Wars and ConflictsΒ permalink
Britains Most Humiliating Defeat
This discussion has been closed.
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Message 1.Β
Posted by pc1973 (U13716600) on Thursday, 22nd October 2009
The surrender of Singapore and the Dutch sailing down the Medway and sinking the Royal Navy at anchor are the two that spring to mind.
Anyone else think of any better ones? -
Message 2
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Thursday, 22nd October 2009
Wayne Rooney getting us kicked out of the World Cup?
Any number of Eurovisions?
Sterling's departure from the ERM in 1992?
If you insist on it being a battle, I'd opt for Gazala in 1942. Unlike Singapore, there were no reasons at all why 8th Army should have lost, other than incompetent leadership.
LW -
Message 3
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Thursday, 22nd October 2009
Suez? Ok the military campaign may have technically gone ok,but being threatened with finacial ruin by an superpower who was an ally is pretty humiliating and a sign that your days at the top are over.
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Message 4
Posted by MattJ18 (U13798409) on Thursday, 22nd October 2009
Yorktown...
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Message 5
Posted by U2133447 (U2133447) on Thursday, 22nd October 2009
Hastings 1066, its the last time we were successfully invaded.
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Message 6
Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Thursday, 22nd October 2009
prestonpans
got to be one of the only times british redcoats actually ran away -
Message 7
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Friday, 23rd October 2009
Field of play: 1950: USA 1-0 England.
Field of battle: 1879: Isandlwana. -
Message 8
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Friday, 23rd October 2009
Other way round to you, WC (in more ways than one):
Field of Battle: Yorktown, 1781
Field of Play; Albury, Australia, March 1992. Zimbabwe defeated England by 9 runs in ODI WC after bowling out one of the strongest ODI sides Enfgland have ever put on the field (which would go on to play Pakistan in the final of that competition) for only 125 in the inaugural meeting of the two sides. It was modern cricket's version of Isandhlwana. -
Message 9
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Friday, 23rd October 2009
Of course the defeats in the 1950 football World Cup and the 1992 cricket World Cup refer to England rather than Britain and perhaps should not be included as I'm sure the Scots, Irish and Welsh (although all the latter have appeared in England's cricket side) were pretty pleased about them.
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Message 10
Posted by colonelblimp (U1705702) on Friday, 23rd October 2009
If you insist on it being a battle, I'd opt for Gazala in 1942. Unlike Singapore, there were no reasons at all why 8th Army should have lost, other than incompetent leadership.Β
Arguably, you could say much the same about Singapore. The Japanese were outnumbered by at least three to one on land, and the disaster was largely due to an appalling lack of professionalism. For example, little or no training in jungle warfare was undertaken by the troops on the spot before the outbreak of war in the Far East. No defences were constructed in northern Malaya. The British and Indian troops were outfought at nearly every turn, not because of their own qualities but because of the deficiencies of their commanders. In an attempt to camouflage the army's dire performance (which was due to institutional failings, not the local situation - witness the string of defeats by the Germans in 1940 - 42), the Japanese were attributed with superhuman prowess as jungle fighters which they certainly didn't have.
Alan Brooke wrote a few days later "Cannot work out why troops are not fighting better. If the army cannot fight better than it is doing at present we shall deserve to lose our empire!" - as, of course, we did. -
Message 11
Posted by sunshineandshowers (U13926964) on Friday, 23rd October 2009
Anyone else think of any better ones?Β
How about being best at being worst in Europe at just about everything.
That could not have been easy but we managed it anyway. -
Message 12
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Friday, 23rd October 2009
colonelblimp
That, actually, is my main reason for regarding Gazala as more humiliating than Singapore.
The small pre-war garrison did train in jungle warfare, and fought well. The Indian, Australian and British infantry divisions sent to reinforce were all war-raised and poorly trained before they got to Singapore, and (with the possible exception of the Indian one) were not there long enough to remedy these defects. 8th Australian and 18th British were still disembarking when the Japanese invasion started.
The discrepancy in numbers takes into account the large numbers of base units at Singapore, which were not equipped or organised for tactical operations.
The fact is that the Japanese divisions,being well-trained and combat-experienced, outclassed the majority of their British Commonwealth opponents. Much historical analysis of Singapore unconsciously adopts the racism of the time and assumes that the Japanese were inferior and therefore there were no mitigating factors.
By comparison, 8th Army before Gazala consisted of the best-trained and most experienced divisions in the Army. They were also the best equipped, with superiority in artillery, plenty of 6lbr A/Tk guns (which could knock out any of the German panzers at battlefield ranges) and with a superiority in numbers of tanks that could match or outclass their opposite numbers, especially the Grant. 8th Army was in fact preparing to attack, an offensive that was supposed to clear North Africa before the US arrived.
The fact that this Army, the best Britain could field in 1942, was comprehensively defeated was entirely down to a failure of tactical leadership at almost all levels. What could be done with the manpower and equipment when properly lead was demonstrated at First Alamein, when the remnants of this force managed to stop Rommel in his tracks.
Singapore was a humiliation, and if trained, experienced troops had been sent instead of untrained formations, it might have been different. There was no sensible reason for Gazala, which is why there was such an orgy of sackings at GHQ in the aftermath, and why most of the seniors in 8th Army (notably Ramsden and Lumsden) were living on borrowed time.
I would recommend Carver's "Tobruk" and Barrie Pitt's "Crucible of War: Auchinleck's Command", particularly Carver, on Gazala.
LW -
Message 13
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Friday, 23rd October 2009
It is amazing how you missed one of the most obvious, the battle of Knut during the 1915 British invasion of Iraq with more than 30,000 British troops brought mainly from its eastern forces (India etc.). That was a sizeable army and it should have no problem against an Ottoman army famed for its chronic incompetence and failures (they were only good in pillaging defensless citizens, not at all at fighting). Albeit Ottomans led by an old German general as their consultant, they encircled the British (how can anyone encircle such a sizeable army having only the same size of an army is still a question) and isolated them, cut their supplies to the extend that British started duying of hunger and ilnesses. They finally surrendered and most of them died in Ottoman captivity under famine and torture. Some Pakistanis had joined the Ottomans to escape torture. A great humiliation but then at the end of the day British were reknowned not to care much about the lifes of other "subjects" and tended to waste such armies with no remorse.
On the other hand, Kallipoli was - it seems - a deliberate attempt of the British to self-inflict a loss (the German general consultant present there reveals that by wondering what on earth did British wait for 1 month (= 1 millenia in war terms) outside Dardanelia when they could had just enterred and taken everything... indeed what they would expect other than leave Ottomans the time to defend themselves? So blatant that it even casts shadows on the Knut battle above.
In the WWII there are so many campaigns, again in the region of my interest (Balkans), the British managed to pressure the victorious Greeks to ally with them only to make them loose in 1 second:
Before the British, the Greeks led by president-dictator Metaxas sent a 120,000 force in northern Epirus (currently Albania) and kicked a first 300,000 strong Italian army that only managed to invade 30km into Greek territory (!), then pushed them up in mid-Albania where it held seemingly with ease a huge Italian 550,000 soldiers strong counter offensive (half a million, thus was men, airplanes, cars and such not beans!!!).
Then the British came in sending some 55,000 ANZAC forces (the usual "meat"... remember: in Galipoli it was mainly ANZAC too, not accidental) causing Germans to attack, capture Jugoslavia, then get Bulgaria as ally and attack Greece with a combined force of 45,000 (50% German - 50% Bulgarian - the latter actually very fanatic about it thus much more fearsome and dangerous than the unpassionate Germans)... only to be stopped at the Metaxas-line fortresses by a meager force of 5,000 soldiers and... 2,000 local civilians!!!
So having 120,000 troops in Epirus (not that far, distances are small there) out of which easily 20,000 could be sent to Macedonia (the later the better cos it would just encircle the Germans inside Greece and they would be slaughtered!), having at least other 30,000 forces in south Greece... topped with the practically impregnable Metaxas-line fortresses (other 7,000 there)... on the overall the Greeks could give there nearly 60,000 troops from 3 sides... and add there the 55,000 ANZAC forces well fed, well armed and with high moral (Australians sympathised with Greeks unlike Egyptians and really wanted to fight)... so all that... managed to lose finally against a...
.. a 12,000 strong German mechanised "invasion team" that went down to Athens in two days without resistance to find out that the British had taken the governement days before and had left 1-2 British friendly generals to capitulate (who became German-friendly, then again British-friednly at the end of the day)...
... so British did not manage only to lose big time but they managed to cause others, really victorious armies to lose big time too.... talking about the will to lose! -
Message 14
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Saturday, 24th October 2009
On the other hand, Kallipoli was - it seems - a deliberate attempt of the British to self-inflict a loss (the German general consultant present there reveals that by wondering what on earth did British wait for 1 month (= 1 millenia in war terms) outside Dardanelia when they could had just enterred and taken everything... indeed what they would expect other than leave Ottomans the time to defend themselvesΒ
Well that wouldnt be cricket would it.......
In all seriousness I think that it didnt help that the Admiral in charge simply wasnt up to the job,that Churchill misunderstood the difference in ballistics between a naval 12 inch gun and a howitzer,or that Nelson's maxim should have tattooed on every RN Sea lords arm that "Anybody who attacks a fort is an idiot". -
Message 15
Posted by billy the ball (U2740765) on Saturday, 24th October 2009
If you insist on it being a battle, I'd opt for Gazala in 1942. Unlike Singapore, there were no reasons at all why 8th Army should have lost, other than incompetent leadership Β
By comparison, 8th Army before Gazala consisted of the best-trained and most experienced divisions in the Army. They were also the best equipped, with superiority in artillery, plenty of 6lbr A/Tk guns (which could knock out any of the German panzers at battlefield ranges) and with a superiority in numbers of tanks that could match or outclass their opposite numbers, especially the Grant. 8th Army was in fact preparing to attack, an offensive that was supposed to clear North Africa before the US arrived.
The fact that this Army, the best Britain could field in 1942, was comprehensively defeated was entirely down to a failure of tactical leadership at almost all levels. What could be done with the manpower and equipment when properly lead was demonstrated at First Alamein, when the remnants of this force managed to stop Rommel in his tracks.Β
Gazala battles May26 - June21 1942
Col Bonner Fellers rumbled June 29 1942.
In the vastness of the Western Desert, knowing the enemy's strength and deployment 24 or less beforehand provided a massive advantage.
Strange that without this intelligence, Rommel no longer seemed the superhuman that everyone (even 8th Army soldiers) had believed him to be. -
Message 16
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Saturday, 24th October 2009
billy
Fellers' indiscretions might have helped Rommel with his dispositions and timing of his attack, but they did not affect the tactical battle and 8th Army was not taken by surprise.
I know the details of Rommel's favourite intelligence source have only recently come out and do shed new light on the Desert War, but it is not the answer to everything, anymore than Ultra is.
On the other hand, may be the Fellers fiasco should go down as one of the most humiliating counter-intelligence disasters?
Incidentally, I am not arguing that Singapore was not a tremendous disaster; it was appalling.
I suppose the fact that Gazala did not result in the loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal, whereas Singapore was the loss of a strategic hub, could be used to support the Singapore argument.
But the OP did specify "humiliating" as his criteria. Singapore was humiliating, but it happened when every Allied nation, including the USA, was losing its Far East possessions, and there were contributory factors, known at the time.
The summer of 1942, on the other hand, was Britain's last chance to win a major strategic victory before the USA entered the European war in force. Had the British game plan worked, our hand would have been immeasurably strengthened in strategic discussions with our ally. As it was, Gazala made it appear that Britain simply couldn't win a major battle without the USA, an impression that Alamein only partly reversed. It also made TORCH necessary. So the humiliation of Gazala was, overall, greater than Singapore.
(Now, if you want a really good conspiracy theory, the whole Fellers thing was an American plot to undermine the British and ensure we were reduced to a second-class partner for the rest of the war.....But I'm a "cock-up" rather than a "conspiracy" theorist.)
Cheers
LW -
Message 17
Posted by colonelblimp (U1705702) on Sunday, 25th October 2009
Hi, LongWeekend.
I agree with much of what you say, and maybe Singapore could more aptly be described as "Britain's most catastrophic defeat", rather than "most humiliating". I would argue that it destroyed what remained of Britain's prestige in the Far East (though that process was well down the road anyway, with the inevitable approach of Indian independence), encouraged Australian dependence on the US rather than Britain, and demonstrated once and for all that the UK had ceased to be a world power. So its effect on British prestige has been permanent, while the debacle at Gazala is largely forgotten by those not interested in military history.
I certainly agree that the Japanese divisions totally outclassed the British (by which I also mean Commonwealth and Indian) forces in Malaya but not because they were specially trained in jungle warfare, which was one of the excuses made at the time. Not the least humiliating aspect of the fiasco is that, with 2 years' worth of wartime lessons to draw on, Britain was still fielding such poorly trained troops. The Chief Engineer of Malaya Command later claimed (which may be the operative word, of course) he had advocated in summer 1941 that instruction should be given in jungle warfare to the units then on the spot - and that he had been ignored.
However, as you point out, even our best-trained, best equipped formation was comprehensively defeated at Gazala because of the shocking ineptitude of its commanders at every level. In the absence of an Auchinleck or Montgomery to take command in the field and successfully manage the institutional defects of the British Army by sheer personal ability, there is every reason to suppose that any British troops sent to Malaya, no matter how experienced, would have fared just as badly against the Japanese as 8th Army did at Gazala.
Having said that, whatever their failures of leadership, none of the senior British commanders at Gazala actually ran away - which, to be blunt, is exactly what Gordon Bennett did at Singapore. -
Message 18
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 25th October 2009
colonelblimp
A major part of the problem was that two years into the war, the British Commonwealth did not have the resources for a three front war. The resources that should have already gone to the Far East had been diverted to North Africa (whence a lot of the forces sent east in December 1941 came).
In the middle of 1941, when serious thought was given to reinforcing the Far East, no experienced forces could be spared from Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ Forces or the Middle East. CinC India had resisted sending the war-raised 11th (his best three divisions, and extra brigades having gone to the Middle East)to Malaya because their training was incomplete. This was the reason they weren't given jungle training on arrival; they needed to finish initial training. The division's units fought well initially, but fell apart when they had to do a complicated withdrawal.
The Australian 8th was a similar story. Australia's best-prepared divisions had gone to the Middle East. The Australian Generals Staff had resisted sending the 8th before its training was complete, but the need for more troops in Malaya Command, as a deterrent, made it vital.
For the British, the original plan (mid-41) had been to send either the Regular Army 2nd Division, in India, or 70th (also Regular) from the Middle East, with the war-raised 18th replacing 2nd in India.
But events, and a lack of shipping (which was taking 6th and 7th Australian back to Australia)prevented this, and 18th was sent on to Singapore. 18th had been formed at the beginning of the war, but its units were all new, it had been at the back of the equipment queue and its traiining had been interrupted by diversion to harvesting duties in the months before it deployed.
If the Australian Government had agreed to either the veteran 6th or 7th going to Singapore instead of all the way back to an unthreatened Australia, and the British been able to get 2nd or 70th (the shipping for 70th was carrying 7th Australian)to Singapore, it would probably have been a very different story.
2nd Div went on to be the only wholly British Army division in Slim's 14th Army. 70th was broken up to form the basis of Wingate's Special Force.
As for Gordon Bennett - mentioning that here is a bit like whistling on deck in a storm!
Cheers
LW -
Message 19
Posted by wollemi (U2318584) on Sunday, 25th October 2009
Well...
Gordon Bennett was subjected to both an Army Inquiry and Royal Commission wrt his actions. Both found against him, though in legal terms he was likely defined as an escaping POW. That did not help his career, nor public opinion
More relevant though is these were the only formal inquiries into anything to do with Singapore
2 points:
Australia might have looked 'unthreatened' from 20,000km away but it was being attacked to isolate it from the US and Papua New Guinea invaded to further those attacks. Papua was also Australian territory at that time
How was the training of the troops - or lack of it - responsible for the sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse?
This was the killer blow for the function of Singapore as a naval base
If not the end of Empire, it was the beginning of the end. The British High Command were perceived to be undermining the Pacific War to bolster the European -
Message 20
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 25th October 2009
Wollemi
I knew that would bring you back!
The lack of training of the troops meant the base was lost, which meant it couldn't be used against the Japanese. Important though they were, the Prince of Wales and the Repulse could be replaced - as it was, in April 42, Admiral Somerville was able to bring the (newly repaired) Valiant, four R class battleships, and the armoured aircraft carriers Indomitable and Formidable into the Indian Ocean. Now, if he'd been able to base them on Singapore, that would have been interesting.
Incidentally, how long after they got back from the Middle East did 6th and 7th Divs get back into major combat?
Btw, did you see my thread on history teaching on the other board, would be interested in the view from Oz?
Cheers
LW -
Message 21
Posted by wollemi (U2318584) on Sunday, 25th October 2009
I'm sure I can't convince you, LW but here goes
I notice you haven't mentioned Churchill's grand theft on the high seas when he detoured returning Australian troops off to Burma.
Malaya/Singapore was lost in London. It had already been known for a year that Singapore's defences were poor
The priority for London in December 1941 was to engage the US in the European War, if the the 'colonies' fell they could be regained later
Sure lots of things on the ground could have been done better, including jungle warfare and better leadership, But no, that would not have saved Singapore
Australia should have remained neutral in 1939, and sought an alliance with the US just for the Pacific War. That's after all what eventuated -
Message 22
Posted by Old Hermit (U2900766) on Monday, 26th October 2009
Oh Wollemi. No, no, no!
Despite what you believe, there was no grand betrayal of Australia by the British during the Second World War. Its incredibly naive and foolish to think so.
Australia chose to go to war in 1939 even though Britain had considered that it didn't have to by the Statute of Westminster. The Statute wasn't adopted until 1942 even though it would have given Australia the right to declare war of its own accord or not. Even then it would have been foolhardy to leave Britain to its fate as Australia simply would not have survived if Britain had been invaded. It was in Australia's interest for Britain to survive, hence why Australia did consider itself at war. Australia's economy was wholly dependent on Britain's (especially after Australia initiated a mini-trade war with the US in the 30s), Australia's ONLY military guarantee came from the Royal Navy and Australia's diplomacy was carried out primarily through British channels. If Australia had decided to abandon Britain to its fate in 1939 and Britain had subsequently lost, it would have been a complete and utter disaster.
Look at it this way if Britain had fallen or made peace in 1940 while Australia was neutral. Japan would have found a seriously weakened (even more so than in 1941/1942) imperial power in Malaya and would have seized on the chance to take it. Australia would be left at the mercy of Japanese aggression because you can be sure the Americans would not have pitched in for the survival of Australia alone. Even if Australia was not invaded, the quality of life would have plummetted without British and Commonwealth goods reaching it.
As for the fall of Singapore, it was really lost on both the metropolitan and colonial fronts. The plan for the defence of Malaya (MATADOR) was good in theory but didnt match up with the forces there. There were clashes over who had primary defence of the area between the RN, Army and RAF. The defence was hodge-podged from the beginning as Britain just did not react quickly enough to the Japanese threat. And to be fair, its understandable. If the metropolitan base has a war raging on its door step with the threat of invasion still there and daily and nightly bombing raids, its only natural that resources be concentrated on defending the metropolitan as without that the rest falls apart. -
Message 23
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Monday, 26th October 2009
Interesting post Old Hermit.
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Message 24
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Monday, 26th October 2009
wollemi
We have, of course, sailed round and round this buoy (somewhere west of Ceylon, I think) before.
I can't agree that had the troops been properly trained Singapore would have fallen. Later events showed that properly trained British, Indian and Australian troops were more than a match for the Japanese. A look at the fighting in Malaya shows that the troops fought well enough when static, but could not manoeuvre and co-operate.
I occurs to me, though, that one thing we have never done is consider what would have happened if Prime Minister Wollemi had ousted Menzies and imposed the "Australia First" principle.
I suspect that the realities of not sending troops to the Middle East would have been that Australia would have had to accept the task of garrisoning Singapore. Pressure would have come from the USA - Roosevelt wanted to supply China via the Burma Road and thus did not want British possessions in the area to be too tempting to the Japanese.
The irony of that would have been that an Australian division sent in August 1940 (the great Japanese war scare before the real one) would have had over a year to train, and probably would have done if only to keep it out of Singapore's temptations and would have the pick of Australian commanders.
The outcome in early 1942 might have been very different.
But then you'd have had a naval base, but no Navy
LW -
Message 25
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Monday, 26th October 2009
and how do they teach History in Australia?
It can't all be "I wouldn't have done it this way"
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Message 26
Posted by wollemi (U2318584) on Monday, 26th October 2009
Well we'll never know about Singapore, will we, because there was NO INQUIRY
So the responsibility will continue to fall on Percival, and the troops
There was no inquiry because it would have shown just what a chimera Singapore had been - an imperial folly concocted in London and maintained well past its use by date, by that arch imperialist, Churchill
Old Hermit
Australia must have indeeed been 'foolhardy' in 1939 because both the Opposition and the Head of Defence, Shedden, were against sending the AIF to the Middle East. It was Menzies who made the decision, and shares some responsibility for the parlous state of homeland defences in December 1941.
Pre WW2 Japan was not interested in Australia, it was a '3rd tier' country in its grand design to conquer SE ASia and the Pacific, . Australia was seen only in within the framework of its alliances - with the British Empire and potentially the US after Pearl Harbour
I'm rather chuffed about being elevated to 'president'
I might change a few history texts -
Message 27
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Monday, 26th October 2009
There was no inquiry because it would have shown just what a chimera Singapore had been - an imperial folly concocted in London and maintained well past its use by date, by that arch imperialist, ChurchillΒ
To be fair,if there had actually been a fleet to send to the base rather than the token forcethat actually was sent then things may have been different.The problem was that the RN did not have the capacity to fight in the Atlantics,the Artic,the Med,The Indian Ocean and the Far East.Then again I dont think any Navy in 1941 could have achieved that.
If the RN had the same numbers it had pre Washington Treaty or in late 1918 maybe.In 1941? too stretched -
Message 28
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Monday, 26th October 2009
"President"?
I only made you Prime Minister.
Mind you, if you had seized ultimate power and declared yourself President, your isolationist tendencies would probably have led to the severing of all links with the UK.
Which would mean we would never have got John Pilger and Germaine Greer. Or Skippy. The cultural deprivation we would have suffered.
(Something tells me Barry Humphries and Clive James would have turned up as asylum seekers).
At what point would you have invaded New Zealand?
It is obviously past my bedtime.
Cheers
LW -
Message 29
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Tuesday, 27th October 2009
I picked up an interesting book the othe day. Great Military Disasters. Strangely it only lists one British one, and that was the Charge of the Light Bridage. Singapore and even the first days on the Somme don't rate a mention. The U S though rate 4,Gettysburg Custers Last Stand. Pearl Harbour and Mogadishu (Blackhawk Down) Would you all agree?
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Message 30
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 27th October 2009
GF,
It's all up to the editors' discretion. Where was that book published? -
Message 31
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Tuesday, 27th October 2009
Published by a company called Parragon in 2009 in China.
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Message 32
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 27th October 2009
GF,
Looks like they made their selections from movie DVDs or TV. -
Message 33
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Tuesday, 27th October 2009
The Charge of the Light Brigade was hardly a disaster. A costly mistake, in one small part of a battle that was largely successful.
Singapore really was a DISASTER! (I'll make do with capitals, as don't have a big enough font to do it justice!) Lost a battle, lost an army, lost an Empire. -
Message 34
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Tuesday, 27th October 2009
Some of the disasters listed are interesting.Cannae 216BC
Teutoburg Forest 9B C
Manzikert 1071
Hattin 1187
Agincourt 1415
Lepanto 1571
Spanish Armada 1588
Karansebes 1788
Retreat from Moscow 1812
San Jacinto 1836
Charge of the Light Brigade 1854
Gettysburg 1863
Sedan 1870
Little Big Horn 1876
Adowa 1896
Tsushima 1905
Gallipoli 1915
Caporetto 1917
Pear Harbour 1941
Midway 1942
Stalingrad 1943
Dien Bien Phu 1954
Longewala 1973
Mogadishu 1993 -
Message 35
Posted by Sixtus Beckmesser (U9635927) on Tuesday, 27th October 2009
To return to the original question of Britain's most humiliating defeat. Here are my candidates from the last 200 years (I don't have time to go any further back!)
1. Singapore - I don't think it is possible to overestimate the damage this did to Britain's reputation - it led directly to Indian independence and the loss of empire.
2. Dunkirk - this has been glossed over with the rose-tinted specs of final victory and the legend (not wholly untrue) of national deliverence. But "lest we forget" Churchill's maxim that "Wars are not won by evacuations". Dunkirk was a complete disaster by any stretch of the imagination.
3. Gallipoli. A classic case of marching to the top of the hill and back again. Ill-conceived, ill-planned, ill-thought out and cost the lives of a huge numbers of British and Colonial troops.
4. "Black Week" in the early months of the Boers War (December 1899). The army of the largest empire on earth humiliated by a band farmers, turned irregular mounted infantry at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso in quick succession. The British lost nearly 3000 men, to the Boers' 300. As one officer at Colenso remarked "I never saw a Boer all day".
5. The Failure of the Gordon Relief expedition 1885. The reputation of "our only general", Wolseley, never recovered from the failure by two days to reach Khartoum. not a defeat, but a humiliating failure, due not least to Wolseley's stubborn insistence on applying small scale solutions to a largescale operation (ie: the use of whalers to go up the Nile)
6. Isandhlwana. The total defeat of a modern army in the field, but tribesmen armed with spears. A combination of outrageous overconfidence on the part of the British and brilliant strategy by a highly mobile and well disciplined Zulu army.
7. The Fall of Cawnpore and subsequent massacres. The most signal rebel success in the Indian Mutiny, Cawnpore was the largest garrison station in north central India and its fall acted as petrol on a fire to the Mutiny. The fact that the British garrison had surrendered (on a false promise of safe conduct) was deemed, in hindsight to have added to the humiliation.
8. The First Afghan war. This was the C19th fall of Singapore. The unbeaten British/EIC army was totally destroyed by the Afghans whilst retreating from Kabul in the depths of winter. some 14,000 left Kabul, of whom only one man made it to Jallallabad (Dr Brydon, who later went right through the seige of Lucknow in the Mutiny). The myth of British invincibility was destroyed and the seeds of the Mutiny sown. -
Message 36
Posted by Old Hermit (U2900766) on Tuesday, 27th October 2009
Well, just two critiques on your first two defeats.
Singapore didn't necessarily lead to the independence of India or the loss of Empire at all.
Dunkirk was in effect a success and not a defeat. The preceding campaign in France was the disaster but Dunkirk was a success. -
Message 37
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Tuesday, 27th October 2009
The first, and indeed the second Afghan War was not helped by (as they still do) Factions of the Afghan people deciding which side the bread was buttered on, and changing sides. A case of keep your enemies close, and your (So called) friends even closer.
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Message 38
Posted by Sixtus Beckmesser (U9635927) on Tuesday, 27th October 2009
Hmmmm Old Hermit.
I would take issue with both your "critiques".
The loss of Singapore, like the loss of the French and Dutch colonies in the East Indies was crucial in destroying, once and for all, the myth of European superiority. After the war the colonial powers all tried to resume their colonies, ultimately without success. The fall of Singapore was the writing on the wall, and was surely in the mind of Ho Chi Minh at Dien Bin Phu. of course, the capture of large numbers of Indian troops also led directly to the creation of Bose's Indian National Army which fought with the japanese in Burma against the British (and Indian Army). I think the link is pretty clear.
Regarding Dunkirk, Churchill himself in the House clearly stated that "We must be very careful not to assign to this deliverance the attributes of a victory. Wars are not won by evacuations." (June 4, 1940) For an army to quit the field, leaving behind all its armour and artillery is, by all measures of war, a defeat, and a pretty disastrous one. The rescue of the army by the Royal Navy and the volunteers of the little ships was a remarkable success, but by no possible stretch of the imagination could Dunkirk be seen as a victory. -
Message 39
Posted by Sixtus Beckmesser (U9635927) on Tuesday, 27th October 2009
"The first, and indeed the second Afghan War was not helped by (as they still do) Factions of the Afghan people deciding which side the bread was buttered on, and changing sides. A case of keep your enemies close, and your (So called) friends even closer."
How very true, Fred. A lesson that might readily be learnt by today's commanders in Afghanistan. -
Message 40
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Tuesday, 27th October 2009
Sixtus
The test here is "most humiliating defeat", not "not a victory".
Had the BEF had to surrender en masse, that would have been a humiliating defeat. The fact that the bulk of them got away rescued it from that.
And I don't think you can quote Churchill in support of your contention. His speech is one of the greatest pieces of rhetorical sleight of hand in the English language, on a par with Antony's "I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him" in "Julius Caesar". Whatever the words in cold text, as delivered they convinced his audience at the time that it was some kind of victory, just by being a deliverance.
LW -
Message 41
Posted by Sixtus Beckmesser (U9635927) on Wednesday, 28th October 2009
Our positions are not that opposed, Long Weekend.
I am very happy do describe the Dunkirk evacuations as a remarkably successful "deliverence" in themselves, but how can you possibly describe an action which left the enemy in total possession of the field and in which we lost all our armour and artillery (and much other equipment besides) as a victory?
The mind absolutely boggles! -
Message 42
Posted by FormerlyOldHermit (U3291242) on Wednesday, 28th October 2009
Sixtus,
It may have destroyed the image of European superiority in the Far East but it didn't stop Britain maintaining a Far Eastern presence until the early 70s, with Singapore itself labouring on as a British possession for about two decades after its fall. And Britain did re-assert its control over the Far Eastern possessions successfully. It came back into the region, restored order in its own, the Dutch and the French posessions before handing them back to them. Whilst the Dutch and French were unable to maintain their control in the face of Nationalist movements, Britain successfully nullified nationalist movements on the whole by granting self governance, dominionship and eventually independence. Through the astute use of the Commonwealth and the tacit support of the United States, Britain was capable of maintaining a form of imperial prestige in the Far East until the withdrawal from th East of the Suex which was the product of a home grown economic crisis instead of an imperial problem. As to the independence of India link, it was pretty inevitable considering the problems since the end of the First World War. The Cripps mission in '42 promised independence and the Labour Party had pretty much come round to the idea of Indian independence during the war also. The link between Singapore and the independence of India is a bit strenuous and ignores the pre-war history of the independence movement.
As for Dunkirk, it was a victory because our objectives were fulfilled beyond our expectations. Dunkirk was an evacuation (Operation Dynamo to be precise) and it was a success as the greater part of the British Army was evacuated. -
Message 43
Posted by Sixtus Beckmesser (U9635927) on Wednesday, 28th October 2009
To be honest, I can't be bothered to argue further about Dunkirk, Old Hermit, but I think you are viewing the disaster of May-June 1940 through the rose-tinted spectacles of hindsight.
-
Message 44
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Wednesday, 28th October 2009
RE Dunkirk,
As a campaign the summer of 1940 and the battle of France was an unmitigated disaster.As an operation "Dynamo" was a success,far more men were evacuated than was initially considered possible.
Just my 2 penneth
Vf -
Message 45
Posted by Sixtus Beckmesser (U9635927) on Wednesday, 28th October 2009
Hello VF,
I'm afraid I see Dunkirk in the wider context of the Fall of France. It was the last act of "the Battle of France" as far as the BEF was concerned, rather than a separate action.
At the Battle of Vittoria in 1814, Wellington defeated the French, driving them over the Alps into France and capturing almost all their baggage and artillery. I don't think one would describe that action as a french "success", merely because the rump of the army survived and limped back across the Alps.
I merely apply the same rule to Dunkirk, which remains, in Churchill's famous phrase "a miracle of deliverance" despite being on of this country's greatest defeats.
SB -
Message 46
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Wednesday, 28th October 2009
Sixtus_Beckmesser,
I see your point,if you see Dunkirk "as a part of the whole" then it was a heavy defeat.To add a joker to the pack though.......
Would you consider the Battle of France soley a British humilation or a French one? Gamelin was the "main man" and it was his orders that the allies followed.
Regards Vf -
Message 47
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Wednesday, 28th October 2009
Much more a French Disaster. The BEF was only a detail, and already outflanked by the French disaster at Sedan, so could do little except retreat.
-
Message 48
Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Wednesday, 28th October 2009
the charge of the light brigade
the retreat from mons
arnhem
dunkirk
spion kop
tobruk
isandhlwana
and even bluff cove
these arent strictly defeats in the british phsyche lol
they are glorious defeats where we go down fighting - so they dont count (not sure how the germans would rank these)
singapore had no good bits - a complete capitulation with no redeeming factors
got to be that
st -
Message 49
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Wednesday, 28th October 2009
Sixtus
I don't think you read my post very carefully.
I didn't say it was a victory. Nor, indeed did Churchill. He was very careful to say it shouldn't be given the attributes of a victory. But, like Antony claiming to be pouring oil on troubled water, his words had the opposite effect.
Churchill's ability to tap into the British capacity for self-delusion was just as well. Otherwise we'd have given up and the wrong lot would have won WWII, by two falls and a submission.
The mind might boggle at 70 years distance, but that's the way it was.
Cheers
LW -
Message 50
Posted by Sixtus Beckmesser (U9635927) on Thursday, 29th October 2009
Ah yes, a good call for Arnhem, though the humiliation was chiefly for Monty, the ground having fought like lions.
Mons is an interesting case in that the Army was extricated and preserved whilst retaining its artillery and equipment (unlike Dunkirk, see above). In this respect, it parallels Borodino quite closely: both are bloody encounters which are ultimately indecisive as the nominal "loser" manages to withdraw in good order and preserve their army "in the field". Quatre Bras might be viewed similarly.
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