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Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 1.
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 20th January 2010
This is just a reply to Alan on something that he is trying to get away with on Britain before and after WW2 thread, but I can’t address there for fear of being a recidivist thread hijacker, and of getting under Grumpyfred’s skin, and – finally – to pretend that I am considerate. there was nothing "fruitful" about Brest-Litovsk as far as the Bolsheviks were concerned. Felshtinsky brilliantly expressed the whole idea of Brest-Litovsk Treaty as follows:
“Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Party, and Menshevik one alike, believed in the final victory of socialism world-wide. It seemed as obvious as, say, the inevitable collapse of colonial empires at present. The answer to the question whether the world revolution would come was resolutely positive and based on the belief in the ultimate victory. However, after October 1917, the need arose to examine this previously theoretical question from practical stand point: was it more important to preserve the Soviet power in Russia, where the revolution had already occurred, or was it to attempt organizing German revolution, even at the expense of the fall of the Soviet power in Russia. In 1918, the answer to that question was not as obvious as it would seem today….For Lenin, German revolution faded in the background at the expense of the victorious revolution in Russia. Moreover, Lenin did not have to hurry with the German revolution, because it would shift the center of Communist gravity to industrial West, and Lenin would remain just the head of the government of an “underdeveloped”, “backward” and “uncultured” country. It is in light of Lenin’s changed views on German revolution that one has to examine the entire history of Brest-Litovsk negotiations from December 1917 through March 1918.(Big Bosses, Conspiracy Two: Brest Peace)
the threat of a German attack on Petrograd (later Leningrad, now St Petersburg) persuaded Trotsky to advise Lenin to accept whatever terms the Germans dictated in order to end the war "Trotsky was for peace only to the point that the peace would be “void of annexations, or contributions.” He opposed it when it became clear that the annexation agreement would be signed. From the first to the last day of the negotiations, it was apparent to Trotsky that the Soviet power was incapable of conducting revolutionary war. In that regard he did not have any differences with Lenin. At the same time, Trotsky believed that the Germans would not be able to “assault the revolution, which would announce the secession of war.” In this regard, he differed from Lenin. Lenin bet on the agreement with Germany and was prepared to capitulate on one condition: the Germans would not demand Lenin government’s resignation.” (same)
In the case of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact the positions were reversed with Hitler so keen to attack Poland he was willing to accept whatever demands Stalin made, however outrageous. Rapallo was largely motivated by Soviet anger at the Western Powers for their intervention in the Civil War. This is a respectable conclusion based on what you think you know, Alan. However, what you don’t know, or have some difficulties processing, I’ve referenced a few times – the last time right here:
I don’t see any reason for you to dismiss this source, unless you can prove it wrong, of course. But you haven’t done so.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 2
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Wednesday, 20th January 2010
You're right about the difference between Trotsky and Lenin and that Lenin eventually overruled Trotsky in the interests of getting an agreement. I stand corrected but it strengthens rather than weakens my point since Lenin was not so much concerned then about territory, over which he then had little or no control anyway but staying in office (not yet power). He didn't want to go the same way as Kerensky who had made the fatal mistake of continuing the war (a mistake which Lenin had exploited).
If you can bear to tear yourself away from your samiszdat authors I recommend Robert Gellately's "Lenin, Stalin and Hitler: The Age of Social Catastrophe" which examines the similarities and differences between the Bolshevik and Nazi Parties and how Stalinism was an extension, not a repudiation, of Leninism and how Stalin had been picked out and fast-tracked to the inner core of leaders by Lenin. Unfortunately, I sold my copy recently else I wouldn't have made such a silly mistake about Brest Litovsk.
As far as your source about the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact is concerned the point I was making concerned Hitler's motivation not Stalin's which your source doesn't address. The point you appear unwilling or unable to accept is that Hitler had made up his mind to attack the Soviet Union at some point in the future even at the time of the R-M Pact in August 1939.
However he had postponed a decision on exactly when until he had dealt with the issue of Poland and after he had turned his attention to the West (cf. his remarks to the High Command on 23 May 1939 which I have quoted from Wheeler-Bennett). Stalin, on the other hand, had decided to keep out of any European war started by Hitler, at least for the time being, because he considered the Allies were not being serious and, furthermore, they couldn't be trusted as they seemed to be playing a double game of negotiating with both him and the Germans (viz. the Wohltat and Spencer missions) which, of course, Stalin was about to do himself when he told Molotov to give a favourable reply to Ribbentrop on 11 August whilst at the same time hosting the Drax-Doumenc Military Mission.
Nevertheless Stalin wanted to exact the maximum price he could from Hitler for his quiescence. On the other hand there was no cost in Hitler granting Stalin a third of Poland and the Baltic states (where there were substantial German minorities) when he fully intended to take them by force anyway. Hitler no more intended to honour the Pact than he had honoured the Polish treaty of 1934, the Anglo-German Naval agreement of 1935 or the Munich agreement of 1938. To him, they were so many scraps of paper, merely a means to a more significant end which was the establishment of German hegemony in Europe.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 3
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 20th January 2010
As far as your source about the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact is concerned the point I was making concerned Hitler's motivation not Stalin's which your source doesn't address. The point you appear unwilling or unable to accept is that Hitler had made up his mind to attack the Soviet Union at some point in the future even at the time of the R-M Pact in August 1939. This point I've addressed by providing a few other sources, main source being the INSIDE Wehrmacht source - General Mueller-Hillebrandt, - as well as a few unclassified in the 90s Soviet Army archive sources, Alan. It turns out that, despite what Hitler's motivation and intention was, Wehrmacht was incapable of launching the Polish campaign without the deal with Stalin. There is no proof that either of these 'gentlemen' were unaware of this situation. You certainly haven't proved it, although you keep claiming that you do know what they really thought.
Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 4
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Wednesday, 20th January 2010
Why did Hitler order the attack on Poland for 26 August then, before he had concluded the deal with Stalin? Stalin knew that Hitler was going to invade Poland anyway, which provided the incentive for him to cut a deal so as to still allow for a buffer state, albeit an artificial one, between them.
Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 5
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 20th January 2010
Why did Hitler order the attack on Poland for 26 August then, before he had concluded the deal with Stalin? As most of us know, Wehrmacht attacked Poland on September 1, Alan. It's just as with the opposite - but equally silly - contention that Red Army would not under any circumstances attack Wehrmacht until 1942. Plans changed, particularly timelines. As Solonin and Zakoretzky broke the news for some of us, Stalin had seriously negotiated with Hitler behind close doors at least since the Fall of 1938.
Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 6
Posted by baz (U14258304) on Thursday, 21st January 2010
but I can’t address there for fear of being a recidivist thread hijacker
Don't worry about barging in on others' threads, Suvorovetz. These boards are a public space, not the private property of anyone. If people get shirty, then tough. I disagree with lots of people on these boards and I know they feel the same - or worse - about my views.
This is a place to have a bit of cut and thrust, or even a little rough and tumble. I, for one enjoy it thoroughly.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 7
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 21st January 2010
These boards are a public space, not the private property of anyone. Believe me or not, I caught some flak for that too, baz, the complaint being that I use it without paying 鶹Լ license tax.
Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 8
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Thursday, 21st January 2010
I'm sure most of us do, but some of us also know that he had given the original order to begin "Operation White" at dawn on Saturday 26 August but pulled back almost at the last minute (in fact four hours before the attack was to proceed even after Keitel had told him it was impossible to cancel the original order - Hitler succeeded in doing what the Kaiser had failed to do in 1914 and reverse the timetables - although by 1939 the trains had been replaced by motorised transports).
However my mistake was to suggest that Hitler had given the original order to invade before Ribbentrop had concluded the deal with Stalin but, looking at the timeline again, this was not the case and the invasion plan, prepared months in advance with troops and armour poised on the border, was given the 'green light' once Hitler had heard that an agreement had been signed in Moscow late on the 23rd.
So to that extent you are right tosay that the invasion was prompted by the R-M Pact, and I apologise for my error, but not to say that the R-M Pact was a cause of the invasion. What caused to Hitler to pause and postpone the invasion for six days was the news that Mussolini did not feel obliged to enter the war if Germany attacked Poland and that the British and the French, with Chamberlain under much more pressure from his Cabinet, far from abandoning their guarantee tp Poland once the news of the Nazi-Soviet Pact had been released as Hitler expected, had actually firmed it up with a treaty of mutual assistance.
This presented Hitler with a problem. Having taken care of his eastern flank with the R-M Pact the risk now opened up of Germany being attacked on its lightly defended western frontier whilst the Wehrmacht was engaged in Poland. You are right to point out that despite the modernisation and rearmament the Wehrmacht was not equipped to fight a two-front war and was trained to fight offensively not defensively.
Also Italy was now not available as a partner to distract the French. So what should he do? Abandon the invasion and make his diplomatic coup with Stalin appear meaningless or plough ahead and gamble that Britain and France, even if they declared war, would take no offensive action in the West?
For a week he temporised and opened up diplomatic talks with the British through the Swedish businessman, Dahlerus, and directly through the British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson. Hitler made his usual opening gambit of a generalised Anglo-German Treaty of Friendship. However the British, now more wary of Hitler's motives, insisted he open up direct talks with the Poles to settle the questions of Danzig and the Polish Corridor to which Hitler, suprisingly, agreed.
However Hitler's aim was not a repeat of the year before with some diplomatic conference awarding him Danzig and the Polish Corridor without a shot being fired, thus depriving him of his war of choice, although that is clearly what Chamberlain and Halifax hoped would be the outcome and continued to hope for, even after German troops had crossed the frontier on the morning of 1 September.
Hitler's aim was to isolate Poland diplomatically before commencing his attack. He had already half succeeded in this with the agreement with Stalin. The diplomatic pas-de-deux that he undertook with the British in the last week of august was intended simply as a means of affording the British and French a specious reason for abandoning their guarantees to Poland by showing that Poland had spurned Hitler's reasonable 'offers' of a peaceful settlement just as chamberlain had abandoned the guarantee to Czechoslovakia the previous March.
What Hitler had not counted on was the changed mood of both political and public opinion (which, of course, neither he nor Stalin had to take in account domestically), especially in Britain. Chamberlain was under enormous pressure from his Cabinet, the House of Commons and the wider public not to abandon the Poles in the same waythe Czechs had been abandoned.
Chamberlain spelled out the consequences of any attack in Poland in a letter to Hitler which Henderson gave him on 28 August so Hitler's "shock" at the Anglo-French declaration of war on 3 September was, in many ways, somewhat synthetic.
In the end Hitler chose to gamble that the British and French would take no action. After all, he had gambled before and it had paid off, the Rhineland in March 1936, Austria in March 1938 and Czechoslovakia in March 1939. In a sense, Hitler was proved right again since, although the British and French did declare war, they initiated no aggressive action whilst he was involved with the Polish campaign (or even after that) and it was he not they who initiated an aggressive war in the west the following year.
The only drawback was the installing of the naval blockade by the British but the economic agreements with the Soviets nullified that and gave Germany access to more than enough raw materials to continue his arms buildup.
I think the argument between us revolves around a mutual speculation into Hitler's thought processes. Your contention is, as far as I understand it and correct me if I am wrong, is that the R-M Pact was a necessary pre-condition for the invasion of Poland and that he would not have ordered an assault without it. Mine is that, just as he gambled without getting the British and French to renounce their guarantees to Poland, he would have gone ahead anyway as the plans and his own appetite for war, albeit a limited one, was too far advanced.
since we are talking about an event that didn't occur, namely Ribbentrop's failure to secure a deal with Stalin, the speculation is idle and useless. However there is one circumstance in which I would agree with you would have stopped Hitler in his tracks and forced a cancellation of his plans, at least temporarily, and that would have been a firm agreement between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. Failing that, Hitler would have had to gamble that, even if Stalin had spurned his approaches, he would have sat on his hands and done nothing, just like the British and French did (although without the declaration of war) while he conquered Poland.
There remains the question of motive. what were Hitler's and Stalin's motives for concluding the R-M Pact? I think we can agree that Hitler's motives were quite straightforward - to enable him to launch an aggressive war against Poland unmolested (although that is not to imply that the R-M Pact was a necessary pre-condition for invasion, as you argue, but with which I disagree as shown above).
Stalin's motive was much more pragmatic than ideological. I go back to the account I gave on the "Provoking War..." thread of the 11 August meeting of the Politburo in Read and Fisher's book. Molotov (and presumably most of the Politburo) assumed that Britain and France were looking for a way to wriggle out of their commitments to Poland because of what he had discovered of the diplomatic approaches the British were making to the Nazi leadership through Dahlerus and Spencer and that the approaches to the Soviets were not serious.
It was only Stalin that questioned this assumption and considered the possibility that the British and French might stand by Poland. Given this evidence it is clear that Stalin was pursuing a "safety-first" policy rather than an aggressive one.
An understanding with Germany would mean that, if Molotov was right and the British and French abandoned their guarantees to Poland, the Soviets would still benefit by gaining territory without having to fire a shot (at least against the Germans) and limiting the war to Poland. If Stalin was right and a general European war did break out as a consequence of Hitler's decision to invade Poland the Soviets would be able to stay out of it and Stalin could watch from the sidelines and see who was left standing at the end of it. The assumption by both Stalin and Molotov (at least on 11 August) was that Hitler was going to invade Poland, come what may.
Despite the propaganda that may or may not have been concocted for foreign communist parties to justify the ideological headstand a week later the Soviet motive seems to have been to stay out of a European war rather than provoke one.
The biggest diplomatic drawback of the R-M Pact, as far as Hitler was concerned, and the one with the biggest long-term results concerned Japan. Hitler made his diplomatic overtures to the Soviets without consulting the Japanese and it seemed to them to violate the principles of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Although the Japanese did agree to become part of a more formal alliance with Germany and Italy towards the end of 1940 the R-M Pact did throw questions up as to the reliability of Germany as an ally.
It probably served to influence the debate between the Japanese Army and Navy over an extension of the current land-based conflict with China that would have included the Soviet Union or a campaign based in the Pacific against the USA and the Western colonial Powers.
Although the Japanese did launch a limited offensive against the Soviets, it's failure along with Hitler's change of tack, caused the navy to win the debate, as we know and induced the Japanese to perform their own piece of headstanding when they concluded their own Non-Aggression Pact with Stalin in April 1941 (which they carefully observed until Stalin violated it in August 1945). From that point onwards two different wars were fought in Europe and Asia under the same nominal umbrella with only their opponents providing a common link.
Even when Hitler reverted to ideological type and invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941 the Japanese were not going to change their strategy on his account. Thus the root cause of the failure to mount a co-ordinated attack on the Soviet Union can be seen as the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 9
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Thursday, 21st January 2010
suvorovetz,
At the same time, Trotsky believed that the Germans would not be able to “assault the revolution, which would announce the secession of war.”
Is that a direct quote? It seems to me the right word would be 'cessation' instead of 'secession.'Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 10
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 21st January 2010
Is that a direct quote? It seems to me the right word would be 'cessation' instead of 'secession.' This is my translation of the direct quote from Russian. Please don't mind some kinks you find in my posts here and there, my forehead is still hurting after I hit the floor having forgotten to tie my shoe laces. Just another day at the factory, you know.
Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 11
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 21st January 2010
However my mistake was to suggest that Hitler had given the original order to invade before Ribbentrop had concluded the deal with Stalin but, looking at the timeline again, this was not the case I congratulate you with the renewed attention to timelines, Alan. I don't think there is anything more important for history research.
So what should he do? Abandon the invasion and make his diplomatic coup with Stalin appear meaningless or plough ahead and gamble that Britain and France, even if they declared war, would take no offensive action in the West? These questions are indicative of the situation, which Suvorov described with the following analogy: one gets in a whole lot of trouble sitting down to play cards with a professional cheater.
However there is one circumstance in which I would agree with you would have stopped Hitler in his tracks and forced a cancellation of his plans, at least temporarily, and that would have been a firm agreement between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. That's progress way beyond a baby step.
Stalin's motive was much more pragmatic than ideological. ... Given this evidence it is clear that Stalin was pursuing a "safety-first" policy rather than an aggressive one. Amazing. You don't have any evidence, Alan, just some historians' speculations based on outdated assumptions. The evidence is out there in Stalin's own words: he entered the Pact to draw Germany into exhausting war with the French and the British in order to advance Comintern goals. He could not possibly be clearer. What were the Comintern goals, Alan? I haven't read anything about safety there. If you have conceded a few lines above that, had Stalin made a deal with the British and the French, the war would have been stalled if not avoided altogether, what safety are you talking about?Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 12
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Thursday, 21st January 2010
The evidence is the Politburo meeting of 11 August. Where is your evidence, apart from dubious Comintern propaganda, that by signing the R-M Pact Stalin wanted to "promote" a European war when the assumption of both Hitler and Stalin was that a German-Soviet Pact would force the British and French to abandon their guarantees to Poland as unenforceable? You have cited the evidence that Hitler was "shocked" when Britain and France declared war 111 days after the signature of the Pact. Why would Stalin's attutude be any different except he knew he had bought off Hitler, at least in the short term, by signing the Pact?
Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 13
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Thursday, 21st January 2010
The figure above should read 11, not 111, days. Uncorrected typo, I'm afraid. My apologies.
Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 14
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 21st January 2010
The evidence is the Politburo meeting of 11 August In regard to this meeting, the only thing you mentioned was that Stalin and Molotov made an assumption that Hitler would invade Poland. It's a strange kind of evidence, because, first of all, I don't think you have any minutes of that, and, secondly, this was exaclty the time when English and French delegation arrived in Moscow and Stalin launched the final push to make the deal with Hitler done. What does it have to do with "safety" vs "aggression" exaclty?
Where is your evidence, apart from dubious Comintern propaganda, that by signing the R-M Pact Stalin wanted to "promote" a European war when the assumption of both Hitler and Stalin was that a German-Soviet Pact would force the British and French to abandon their guarantees to Poland as unenforceable? It's like saying, what is your evidence apart from the evidence you have, and how could he foresee, even though he did? The key here, of course, is the word "propaganda," implying that the minutes of Stalin's speech of August 19, 1939 and derived from them Comintern Directives were deliberately misleading. Of course, this logic is remarkably backward. It's like a football coach giving his players talking points prepared for the pre-game presser in a locker room, and then describing his game plan in the pre-game presser in front of cameras. It does not make any sense.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 15
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Thursday, 21st January 2010
this was exaclty the time when English and French delegation arrived in Moscow and Stalin launched the final push to make the deal with Hitler done
It was also the time that he made his final push, as your quote implies, to see what concessions he could extract from the British and French. If Stalin's mind was made up he would not have pursued this twin-track strategy so late in the game.
Your theory seems to come down to this, Stalin wanted the R-M Pact to provoke a general European war (although not be part of one), Hitler wanted the R-M Pact to avoid one. Wouldn't a simpler and more direct explanation be that each wanted the R-M Pact to avoid a war with the other, at least for the time being?Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 16
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 21st January 2010
Your theory seems to come down to this, Stalin wanted the R-M Pact to provoke a general European war (although not be part of one) Yes. And - what makes it really exciting - he himself said so. Hitler wanted the R-M Pact to avoid one. Hitler wanted the Pact to invade Poland, with all the evidence showing that he did not expect a general European war.
Wouldn't a simpler and more direct explanation be that each wanted the R-M Pact to avoid a war with the other, at least for the time being? No. They did not need the Pact to avoid a war with one another, if that was all they wanted.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 17
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Thursday, 21st January 2010
Re: Message 8.
Allan,
great message. As I read also "something" about all this I really enjoy the debate with Suvorovetz. It's the 鶹Լ history messageboard at his best.
Warm regards and with high esteem to both,
Paul.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 18
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Thursday, 21st January 2010
They did not need the Pact to avoid a war with one another, if that was all they wanted
Then why the fuss over signing it in the first place? He "wanted it to invade Poland" so Russian troops wouldn't come flooding in to stop him. An invasion of Poland was a clear threat to the Soviets just as an invasion of Belgium would be a clear threat to France. A non-aggression Pact cleared the way not only for the invasion of Poland but for the later assault on the West.
As I thought, you are saying simultaneously that Stalin expected a declaration of war by Britain and France (and presumably aggressive action too although Molotov didn't) whilst Hitler, privy to the same intelligence such as the simultaneous conversations that the British were having with both the Germans and the Soviets and appreciative of the same political situation, didn't.
It seems to me that you are over-complicating what is a very straightforward issue. Although both were dictators of a megalomaniac bent nevertheless they were both appreciative of their own self-interest. Hitler wanted a limited war with Poland. e wanted to keep the Soviet Union out of the conflict, for the time being. Stalin also wanted to keep Hitler at arm's length if he could as well as acquire territory that he coveted at as little cost to himself as possible.
The build-up to war with Poland offered a perfect opportunity where the self-interest of both dictators coincided. As for what Britain and France might do, Stalin didn't care a fig as the only serious security threat to him was Hitler and he could appease him better than Chamberlain ever could by generous economic agreements in return for land grabs.
However, just like Chamberlain, Stalin proved to be bitterly disappointed by the outcome. Hitler never kept his word or honoured any piece of paper he was supposedly bound by.
The British and French were driven into what was essentially a quixotic gesture of declaring war on Germany not by any sense of honour or loyalty to Poland but because of the change that had occurred in parliamentary and public opinion following the disavowal of the Munich Agreement by Hitler when he absorbed the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and the strong desire not simply stand idly by and say nothing again. The pressure of parliamentary and public opinion were non-existent considerations in the calculations of Stalin and Hitler but it was that that ultimately determined Chamberlain's ultimatum to Hitler on 2 September followed by the declaration of war on 3 September.
There was no certainty that an invasion of Poland would lead to a declaration of war by Britain and France or, by your analysis, Hitler would have been a lot less keen to carry it out as he was so "shocked" (although he had considered that very possibility in his remarks to the High Command on 23 May which I have quoted elsewhere as well as his remarks to Burckhardt, the League of Nations Commissioner for Danzig on 11 August in which he signalled his desire to eventually turn on the Soviets for economic reasons and acquire the Ukraine - initially annexed by Germany from the Soviets by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk - which I have also quoted elsewhere).
After six days of indecision following his postponement of the Polish invasion on 26 August even though he had the Soviet Non-Aggression Pact signed, sealed and delivered in his pocket (thus confounding your thesis that the Pact was the only pre-condition he needed to invade Poland) in which he temporised with the British Hitler did what he generally always did, and gambled, taking the risk that the Western Powers would take no action.
In political terms you might say he failed (although for 48 hours following the invasion it looked as if the British and French would indeed nullify their guarantees to Poland - the actual declaration of war by Chamberlain at 11 am on 3 September - 7 hours before the French one - surprised much of the British public as it did Hitler since the ultimatum had been sent out near midnight the previous day and had been given no publicity) but in military terms the gamble paid off spectacularly as Hitler was allowed to conduct his limited war with Poland unmolested by either the western Powers or the Soviets and it was he, not they, who struck the first offensive blow against both of them.
What Stalin wished to avoid was the western Powers defending Poland to the last Russian.
"They are treating us like farm-hands"
was his dismissive comment about the Drax-Doumenc Mission. He thought, with some justice, that the basis for the appeasement of Hitler was a desire by the West to contain, if not destroy, the Soviet Union. He constantly repeated the statement that the West were trying to incite Hitler to attack the Soviet Union, particularly after the Munich Agreement. An agreement, especially involving military assistance, with the British and French in August 1939 seemed to offer nothing but benefits to the west and costs to the Russians whereas Hitler might be more of a threat but at least he is willing to offer a reasonable price for Stalin's co-operation.
So in the end it was a no-brainer for Stalin, either sign up with your fairweather, or rather foul-weather, friends who had never had anything nice to say about you and possibly deter your worst enemy from invading your neighbour who was always very unpleasant towards you but if not engage in a war over his territory that might spill over into yours or, on the other hand, make a deal with your worst enemy which would guarantee you safety plus an extra bit of territory into the bargain.
Unfortunately, as the saying goes, 'he who sups with the devil should use a long spoon', Stalin's appeasement of Hitler, like Chamberlain's before him, made war more, not less, likely.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 19
Posted by baz (U14258304) on Friday, 22nd January 2010
Believe me or not, I caught some flak for that too, baz, the complaint being that I use it without paying 鶹Լ license tax
If you needed a tv licence for these boards, suvorovetz, Aunty beeb would soon make that very clear to you, don't worry. I suggest that those giving you 'flak' for not having a licence are stumped by your answers, and need to give you a hard time while they think of a witty riposte. Keep up the good work. Illegitimi Non Carborundum!Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 20
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 22nd January 2010
Illegitimi Non Carborundum! That's exactly what I used to say but could not spell out properly, baz. I don't mind a bit of an edge, and I certainly don't mind entertainment; and there has been no lack of that here over time, thank you very much.
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Message 21
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 22nd January 2010
It seems to me that you are over-complicating what is a very straightforward issue…. As for what Britain and France might do, Stalin didn't care a fig as the only serious security threat to him was Hitler and he could appease him better than Chamberlain ever could by generous economic agreements in return for land grabs..
Alan, I have written materials to fall back on, so I don’t need creative powers of imagination to guess what Stalin did or did not care about. All I need to do is read – how complicated is that? Would you care to read and, perhaps, try to remember this?
“…we are absolutely convinced that, should we conclude a treaty of alliance with France and Great Britain, Germany will be forced to remove its pressure from Poland and seek a modus vivendi with the Western powers. In this way, war might be avoided, but subsequent developments with respect to us will take on a dangerous character. On the other hand, if we accept Germany’s proposal, which you know, is to conclude a nonaggression pact with us, it will undoubtedly attack Poland. Then the entry of England and France will become inevitable...For us it is crucial that this war last as long as possible, so that both sides emerge exhausted. For these reasons we must accept the pact proposed by Germany and do everything possible so that this war, once begun, last as long as possible. At the same time, we must intensify our propaganda work in the belligerent states in order to be well prepared for the moment when the war ends.” (Joseph Stalin, August 19, 1939; published by Havas in Geneva on November 27, 1939; DNB in Berlin, Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant in Rotterdam and De Telegraaf in Amsterdam on November 29, 1939, and Le Temps in Paris on November 29, 1939).
The authenticity of this speech is thoroughly examined by Richard Raack, Professor of History Emeritus of California State University in Hayward (R. Raack, New Information About Stalin’s Speech on August 19, 1939). Both the spirit and the letter of the speech are completely compatible with what veteran diplomats, “Moscow experts” American George F. Kennan, French Jean Payart, Polish Juliusz Lukasiewicz and Waclaw Grzybowski, and Germans Friedrich von der Schulenburg (executed by Hitler in 1944) and Ernst Kostring had always claimed - which is that Stalin had wanted a big war in Europe in order to weaken it and thus create conditions for “bolshevization” of countries to the West of the Soviet Union.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 22
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Friday, 22nd January 2010
You should try and differentiate between the outcome Stalin hoped might happen and the one Stalin expected to happen. That is the difference between propaganda and rational assessment. Stalin had no means of knowing, on 19 August, that Britain and France would honour their guarantee to Poland, irrespective of a Soviet agreement. From what we know of discussions within the Politburo, not propaganda speeches, the general assumption was that they wouldn't, or else why would Hitler be so keen to invade?
At the end of June, Zhdanov, Stalin's chief ideologue, had written an article in "Pravda" after the Western Powers had rejected Stalin's draft proposals for an agreement:
"What they want is a treaty in which the USSR would play the part of a hired labourer bearing the brunt of his obligations on his shoulders. No self-respecting country will accept such a treaty unless it wants to be a plaything in the hands of people who are used to having others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them."
Meanwhile in Berlin on 26 July, Karl Schnurre, who was ngotaiting a trade deal with the Soviets, pointed out to his Soviet guests the advantages of doing a political deal:
"What could England offer Russia? At best participation in a European war and the hostility of Germany. What could we offer on the other hand? Neutrality and staying out of a possible European conflict, and, if Moscow wished, a German-Russian understanding on mutual interests which would work out to the advantage of both countries."
If Stalin was so keen to promote war why did the Germans make the first approaches to the Soviets asking in May to reactivate the trade deal which had stalled due to Soviet intransigence. Why did the Germans make all the running in completing the agreement with Hitler telling Ribbentrop to waive any objection when Stalin raised the ante by demanding a share of Poland and agreement to the occupation of the Baltic States?
It was Hitler who was keen to prevent an agreement between the Soviets and the West which would be a major obstacle to his desire to occupy Poland. Stalin was interested in keeping the Soviet Union out of any conflict and extracting the most concessions he could from either side.
When examining historical evidence you have to take all of it into consideration and examine it in context and not simply seize on one piece and ignore everything else. You must also not fall into the trap of taking every document or statement at its face value, particularly political speeches, full of slogans and cheap rhetoric. If we were to do that, the Soviet Union in the 1930s would be considered the most liberal, tolerant society in the world in the 1930s due to its 1936 Constitution safeguarding civil rights and national minorities and Hitler would go down in history as a man who only wanted peace.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 23
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 22nd January 2010
You should try and differentiate between the outcome Stalin hoped might happen and the one Stalin expected to happen. Since I have no magical mind-reading powers - aparently in contrast to you - all I can do is to go by available historic documents, Alan.
Stalin had no means of knowing, on 19 August, that Britain and France would honour their guarantee to Poland, irrespective of a Soviet agreement.
"...if we accept Germany's proposal, which you know, is to conclude a nonagression pact with it, it will undoubtedly attack Poland. Then the entry of England and France will become inevitable." (Joseph Stalin, August19, 1939)
"German forces have invaded Poland and its planes have bombed Polish cities, including the capital, Warsaw." (鶹Լ, September 1, 1939)
"I have to tell you now that... this country is at war with Germany."(Neville Chamberlain, September 3, 1939)
Hmmm.
From what we know of discussions within the Politburo, not propaganda speeches, the general assumption was that they wouldn't, or else why would Hitler be so keen to invade? Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939 WAS the discussion with Politburo. It was secret. When Comintern dissidents leaked it to Havas and a few other outlets, Stalin officially denied that it had ever taken place - in an unusually apparent for him diplay of rage.
At the end of June, Zhdanov, Stalin's chief ideologue, had written an article in "Pravda" after the Western Powers had rejected Stalin's draft proposals for an agreement:
"What they want is a treaty in which the USSR would play the part of a hired labourer bearing the brunt of his obligations on his shoulders. No self-respecting country will accept such a treaty unless it wants to be a plaything in the hands of people who are used to having others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them." So, Alan calls secret speech and instructions to henchmen 'propaganda'; yet, Stalin's henchman's article in Pravda - written weeks before Stalin's plan have been made apparent - was an honest expression of Stalin's thought process? Apparently, my football coach analogy in a post above went way over his head. Is it just him, or anybody else here did not get it?Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 24
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Friday, 22nd January 2010
Alan,
I used the same quote about 'chestnuts and fire' in a previous post but I now see that this was just accepted wisdom and has little real bearing on the very convoluted history of this period. I think now that it is reasonable to assume that Stalin had everything to gain by the R-M pact. By allowing Germany to advance into Poland it created a part buffer zone where, in addition, German future military movements or threats could be assessed more speedily. Considering the amount of 'secret' co-operation that already existed between the two countries a non-aggression pact was the most logical strategy for Stalin to follow.
There was also the not insignificant threat of a declaration of war by France and Britain and the subsequent war on two fronts that Hitler would have to pursue. I have no idea what was in Stalin mind at the time but to engage the Western allies as early as possible does seem a nice little insurance policy to me. Then, should Germany invade Russia as per 'Mien Kampf' then it would be an easy matter for Stalin to play the 'violated virgin' and appeal to the West for assistance.
To continue the sporting metaphor, it is my belief that from 1939 'Stalin had his eye on the ball and never lost sight of it.' He played a 'blinder'.
Regards Spruggles.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 25
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 22nd January 2010
Welcome to the take-no-prisoners thread, Spruggles
By allowing Germany to advance into Poland it created a part buffer zone where, in addition, German future military movements or threats could be assessed more speedily This is a bit of a contradiction in an otherwise excellent post – in my opinion. The Pact for all intents and purposes erased the buffer and created a mutually exposed demarcation line. It was eye-to-eye contact - quite literally in many places - from that point (2nd half of September, 1939) on.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 26
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Friday, 22nd January 2010
It was secret. When Comintern dissidents leaked it to Havas and a few other outlets, Stalin officially denied that it had ever taken place - in an unusually apparent for him diplay of rage.
So secret, that there exists no original copy of the proceedings or the minutes or record that it even took place apart from the samiszdat versions that have been pieced together some years later. Also the Comintern and the Politburo, the inner ruling circle of the Soviet Communist Party were two completely different bodies. Comintern dissidents would not be found attending meetings of the Politburo (indeed if they were dissidents they would not be found attending meetings of the Comintern).
Khruschev's Secret Speech attacking Stalin in 1956 was leaked by foreign communists but they were actually in attendance as observers to the much larger Central Committe of the CPSU which Khruschev addressed (albeit in secret session) but which one of Stalin's 14 hand-picked closest advisers would have leaked details of the most sensitive discussion of a European crisis especially to foreigners, communist sympathisers or not? It would have meant an instant death sentence.
Also, remember what you said about timelines? Ribbentrop did not fly to Moscow until 22 August and the Pact was not signed until late on the 23rd after Hitler had agreed to the partition of Poland and Stalin's occupation of the Baltic States at a time of his choosing. According to your version of history, Stalin is taking credit for an agreement that he has not only not signed but that he hasn't even negotiated!
I may not be a mind-reader but you seem to be endowing Stalin with magical powers as a fortune-teller with the ability to not only foretell the actions of the British and French in advance but also that Hitler, a figure not noted for his amenability, would concede to his demands in full. I don't think even Rasputin could match that!
..if we accept Germany's proposal, which you know, is to conclude a nonagression pact with it, it will undoubtedly attack Poland. Then the entry of England and France will become inevitable.
There was nothing "inevitable" at all about the Anglo-French declaration of war. The two governments temporised for 48 hours after Hitler's attack (the French even longer than the British - you show the dates clearly yourself). It was only the threat of a Cabinet revolt and being forced out of office that compelled a reluctant Chamberlain to issue an ultimatum late on the evening of 2 September as I have already pointed out (cf. Andrew Roberts' biography of Lord Halifax, "The Holy Fox", which outlines the events of 1-3 September within the British Cabinet in great detail).
Assuming that Stalin did not have psychic powers and was not able to foresee the future he could only go on previous experience in which 'inevitability' didn't feature at all, far from it. At Munich in September 1938 the British and French leaders gave firm guarantees to defend what was left of Czechoslovakia after the Sudetenland had been taken away. However on 15 March 1939 when Hitler forcibly occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia in defiance of the Munich Agreement the British and French did not operate their guarantees for various specious reasons (mainly the Hitler-organised secession of Slovakia).
Why would Stalin expect the British and French to honour their guarantees to Poland when they had signally failed to do so in the case of Czechoslovakia 6 months previously? Also, although Britain and France did indeed declare war on 3 September 1939 they launched no attack on Germany which liquidated Poland unmolested (coupled with assistance from the Red Army). There was no actual land fighting between Germany and the Allies until Hitler launched his assault on Norway 7 months later in April 1940.
Indeed, the only land war that took place between the surrender of Poland at the end of September 1939 and Hitler's invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 was Stalin's assault on Finland between November 1939-March 1940 (you might also add the assault by the Japanese, supposedly Hitler's ally, on Siberia at the end of 1939).
Hitler's decision to strike north first rather than west in the spring of 1940 was largely motivated by this campaign since we now know that Hitler ordered the drawing up of plans for the invasion of Denmark and Norway in December 1939 following Stalin's assault and before either the Altmark Incident (February 1940) or the British Cabinet's decision to mine Norwegian coastal waters (agreement not given until the beginning of April 1940). It is clear from this that Hitler thought his Swedish iron ore supplies were more at risk from Stalin than from the Allies.
However if, as you claim, the objective of the R-M Pact from Stalin's point of view was to initiate a general war in Europe while sitting back to see who was left standing the piece of thuggery against Finland cut across all of this. Not only did no general war break out after the invasion of Poland (it may have been the de jure state of affairs but it certainly wasn't the de facto state) until Hitler himself initiated one in April-May 1940 but the first country to launch an aggressive war was the Soviet Union with disastrous results both militarily and politically.
Although massive firepower enabled Stalin to get his way (although Finland remained independent and later joined with Hitler in attacking the Soviet Union - the only democratic state to join the Axis Powers) the deficiencies in training, equipment and fighting capability of the Red Army lay exposed for all to see - the Red Army lost over 126,000 troops dead or missing, suffered nearly 265,000 wounded, 5,500 captured as well as the loss of over 3,500 tanks and 500 aircraft compared to nearly 26,000 dead or missing Finns, 43,500 wounded, 1000 wounded, 20-30 tanks lost along with 62 aircraft. If the Russo-Finish War was a 'victory' for the Soviets it was one of pyrrhic proportions.
The campaign certainly aroused Hitler's suspicions as it involved the Soviets moving into a sphere of interest (Scandinavia) that had not been agreed in the negotiations leading to the R-M Pact. More importantly, in Britain and France Stalin was seen as equal, if not greater, threat than Hitler.
There was enormous sympathy for the Finns in the West, particularly in France, where there was still general dismay that nothing had been done to assist the Poles. Under pressure the Allies assembled an expeditionary force to assist the Finns against the Soviets. However bureaucratic and military incompetence coupled with Norwegian and Swedish refusal to permit access through their territory caused inordinate delays. Nevertheless the expedition was due to set sail when the Finns sued for peace at the end of March, the only, but not insignificant, result of the whole enterprise being the removal of Daladier from office in favour of Reynaud.
Thus Stalin, whom you claim, had deliberately "promoted" a war between Hitler and the West came within a whisker of becoming the object of the first aggressive action taken by the Western democracies before they even fired a shot against the Germans when only 7 months before they were desperately seeking an alliance from him! More than that he had openly advertised the weakness and vulnerability of his forces to Hitler who duly took note for future reference. Hardly the great master-planner! Truly, by their deeds, not by their words, shall ye judge them.
Your so-called 'killer' document has 'forgery' written all over it, probably concocted years later, thus accounting for Stalin's powers of prophecy, especially as a copy came to light in the archives of the French Army. The purpose may be either to discredit Stalin by showing what machiavellian purpose he had and that he, not Hitler, was the true initiator of WWII or, on the contrary, to uphold Stalin as the true destroyer of fascism by showing how the R-M Pact was part of a master plan to defeat Hitler rather than actually displaying Stalin's lack of principle in standing Marxist-Leninist theory on its head. Either way it belongs more in the realms of historical fiction than historical fact.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 27
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Friday, 22nd January 2010
Apologies for another error in my previous message. In my list of Finnish losses in the Russo-Finish War the figure of 1000 refers to captured not wounded. Apologies again to those who bothered to read that far.
Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 28
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 22nd January 2010
So secret, that there exists no original copy of the proceedings or the minutes or record that it even took place apart from the samiszdat versions that have been pieced together some years later. Of course, normally Stalin would publish meticulous minutes of Politburo proceedings, especially the ones discussing war policy. Not that anybody in the world is aware of them, but you referred to a few, as I recall, although you failed to produce any references. Except that you know exactly what Stalin was thinking.
Also the Comintern and the Politburo, the inner ruling circle of the Soviet Communist Party were two completely different bodies. Comintern dissidents would not be found attending meetings of the Politburo (indeed if they were dissidents they would not be found attending meetings of the Comintern). As they say in Russia, it's bad when one forgets something he does not know. This is the part of the minutes published by DNB that I haven't quoted just yet:
"We have received from Moscow, from a source which we consider to be absolutely trustworthy, the following detailed information on the meeting held, at Stalin's initiative, on August 19 at 22:00, and the speech that he delivered there for the occasion. On August 19, in the evening, Politburo members were urgently called together for an urgent and secret meeting, which was also attended by prominent leaders of the Comintern, but only those from Russian section. Not one of the foreign Communists, not even Dimitrov, Secretary General of the Comintern, were invited to this meeting, whose purpose, not indicated on the agenda, was to hear Stalin's report..."
Khruschev's Secret Speech attacking Stalin in 1956 was leaked by foreign communists but they were actually in attendance as observers to the much larger Central Committe of the CPSU which Khruschev addressed (albeit in secret session) Here, ladies and gentlemen, Alan is trying to cover one layer of drivel with another, so that it really becomes too muddy to comprehend. Khruschev's "secret" speech was never actually secret, since the Party published 60 thousand copies of transcripts straight away, perhaps, even before it was delivered.
Also, remember what you said about timelines? Ribbentrop did not fly to Moscow until 22 August and the Pact was not signed until late on the 23rd after Hitler had agreed to the partition of Poland and Stalin's occupation of the Baltic States at a time of his choosing. According to your version of history, Stalin is taking credit for an agreement that he has not only not signed but that he hasn't even negotiated! Oh, yes, the timelines. Thanks for the reminder. Ok, the negotiations had been going on since the Fall of 1938
On August 15 Schulenburg sent a letter to Berlin, in which he informed Hitler via his boss Ribbentrop about Molotov hinting Stalin's interest in the pact
On August 16 Hitler instructed Ribbentrop to send a cable to Moscow that he was ready to fly to Moscow at any time beginning Friday, August 18
(all of this is available in various compilations of the diplomatic correspondence between USSR and Germany in 1939 through 1941)
Why would Stalin expect the British and French to honour their guarantees to Poland when they had signally failed to do so in the case of Czechoslovakia 6 months previously? And yet he did. I guess, his mind-reading powers were more useful than yours: he could predict the future, while - in your case - it's like in Sting's song, "...forget about the future, let's get on with the past..."
Your so-called 'killer' document has 'forgery' written all over it, probably concocted years later, thus accounting for Stalin's powers of prophecy, especially as a copy came to light in the archives of the French Army You're changing your story now. It's just been Stalin's propaganda a few posts ago. But, as I said before, Richard Raack wrote a long paper on this. Here's quite a settled nuance that brings the whole Alan's house of cards down, if he even understands that the dots are firmly connected:
"It is necessary to emphasize that a significant point of contention...is the fact of Politburo session on August 19, 1939 in and of itself. Molotov's and later Stalin's interpreter V. N. Pavlov, in the interview given to Soviet military historian P. A. Zhilin in 1972, said that Stalin had been the initiator of the agreement with Germany and had prepared the document himself. The document "was discussed with Politburo."...[It is obvious] that [Comintern] Directives were prepared the same way."Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 29
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Friday, 22nd January 2010
All very entertaining and adding to the gaiety of nations, I'm sure, Suv, but even if I accept your document as totally authentic I am still at a loss to know the source of Stalin's power of divination and ability to foretll the future on 19 August for events that were yet to happen.
It is a pity, for his sake and that of his fellow-countrymen, that these powers seem to have deserted him when he decided to attack Finland in December 1939, and more pertinently, when Hitler decided to attack him in June 1941.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 30
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 22nd January 2010
It is a pity, for his sake and that of his fellow-countrymen, that these powers seem to have deserted him when he decided to attack Finland in December 1939, and more pertinently, when Hitler decided to attack him in June 1941. It shouldn't be a pity for anybody who does not crave to be enslaved by a Communist regime. But the problems with Stalin's divine powers really began with the unexpectedly fast and hapless collapse of the British and French forces on the Continent. Consequently, Stalin forced the attack on Finland at the very inconvenient from military stand point time, and, finally, Zhukov missed the Wehrmacht launch in June, 1941. La Garde recule - God Save the Queen...
Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 31
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 22nd January 2010
Consequently, Stalin forced the attack on Finland at the very inconvenient from military stand point time Speaking of time-lines, let me correct myself here. The forcing of the Finnish campaign schedule has more of the "Phoney War" connection. As Stalin said in his speech to Red Army Brass, "They're fighting there, of course, but the war is kind of weak. One can't tell if they're fighting or playing cards. They could even reconcile, for all we know..."
Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 32
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Friday, 22nd January 2010
Speaking of time-lines, let me correct myself here
I should think so, since Stalin's 'forced' attack on Finland (December 1939) came before, not after, the collapse of British and French forces on the continent (May-June 1940). A war with with over 370,000 Russian casualties could hardly be described as 'phoney'.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 33
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 23rd January 2010
attack on Finland (December 1939) came before, not after, the collapse of British and French forces on the continent (May-June 1940). Alan, cheater cheater pumpkin eater, it’s too late, I beat you to the punch on this one.
A war with with over 370,000 Russian casualties could hardly be described as 'phoney'. Exactly. Except that anybody who does not know what the Phoney War is referred to, does not even qualify to use this board, am I right, Andrew? It is certainly not referred to the Winter War, and I certainly did not refer it to the Winter War either. Trust me on this one, Alan. Speaking about the Winter War, Liddell Hart - I should hope that many here know who he is - basically wrote that Red Army’s inadequacy conducting this war was greatly exaggerated. In turn, Mark Solonin’s very detailed and meticulous analysis of this campaign revealed that – by all statistical measures - the Finns turned out to be by far the most motivated, effective and efficient armed forces of all engaged in WWII combat anywhere in the world; Mannerheim (himself a former pre-revolutionary Russian Army General) being the best and enormously and unfairly underrated military leader of the entire war. He certainly was much, much better than Zhukov – you’re not going to get any argument from me on this one.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 34
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Saturday, 23rd January 2010
Well, that's a relief, if not pleasant surprise. Still does not explain why, if Stalin was so keen to promote a war between the West and Hitler in August he chose to launch the first offensive attack anywhere in Europe following the liquidation of Poland only three months later with such disastrous results, at least interms of men and equipmment.
The contrast lay between the Wehrmacht's clinical, if brutal, liquidation of Poland (with some assistance from the Red Army, admittedly) in less than 4 weeks and the Red Army's 4-month campaign against Finland in which it suffered at least 5x as many lossess as the Finns and Finland was still left as an independent nation with hostile intent towards the Soviet Union.
As for leadership, I'm sure that there were many generals and officers (later to be liquidated by Stalin in 1940) on the Polish side who had pushed back the Red Army in 1920 who were considerably younger than the 72yo Mannerheim.
I raise the question of the Winter War, since it seems to cut across the sentiments expressed in Stalin's August 19 "address" to the Politburo (which was a deliberative body, like the British Cabinet, not a forum to which speeches were addressed setting out a firm line, like a party congress), by which you lay so much store, where he stated that Soviet policy should be directed towards "maintaining neutrality and waiting for the right time". How come he didn't mention his attack on Finland in August to his closest henchmen? I would have thought it was a fairly important item not to overlook.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 35
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 23rd January 2010
Still does not explain why, if Stalin was so keen to promote a war between the West and Hitler in August he chose to launch the first offensive attack anywhere in Europe following the liquidation of Poland only three months later with such disastrous results, at least interms of men and equipmment. On the contrary. Even though the Finnish campaign turned out to be an unexpectedly difficult one, the territorial gains in the Finnish Gulf area made Germany's ore shipments from Sweden completely exposed. Moreover, Red Army gained several launching pads for the planned for 1941 renewed offensive, including the naval base at Hanko.
The contrast lay between the Wehrmacht's clinical, if brutal, liquidation of Poland (with some assistance from the Red Army, admittedly) in less than 4 weeks and the Red Army's 4-month campaign against Finland in which it suffered at least 5x as many lossess as the Finns and Finland was still left as an independent nation with hostile intent towards the Soviet Union. Why so selective with respect to Poland? Stalin's liquidation of Poland - it's Eastern part that is - was even more clinical, if brutal. By the way, according to Solonin, based on all statistical indicators, Finnish forces were by far more effective under attack by Red Army than Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe during their unexpected attack on Red Army later on.
where he stated that Soviet policy should be directed towards "maintaining neutrality and waiting for the right time". How come he didn't mention his attack on Finland in August to his closest henchmen? This only confirms that his ultimate goal was not the territorial gains outlined in the Pact, as you keep claiming, but the bolshevization of the entire Europe. He neither mentioned East Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bessarabia, nor Bukovina.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 36
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Saturday, 23rd January 2010
Even though the Finnish campaign turned out to be an unexpectedly difficult one, the territorial gains in the Finnish Gulf area made Germany's ore shipments from Sweden completely exposed
Which makes it even more difficult to explain. Why would he seek to antagonise the power he had only done a deal with 3 months before (and which he was supplying large and growing amounts of raw materials, including iron ore) when no blow had been struck, either way, in Western Europe as well as almost becoming involved in a war with the British and French who were on the point of despatching an expeditionary force to help the Finns?
This only confirms that his ultimate goal was not the territorial gains outlined in the Pact, as you keep claiming, but the bolshevization of the entire Europe.
The why did he make territorial gains the condition for signing the Pact 4 days later? A pretty important bargaining position, I would have thought, that he might have outlined to his ruling elite beforehand.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 37
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 24th January 2010
Which makes it even more difficult to explain. Why would he seek to antagonise the power he had only done a deal with 3 months before (and which he was supplying large and growing amounts of raw materials, including iron ore) when no blow had been struck, either way, in Western Europe as well as almost becoming involved in a war with the British and French who were on the point of despatching an expeditionary force to help the Finns? It sure does make it difficult to explain away your position. However, from Stalin’s stand point it was very straight forward. Better yet, he explained it to Politburo in perfectly clear terms: he committed to support Germany in its imminent war with the British and the French for as long as possible by supplying Germany with strategic materials, while he was preparing to take advantage of the devastation caused by this war at the right moment, particularly by cutting Germany from its only major supply routes that he was not in control already, i.e., ore shipments from Sweden and oil shipments from Romania. Let me guess, now you’re again going to ask me how did he know that the British and the French would declare the war against Hitler, but not deploy forces in Finland?
The why did he make territorial gains the condition for signing the Pact 4 days later? A pretty important bargaining position, I would have thought, that he might have outlined to his ruling elite beforehand. To erase the buffer, of course, particularly Poland, where the first “March to Warsaw and Berlin” ground to a halt in 1920; and to get a clear path to the above mentioned supply routes.
Is Ed "Too Tall" Jones Too Tall? Just kidding. This is from GEICO commercial. But - in the context of the top of this thread - I suggest that much more interesting question would be, "why both Lenin's and Stalin's governments always preferred to deal with their perceived ideological enemies from Reichswehr to Hitler's government at the expense of German Communists and Socialists"? I think Felshtinsky and Suvorov nailed it: Marxist society was never envisioned entirely classless and flat. It can't be. Somebody must be in charge. Somebody would have to determine who works when and where, who eats what and how much, etc, etc. In other words, this society would be run by the wise elite armed with the victorious Marxist-Leninist science. And from the moment Lenin and Co seized power, they were absolutely going to make sure that they would remain that elite.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 38
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Sunday, 24th January 2010
Let me guess, now you’re again going to ask me how did he know that the British and the French would declare the war against Hitler, but not deploy forces in Finland?
Wrong guess, the British and French actually did deploy troops, about 150,000 of them, although very slowly due to diplomatic, bureaucratic and militarily incompetent delays, which they were on the point of despatching to Narvik to link up with the Finnish Army. The more pertinent question is how did he know the Finns would surrender before he became involved in a war with Britain and France? I would also ask what "devastation" in Europe?
Before Stalin launched his attack on Finland on 30 November no actual land fighting had taken place in Europe since the surrender of Poland and was not to do so for a further 5 months. The only real combat was taking place in the Atlantic where Britain, not Germany, was struggling to keep open her supply lines. At the same time as Stalin launched his assault on Finland he ordered Zhukov's superior forces in the East to remove the Japanese from Siberia. So the only country involved in a two-front war, one of choice, one of necessity, at the end of 1939 was the Soviet Union.
Again, despite your avowed dislike of Stalin, you seem to fall victim to the most egregious Marxist claptrap. The links between Germany (or Prussia) and Russia go much further back than the Bolsheviks. Although like France and Germany they were natural rivals (especially over Polish territory) there was much that brought them together to avoid conflict. Long before Ribbentrop and Molotov Poland had been partitioned diplomatically 3 times in the 18th century to avoid conflict (or in the wake of one) when Catherine the Great and Frederick the Great were the respective rulers rather than Stalin and Hitler.
In 1762 the new Tsar Paul (who had succeeded on the death of his mother Elizabeth) withdrew his army from the gates of Berlin because of his overwhelming admiration for the military prowess of Frederick the Great (Hitler often quoted this example in the bunker when Roosevelt died in April 1945 - the only problem was that Roosevelt was American not Russian so the parallel was not exact). A Prussian-Russian alliance had turned the tide of war in Europe and had effectively ended Napoleon's bid for supremacy at the Battle of Leipzig in 1813.
A far simpler explanation of all three treaties made between 1918-39 can be found in straightforward diplomatic self-interest rather than attempts at squaring the circle ideologically.
In 1918 the Bolsheviks were in office but not in power. Millions of troops, both German and Allied, were on Russian soil along with thousands of displaced Russian troops unwilling to accept the change of regime. Lenin simply decided to cut his losses, at the point of a gun (as the Germans had threatened to occupy Petrograd, which they could have easily done - it was this threat that caused the Bolsheviks to abandon the city and reinstate the pre-Peter the Great capital of Moscow) and gambled that a German defeat in the West might nullify the Treaty or, if not, he might renounce it himself at a later date after he had dealt with his domestic opponents.
In 1922 the two most friendless countries in Europe were Weimar Germany and the Soviet Union. In diplomacy, as in life, those without friends are often drawn together for the purposes of mutual assistance. In 1939 Stalin wanted to keep out of conflict (except those of his own choosing) more than he wanted to displace Hitler. He didn't trust the British and the French, as you have pointed out when you said his negotiations with them were not serious or well-intentioned. Hitler came along with a better offer which enabled Stalin to acquire parts of Poland previously belonging to the old Tsarist Empire which the Bolsheviks had lost in 1920.
So they partitioned Poland just like Catherine the Great and Frederick the Great had done. Nothing particularly novel there then. The Finnish War can also be explained by Stalin's desire to recover parts of the Tsarist Empire which the Bolsheviks had lost or given away. From 1809-1917 Finland had been part of the Russian Empire having been seized from Sweden and the overthrow of the Tsar enabled the Finns to declare their independence. A brief, but brutal civil war between the Whites, who favoured Finnish independence, and the Reds, who adhered to Moscow, parallel to the Civil War in Russia saw the Whites victorious. Finnish independence was always linked to anti-communism.
Rather than some economic motivation about threatening Hitler's iron ore supplies (which mainly came by sea around Norway which is why the British decided to mine Norwegian coastal waters in April 1940) Stalin's motivation was historical just as much as his desire to reclaim eastern Poland in August 1939 had been.
Had Stalin been as alert to historical parallels as Hitler was (although with more accurate effect) he would have known that the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was not the first time a Russian ruler had made a pact with a dictator seeking hegemony in Europe. In 1807 Alexander I held a lavish conference (including on a caparisoned barge mid-river) at Tilsit with Napoleon. Alexander agreed to support Napoleon's war against Austria, offering him many economic incentives including joining his boycott of trade with Britain, at the same time benefiting with annexations of territory (this time at the expense of Prussia but also, eventually, Finland).
Alexander, like Stalin of Hitler, both feared and admired Napoleon and considered, at the very least, he was, in Mrs Thatcher's description of Mikhail Gorbachev, "a man you can do business with" and lavished all the formalities and dignities on him due one emperor (albeit self-appointed) from another. However just like Stalin's agreement with Hitler Tilsit broke down in mutual recrimination and ultimately invasion and war.
Maybe an understanding of early 19th century Russian history might have served Stalin better than the intricacies of Marxist-Leninist dogma.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 39
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 24th January 2010
The more pertinent question is how did he know the Finns would surrender before he became involved in a war with Britain and France? I don't understand what surrender are you talking about. Stalin expected to run over Finland and install the puppet Bolshevik government headed by Kuusinen in days. Instead he had quite a combat in his lap, as everybody knows.
I would also ask what "devastation" in Europe? The devastation caused by the war between Germany on one hand and France and UK on the other, of course. Again, he did not expect for the allies collapse so fast and haplessly. So, he did not really have future-reading powers after all, Alan.
Before Stalin launched his attack on Finland on 30 November no actual land fighting had taken place in Europe since the surrender of Poland and was not to do so for a further 5 months. The only real combat was taking place in the Atlantic where Britain, not Germany, was struggling to keep open her supply lines. At the same time as Stalin launched his assault on Finland he ordered Zhukov's superior forces in the East to remove the Japanese from Siberia. So the only country involved in a two-front war, one of choice, one of necessity, at the end of 1939 was the Soviet Union. So that you understand this sequence, you need to straighten out your time-line, Alan. It is very significant that Zhukov's assault began in the morning of August 20, basically at the same time as the invitation for Ribbentrop to come to Moscow and the speech to Politburo delivered, taken time zones differential into account. The timing of their assault achieved the consequent Japanese distrust of Hitler, and their willingness to rather make a deal with Stalin. Combat operations in Manchuria were over by September 15, two days before Red Army invaded East Poland. The attack on Finland took place only when the Polish campaign was over. So, as you can see, Stalin paced himself better than the mesh of your post gives him credit for.
Again, despite your avowed dislike of Stalin That's new and refreshing from you, given that you used to call me Stalin worshiper. you seem to fall victim to the most egregious Marxist claptrap Believe me, the last thing I am is a victim of Marxist claptrap, Alan. Although like France and Germany they were natural rivals (especially over Polish territory) there was much that brought them together to avoid conflict. Poland had been partitioned diplomatically 3 times in the 18th century to avoid conflict (or in the wake of one) when Catherine the Great and Frederick the Great were the respective rulers.
In 1762 the new Tsar Paul (who had succeeded on the death of his mother Elizabeth) withdrew his army from the gates of Berlin because of his overwhelming admiration for the military prowess of Frederick the Great. A Prussian-Russian alliance had turned the tide of war in Europe and had effectively ended Napoleon's bid for supremacy at the Battle of Leipzig in 1813.
A far simpler explanation of all three treaties made between 1918-39 can be found in straightforward diplomatic self-interest rather than attempts at squaring the circle ideologically. I don't even understand what it means. I prefer Felshtinsky: it's a far simpler explanation by very, very far, Alan.
In 1918 the Bolsheviks were in office but not in power... Alan, before you try to argue with twice PHD in History Felshtinsky, whose main field of research is the history of Russian Revolution, perhaps, you need to at least demonstrate what is this sensational treasure trough of information you're basing your far-out theories on. I'll make it easy for you. This is his site with the enormous amount of background information posted on it:
Tell me which ones are so completely wrong and misleading, in your opinion.
Maybe an understanding of early 19th century Russian history might have served Stalin better than the intricacies of Marxist-Leninist dogma. It's safe to say that Stalin did ok all in all, even having experienced a terrible disaster of June 1941, Alan.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 40
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Sunday, 24th January 2010
I don't understand what surrender are you talking about.
The Anglo-French supply convoys were due to sail on 12 March and the force (100,000 British and 35,000 French) were due to disembark at Narvik on 20 March. However the Moscow Treaty ending the war was signed between the Soviets and the Finns on 12 March. Stalin was saved from becoming involved in a shooting war with the Allies by the Finns' desire for peace and Allied military incompetence. However the foiled expedition did bring about the fall of Daladier. See here:
The devastation caused by the war between Germany on one hand and France and UK on the other, of course
But there was no actual land fighting, to speak of, going on between the Allies and Germany during the Winter War of November 1939-March 1940.
This is his site with the enormous amount of background information posted on it: www.felshtinsky.com/...
All of it from the communist side, I see. Nevertheless you could hardly dispute that the Bolsheviks did not gain control over the bulk of Russian territory, nor did the Soviet Union, as such, come into existence, until after the Civil War of 1918-21.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 41
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 24th January 2010
But there was no actual land fighting, to speak of, going on between the Allies and Germany during the Winter War of November 1939-March 1940 Yes, Alan, I've already covered it. That bothered Stalin immensely - see the quote a few posts up, in which he compared the Phoney War to a card game. That may have forced his hand on attacking Finland at a bad time for conducting offensive operations in the Finnish Gulf area.
All of it from the communist side, I see. You're calling all the materials written by the Russian speaking authors coming from the communist side? I congratulate you for having such a non-discriminatory spirit, Alan.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 42
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Sunday, 24th January 2010
That may have forced his hand on attacking Finland at a bad time for conducting offensive operations in the Finnish Gulf area.
To put it mildly, so let's get this straight, because the Western Allies and Hitler were not fighting which was his supposed intention in agreeing the Pact with Hitler in the first place he decided only three months later to provoke a war with a smaller power that you yourself have said was more efficient than the Red Army in unfavourable conditions, losing almost 400,000 men as casualties along with over 3,500 tanks and 500 aircraft (which you would have thought might come in pretty useful if and when Hitler, as he eventually did, decided to renege on the bargain) as well almost contriving a war with the Western Powers himself.
Not the greatest of master-strategists when you look at it rationally. The truth is that just like Hitler Stalin was a dictator who was driven by territorial ambition and a desire to trample on states he considered weaker than his own. Just like Hitler though, things didn't always go his way.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 43
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 25th January 2010
because the Western Allies and Hitler were not fighting which was his supposed intention in agreeing the Pact with Hitler in the first place he decided only three months later to provoke a war with a smaller power that you yourself have said was more efficient than the Red Army in unfavourable conditions, Stalin launched the Winter War end of 1939 because, as he hinted in the above quoted speech to the RKKA brass, he was uneasy with the perceived lack of action in the West and, consequently, he was in a hurry to gain control of the said major supply routes. He obviously did not expect the Finns to put up as good of a fight, but casualties never was a deterrent for him and his henchmen who slaughtered their own compatriots en mass.
Just like Hitler though, things didn't always go his way. This one I am actually in agreement with you, Alan. Stalin – as virtually all the Bolshevik leadership of Lenin’s generation, Lenin included - ended his life in personal defeat and death from unnatural causes, in all likelihood. But, as far as the second world war concerned, on June 24, 1945, he watched Zhukov – ironically enough, the guy who had failed him so badly - receiving Victory Parade on Red Square, whereas Hitler had been dead, burnt and buried in an undisclosed location.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 44
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Monday, 25th January 2010
Stalin launched the Winter War end of 1939 because...he was uneasy with the perceived lack of action in the West
Well he certainly provoked action but I don't think the objective was to provoke a war with the West as he came so close to doing but for diplomatic obstacles, Western military incompetence and Finnish concession.
You made a more valid point regarding my mistake surrounding the timeline of the border war with Japan and the Winter War (again for which I apologise). It was only when I re-examined the issue that I realised how closely the war with Japan was connected with offensive action in Europe.
On 31 August 1939 Zhukov (of whom more later), with well-trained troops and modern equipment such as the T-26 BT and T-28 tanks and the Ilyushin fighter-bomber, inflicted a stunning defeat on the Japanese at Khalkin-Gol inflicting 55,000 casualties on the Japanese for only 10,000 on his side (an unusual preponderance in favour of the Red Army given the later experience in the campaigns against both Finland and Germany).
However, as the West was to learn later, comprehensive defeats did not always put the Japanese in the mood to give up and, according to Read & Fisher:
"...on 5 September the general commanding the Kwantung Army [the Japanese occupation forces] announced that he would provide fresh reinforcements for a new offensive in the autumn which, in one mighty blow, would crush what he called this 'mouse-stirring' by the Soviets."
At this stage Hitler's assault on Poland was in the middle of its first week with no sign of the Soviet intervention which had been agreed as a secret protocol to the R-M Pact on 23 August. The next step may come as a surprise. Read and Fisher take up the narrative again:
"With such a threat hanging in the east at the same moment that Hitler's destruction of the Poles became clear in the west, Stalin could hardly be blamed for a certain nervousness. However, help was at hand. In Moscow...Schulenberg [the German Ambassador] had a series of meetings with the Japanese ambassador, Shigenori Togo, urging him to make a settlement with the Soviet Union. In Tokyo, German Ambassador Ott made similar approaches to the Japanese government, suggesting that Germany would be ready to act as mediator. And on 9 September Ribbentrop himself joined in, telling the Japanese government how important it was to Germany that there should be a settlement between Japan and the Soviet Union...
On 13 September Ambassador Togo saw Molotov and suggested they try to find a formula which would ebnable the border disputes to be settled with honour...The official cease-fire was signed in Moscow three days later [16 September]."
[A.Read & D.Fisher: The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact 1939-41, pub.1988, p.332]
The following day - 17 September- Red Army troops crossed the Polish frontier and began to claim the territory allocated to them under the terms of the secret protocol to the R-M Pact of three weeks before. It was a remarkable example of what Churchill was to call (in connexion with the Soviets' resumption of hostilities with Japan in 1945):
"...the fidelity and punctuality with which Marshal Stalin and his valiant armies always keep their military engagements."
(speech to House of Commons, 16 August 1945).
Why should Hitler be so keen that there should be peace between Russia and Japan and for Stalin to claim the spoils from the destruction of Poland? Quite simply because he was dependent, at least for the time being, on the economic and material aid he was receiving from the Soviets to nullify the British naval blockade (again you ignore the point as to why Stalin should be so concerned about Germany's Swedish iron-ore supplies - most of which came via the sea route around Noway anyway - when he himself was sending increasing amounts of raw materials, including iron-ore to feed the German war machine) and also, after destroying Poland he intended to turn westwards, as he had already indicated in his address to the OKW on 23 May 1939 and his remarks to Burckhardt on 11 August. For this he needed a quiescent and largely satisfied Soviet Union.
From Stalin's point of view, the conflict with Japan in the east coinciding as it did with worsening crisis in Europe must have been a source of great anxiety and another reason for doing a deal with Hitler. The combination, however, of Zhukov's military victory at Khalkin-Gol, the rapid diplomatic settlement with the Japanese after it (thanks to German intervention) and the rapid absorption of Polish territory into the Soviet Union (since Poland had all but collapsed anyway, thanks to the Wehrmacht, when the Red army invaded) must have induced a feeling of something close to euphoria. It certainly produced over-confidence.
He must have considered that there was no better time to realise one of his long-held ambitions, to re-absorb Finland, or as much of it as he could, back under Russian suzerainty. But, as you this point out, the conditions were very different. This time there was no Zhukov, no Wehrmacht, the Red Army was invading territory not defending it and so near-disaster was the inevitable consequence confirming Hitler's poor view of the Soviets' fighting qualities as well as further serving to alienate Stalin from the western allies.
Just a word on Zhukov before I finish, I find it curious how those who wish to both uphold and destroy Stalin's reputation as a war leader should find common cause in minimising or even dismissing Zhukov's achievements. Like Montgomery, whatever his personal flaws may have been, his qualities as a commander were hugely significant in the outconme of the war. His role in the war against the Japanese, the defence of Leningrad, Moscow and then of Stalingrad cannot be seriously underplayed.
However, unlike the Allied commanders, but similar to the Wehrmacht generals, he was not able to exercise his professional judgment unhindered and Stalin's constant interference undoubtedly made his task, as well as that of his fellow commanders, infinitely more difficult as well as exponentially exarcebating the losses suffered by the REd Army. In the end, like others before him, Zhukov fell victim to Stalin's personal and political jealousy as he could bear no rival for the public's attention.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 45
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 25th January 2010
Well he certainly provoked action but I don't think the objective was to provoke a war with the West as he came so close to doing but for diplomatic obstacles, Western military incompetence and Finnish concession. Why should Stalin be concerned about the British and the French, when he saw them ignore his own occupation of East Poland and conduct their war against Hitler so haplessly? As for the Finns, this is what Solonin writes about the end of the war:
"Yet, the main miracle occurred in late evening of March 12, 1940 [when the peace accord was signed in Moscow]. By that time total casualties of the Finnish army (killed and wounded) exceeded 68 thousand troops, i.e., about 40% of the initial strength of the regular army. Those remaining in action were extremely exhausted by the nonstop combat with no possibility to rest or rotate. The Finnish army retreat to Vyborg (from the top of the Karela peninsula 'triangle' to its base) meant significant lengthening of the front line to be held by melting by an hour forces. The proportion of forces on Karela peninsula in the beginning of March was as follows: 6.5 to 1 in personnel; 14 to 1 in artillery; 20 to 1 in air craft. But even these numbers don't reflect the hopelessness of the situation for Finland. Red Army reserve contained hundreds of thousands troops, many thousands tanks and air craft, and it was capable of continuously increasing the numbers of its forces up to any requested level. Mannerheim, meanwhile, had only 14 last battalions of poorly trained reservists..."
[Zhukov's] role in the war against the Japanese, the defence of Leningrad, Moscow and then of Stalingrad cannot be seriously underplayed.
However, unlike the Allied commanders, but similar to the Wehrmacht generals, he was not able to exercise his professional judgment unhindered and Stalin's constant interference undoubtedly made his task, as well as that of his fellow commanders, infinitely more difficult as well as exponentially exarcebating the losses suffered by the Red Army. In the end, like others before him, Zhukov fell victim to Stalin's personal and political jealousy as he could bear no rival for the public's attention. This is all Beevor's history
. Suvorov wrote two books on Zhukov, and the picture is not pretty. Long story short, he was a ruthless enforcer with little or no strategic or tactical prowess in combat. His Khalkin Gol operation was developed by his brilliant Chief of Staff Bogdanov. His real impact on the second world war was the horrendous debacle of June, 1941, the horrendous debacle allowing Wehrmacht to encircle Leningrad, and the missed chance to completely destroy Wehrmacht Army Group South in 1942 and force the collapse of Hitler's Germany right then and there. I'll get to that later with details. Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 46
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 25th January 2010
By the way, I can't believe I missed this: Your so-called 'killer' document has 'forgery' written all over it, probably concocted years later, thus accounting for Stalin's powers of prophecy, especially as a copy came to light in the archives of the French Army. How could it possibly be concocted YEARS LATER in any way, shape, or form, Alan, when Havas published it in Geneva on November 27, 1939; DNB in Berlin, Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant in Rotterdam and De Telegraaf in Amsterdam on November 28, 1939, and Le Temps in Paris on November 29, 1939 - after only a couple of months after the event? Moreover, Stalin HIMSELF acknowledged the significance of these publications by his angry outburst against Havas in the official note of denial.
Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 47
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Monday, 25th January 2010
By that time total casualties of the Finnish army (killed and wounded) exceeded 68 thousand troops, i.e., about 40% of the initial strength of the regular army
Quite so, but not quite as bad as that suffered by the Red Army which lost 397,355 killed, wounded, missing or taken prisoner which represents 93.35% of the operational forces deployed at the beginning of the campaign and 52.24% of the forces deployed at the end. A classic example of a "pyrrhic" victory by the Soviets.
Why should Stalin be concerned about the British and the French...?
But he was very much concerned, especially in March 1940 when Soviet grain and oil shipments were suspended to Germany. At the same time, on 29 March, Molotov addressed the Supreme Soviet in the following terms:
"It is not at all the defence of small nations or the defence of the rights of members of the League of Nations that explains the support of the British and French ruling circles for Finland against the USSR. The explanation of this support is that in Finland they had a ready military bridgehead for an attack on the USSR."
However when Hitler launched his attack on Norway on 9 April not only did Molotov warmly congratulate the German Ambassador, Schulenberg but the obstacles to grain and oil shipments magically disappeared.
Read and Fisher characterise the change of attitude thus:
"Stalin was terrified of being drawn into a war with the Allies, and had determined to keep his co-operation with Germany as low and as quiet as possible, in case it was seen as jeopardising his neutrality, thus giving the Allies an excuse to go to war. That was the way Schulenberg interpreted things.
There was, however, another possible interpretation, which must have suggested itself to Stalin's paranoid mind. Was it not possible that Hitler might double-cross him, especially when the Red Army was making such a poor showing in Finland, and do a deal with the Allies to join forces against the Soviet Union in an attack through Scandinavia? As thought to confirm his fears, "The Times" in London wrote about the possibility of an eventual regrouping of powers, including Germany, in an anti-Soviet front. Since "The Times" was regarded in Moscow as the mouthpiece of the British government, jus as "Pravda" and "Izvestia" were organs of the Soviet party and government, Stalin took such statements very seriously.
The German invasion of Norway, forestalling the Allied plan, had laid those bogies to rest. As if to confirm at least Schulenberg's theory, "Izvestia" carried a prominent article on 11 April explaining the German action in Scandinavia, and supporting it. To the German Ambassador it read 'like one big sigh of relief'..."
[Read & Fisher, op.cit.,pp 444-5]
You must remember that Stalin saw no difference between the Allies and Hitler and perceived them both as equally hostile to the interests of the Soviet Union. The decision of the British and French to even consider deploying forces in Finland against the Red Army, however dilatorily, when they were so reluctant to commence aggressive action against Germany muist have aroused within him all the old fears that dated back to the Allied Intervention of 1919.
However, now at long last, the war in the West had begun and both the Allies and Hitler would have something else on which to focus their attention other than the Soviet Union.
His real impact on the second world war was the horrendous debacle of June, 1941, the horrendous debacle allowing Wehrmacht to encircle Leningrad, and the missed chance to completely destroy Wehrmacht Army Group South in 1942
Again, I think you are ascribing to Zhukov the faults of his boss. The failure to build fortifications in depth and have properly deployed reserves was Stalin's responsibility not Zhukov's and the encirclement of Leningrad was due to Stalin's decision to antagonise Finland which gave the Germans a base to attack from the north. Every strategic and tactical decision he took had to be approved by Stalin. It's like blaming von Manstein for the failure to turn the Russian war around in 1943. Like every dictator Stalin wanted the credit when things went right and shifted the blame to others when things went wrong.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 48
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Monday, 25th January 2010
Havas published it in Geneva on November 27, 1939
Still enough time had elapsed to know that Britain and France had honoured their guarantees to Poland (at least by declaring war, if little else) which Stalin had no way of knowing they would do on 19 August.
Btw, I think you misunderstood me when I referred to Feltschinsky's 'communist' sources. It was the wrong choice of word. I should have put 'bolshevik' instead since I noticed there were references to Trotsky's journals and diary written in exile. I was referring specifically to my point about the motives surrounding the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 and I did not mean to be disrespectful to either you or Mr Feltschinsky and if I appeared so I apologise.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 49
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 25th January 2010
Quite so, but not quite as bad as that suffered by the Red Army... A classic example of a "pyrrhic" victory by the Soviets It is certainly not a classic example of pyrric victory. The point is that, even though the campaign turned out to be a difficult one, Red Army could sustain the rate of casualties it incurred, while the Finns could not. Not beyond the point of signing the Moscow Treaty, as Solonin clearly explained.
But he was very much concerned, especially in March 1940 when Soviet grain and oil shipments were suspended to Germany. At the same time, on 29 March, Molotov addressed the Supreme Soviet in the following terms Alan, you keep cheating with timelines. I can grant you even the possibility that Stalin opted to sign the March agreement to avoid further complications, having already secured territorial gains he had been seeking in the Finnish Gulf. However, back at the end of November he had no reason to sit back and every reason to proceed with his grand plan.
The failure to build fortifications in depth and have properly deployed reserves was Stalin's responsibility not Zhukov's and the encirclement of Leningrad was due to Stalin's decision to antagonise Finland which gave the Germans a base to attack from the north. This is a theme I'd be delighted to elaborate on when I get Suvorov's books handy - some parts are too good to pass up. So, stay tuned on this. Just one question. Have you ever heard of the rail road station Mga? This is where the fate of Leningrad had been sealed for 900 days of its blockade. This station is South-West of the City; it has nothing to do with the Finns and everything to do with Zhukov’s bonehead tactics against the advancing Wehrmacht Army Group North.Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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Message 50
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 25th January 2010
I did not mean to be disrespectful to either you or Mr Feltschinsky and if I appeared so I apologise. Compared to 'Stalin worshiper' comment, it's really nothing, Alan. But, as I explained earlier, my skin is thicker than my skull - at least I hope so.
Link to this forum: Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties
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