for the actual invasion).
Once there was a lodgement, it was in German interests to confine it as much as possible, as it would be easier to contain and lack of room for manoeuvre would complicate the Allied build-up and attempts to break out. It was this factor that caused Eisenhower and Montgomery to deman an expansion to five beaches instead of the original three, and that hampered British attempts at breakout in the cramped and crowded eastern sector.
Normandy cost the Germans more than they expected, and they were not able to hold a line on the Seine, which both they and the Allies had expected originally, but it was still the right strategy given the demands of two fronts.
(It tends to be forgotten that Monty's projected D+90 phase line on his planning map was pretty much where the Allied forces actually ended up on D+90 - but the phase lines in between turned out to be wrong. He defeated the Germans the way he said he would, but not where and when he said he would.)
LW -
Message 24
Posted by hotmousemat (U2388917) on Thursday, 15th April 2010
Once there was a lodgement, it was in German interests to confine it as much as possible, as it would be easier to contain and lack of room for manoeuvre would complicate the Allied build-up and attempts to break out.Β
I agree that would be in their interests, but they only had limited resources - defend one place and you can't defend somewhere else.
The question is; was it going to work? The answer is; only if the Germans can win. Because if they weren't going to win, then they were never going to be able to disengage without being utterly destroyed, which of course is what happened.
Trying to knock the invasion back into the sea was the right approach, if it could be done on the first day.Β
Again, you cannot disagree - 'if it could be done'. But I do not think it is likely that it could. Consider the difficulties the Allies had pushing in the other direction.
Certainly if the armour had been deployed close to the beaches it might have been effective, but they didn't have so much of it that it could have covered all the possible invasion beaches. And the closer to the beaches, the easier it would be to knock out. If you want to deploy static 'armoured' defences that close it makes more sense to make them out of concrete.
Nor do I think deploying reserve forces so quickly - at night - was easy; think how much could have gone wrong. Remember the fate of other 'armoured thrusts' including our own, later in the war. One dodgy bridge or an unlucky breakdown at a narrow place, then dawn breaks to reveal lines of tempting targets strung out along the roads. And the sooner you start, the more chance your intelligence is wrong and you are going in the wrong direction!
Armed with a history book, we can all out-general Napoleon! But I think we should resist this and if we see somebody acted in a way that doesn't make sense to us now, assume this is because we probably fail to realise how things looked at the time. We should explain, not judge. -
Message 25
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Thursday, 15th April 2010
hotmousemat
"we should explain,not judge."
Well actually, chum, that's what I was doing. My post was an explanation of the thinking behind the German defence strategy and the Allied concerns. I specifically pointed out the Eisenhower and Montgomery both insistedon widening the bridgehead to avoid being boxed in.
For Rommel's thinking, I would suggest David Fraser's biography. Fraser was well-placed to write the book having both reached the rank of General himself and having served in Normandy (as adjutant of the Grenadier Guards armoured regiment). For Eisenhower and Monty's thinking, Carlo d'Este's biography of the former and the notorious Memoirs of the latter. And the US and British Official Histories.
Rommel was actually aware of the difficulties of moving reserves in the face of airpower; that's why he wanted them closer to the likely invasion area. I agree moving large formations at night is difficult (I've done it, at regimental level, on exercise and that was bad enough. On one occasion I took my guys on an impromptu invasion of another country 70kms from our intended route). But it is a lot easier to do it in your own territory, which is what the German move would have entailed,with your own engineers to hand. These were experienced troops ( a lot more experience3d than me, for a start).
As to "if it could be done",the German defenders had to try. the alternative was to fall back progressively toward Germany while the greater resources of the Allied armies got progressively more space in which to manoeuvre. In the end, their resources were not enough, but they held the Normandy perimeter longer than either they or the allies expected.
Two last points:
- The way the Germans acted makes perfect sense to me from the vantage point of 2010, because the operational and tactical imperatives are perfectly understandable.
- We need to explain why historical events happened the way they did, which is what I was endeavouring to do. But it is a perfectly valid historical exercise to also judge those decisions and explore whether they were correct. That I have also tried to do,and that was the purpose that Erik was pursuing in posing his orginal question.
Cheers
LW -
Message 26
Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Thursday, 15th April 2010
If you are seriously going to postulate a 2 or 3 day bombardment by battleships, surely you would have needed 4 or 5 times as many vessels? How big was an outfit of shells? At 2 rounds/minute, to keep 1 British 15" in action for 24 hours would mean 2500 tons of shell.
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Message 27
Posted by englishvote (U5473482) on Friday, 16th April 2010
The German build up around the Normandy beachhead was extremely slow, mostly down to the effects of the allied airforces and also to the results of the French and Belgium resistance sabotage efforts.
Contrary to allied planning the Germans were moving fewer troops into the area than the allies were putting ashore over open beaches.
So Rommelβs plan of pushing the allies back into the sea was doomed by lack of troops early on partly due to the difficulty in moving units under allied air cover and also by Hitlerβs refusal to release any troops from the 15th army defending the Pas de Calais.
But Rommel wished to pull the panzer divisions back from the front line a week after the invasion, he needed to create a mobile reserve from the powerful units available to him.
The lack of infantry divisions made this difficult and the constant allied pressure meant that the panzer divisions were kept in place.
Supplies were critical for the Germans, they simply could not move enough into the area to meet demand. Fuel was the most critical and there was major restrictions on how far forward supply depots could be placed, this led to units burning a lot of fuel just in travelling to get their petrol.
A battle of manoeuvre was not a possibility to the Germans due to lack of fuel and allied air power, the only means they had of halting the allies was a static defence.
The German generals on the spot knew the inevitable results of this grinding attrition that was taking place trying to hold a line, but Hitler refused to allow any retreat. Of course the counter attack westward after the American breakthrough at St Lo made a bad situation even worse and led to the loss of huge amounts of equipment at Falaise.
A lot of this was planned by Montgomery, he intended to remove the German βfreedom of manoeuvreβ and make them fight on his terms until the allies were ready to breakout and use freedom of manoeuvre to their advantage. -
Message 28
Posted by hotmousemat (U2388917) on Friday, 16th April 2010
LW,
I do take your points; indeed I am sure you know more about the military side than I do. I suppose I am saying is it all depends on what level we are starting any 'what if...?'
We would both agree that a discussion that started 'What if Hitler had used ICBMs on D-Day?' would be unrealistic, because if that had been a possibility then lots of other things would have been different too.
But what about starting 'What if Rommel had been allowed a free hand...?' OK, it seems more sensible than the ICBM scenario, but is it actually realistic? I suspect the ghost of Hitler would respond that the way he organised the army command, which included clearly disloyal elements, was a matter of necessity. Of course, if Germany had been a democracy then the German army might have been run differently, but then if Germany had been a democracy so would everything else!
My suggestion is that this is often, if not always, the case with 'what ifs?' Everything that did happen, happened for various reasons, so the 'what if?' has to alter those too. But altering those changes other things...
Mind you, these boards would be a lot duller if anyone took any notice of what I'm saying and gave up the 'what ifs'.
On a final point, I think Hitler might have argued as follows; It has become clear that sooner or later, Germany will be defeated in the field. The only hope is political - that the west will become so concerned that Stalin's advance is swallowing too much of Europe that they will therefore need to come to terms with me. So my priority is for the army to delay the western powers; lots of militarily pointless 'last ditch' defences. But I cannot trust my army commanders to do this; they will surrender or attempt a coup. That is why I need to divide authority; yes, it is bad militarily, but that is no longer the important consideration.
Not unreasonable? -
Message 29
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Friday, 16th April 2010
I agree with your ''what if'' evaluation, hotmouse. If ''what if's'' were eliminated, these boards would be a lot less interesting. However that's not what I tried to inspire when I launched this thread. I endeavoured to initiate an exchange of views concerning the value of Lewis's opinions about prolonged bombardment of the Normandy beaches vis-a-vis the short, 40-minute-to-an hour shelling that in fact took place. I am aware, as are you undoubtedly, that it has been opined more than once by those whose opinions I think we all respect, that the opening bombardment of Tarawa was inadequate and that a 48-hour bombardment of the landing beaches in the Pacific thereafter was common. It was definitely worthwhile there, and while I realize the conditions were very different at Normandy, I thought it was worthy of discussion.
I doubt if there'd have been any problem with accumulating, or replenishing, the warships' magazines for a prolonged bombardment. If it could be done in the Pacific with the enormously long supply lines there, it could certainly be handled in the English Channel.
It's definitely been an interesting thread.
Any more comments? -
Message 30
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 18th April 2010
Erik
I think the key element here is the different operational challenge between conditions in the Pacific Islands and the Cross-Channel attack (and for that matter, Sicily, Salerno and Anzio).
For the Pacific, the main thing was to get ashore. The Japanese defenders would be a finite force, with no major strategic reinforcement possible from Japan or China. Once established ashore, the US Forces would inevitable come to overwhelm the defenders.
Therefore, several days could be allocated to the bombardment, because the loss of surprise would not affect the resistance encountered.
For D-Day, early committment of the German reserves would allow the beachead to be contained. Anzio was a recent glaring example of this danger. So surprise was vital for Normandy.
The short bombardment was the only measure to achieve surprise, but it was a vital one.
LW -
Message 31
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 18th April 2010
Ooops
"was NOT the only measure for achieving surprise" -
Message 32
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Sunday, 18th April 2010
Re: Message 30.
LongWeekend,
I followed this debate with great interest and learned a lot.
"For D-Day, early committment of the German reserves would allow the beachead to be contained. Anzio was a recent glaring example of this danger. So surprise was vital for Normandy."
I am glad that you mentioned Anzio, as indeed if the Germans couldn't be surprised and had the time to...Coincidentally saw recently a report of Anzio with a lot of original footage.
I am also glad that you keep reminding us as in your message 2 of the importance of the surprise element to avoid to give the Germans the time to react rapidly enough.
I thank also the other contributors as the initiator Eric for their worthy thinking about the question.
Kind regards and with esteem,
Paul. -
Message 33
Posted by ffiill (U3925987) on Monday, 7th June 2010
Sure you will know about the USAFs role in this. Sadly they were noted for protecting their own rear ends.
Airborne Units were dropped short of their targets to avoid the aircraft attracting ground fire; Likewise gliders who were in some cases dropped over the seas where they crashed drowning their passengers.
Not forgetting the so called precision bombing which was a total waste of time.
And as for the ampetamine head spped freaks in their Typhoons they shot at anything that moved. -
Message 34
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Tuesday, 8th June 2010
ffiill,
What a curious post! Please try to remember that the majority of the pilots of the unarmed Dakotas were seeing action for the first time. One tends to be a little 'nervy' at such times and try not to overlook the fact that a lot of them did the job and at great cost to them. Precision bombing a waste of time? debatable. Amphetamine speed freaks flying Typhoons? Have you ever tried to dive at the ground from three thousand feet and about three hundred miles per hour and try to locate a target whilst those on the ground are doing their very best to destroy you?
And why pick out just Typhoons? Have you something against them rather than the rest of the allied aircraft used in this role, or is it Hawker aircraft in general you dislike? -
Message 35
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 8th June 2010
Evidently, ffiill intends to make a name for himself as a troll.
-
Message 36
Posted by Catigern (U14419012) on Tuesday, 8th June 2010
Let's not jump to conclusions, as ffiill's posts on Bannockburn and the Somme were perfectly sensible.
-
Message 37
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Wednesday, 9th June 2010
What a curious post!Β
IS it really that curious? The USAF did fail to deliver some of what was planned for it on D-Day. Defences survived the bombs and beaches remained uncratered. And certainly airborne troops were dropped early and off target.
Why? Natural difficulties with implementing such a huge plan and natural responses from pilots, some of whom were inexperienced, some scared and others clouded by the fog of war.
Understandable that may be from our point, but probably not so for infantry assaulting the beaches more concerned with their lives than reasonable reasons. Nor was the USAF the only one to "blame". In Crete and Libya, the RAF had a poor reputation among the British soldiers who quipped that RAF stood for "Rare as ****". -
Message 38
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Wednesday, 9th June 2010
cloudyj,
Nor was the USAF the only one to "blame".Β
Pedantry alert: they were the USAAF. -
Message 39
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Wednesday, 9th June 2010
Pedantry alert: they were the USAAF.Β
D'oh! As the Americans say: "my bad".
On the subject of amphetamine-fuelled (mentioned earlier)...almost all the British forces at Alamein were doped up prior to the attack by their regimental doctors. -
Message 40
Posted by TrailApe (U1701496) on Wednesday, 9th June 2010
According to him, the Churchill was awfully slow because of its heavy armour and its turret was too weak to mount a gun powerful enough to kill a Tiger.Β
There has been a lot of comparisons between the Churchill and the Sherman, and since the British, Canadians and Polish all used both, there were plenty of expert opinions out there, however, in my estimation itβs like anything else, it comes down to what you are used to. Churchill crews would shudder at the possibilities of getting into a 'Ronson' whilst Sherman crews would not like the idea of being a slow target liable to break down at any moment.
The Shermans were more reliable and had a better HE round for their gun, the Churchillβs were tough and β as mentioned elsewhere, suprisingly nimble. At Longstop they drove up a Tunisian Mountain and totally surprised the incumbent German defenders, and in another action in NW Europe they ploughed through a forest that the Germans had considered impassible for AFVβs.
Of course the Sherman could be upgunned to take the 17lber and the 17lb Churchill variant β the Black Prince, never got into the war (mainly because of the forthcoming Centurion, so the pros and cons go on endlessly. Possibly they complemented each other?
However, guess which type of tank of the Allies was the first to take out a Tiger in the West?
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