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Moscow Negotiations in August 1939

• Message 1.Β 

  Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 14th January 2010

  When on the β€œProvoking military action” thread Alan raised this question Then why did Stalin make two draft proposals for a military alliance with the British and French, which they rejected, in June-July 1939 before he took up Hitler's offer?Β  I bailed out with a generic answer not to clutter the thread already spreading in all sorts of directions. But since I happen to have just an article on this written by Russian historian and ex-military officer Keistut Zakoretzky, why not giving it a closer look? To save space, I’ll skip a few pages and get to the pertinent conclusions:
  
  β€œFirstly, it turns out that the country (USSR) inviting delegations to negotiate some concrete accord (treaty, agreement) and demanding that [the delegations] be authorized to sign [the accord], offered a real draft of the accord neither in advance, nor in the beginning of the negotiations. Consequently, line items of the mutual document were not collaborated on. So, British and French delegations could only presume its contents. It’s not how serious negotiations are prepared.
  
  Secondly, Soviet side suggested discussing strange, unsolvable methods of calculating numbers of troops for possible future military groups based on some linked proportions in percentage points.
  
  Thirdly, Soviet side suggested discussing strange variants of war that were inadequate in the current at the time situation in Europe. Most probable at the time was the threat of war between precisely Germany and Poland. Every participant knew that. Moreover, Admiral [Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-] Drax even tried to emphasize this on the first day of the negotiations by stating that Germany had already mobilized 2 million troops and was planning to launch on August 15… Soviet side pretended that it did not see any pertinence of that information. Voroshilov even teased that there was still no war after August 15, despite all the scare. If the situation is judged as indeed threatening in the context of certain events, unrelated matters are not discussed in the pertinent negotiations.
  
  However, this is exactly how one sets negotiations up for failure in order to blame the other side. Classical scheme!” (K. Zakoretzky, When Was the Plenum?)
  

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• Message 2

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  Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Thursday, 14th January 2010

  No problem with the above, Suv, but we've already seen from the account I quoted from Read & Fisher of the 11 August meeting of the Politburo that Molotov doubted the bona fides of the British and French because of what he had discovered of the Wohltat talks in July and the Spencer mission to Goering at the beginning of August.
  
  Stalin's negotiating technique was to make outrageous demands (such as a share of Poland and eventual control of the Baltic States) and see which side accepted them. Hitler did, the British and French didn't, which settled the issue.

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• Message 3

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  Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 14th January 2010

  Alan Stalin's negotiating technique was to make outrageous demands (such as a share of Poland and eventual control of the Baltic States) and see which side accepted them. Hitler did, the British and French didn't, which settled the issue.Β  But the point is that there was no parity in Stalin's negotiations with different sides. Quoting Zakoretzky again:
  
  "By contrast, negotiations with Germany were conducted much more seriously and consistently in terms of logic and "accuracy", if you will, as well as fully accounting for German zeitnot. Autumn was approaching with its lengthy rains detrimental to executing blitzkriegs. This made Hitler hurry. And for "urgency," one pays premium everywhere in the world. All left to be done was not to overkill, and yet not to miss the opportunity. The final of all active stages of these negotiations began in the first days of August. Some information about those was published in Russian in Bezymensky's book [Special Folder Barbarossa]...But more detailed information saw the light of day during the collapse of the USSR, 2 publications in the Baltics being particularly interesting..."

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• Message 4

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  Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Thursday, 14th January 2010

  Re: Message 3.
  
  Suvorovetz,
  
  I already mentioned it to you once in another thread. The British and in their track the French (who seem to have always looked to Britain for what action they would start) were dragging their feet in the urgent negociations in August 1939? I mentioned the slow boat instead of a plane to Moscow, not a serious negociator and without real acting power... I all read it for the first time in William Shirer's "Collapse of the Third (French) Republic. And that was written in the Fifties. In the meantime there seems to be a lot of new resources...
  
  As I think to have understood from Caro's thread (Provoking military action) Allan and Hotmousemat are speaking about some difference of opinions in Britain? Is that the reason for the slow boat, Allan?
  
  As I understand it from you, Suvorovetz, Stalin was more interested in the German proposals?
  
  And yes with a Poland that would not be happy with a British, French, Soviet alliance allowing Russians into Poland when the Germans invaded?
  
  Thus was Stalin double happy? With British and French dragging their feet and the German begging via Ribbentrop?
  
  Suvorovetz, sorry and it is a poor escape, not having the time to search again for all the sources on this ΒιΆΉΤΌΕΔ board and on a French history messageboard where the same theme is discussed in depth, I let it to the erudites of Caro's thread to discuss it further overhere...
  
  Warm regards to all the excellent contributors of these messageboards,
  
  Paul.

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• Message 5

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  Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 14th January 2010

  Hi, Paul I mentioned the slow boat instead of a plane to Moscow, not a serious negociator and without real acting power... I all read it for the first time in William Shirer's "Collapse of the Third (French) Republic.Β  The attitude of the British and the French is not a hill for me to die on, if you know what I mean. However, as Zakoretzky points out, "...everybody knew something and engaged in the maze of intrigues, not willing to 'make the first move'." He also says, "The French side had 'necessary authorizations' - strictly speaking - from the first day. General Doumenc announced his on August 12. Written authorizations for the British mission were received during the negotiations, which Admiral Drax announced on August 21, on the last day."

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• Message 6

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  Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Thursday, 14th January 2010

  From the French and British perspective: General Gamelin and prime minister Daladier favoured an alliance with the USSR, mostly because they saw this as the only realistic way to offer significant assistance to Poland. However, their focus was on practical military cooperation rather than a political deal, which would have provoked too much resistance at home. Hence they sent as their representative a staff officer with good planning skills, instead of a strong political representative.
  
  The British went along but their heart wasn't in it. The problem was that Poland had already categorically refused the idea of having its safety guaranteed by the USSR -- not without good reason, but perhaps insufficiently aware of its own weak position. The British government was reluctant to force an alliance with the USSR on Poland. The admiral they sent to Moscow to negotiate, a worthy person who went into history as Sir Reginald Aylmer Ranfurly Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax, was personally opposed to the agreement. Whether the Stalin knew this or not, he must have realized that London wasn't serious about a deal.
  
  Part of the problem was that after Stalin's purges of the officer corps, the USSR was seen as military very weak, despite some more optimistic reports from visitors. Admiral Drax felt that an alliance with the USSR wasn't worth risking a possible conflict with Spain, which he considered militarily more important. Many people in France and Britain felt the same about Italy. It was regarded as far from certain that Mussolini would side with Hitler in a war -- the French even placed orders for combat aircraft in Italy -- but he was unlikely to ally with Stalin.
  
  Hitler was able to offer Stalin what the French and British could not -- large chunks of Eastern Europe. A continuation of a policy of western expansion that had begun under the Czars, and a restoration of pre-WWI boundaries. From Hitler's perspective, such gifts were probably to be regarded as strictly temporary, but for Stalin it made sense to accept: At the very least it was a buffer zone, and he bought time to prepare for a later conflict.
  
  

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• Message 7

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  Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Thursday, 14th January 2010

  As I think to have understood from Caro's thread (Provoking military action) Allan and Hotmousemat are speaking about some difference of opinions in Britain? Is that the reason for the slow boat, Allan?Β 
  
  Paul,
  
  Please read, if you can the excellent "The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact 1939-41" by Anthony Read and David fisher. Published in 1988 it obviously does not benefit from the opening up of the Kremlin files (which are rapidly closing again) following the fall of Communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union but nevertheless provides siome useful insights.
  
  In particular he describes a meeting between Admiral Sir Reginald Plunkett Ernle-Erle Drax, Chamberlain's appointee as head of the Anglo-French Military Mission to Moscow and Admiral Sir Hugh Sinclair, head of MI6, known as 'C' and also, confusingly, as 'Quex@ in London at the end of July shortly before Drax left for Russia.
  
  "He [Quex] began, in his deceptively gentle voice, by describing what had happened so far in the political talks.
  
  'When they started', he said, 'the Russians were here and the British were here.'
  
  He held his hands about eighteen inches apart.
  
  'Now the Russians are here, and the British are here.'
  
  his right hand, representing Russia, stayed still; his left hand, representing Britain, moved across to within two inches of the right. Drax gained the impression that Quex disapproved of the British flexibility towards the Soviet Union, which was hardly surprising; he had always regarded the Bolsheviks as the prime targets for his organisation's activities, ever since he had taken over as 'C' in 1923. Only very recently had he been forced to start directing his agents against Nazi Germany.
  
  as the conversation continued, it was clear to Drax that certain members of the government were not optimistic about any outcome of the negotiations with the Bolsheviks.
  
  'It's an infernal shame', Quex sympathised, 'that they should send you out to Moscow to try to clear up the mess that has been made there by the politicians.'
  
  This was the first indication he had, Drx recalled later, that the political dimension was not quite as straightforward as he believed. Everyone else, including the British press and politicians, appeared to think that the Russians, however unorthodox and difficult they might be. were eager to reach a satisfactory agreement with the British and French. They, in their turn, were supposed to be keen to stop Hitler. Now Quex was questioning this comfortable scenario, adding an entirely new dimension to his mission."
  
  (Read & Fisher, op.cit. p.130)
  
  You must remember that Chamberlain had been very much forced against his will and better judgment to open talks with the Soviets when it became clear that the paper guarantee he had issued to Poland in April was insufficient to deter Hitler. Privately, he viewed Hitler and Stalin with equal distaste and supported the notion of a strong Germany to prevent the tide of Bolshevism sweeping across Europe.
  
  Right up to the eleventh hour (and indeed past the eleventh hour if you look at his actions, or rather lack of them, until he was firmly disabused by his Cabinet colleagues on the evening of 2 September) he hoped for some fortuitous event such as the replacement of Hitler by the (as he believed) more moderate Goering or the intervention of Mussolini which would rescue hiim from the dilemma of having to make the distasteful choice between Hitler and Stalin. In the event it was Stalin who resolved Chamberlain's difficulty by choosing Hitler himself.
  
  

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• Message 8

  , in reply to message 6.

  Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 14th January 2010

  Hitler was able to offer Stalin what the French and British could not -- large chunks of Eastern Europe.Β  I still don't understand why we need to interprete something that Stalin articulated himself very clearly, but I'l get to it later on.

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• Message 9

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  Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 15th January 2010

  A continuation of a policy of western expansion that had begun under the Czars, and a restoration of pre-WWI boundaries. From Hitler's perspective, such gifts were probably to be regarded as strictly temporary, but for Stalin it made sense to accept: At the very least it was a buffer zone, and he bought time to prepare for a later conflict.Β  Let's start with the last sentence: how does the deletion of a number of countries between two potential adversaries create a buffer zone? The answer is, it does not. Not in our Einstein's Space/Time Continuum, where it is the exact opposite.
  
  Here are some excerpts from the Official Government Instructions sent from Moscow to diplomatic missions of the USSR in the Balkans:
  "The Comitern sent the following official communique to all Communist parties in the Balkans:
  1. Russia has realized that it is time to abandon the tactics adopted by 7th congress of the Comintern in 1933...
  2. The desire of France and England to draw the USSR into peace front... was very disadvantageous to us. We would have helped to rescue Anglo-French imperialism which would have represented an absolute violation of our principles...
  3. Considering the above, the USSR has taken up a program which we will carry out later....The revolutionary activity , which is continuously developing under the guidance of Communist parties in all countries, will prepare a favorable ground for our future intervention. The Communist Party must exploit the difficulties that inevitably will arise in this war begun by the capitalist countries. The party will make the decisions necessary for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat..."(R.Raack, New Information About Stalin's Speech on August 19, 1939)
  

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• Message 10

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  Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 17th January 2010

  Let's start with the last sentence: how does the deletion of a number of countries between two potential adversaries create a buffer zone? The answer is, it does not.Β 
  
  That's a matter of perspective. Poland and the Baltic states were too weak to offer much military resistance to either of the adversaries, and too independently-minded to enter in an alliance or to allow them to station troops there. From the perspective of the two big players, the central European states represented not so much a buffer as a dangerous void -- much like Belgium and Luxemburg on the Western borders of Germany. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact allowed both sides to shift their forces into defensive positions further forward, creating a shield in front of their "home ground". Both parties to the agreement were aware that their industrial centres were vulnerable to attack.
  
  However, that was a secondary consideration. The primary interest of Hitler and Stalin in this deal was territorial. The borders of Poland as created by Versailles were unacceptable not only to the Nazis but in general to conservative Germans, while Stalin was undoing the last remains of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the outcome of the Polish-Soviet war of 1920. For Hitler, this consolidated his credibility with the officer class; for Stalin, it helped to eradicate the memory of his embarrassing failure in 1920.
  
  As for the ideological explanations on offer... Throughout this period, Communist officials and parties everywhere in the world demonstrated an amazing ability to make 180 degree political turns and find excuses for it, whenever Stalin said so. Raw, opportunistic power politics was the dominant factor in the latter's decision making, with ideology firmly in the background. If further opportunities presented itself to expand the power of the USSR, the party and its leader, Stalin would grab them. Meanwhile, his relation with Hitler would be friendly for as long as it was too dangerous to be unfriendly, just as he later showed himself a good ally to the Western powers until Hitler had been defeated.
  
  

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• Message 11

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  Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 17th January 2010

  The primary interest of Hitler and Stalin in this deal was territorial. The borders of Poland as created by Versailles were unacceptable not only to the Nazis but in general to conservative Germans, while Stalin was undoing the last remains of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the outcome of the Polish-Soviet war of 1920.Β  For clarity in this question, I'll quote Theodor Liebknecht, the brother of slain German Communist Karl Liebknecht:
  
  β€œThis was a continuation of Lenin’s Brest policy. Pre-revolutionary secret German-Bolshevik relations had been its basis. The Treaty of Rapallo, secret Soviet-German military cooperation successfully undermining Versailles system, would be its future. The Soviet-German Pact dividing Europe signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop is its apogee. β€˜The line of political relations between Germany and Russia, stretching from Brest-Litovsk to August 23, 1939, and June 22, 1941,… so seemingly convoluted, is actually a completely straight line – the line of a secret agreement, criminal deal!’(Theodor Liebknecht’s Notes) That’s how Theodor Liebknecht, who spent all his life investigating his brother’s murder, finished his diary. (Y. Felshtinsky, Big Bosses)
  

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• Message 12

  , in reply to message 7.

  Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Sunday, 24th January 2010

  Re: Message 7, 6 and 5.
  
  Allan,
  
  excuses for the delay in reply. Thank you very much for the extended response from which I learned a lot. Have the same to say to Mutatis Mutandis and Suvorovetz.
  
  Warm regards to the three of you,
  
  Paul.

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