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Hitler His Part In His Downfall
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Message 1.Â
Posted by FowPah (U1746998) on Sunday, 4th April 2010
Did his partially successful stand and hold policy (at the time) outside Moscow, winter 41/42 rather than tactical retreat favoured by the military sow the seeds for his later disastrous decisions at Stalingrad and other places?
Or was his megalomania always going to end in him overruling the military leading to ultimate defeat? -
Message 2
Posted by vesturiiis (U13688567) on Sunday, 4th April 2010
Hi Wayne F
Have read that the Allies really considered AH a plus to their cause and decided against taking him out.
Not much of admiration for his military genius,
quite a loser that way-right.... -
Message 3
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Monday, 5th April 2010
Buried in your question is the assumption that the German military leadership could have been successful without Hitler's interference. This is a favorite theme among defeated generals; they are always eager to explain in their memoirs how they would have won the war if they had been given a free hand. German generals were no different, and field-marshall Erich von Manstein popularized the theme in his own autobiography, significantly titled 'Verlorene Siege' -- 'Lost Victories'.
Reality was more dour. The fate of Nazi Germany was probably sealed when Hitler decided to attack the USSR, admittedly against the advice of many of his generals. With this action the 'Reich' was embarking on a war on two fronts again. Worse, it was biting the hand that fed it. Hitler's notions that the conquest of the Ukraine, the Kaukasus and European Russia would give him the resources to continue the war indefinitely were illusory. The most better military leadership could have achieved, was making the war longer.
It is certainly true that from 1942 onwards, Hitler's stubborn determination to hold onto every scrap of conquered ground increasingly eroded the tactical flexibility of the Wehrmacht, and his paranoid insistence on exercising personal control had a highly disruptive effect on command arrangements. However, the seeds for these tendencies were always there in his character: The partial success of his 'Haltbefehl' in the winter of 1941-42 at most reinforced this streak. Hitler's handling of his generals was not fundamentally different from his management of civilians officials, which were also played out against each other and judged more on their loyalty than their capability. -
Message 4
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 5th April 2010
Worse, it was biting the hand that fed it. This is an overstatement. Hitler authorized Directive 21 – aka Plan Barbarossa - on December 18, 1940, immediately following Molotov's "offer" to the Axis powers, which made Hitler realize that he was being had. Moreover, as he later explained to Mussolini, he realized that he had been had all along - ever since he had entered negotiations with Stalin - sometime in 1938, according to various sources.
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Message 5
Posted by FowPah (U1746998) on Monday, 5th April 2010
suvorovetz do you think his early successful orders preventing retreat caused him to act recklessly with his troops later.We know he showed little regard for the lives of the Wehrmacht later on but you think his early strategic decisions, which worked to some extent. affected his later plans for the worse.
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Message 6
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Monday, 5th April 2010
Hitler authorized Directive 21 – aka Plan Barbarossa - on December 18, 1940, immediately following Molotov's "offer" to the Axis powers,Â
Hitler approved the final plan on that date. He had ordered it to be drawn up the previous July after the Fall of France and before the Battle of Britain had even started in earnest. -
Message 7
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Monday, 5th April 2010
Re: Message 3.
Mutatis Mutandis,
I mostly agree with what you said, certainly as you say up to 1942.
Hitler wasn't stupid, but it was a gambler. Many are that driven by hearsay and not historical research that they demonize the figure of Hitler and by that are distorting the historic reality.
There is in France a certain François Delpla, "l'enfant terrible" (the terrible child
) of French historians. A kind of a French Suvorov. He has written now some three or more books among others one on Churchill and one mentioning Paul Reynaud and the political role of his mistress. The last book couldn't appear because of a procedure against him from Reynaud's family.
That said: I don't always follow François Delpla that I met on several French messageboards, but the least you can say that he is as anti-Nazi and anti-Hitler as I am, but he only ask to comtemplate the historical proven slyness of a Hitler, perhaps the slyness of a gang-leader, but nevertheless he was the master of the plots I think even up to 1942, when he obviously "lost the pedals".
You can say what you want of François Delpla, but he is doing his research in depth even with every first-source material. I read among others a more than 200 pages discussion only about the "Haltbefehl" at Dunkirk. If you understand French, he has his own messageboard. But in my opinion he is many times rather boring (sorry François...he understands and perhaps speaks also English and German) because of his endless messages and it is not so easy to follow his French, perhaps also his English...I mean the logical following of the reasoning in the thread...not always that clear cut as for dummies as I (and some others, who say the same). But at the end of the road he is with his contributions adding to the history writing of WWII...in my humble opinion...and I agree it is off topic...
Kind regards and with esteem,
Paul. -
Message 8
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 5th April 2010
suvorovetz do you think his early successful orders preventing retreat caused him to act recklessly with his troops later I think that any of his interference with combat command and control was of little consequence. His fatal mistake was made in August of 1939, when he decided to enter the Pact with Stalin. His Russian campaign started out miraculously well for the first two or three months, when the enourmous Red Army machine literally collapsed in front of the advancing Wehrmacht. But no amount of tactical success would be enough to save him from strategic abyss he had been facing already.
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Message 9
Posted by AlexanderLiberty (U14397753) on Monday, 5th April 2010
"...it is better to go on striking in the same direction than to move one's forces this way and that."
Carl von Clausewitz can teach us.
In one hand, probably, He lost the war when German Tanks started the invasion of the USSR but more than ever the battle of Britain was the swansong of AH.
How can Germany defend its territories against the multiple attack from east (USSR) and west (UK + US)?
In the other hand, in the Europe History, more than one time , the Continent destiny was decide by UK Forces (The Napoleon’s defeat was a truly example) so he didn’t win because, in my opinion, the German war machine didn’t have the hundred-year-old experience of British Troops (they’d fought all over the world).
"Experience is the teacher of all things"
Julius Caesar, Commentarii de Bello Civili (Commentaries on the Civil War), 2. 8 (50s or 40s BC) -
Message 10
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Monday, 5th April 2010
Re: Message 9.
Alexander,
"In the other hand, in the Europe History, more than one time , the Continent destiny was decide by UK Forces (The Napoleon’s defeat was a truly example) so he didn’t win because, in my opinion, the German war machine didn’t have the hundred-year-old experience of British Troops (they’d fought all over the world)."
Have you read Peter Hofschröer:
I had already the honour to have a conversation with him on these messageboards, but for some reason if I recall it well it ended in some difficulties, not because of the Waterloo subject but again if I remember it well because of some "jokes" about British people...Not sure if I can find it back as he wrote under some kind of German nickname...
Kind regards,
Paul. -
Message 11
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Tuesday, 6th April 2010
By the way, Hitler authorized Directive 21 – aka Plan Barbarossa - on December 18, 1940, immediately following Molotov's "offer" to the Axis powers,Â
Hitler approved the final plan on that date. I've already quoted Solonin on this, but it looks as a good place for a friendly reminder:
Even as of December 18, 1940 - upon its authorization by Hitler - Plan Barbarossa did not contain any timeline for strategic deployment, nor too many details beyond broad statement of intent to prepare for blietzkrieg. The Plan called for the OKW staff to verbally brief Hitler about their respective operational and deployment plans. Even tentative strategic deployment timeline counting down toward June 22 was not established until April 30, and it was still not declared final until June 18. -
Message 12
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Tuesday, 6th April 2010
However, according to Kershaw:
"...On 29 July [1940] [Hitler] asked the Chief of the Wehrmacht Directional Staff about deploying the army in the east, and whether it might be possible to attack and defeat Russia that very autumn. Jodl totally ruled it out on practical grounds. In that case, Hitler said, absolute confidence was needed. Feasibility studies were to be undetrtaken, but knowledge confined to only a few staff officers. Remarkably, in fact, the Wehrmacht had not waited for Hitler's order. "The army", Jodl was later to remark, "had already learnt of the Fuhrer's intentions at the stage when these were still being weighed up. An operational plan was drawn up even before the order for this was given." And already in July, as he later put it "on his own initiative (aus eigennem Antrieb)", Major General Bernhard von Lossberg, from Jodl's 'National Defence Department' (Abteilung Landesvertiedigung), had begun work on an 'operational study for a Russian campaign (an die Bearbeitung einer Operationsstudie fur einen Russlandfeldzug)'. The draft plan was at this stage merely intended to be held in readiness for the point at which it might be needed. Hitler's discussion with Jodl indicated that this point had arrived."
I.Kershaw, "Hitler Vol.2: Nemesis: 1936-45", chap.7, 'Zenith of Power', p.307.
The Wehrmacht were not merely anticipating their master's wishes. For them, as for Hitler, the real war started on 22 June 1941. Everything else was prologue. -
Message 13
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Tuesday, 6th April 2010
Alan However, according to Kershaw:
"...On 29 July [1940] [Hitler] asked the Chief of the Wehrmacht Directional Staff about deploying the army in the east, and whether it might be possible to attack and defeat Russia that very autumn..."
The Wehrmacht were not merely anticipating their master's wishes. For them, as for Hitler, the real war started on 22 June 1941. Everything else was prologue. You seem to be missing the point here. My clarification pertains to your casual use of the term "final plan" as opposed to presumably "draft plan." The fact that Hitler had asked OKW staff to consider planning of Russian campaign at the end of July of 1940 is noteworthy for other reasons – particularly, because it came in the wake of Stalin’s violation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in regard to Bukovina in the summer of 1940. The content of the Directive 21 authorized in December 1940 really boils down to two major breaking ground reach-goals for Wehrmacht: 1. Prepare to conduct one helluva blitz Blitzkrieg; 2. Prepare to do it EVEN BEFORE THE WAR AGAINST UK IS OVER.
Now that had NEVER been in the works before; Wehrmacht had NEVER been anticipating this sort of their master’s wishes; the master’s wishes had always been to fight limited theater blitzkriegs. -
Message 14
Posted by baz (U14258304) on Tuesday, 6th April 2010
Or was his megalomania always going to end in him overruling the military leading to ultimate defeat?Â
Georges Saba, one of Saddam's staff, claimed to have been one of the few who dared tell him the true state of his position militarily. Saddam preferred to go with the 'yes men', and believe he could prevail - remember 'comical' Ali telling the world's press that the alliance were defeated, while US tanks were in Baghdad?
Hitler's early successes, despite the caution of some of his closest advisors at the time, must have fed his megalomania, even to the point where defeat was inevitable. Napoleon's 'Hundred Days' would make an interesting thread on the subject of megalomania, too. -
Message 15
Posted by FowPah (U1746998) on Tuesday, 6th April 2010
Was it possible to start Barbarossa earlier? I know the Balkans became an issue at the time causing forces to be redeployed.But were the ground conditions suitable for blitzkrieg earlier on? And also why were the Wehrmacht not suitably clothed for the harsh weather?Even with a quick victory large forces would have to have remained through the winter.
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Message 16
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Tuesday, 6th April 2010
And also why were the Wehrmacht not suitably clothed for the harsh weather?Even with a quick victory large forces would have to have remained through the winter. I wish more people asked these questions when they read Kershaw, Beevor, etc, etc
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Message 17
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Tuesday, 6th April 2010
why were the Wehrmacht not suitably clothed for the harsh weather?Even with a quick victory large forces would have to have remained through the winter.Â
Churchill gave an answer to this in a radio broadcast he made on the second anniversary of his appointment as PM on 10 May 1942:
"Dictators, as well as democracies and parliamentary governments, make mistakes sometimes. Indeed, when the whole story is told I believe it will be found that the dictators, for all their preparations and prolonged scheming, have made greater mistakes than the democracies they have assailed.
Even a Hitler makes mistakes sometimes. In June last, without the slightest provocation and in breach of a pact of non-aggression, he invaded the lands of the Russian peoples.
At that time he had the strongest army in the world, trained in war, flushed with incredible, unbroken success, and equipped with limitless munitions and the most modern weapons. He had also secured for himself the advantages of surprise and treachery.
Thus he drove the youth and manhood of the German nation forward into Russia. The Russians, under their warrior chief, Stalin, sustained losses which no other country or government has ever borne in so short a time and lived. But they, like us, were resolved never to give in.
They poured out their blood upon their native soil, they kept their faces to the foe from the very first day to the end of the year and on through the night they fought with unflinching valor. And, from the very first day when they were attacked, when no one could tell how things would go, we made a brotherhood with them and a solemn compact to destroy Nazidom and all its works.
Then Hitler made his second grand blunder. He forgot about the Winter. There is a Winter, you know, in Russia. For a good many months the temperature is apt to fall very low. There is snow; there is frost and all that.
Hitler forgot about this Russian Winter. He must have been very loosely educated. We all heard about it at school, but he forgot it. I have never made such a bad mistake as that." -
Message 18
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Tuesday, 6th April 2010
Churchill gave an answer to this in a radio broadcastÂ
You mean, this?
Hitler forgot about this Russian Winter. He must have been very loosely educated. We all heard about it at school, but he forgot it. I have never made such a bad mistake as that Surely you don't think that this was anything other than mockery. -
Message 19
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Wednesday, 7th April 2010
Of course it was mockery but like all effective mockery it contained more than an element of truth. The fact was that, far from being a model of Prussian efficiency the Nazi war machine was totally disorganised and incapable of sustaining a long war. Alan Clark has the following passage in the opening of his "Barbarossa":
"After the French surrender Hitler approved an OKH suggestion to demobilise a number of divisions, which is scarcely consistent with his own plan to attack what was believed to be the largest army in the world within the coming year. The only explanation is that in the absence of a proper supervisory body and procedure the order somehow leaked past. Yet at almost the same moment Hitler was directing that the number of Panzer divisions in the Army was to be doubled and tank production raised to a level of eight hundred to a thousand units per month. Once again the Ordnance Office intervened, with a report that an expansion of this kind would cost over two billion marks, and would require an additional one hundred thousand skilled workers and specialists.
Hitler agreed to its postponement "for the time being", but the reorganization of the Panzer divisions had gone ahead, so that the net effect was that the tank strength of each division was halved. In the result there was some compensation in their increased fire power and the gradual substitution of the heavier PzKw III for the PzKw II, but the Panzer divisions were never to recover the numerical strength and mobility with which they had begun the battle of France. Hitler had also directed that the number of motorised divisions be doubled, but without making any provision for an increase in the production of the vehicle industry. The result was that many of the new formations had to equip themselves with captured or requisitioned trucks, which were to prove unreliable and difficult to service under severe conditions."
A.Clark, "Barbarossa", Chap 1, 'The State of the Wehrmacht' pp.17-18 (pbk.edn.).
In fact vehicle shortages were apparent from the outset and over half the troop carriers were horse-drawn. Far from launching a 'blitzkrieg' the German Army was as dependent on the horse as it had been in 1914.
The explanation is that Hitler massively underestimated his opponent and that any campaign would take weeks rather than months and that any occupying force could loot the supplies of its victim as the Wehrmacht had already done all over Europe and thuis these logistical difficulties would be of no consequence.
"You only have to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come tumbling down"
he told his generals prior to the assault.
He based his belief on the experience of 1914-18 when not one, but two Russian regimes had been destabilised and a Carthaginian peace imposed. The only difference this time was that there would be no Western Front to divert attention and resources or, ultimately, nullify the campaign. He also believed that the Russian morale and will to fight had been permanently corrupted by a quarter of a century of communism. Preparations for a winter campaign would obviously go against the grain of all this.
Maybe you ought to ask yourself this question. How did a German Army not only survive but prosper in Russia for four years in 1914-18 (including 4 winters - 5 if you count the winter of 1918-19 when an army of over a million men remained in occupation of ceded territory) destabilising two governments, launching an offensive in the winter of 1917-18 which threatened to take Petrograd causing the newly-installed Bolshevik Government to flee to the former capital of Russia before agreeing to peace terms which made Versailles look like a compromise?
Had the Russian climate deteriorated so much in the intervening two and a half decades? I doubt it somehow. Or did the Reichswehr Commisariat remember what they had been taught in school and did Hitler forget? But maybe you will think I am mocking you and that would never do. -
Message 20
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 7th April 2010
Had the Russian climate deteriorated so much in the intervening two and a half decades? I doubt it somehow. Or did the Reichswehr Commisariat remember what they had been taught in school and did Hitler forget? But maybe you will think I am mocking you and that would never do. From where I stand, you're mocking yourself. Barring all pseudo-psychological analysis applied every time the facts don't fit the suggested narrative, the explanation to the said facts is very simple: Hitler was not prepared for the Russian campaign and he really had not been preparing for the world war he had allegedly started. On August 23, 1939, he walked into a trap and, from that moment on, he was led by the unfolding events, not the other way around.
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Message 21
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Wednesday, 7th April 2010
Hitler was not prepared for the Russian campaign and he really had not been preparing for the world war he had allegedly started.Â
I agree with the first half of your sentence which is the point of both the Churchill and Clark quotations. However the second half is a total non sequitur. Did Hitler "allegedly" attack Poland in September 1939, "allegedly" invade Norway and Denmark in April 1940, "allegedly" launch a massive assault on France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg in May 1940, "allegedly" occupy Yugoslavia and Greece in April 1941. Awful lot of allegations there which appear instantly provable.
Just because Hitler didn't prepare adequately for war doesn't mean he was not responsible for it. -
Message 22
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 7th April 2010
Did Hitler "allegedly" attack Poland in September 1939Â
Hitler did actually attack Poland on September 1, 1939, which he had - just barely, as Mueller-Hillebrandt later revealed in his memoires - prepared Wehrmacht for. A lot of people - you're obviously included - make a leap equating this day with the start of the world war, often implicitly intended. There's nothing further from the truth, though. Hitler invaded Poland expecting no action from the West. It is well documented that he was stricken speechless upon finding out that the French and the British declared war against him on September 3. So, your "tinkering" with the word allegedly in the following passage "allegedly" invade Norway and Denmark in April 1940, "allegedly" launch a massive assault on France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg in May 1940, "allegedly" occupy Yugoslavia and Greece in April 1941. Awful lot of allegations there which appear instantly provable. is indeed a non-sequitur.
Just because Hitler didn't prepare adequately for war doesn't mean he was not responsible for it. Another non-sequitur. I never said that Hitler was not responsible for war crimes he had committed; neither I ever denied Holocaust; nor I ever denounced the prosecution of Nazi criminals. -
Message 23
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Wednesday, 7th April 2010
This is fanciful stuff, Hitler's conferences upto and including 1939 are littered with his plans for European hegemony - the conference of 23 May 1939, for example, which Sir John Wheeler-Bennett rightly acknowledges as second only in importance to the Hossbach Memorandum meeting of 12 November 1937 for giving us an insight into Hitler's thought processes and Nazi planning, when he gave the final decision for the elimination of Poland and he spoke about a forthcoming war with Britain and France. I have quoted from this before but as you appear to be caught up in your own particular bubble there seems little point in constantly going over old ground.
Although he may have been surprised by the Anglo-French decision to honour (if only legalistically) their guarantee to Poland it made no difference in the long run as he was planning to attack France anyway. As for being 'duped' by Stalin over the Nazi--Soviet Pact he made his own motives clear about signing the Pact at the Berghof meeting of his closest advisers on 22 August 1939:
"There is no time to lose. War must come in my lifetime. My pact was only meant to stall for time, and, gentlemen, to Russia will happen just what I have practised with Poland - we will crush the Soviet Union." -
Message 24
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 7th April 2010
Although he may have been surprised by the Anglo-French decision to honour (if only legalistically) their guarantee to Poland it made no difference in the long run as he was planning to attack France anyway. Of course, it made a big difference. The difference between the limited theater blitzkrieg and the multiple front war of attrition, i.e., the difference between life and death for him, as he had articulated in much selectively quoted Mein Kampf. To be specific, his thought process about European hegemony encompassed time period stretching for hundreds of years - again, as he had articulated in the said Mein Kamph.
As for being 'duped' by Stalin over the Nazi--Soviet Pact he made his own motives clear about signing the Pact at the Berghof meeting of his closest advisers on 22 August 1939: "There is no time to lose. War must come in my lifetime. My pact was only meant to stall for time, and, gentlemen, to Russia will happen just what I have practised with Poland - we will crush the Soviet Union."Â Likewise, there's no indication that he expected to do it in the midst of the war with the western powers. In fact, I'm pretty sure that he did not expect his "lifetime" to conclude as soon as in 1945.
Your blatantly unapologetic selectivity is almost admirable in its audacity. And here's why: when I repeatedly quoted Stalin's speech as of August 19, 1939, in which he had clearly articulated his reasoning for entering the Pact with Hitler signed 4 days later, you came up with 100 reasons why this speech should be completely discarded from any consideration. But from where I stand, there's only one reason for that: you just don't like the obvious implications stemming from the contents of the said speech. -
Message 25
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Thursday, 8th April 2010
In a letter presented to Hitler by Henderson, the British Ambassador to Berlin who had returned to London for consultations, written after the Nazi-Soviet Pact became public Chamberlain stated the following:
"..whatever may be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain's obligation to Poland, which His Majesty's Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly and which they are determined to fulfil."
[Quoted from J.W.Wheeler-Bennett, "Munich: A Prologue to Tragedy" Pt.4 Ch.II, 'The Russian Sphinx' p.411 (1963 Papermac edn.)].
In other words, if, after having been informed explicitly by the head of the British Government that Britain (and presumably France) would honour their guarantee to Poland, despite his pact with Stalin, Hitler chose to gamble that Chamberlain was merely bluffing and go ahead anyway he has only himself to blame. It was one of many miscalculations that the Fuhrer made throughout the war which explains why Germany suffered such a catastrophic defeat and why his life ended in 1945. Chamberlain's letter of 23 August gives one good cause to believe that Hitler's "shock" at the Anglo-French declaration of war was largely synthetic.
As far as Stalin's speech of 19 August on which you seem to place so much reliance I should be grateful if you could indicate the passage where Stalin predicts that French resistance would last less than six weeks. There was no war going on at all in Europe when Hitler launched his attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, having conquered a greater area in 2 years than Napoleon had done in more than a decade. The fact that a two-front war later developed was due to the fact that he totally underestimated the resistance of the Russian people and the military capacity of the Soviet Union and he declared war on the United States in December 1941. Again the Great Miscalculator brought about his own nemesis. -
Message 26
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 8th April 2010
Chamberlain's letter of 23 August gives one good cause to believe that Hitler's "shock" at the Anglo-French declaration of war was largely synthetic. Good for you. Personally, I don't buy this, and by all accounts - including Nuremberg testimony by Keitel - Hitler had absolutely no regard for Chamberlain.
As far as Stalin's speech of 19 August on which you seem to place so much reliance I should be grateful if you could indicate the passage where Stalin predicts that French resistance would last less than six weeks. There is none. Moreover, Stalin seemed to have believed that Germany would be on the receiving end of the rightly expected by him conflict; and Stalin's initial war plans - soon to be radically changed - had seemed to be drawn up against the British.
There was no war going on at all in Europe when Hitler launched his attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941Â That would be news for a lot of people. Why would the minutes of the meeting between Molotov and Ribbentrop, as well as between Molotov and Hitler himself, in November of 1940 include repeated interruptions due to the British bombing raids on Berlin?
The fact that a two-front war later developed was due to the fact that he totally underestimated the resistance of the Russian people and the military capacity of the Soviet Union and he declared war on the United States in December 1941. This is an Alice in Wonderland type of situation. Hitler's Plan Barbarossa had been a desperately poor strategic document, but the plan actually worked against all odds. Here's a solid research containing factual evidence to that end:
However, as I said before, it mattered not already. Ribbentrop had signed his and his boss' death warrant on August 23, 1939. -
Message 27
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Friday, 9th April 2010
Hitler had absolutely no regard for Chamberlain.Â
Which I'm sure was reciprocated but you're missing the point. It was not a matter of their personal relationships but the fact that Hitler received an explicit statement in writing from the head of the British Government a week before he invaded Poland stating that Britain intended to honour its guarantee despite the coup de theatre of Hitler's pact with Stalin. Hitler could hardly be surprised therefore if Chamberlain, even if with the help of a little goading from his Cabinet colleagues, stood by his word and declared war. Hitler gambled that Chamberlain was bluffing and lost his bet.
Stalin seemed to have believed that Germany would be on the receiving end of the rightly expected by him conflict; and Stalin's initial war plans - soon to be radically changed - had seemed to be drawn up against the British.Â
Quite right, so much for 'the master planner' and 'war strategist'.
Why would the minutes of the meeting between Molotov and Ribbentrop, as well as between Molotov and Hitler himself, in November of 1940 include repeated interruptions due to the British bombing raids on Berlin?Â
There was one British raid, timed to coincide with the meeting. As Churchill wrote later:
"We had heard of the conference beforehand and though not invited to join the discussion did not wish to be entirely left out of the proceedings."
You have obviously got me there as what I should have said that there was no land war going on in Europe when Hitler launched Barbarossa. Britain was not going to defeat Germany by launching bombing raids, especially the sporadic, ill-targetted raids it mounted until 1942. At best they were a sop to civilian morale which had been pounded by the Blitz.
Until the United States entered the war Britain was unable to mount any substantial assault on the mainland of Europe and could barely scrape together 4 divisions with the help of its Dominion allies for the campaign in North Africa. It was also only after America entered the war that it was possible to mount a sustainable strategic bombing offensive that was capable of reducing Germany's warmaking capacity but even then bombing alone was never going to defeat Germany. For that armies were needed to take territory and this again only became possible with the entry of the United States. Who was responsible for the entry of the US into the European theatre?
Hitler's Plan Barbarossa had been a desperately poor strategic document, but the plan actually worked against all odds.Â
Really??? Barbarossa worked??? I don't know what alternative history books you have been reading but here's how the Fuhrer described the aims and objectives of the plan:
"The area of operations is divided into southern and northern halves by the Pripet Marshes. The point of main effort will be made in the northern half. Here two army groups are to be committed.
The southern of these two army groups - in the center of the whole front - will have the task of breaking out the area around and to the north of Warsaw with exceptionally strong armor and motorized formations and of destroying the enemy forces in White Russia. This will create a situation which will enable strong formations of mobile troops to swing north; such formations will then co-operate with the northern army group - advancing from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad - in destroying the enemy forces in the area of the Baltic states. Only after the accomplishment of these offensive operations, which must be followed by the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt, are further offensive operations to be initiates with the objective of occupying the important center of communications and of armaments manufacture, Moscow...
The army group south of the Pripet Marshes will make its point of main effort from the Lublin area in the general direction of Kiev, with the object of driving into the deep flank and rear of the Russian forces with strong armored formations and of then rolling up the enemy along the Dnieper. The German- Rumanian group on the right flank will have the task of
(a) protecting Rumanian territory and thus of covering the southern flank of the whole operation;
(b) in co-ordination with the attack by the northern of Army Group south of tying up the enemy forces on its sector of the front; then, as the situation develops, of launching a second thrust and thus, in conjunction with the air force, of preventing an orderly enemy withdrawal beyond the Dniester.
Once the battle south or north of the Pripet Marshes have been fought, the pursuit is to be undertaken with the following objectives:
In the south the rapid occupation of the economically important Donetz Basin, in the north the speedy capture of Moscow."
Hmmmm. "must be followed by the capture of Leningrad", "rapid occupation of the...Donetz Basin", "speedy capture of Moscow". Doesn't sound such a great success to me.
The fact is that a campaign that was supposed to last months, if not weeks, lasted four years of the most ferocious fighting known in European history with the last battle the costliest, apart from Stalingrad, in terms of casualties to both sides of the whole war, that of Berlin. After initiating war in 1939 Hitler literally brought it to his own doorstep. -
Message 28
Posted by FowPah (U1746998) on Friday, 9th April 2010
Just a brief visit here.Barbarossa didn't seem to have clear objectives.Hitler had to be repeatedly asked by the military to allow an advance on Moscow.Halder wanted that and tried to prepare for that but was granted his wish probably too late in the day.Hitler wished operations north (around Leningrad) and south (around Kiev) to take precedence.
However all that said the strategic errors were underestimating the Soviet forces (both in numbers and ability to fight) which denied a quick victory.The losses both of men and machine were unsustainable over the longer term.The vastness of the country combined with the harsh climate meant a quick victory was the only chance.He gambled and failed. -
Message 29
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Friday, 9th April 2010
Quite right. Just as he gambled that Britain and France would not honour their guarantee to Poland and failed. Just as he gambled that the US would be too preoccupied with the Pacific to become involved in Europe and failed. As far as Barbarossa is concerned he changed the aims and objectives of the plan after it had been implemented, a sure recipe for failure.
-
Message 30
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 9th April 2010
Hitler could hardly be surprised therefore if Chamberlain, even if with the help of a little goading from his Cabinet colleagues, stood by his word and declared war. Hitler gambled that Chamberlain was bluffing and lost his bet. Alan, you're contradicting himself here, which could hardly be surprising to me, given the history of the history board.
Really??? Barbarossa worked??? For the most part. The opening paragraph - the overarching strategic objective of the Directive 21, aka Plan Barbarossa - stated the following:
"German armed forces must be prepared to destroy Soviet Russia in the course of a short-term campaign even before the war against England is over." Check, as Solonin's analysis shows - I don't believe that you spent any time navigating the link I have provided. But you're clearly missing the point, which is obvious from this comment of yours:
Stalin seemed to have believed that Germany would be on the receiving end of the rightly expected by him conflict; and Stalin's initial war plans - soon to be radically changed - had seemed to be drawn up against the British. Quite right, so much for 'the master planner' and 'war strategist' The 'master planner' did not really care for the advertised 'collective security' in Europe. He was intensely preparing for the big war and he got it. -
Message 31
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 9th April 2010
Alan, you're contradicting himself here I meant to write yourself, of course.
-
Message 32
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Friday, 9th April 2010
He was intensely preparing for the big war and he got it.Â
Stalin's "intense" preparations were even less adequate than Hitler's. They involved becoming the main supplier of his supposed enemy and offering to join his alliance in January 1941 (which Hitler spurned). For two years Stalin desperately tried to avoid war until it was imposed on him. It was only the ability of the Red Army and the Soviet war economy to adapt and recover from catastrophe that enabled the Soviets to save the day.
In the final analysis, as Wayne Fountain rightly points out, the Soviets and the Western Allies were able to sustain a long war whilst Germany was not. Hitler needed a short war but due to his miscaluculations and incompetence, not through any trickery or duplicity by Stalin or anyone else, he got a long one. Hitler started the war but he was incapable of finishing it. -
Message 33
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 9th April 2010
Stalin's "intense" preparations were even less adequate than Hitler's. They involved becoming the main supplier of his supposed enemy and offering to join his alliance in January 1941 (which Hitler spurned). For two years Stalin desperately tried to avoid war until it was imposed on him. It was only the ability of the Red Army and the Soviet war economy to adapt and recover from catastrophe that enabled the Soviets to save the day. Needless to say that almost everything in this paragraph is completely false, with the confidence level of the opposite so-to-speak. Your loyalty to the old-school fiction writers like krenshaws and beevors is commendable, but it's time to move on, Alan. Even for a short period of time in the 90s, when the Russian military archives were only partially opened, the real historians managed to fish out enough information to completely debunk your world view. I suggest you read something new, like this:
or this:
or this:
or this:
Much of this good stuff is yet to be translated to English. As Richard Raack has repeatedly lamented, the academic establishment in the West is not that eager to smell the coffee - for obvious, mainly political, reasons. But for you personally, Alan, I'll try to help you as much as I can. -
Message 34
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Friday, 9th April 2010
I should try reading more than one author to get the truth. You yourself have admitted that Stalin's 19 August speech proved a poor prognosis of the way war in Europe would develop. By throwing his lot in with Hitler rather than the Western Allies he put the Soviet Union in greater, not less, peril since it allowed Hitler to eliminate France and expel Britain from the European mainland without any concern for his eastern flank. It was Stalin, not Hitler, who was duped by the Nazi-Soviet Pact.
I should still like you, or any of your sources to explain to me, if you can, why, after the signature of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Stalin was so sure that Britain and France would declare war on Germany, given the fact that he had broken off talks with the British and French because he believed they were brokering a deal with the Germans in secret, and why Hitler was so sure they wouldn't, given the fact that Chamberlain had informed him in writing only a week before to the contrary? -
Message 35
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 9th April 2010
I should try reading more than one author to get the truth. There are at least 15 very solid researchers - that I have already mentioned to you, in particular, - who, with various degree of detail and even different political take on the subject, completely agree as to what Hitler's and Stalin's roles had been leading up to and following the Pact. The fact that most of their research is being kept away from the English reading public almost by design does not change the validity of their research. Good luck trying to poke holes in that by Solonin, Meltyukhov, Pavlova, Raack, etc, etc.
You yourself have admitted that Stalin's 19 August speech proved a poor prognosis of the way war in Europe would develop. Stalin's speech was not a prognosis, but rather a strategy statement subsequently reworked as instructions to Comintern leadership. From strategic stand point, what happened between 1939 and 1941 did not change his fundamental stance at the end of the war in 1945: Western powers were the enemies. Hitler had been a tactical ally from August 23, 1939 through June 22, 1941. The British and the Americans were tactical allies from 1941 through 1945. Tactics - by its tactical nature - change fluidly, as does the geo-political situation, Alan.
I should still like you, or any of your sources to explain to me, if you can, why, after the signature of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Stalin was so sure that Britain and France would declare war on Germany Perhaps, he was smarter than you are giving him credit for, Alan. I don't like Stalin just as the next guy - in fact I have deeply personal reasons for not liking him. It does not make him a fool, though. Both you and I just have to deal with the fact that he was quite a player - with clearly established criminal intent - in setting up the catastrophe of the Second World War. -
Message 36
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Friday, 9th April 2010
I agree with you totally that he 'set up' the catastrophe of WWII by agreeing to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, a catastrophe, not least for the Soviet Union, which lost upwards of 14% of its pre-war population, the greatest by any nation, which may have been averted had Stalin signed a pact for the defence of Poland with Britain and France in 1939.
However that does not prove he initiated the conflict. For that the responsibility squarely rests on Hitler. -
Message 37
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 10th April 2010
However that does not prove he initiated the conflict. For that the responsibility squarely rests on Hitler. It's a pity that he did not know that. According to Stalin's speech of August 19, 1939, he was under the firm impression that this is exactly what he was about to do. Moreover, IN THE SAME SPEECH HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALL HE NEEDED TO DO TO AVOID WAR IN EUROPE WAS TO MAKE A DEAL WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH. And, upon examination of various accounts by OKW brass - beginning with Mueller-Hillebrand (see his Das Heer), - it is beyond reasonable doubt that Hitler would not invade Poland without the deal with Stalin.
-
Message 38
Posted by fascinating (U1944795) on Saturday, 10th April 2010
the Soviet Union, which lost upwards of 14% of its pre-war population, the greatest by any nationÂ
I remember reading that Poland lost a much greater percentage than that, something of the order of 25%.
However that does not prove he initiated the conflict. For that the responsibility squarely rests on Hitler.Â
Probably, but remember that the Soviets took the Eastern half of Poland while Hitler took the Western half. If the invasion of Poland is viewed as the start of the war, maybe Stalin was as responsible as Hitler. -
Message 39
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Saturday, 10th April 2010
Apologies, this shows you're right, if only marginally but then Poland got it in the neck from both the Germans and the Soviets. The tragedy of Poland is to have been placed between two of the most predatory nations in Europe:
The Soviets did not invade until 17 September, 16 days after the Wehrmacht so, even if only technically, Hitler fired the starting-pistol. -
Message 40
Posted by FowPah (U1746998) on Saturday, 10th April 2010
Poignant considering todays tragic events.
-
Message 41
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 10th April 2010
The Soviets did not invade until 17 September, 16 days after the Wehrmacht so, even if only technically, Hitler fired the starting-pistol. Well, even technically it's not correct: Red Army had been fighting the Japanese in the Far East by that time - both were major contributors to WWII, of course. As Suvorov brilliantly emphasized in a few of his books, the timing of Zhukov's major offensive at Khalkin Gol had been of particular significance: it had begun approximately at the same time when Stalin had delivered his speech of August 19, 1939, and the call to Berlin setting up the signing of the Pact had been placed.
As for Stalin's "late" entry into Poland, it was certainly by design too - for several reasons:
1. By mid-September, the Khalkin Gol victory had been completely assured
2. By that time, Hitler had done all the dirty work destroying the Polish army, taking the sticky distinction of the world's worst villan and war-monger and being declared war against by the British and the French -
Message 42
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Saturday, 10th April 2010
Suvorovetz
A strong point but I think Hitler would have postponed his attack on Poland (as indeed he did do, by a week, although it proved unnecessary) rather than abandoned it altogether if he could not have brokered an agreement with Stalin. The only thing that might have deterred Hitler would have been a firm military arrangement for the defence of Poland between the Western Allies and the Soviets.
Hitler was a gambler who liked to buck the odds and in his early career he came off spectacularly such as the remilitarisation of the Rhineland in March 1936 when the Wehrmacht was in no position to have resisted a determined Anglo-French response if it had come. This was, to a large extent, the secret of his authority over many, otherwise rational, OKW commanders. however like miost gamblers, success led him to make more and more spectacular bets that, more often than not, especially after 1939, failed to come off, leading Germany to total destruction.
Stalin, on the other hand, was more cautious and liked to bluff. I have shown from the read & Fisher account how slow he was to become involved in Poland after Hitler invaded, a necessary condition of pushing the border westwards one might have thought, delaying the invasion by 16 days because of the fear that the Japanese would mount another assault after their defeat at Khalkin-Gol which had to be resolved by German mediation.
Indeed the fear of a two-front war seemed to obsess Stalin more than it did Hitler, even after he signed the Non-Aggression Pact with the Japanese in April 1941. This may be one of the considerations that impelled Stalin to accept Ribbentrop's offer of membership of the Tripartite Pact given to Molotov at their meeting of November 1940.
Of course Stalin increased the pace of rearmament after 1939, grabbed as much territory as he could, and posted large numbers of troops at the frontier but there is no evidence that he was either willing or capable of conducting an offensive war.
Stalin's war with Finland certainly destroyed any level of trust between the two dictators (if there had been any in the first place) and Molotov's predatory list of demands at their conference in November 1940 certainly confirmed Hitler's view of the Soviets but he had made his mind up 4 months previously after France had fallen that the Soviet Union would be next on the list (although interrupted by a Balkan expedition as it turned out). The wheels were already in motion. -
Message 43
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Saturday, 10th April 2010
Dear Suvoveretz.
My message above was a reply to your earlier posting. However, Read & Fisher ("The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact 1939-41") show that Zhukov expected the Japanese to renew their assault, which the Japanese army generals on the ground wanted to do in order to avenge their loss of 'face' at Khalkin-Gol and it was this that held up the Soviet advance into Poland.
However, curiously, it was Germany who was most keen that the Soviets take up their positions assigned to them under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and it took some nifty diplomatic work, particularly by Schulenburg, the German Ambassador in Moscow, to bring the Russians and Japanese together and assure the Soviets that the Japanese no longer posed a threat. -
Message 44
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Saturday, 10th April 2010
Allan and Suvorovetz,
I thank you both for the very interesting discussion for which I have done already some research, but sadely have no time to intervene due to all my other pending subjects for reply and research.
Kind regards and with esteem,
Paul. -
Message 45
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 11th April 2010
Alan Read & Fisher ("The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact 1939-41") show that Zhukov expected the Japanese to renew their assault, which the Japanese army generals on the ground wanted to do in order to avenge their loss of 'face' at Khalkin-Gol and it was this that held up the Soviet advance into Poland. I dare say that nobody really knows what Zhukov expected. I read one of over a dozen editions of his legendary memoires having already the benefit of reading Suvorov's very much unauthorized Zhukov's biography. So, it was already easy for me to conclude what any serious researcher should have concluded reading Zhukov's masterpieces: it is a mockery. Numbers, timelines, you name it, simply do not add up. As for Khalkin Gol, it is devastatingly simple: Zhukov's assault brilliantly planned by his Chief of Staff Bogdanov began - presumably on Stalin's orders - on the early morning of August 20. Taking into consideration geographic time zones, this coincided with all the activities in Moscow we had already discussed above. This offensive resulted in complete obliteration of the 6th Japanese Army by early-mid September. The Japanese simply did not have any capacity to counter-attack. Hence, the armistice, which several months later was reinforced by the non-aggression treaty.
it took some nifty diplomatic work, particularly by Schulenburg...to bring the Russians and Japanese together and assure the Soviets that the Japanese no longer posed a threat This is not the way I see it at all. Moreover, it contradicts your own earlier assertions about the Japanese being shell-shocked by Khalkin Gol to the point that they tried to stay away from Red Army as much as they could. I completely agree with Suvorov: apart from the devastation of Khalkin Gol, the timing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov signing in Moscow - coinciding with the sneak attack at Khalkin Gol - contaminated Japanese trust in Hitler. Schulenburg's efforts were designed to mitigate the side-effects for Hitler's benefit - ultimately, in vain. As we know, when Hitler dramatically declared war against the US in December of 1941, the Japanese would not respond with reciprocity of breaking their deal with Stalin. The latter, on the other hand, never trusted anybody - let alone Schulenburg - to run his diplomatic affairs. He had direct line of communications to Roosevelt's shady cabinet (hat tip to Anthony Sutton for revealing secret agreements between the two). By the way, the real mission of the legendary Richard Sorge from the GRU ring headed by Berzin was to monitor and - if at all possible - to provoke hostilities between Japanese and Americans.
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