Wars and ConflictsΒ permalink
RAF leaflet 'raids' of 1939
This discussion has been closed.
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Message 1.Β
Posted by Docbrinsley (U6638310) on Sunday, 18th October 2009
Was there any point at all in the RAF dropping millions of leaflets on Germany in the opening months of WW2? Shouln't we have been bombing Nazi troop positons & armour in Poland instead? or even bombing German ports? etc etc?
Dropping leaflets seems fairly typical of Chamberlains' weak, lilly-livered style of government & war aims (but did he have any though!?)-war aims I mean) -
Message 2
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Sunday, 18th October 2009
There is a famous story that when Sir Kingsley Wood, then Secretary of State for Air, was asked why the RAF didn't drop incendiaries on the Black Forest, a source of timber for constructing invasion barges, he replied:
"Why can't do that, it's private property."
Although it does seem ludicrous to us now in view of how the war later progressed the Government did take legal advice on the status of claims that might be made by insurance companies after th war for war damage and it was told it would have no option but to pay up.
More important than that Chamberlain saw the attack on Poland as part of a reckless gamble by a deranged leader without the support of his generals or his people. He did not see it as part of a deliberate plan of European conquest.
There were no widespread demonstrations of popular enthusiasm in Germany for the war as there had been in 1914. Indeed Hitler himself expressed disappointment with the tepid response of the German people (the enthusiastic response was to come 9 months later after the defeat of France when the aim of reversing WWI seemed to have been achieved - little did they realise that for Hitler the real war was to begin 12 months hence).
This led Chamberlain to believe that the German people were opposed to the war and would sooner or later, with the help of the German Army, overthrow Hitler. Therefore the less that was done by the Allies to antagonise them by aerial bombing which would inevitably produce civilian casualties the better.
Also there was a widespread fear of the effects of aerial bombing in this country by both the government and the public generally and Chamberlain did not want to give the Luftwaffe an excuse for massive retaliation by bombing Germany first.
Chamberlain's strategy relied on the power of the Royal Navy to enforce a blockade on Germany which had proved effective in WWI (although only after 4 years) in collapsing the German economy resulting in a change of government that had sued for peace. Chamberlain mistakenly believed that the German economy was weaker than it was in 1918 and that Hitler had been partly driven into attacking Poland because of the weakness caused to the economy by the rearmament drive of the previous 6 years.
What Chamberlain ignored were the economic agreements between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union which more than made up for the loss of resources from the British naval blockade.
As far as aid to Poland was concerned the principle obstacles were logistical. We had few, if any, long-range bombers that could fly that far and return safely (given that they couldn't cross hostile German or neutral Scandinavian airspace). Aid could only be delivered via the Soviet Union which had allied itself with Germany as far as Poland was concerned and invaded 16 days after Hitler.
Very similar problems were faced when the Western Allies wished to help the Polish Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ Army during the Warsaw Uprising of August 1944 but were denied landing and refuelling rights on Soviet territory until it was too late to make any difference (although some flights were made from Italy). It also proved impossible to help the Finns when they were attacked by the Soviet Union even though there was a large groundswell of public opinion in both Britain and France to do so and the Daladier Government collapsed as a result in January 1940. -
Message 3
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Sunday, 18th October 2009
Apologies, "why" in the Kingsley Wood quotation should, of course, have read "we". He supposedly followed it up with:
"You'll be asking me to bomb Krupps' factory next!"
Wood was a close political associate of Chamberlain, having been his PPS and following him into the offices of Postmaster-General and Minister of Health during the inter-war period. However he redeemed himself somewhat by taking Chamberlain aside, after the latter had announced his intention of staying on as PM following the assault on the West on 10 May 1940, and telling him that this course of action was totally unacceptable and that he should resign at once and recommend Churchill as his successor. Churchill was appointed later that evening and Wood was rewarded with the post of Chancellor of the Exchequer (although not always in the War Cabinet). Wood died in office in September 1943. -
Message 4
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 18th October 2009
I would agree generally with Allan's analysis.
In fact, in 1939 Bomber Command could not reach Polish territory (indeed, even in 1944 it was problematic)and even if the aircraft could have got that far, finding and hitting worthwhile targets would have been difficult to the point of impossibility.
Both sides expected that unrestricted bombing would eventually happen, and that its results would be devastating (in fact, much worse than occurred). The French expected the bulk of such attacks to fall on them and wished to delay the moment. The RAF was still building up both the bomber force and the fighter, gun and radar defences of the UK and saw also advantage in delay.
In addition, both sides were keenly aware of the importance of US official and public opinion and neither wanted to be the instigators of civilian bombing.
The principal benefit of the leafleting campaign over the winter or 39/40 was the experience it gave Bomber Command and the boffins of the difficulties of operating at night in blackout conditions, at altitude in winter weather (some of the accounts are harrowing) over enemy territory, at a time when enemy defences were rudimentary.
LW -
Message 5
Posted by JB on a slippery slope to the thin end ofdabiscuit (U13805036) on Monday, 19th October 2009
Also, leaflets were just about all the Battles and Blenhiems could carry. Bomber Command in 1939 was quite pathetic and even when it was built up by 1941 it was still functionally useless being unable to get its bombs on the target at night and unable to get near the target in daylight.
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Message 6
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Monday, 19th October 2009
JB, you forget that the Wellington was in service in 1939, and indeed carried out the first bombing raid of the war. It had a good bomb load for its time, and could (And did) reach Berlin.
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Message 7
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Monday, 19th October 2009
"...Although it does seem ludicrous to us now in view of how the war later progressed the Government did take legal advice on the status of claims that might be made by insurance companies after th war for war damage and it was told it would have no option but to pay up..."
Are you sure that this is true ?
I can't think of a war where enemy civilian property was not seized or destroyed. A forest is, I would think, rather difficult to actually destroy, even now. Seen with that in mind, Sir Kingsley Wood's reply is more of a quip, a rebuttal of a silly idea.
My understanding was that the British government took a rather 'robust' view of damage to private property.
This link shows British policy in 1939, which was to avoid civilian targets IF Germany did the same. Rather famously, they did not.
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Message 8
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Monday, 19th October 2009
Tim Track
I think the other factors, particularly the need to be seen not to be the one to start the bombing, were more important, but the question of property rights was considered, as Allan noted.
Kingsley Wood's remark in the House was probably intended to quell an unwelcome discussion, rather than to represent the totality of Government bombing policy, but he let the remark stand despite criticism.
Bloodthirsty rhetoric was good for home consumption, but it did not play well with the key audience of the USA and almost all decisions in the first few months of the war were taken with that audience in mind. Both the UK and France had recognised they needed US industrial resources on their side, and Germany knew she needed to keep the USA as neutral as possible (the pre-war Neutrality Acts were to Germany's advantage, "cash and carry" a victory for the Allies, Lease-Lend in 1941 even more so).
Your reference, incidentally noted that Germany btried to excuse the bombing of Warsaw as a "defended city" (and therefore a legitimate military target). They tried to use the same rationale about London in September 1940. -
Message 9
Posted by Docbrinsley (U6638310) on Monday, 19th October 2009
Hi LW, Thanks for you comments. I wonder though couldn't RAF bombers take off from French airfields to bomb German positions/communications etc? Taking off from eastern France would have perhaps brought them into range of the then front line
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Message 10
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Monday, 19th October 2009
Doc
Use of bases in north-eastern France would, theoretically, have given the Whitleys and Wellingtons the reach, with a reduced bombload. There would still have been the problem of finding a worthwhile target once you got there; no nightvision equipment and LGBs in 39/40.
But permission from the French authorities would not have been forthcoming; they were concerned about reprisals. The British and French governments had agreed this policy. Even once the land war had started and permission was given for the RAF to use such bases, there were instances of local commanders or even local civilians obstructing runways so RAF bombers could not take off.
LW -
Message 11
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Monday, 19th October 2009
I should perhaps add that the authorities, and the populace, expected the effects of bombing to much worse than they turned out to be, so their reluctance is understandable.
There was also the hope that a negotiated peace would somehow prove possible, especially if the USA could be persuaded to intervene. There was a fairly narrow window for this, as 1940 was an election year and both British and French diplomats, based on the experience of the Great War believed no US intervention happen in that year, but it was worth a try, given the alternatives.
LW -
Message 12
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Monday, 19th October 2009
Leaflet raids were not totally abandoned later on in the war. The 7 leaflets for which Sophie and Hans Scholl and the other members of the White Rose Society were executed in 1943 when they tried to distribute them around Munich University were smuggled out to the West, reprinted and dropped in large quantities over German cities by British and American aircraft.
This was at least one Allied contribution to the German Resistance to Hitler and the Nazis and a suitable way of commemorating some very courageous, if rather reckless, people. The leaflet drop provides the last scene of the recent German film, "Sophie Scholl, the Last Days". -
Message 13
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Tuesday, 20th October 2009
I can remember reading an account where a disgruntle memeber of an aircrew made sure that the leaflets made some sort of lethal device by dropping them whilst contained in their sacks!
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Message 14
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Tuesday, 20th October 2009
VF
I think it was still in their bundles, rather than sacks - diffricult to get a sack down a flare chute.
Dumping them still in bundles must have been common. Getting the binding off meant taking off flying gloves, risking frostbite, and if an unwrapped bundle was dropped inside the aircraft, the leaflets got everywhere (which could be a hazard if they got into the cockpit) and were difficult to clear up, especially as they would be soggy lumps by the time the aircraft was back on the ground at base.
Aircrew morale probably was not helped by certain senior officers (including Harris, then commanding a Group) making no secret of the fact they regarded leafleting as a waste of effort.
I'm not sure Battles and Blenheims did leafleting, unless they leafleted German positions along the Franco-German border. But leaflets were delivered by all sorts of means, down to 25lbr shells.
LW -
Message 15
Posted by JB on a slippery slope to the thin end ofdabiscuit (U13805036) on Thursday, 22nd October 2009
Wellingtons were good bombers for 1939/40, but they could not bomb accurately at night and any sustained use against large cities, the only target they could hit, would have seen them shot out of the skies on a nightly basis even with their remarkable battle damage capacity.
The background to it all was the existence of the RAF as a separate service, much to the annoyance of the War Office and Admiralty who argued that there was no strategic role for aircraft which could be best used to support ground forces.
The likes of Trenchard and Harris had to devise and impliment their own campaign in part out of a desire to keep their service free of Army & Navy control. The concept of strategic bombing was eventually implimented to devastating effect with 4-engine heavies, but there is a powerful argument that such effort would have been better spent protecting convoys. -
Message 16
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Thursday, 22nd October 2009
Wellingtons were good bombers for 1939/40, but they could not bomb accurately at night and any sustained use against large cities, the only target they could hit, would have seen them shot out of the skies on a nightly basis even with their remarkable battle damage capacity.Β
In 1939-1940 the Luftwaffe's night-interception capability wasn't much better than the RAF's. Arguably the Germans had somewhat better radar systems, but their night-fighting force consisted of a few squadrons of obsolete single-seat fighters without special equipment. The Luftwaffe had confidence in its anti-aircraft guns and indeed had an excellent AA gun in the 88-mm, but given the relative ineffectiveness of AAA, they would have needed a vast number of them to shoot down a significant number of bombers. It was late 1942 before the German defences posed a significant threat to a night bomber.
The problem was more that, with the RAF's misguided confidence in the sextant and dead reckoning, its bombers already found it problematic to find and hit a large city.
The concept of strategic bombing was eventually implimented to devastating effect with 4-engine heavies, but there is a powerful argument that such effort would have been better spent protecting convoys.Β
Not 'such effort' -- if Harris had been willing to release a handful of modern bombers and radar sets to Coastal Command, with a negligible impact on his own operations, the losses to U-boats would have been much reduced. -
Message 17
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Thursday, 22nd October 2009
Mutatis_Mutandis,
... if Harris had been willing to release a handful of modern bombers and radar sets to Coastal Command, with a negligible impact on his own operations, the losses to U-boats would have been much reduced.Β
Were level-flight heavy bombers at all effective in ASW attacks or any other naval warfare? The only case in which I've read anything was the B-17 attacks on some Japanese transports early in the Battle of Midway. The pilots claimed direct hits but the Japanese said they hit only the ocean. -
Message 18
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Thursday, 22nd October 2009
"if Harris had been willing to release a handful of modern bombers and radar sets to Coastal Command, with a negligible impact on his own operations, the losses to U-boats would have been much reduced."
This is one of the great RN whinges, but it is not true.
Although in 1941 the Bomber Command OCUs produced enough crews, and the factories produced enough aircraft, to expand the Command by 50%, in fact its strength stood still, because of the diversion of resources to the overseas theatres and Coastal Command. But the RAF had been tasked by the War Cabinet in 1940 to carry out a strategic bommber offensive as its main effort.
The bombers diverted had great effect (apart from actual U-boat sinkings, their presence forced the U-boats to submerge and break off attacks). This greatly reduced U-Boat attacks in the areas covered by air patrol.
But the bombers had been built to carry bombs to Berlin, not cross the Atlantic, ans as a result there was a gap in mid-ocean covered neither by air or by surface escorts.
There were two answers to this; the big Fleet destroyers and a long range aircraft. The Royal Navy did not want to divert these destroyers from more high-profile tasks. The RAF did not want to divert UK bomber production to maritime, partciularly as, in the case of an aircraft,the solution already existed in the form of the Liberator Mk.1.
Unfortunmately, at the time of crisis at the beginning of 1942, there was a shortfall in supply, as the two US services, having entered the war, begaqn an argument over allocation of these aircraft.
It is a factthat the RAF prioritised the bomber force and was slow to convert Liberators,but it is also a fact that the RN would not release its destroyers.
Harris, and the Air Staff, did resist further diversions of aircraft, particularly after the RN reneged on the agreement that Coastal Command aircraft could be used for one-off major bombing operations over OP MILLENIUM, the 1000 Bomber raid on Cologne. It would appear the Naval Staff were afraid that if it was too successful, Churchill would give the bombers back to Bomber Command (this was the reason Harris ahd to use OCU crews to make up his magic number). The upshot was that the Air Staff were confirmed in their fear that any squadrons diverted to Coastal Command (under RN operational control) were gone for good.
While the Atlantic battle was vital for Britain's survival, it couldn't win the war. That would require offensive action, and both the destroyers and the bombers were part of their respective Service's main offensive force. (Incidentally, Bomber Command was hitting U-boat production in its raids)
Ultimately, the answer was the new large escort frigates and escort carriers, combined with Liberators, which came on stream in increaswing numbers from the end of 1942.
The RAF could have produced more maritme Liberators in early 1942, but equally, the RN could have release more Fleet destroyers, and the RN had prime responsibility for the Atlanticbattle.. As usual, the finger is pointed at the mote in the other chap's eye, not the beam in their own.
it was, of course, the Merchant Marine that suffered worst. -
Message 19
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Thursday, 22nd October 2009
Were level-flight heavy bombers at all effective in ASW attacks or any other naval warfare? The only case in which I've read anything was the B-17 attacks on some Japanese transports early in the Battle of Midway. The pilots claimed direct hits but the Japanese said they hit only the ocean.Β
The B-17s at Midway were attacking from medium altitude -- 8,000 ft or higher -- against targets that had time to take evasive action. Japanese doctrine in such cases was to wait until the bombs had been dropped, then put the helm hard over. The B-17s did not only attack the transports: A famous series of pictures shows the Japanese carriers under attack from the B-17s, and especially Soryu making a high-speed full circle.
Effectiveness on ASW missions was much better. Not only because the U-boats were much more vulnerable to bomb damage than a large warship or transport, but because they could be surprised on the surface while changing batteries. At night a large aircraft, approaching at low altitude with the engines throttled back, could surprise a U-boat crew and release it depth charges before the crew had time to react.
To make this work, of course, the aircraft had to be able to find the U-boat. Although U-boats had to travel through the Bay of Biscay on their way to their hunting areas, that area was still so large that visual patrolling resulted only in infrequent sightings. Therefore the debate was not only about aircraft, but also about radars, as the supply of radar sets was limited -- especially the centimetric radars.
Fighting the U-boat war was all about taking away the options the U-boats had one by one. At first they ran at the surface at night to recharge their batteries, but patrols by radar-equipped aircraft removed that option. The alternative was to run at the surface in daylight, so that they could see aircraft approach, but then they had to choose between making an emergency dive and staying at the surface and fight it out with their light AAA. The first option still allowed the aircraft to make one unopposed attack run, the second allowed the aircraft to call in surface ships to deal with the U-boat.
In the end Allied surface ships and aircraft shared about evenly in the destruction of U-boats: 264 and 250 respectively, plus 37 shared. The air raids on ports that Harris offered as an alternative destroyed only 43. -
Message 20
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Thursday, 22nd October 2009
"only 43"? But that is 43 that never got the chance to sink any Allied shipping, unlike a high proportion of the ones sunk at sea.
It also doesn't take into account the ones never produced because of the bombing of factories. To take one certifiable example, the Blomm and Voss yard in Hamburg from June 1944 had a target of 13 prefabricated U-boats a month. It averaged five. That is 80 U-boats that never went to sea.
Harris did not just offer to bomb the U-boats in port (indeed, until the Grand Slam and Tallboy came along, he thought bombing the concret pens a waste of time). He argued that further diversion of Bomber Command squadrons was unnecessary, and they would be contributing to the U-boat war by destroying U-boat production along with evrything else.
Indeed, the argument is sterile, as the peak of U-boat sinkings - 43/44 - coincided with the peak of strategic bombing - there was no longer a need for diversion of bomber squadrons. The crisis point had been early 1942, and further diversion of bombers then would not have helped as they did not have the range to close the Atlantic Gap.
The trouble with a lot of people on the surface is that if they cannot actually see an aeroplane, they can't believe airpower is making an contribution. It is always easier to blame the other service. -
Message 21
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Thursday, 22nd October 2009
Ultimately, the answer was the new large escort frigates and escort carriers, combined with Liberators, which came on stream in increaswing numbers from the end of 1942.Β
Isnt the point about some of the destroyers is that they were not really up for the task itself?If you look at the "Tribals" they have a big anti surface armament,likewise the "J" and "K" class.They were not particulaly well protected from aircraft either.The RN I think recognised this by building the "Flower" class corvettes,but they were two small.They went on to build the "Hunts" but cocked up the figures meaning that they ended up overweight (read DK browns "Nelson to Vanguard - it explains that the designers got a crucial set of somes wrong)
.You only really see the successful designs come along with the "Black Swan","Loch" and "Captain" class vessels.The RN did get the "Hunts" right by the Mk IV version but they were quite expensive.
Unfortunatley the RN seemed to still have an eye on the "battleline" in the 20's and 30's which is why I think that you see the destroyers built more for protecting the fleet and for sinking other countries battleships.I think it was in the "World at War" that an ex RN commander commented that "we seemed to forget the rules of the game and cast aside all the lessons we had learn in the previous war" (or something alomg the lines of that
) -
Message 22
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Friday, 23rd October 2009
VF
They were not optimised for anti-submarine warfare, but they didn't need to be.
The crucial thing was, they had the range to accompany convoys the whole way. They also had good speed for interceptions, a decent capacity for depth charges (and the guns could come in handy against surfaced U-boats, at a time when they mainly attacked while surfaced), functioning ASDIC, good communications and room for things like radar and RDF.
Poor AA armament wasn't a priority in mid-Atlantic.
And the RN could be certain that they could get them back at need (unlike the RAf with its bombers). They had done it before, in early 1940, when the destroyers had been emphasising anti-submarine work, but when then brought back to the Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ Fleet in case of an invasion (there is a surge in merchant sinkings that matches this reallocation of effort).
LW -
Message 23
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Friday, 23rd October 2009
Hi Longweekend
The crucial thing was, they had the range to accompany convoys the whole wayΒ
Some did,some didnt.The older destroyers did struggle with the range.A number of the older V and W's had boilers removed and some armament removed to enable them to carry sufficient fuel.
Poor AA armament wasn't a priority in mid-AtlanticΒ
I suppose I was dilluting the waters (no pun intended) by mentioning this,I was trying to highlight the the DNC had pre war designed, ships that were optomised for surface action as DK Brown (who was a Naval Constructor) put it:
"British ships designed between the wars were designed for a fleet action in the North Sea or Mediterranian.This led to requirements for a heavy torpedo armament,low silliuette,small size and short endurance"
He goes on to say that
"Almost all the postulates proved wrong and war found them inadequate in endurance,anti aircraft and anti submarine armament and resistance to damage".
This is not to decry what the RN and the men achieved,its just to highlight,that in hindsight the destroyers had been designed with a focus on the surface action rather than the ASW.But then the RN didnt expect France to fall the way she did with its respective opening up of the French ports to the Germans.
I dont disagree with you that they were better than nothing,only that they were not the ideal craft for the job.Interesting the ideal design in 1945 was considered a ship that
Could do 25knts in rough weather,
Double "Squid":later "Limbo",
Good turning circle,
Twin 4.5 gun
Easy to build.
Eventually these ship were produced ast the Type 12 frigates ! -
Message 24
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 25th October 2009
VF
The Admiralty probably used that in their defence - the escorts most useful to close the Gap were also the most capable for Fleet actions. And they had lost around 60 destroyers in 40/41.
As you say, the late-war dedicated anti-submarine frigates were the answer in terms of surface escorts, but at the beginning of '42 they were some way off.
It would also have helped if Admiral King hadn't pulled every USN destroyer out of the Atlantic after Pearl Harbor, leaving five USCG cutters as his contribution!
LW -
Message 25
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Monday, 26th October 2009
The Admiralty probably used that in their defence - the escorts most useful to close the Gap were also the most capable for Fleet actions. And they had lost around 60 destroyers in 40/41.Β
Quite,you still have to have ships available to escort fleets.Now given that the newer ships (Thinking Tribals,J,K,L,M's) had been designed with that role in mind and the fact that it would bean extremely risky venture to send even a cruiser out on its own I suppose I can understand the rational in the RN's thinking.That they lost so many isnt that suprising as the RN destroyers main armament was limited in its AA capability,the mounts,even on the newer ships was only 40 degree's elevation.This is why you see ships like the Tribals lose an original mont for a high angled model and the J's lose a set of torpedo tubes.The RN has supposed that it would be extremely difficult to sink a small ship by bombing.Unfortunately they got it wrong.
Given this it made more sense to modify the older vessels such as the "V" & "W"s and the "A" to "I" class to a ASW role.They were even more badly equiped for AA defence than their newer bretherin,they were more aged and more likely to suffer from maintenece issues from high speed steaming if used as fleet escorts. They,as you point out didnt have to worry so much about aircraft and high speed wasnt so much of an issue as your average convoy was unlikely to be belting along at the speed of a battlegroup.Therefore they could afford to lose a bit of speed(by removing boilers) and surface/AA armament for extra fuel tanks and depthcharges.
It would also have helped if Admiral King hadn't pulled every USN destroyer out of the Atlantic after Pearl Harbor, leaving five USCG cutters as his contribution!Β
From what Ive read about Admiral King he was rabidly anti british so that doesnt suprise me in the slightest!Wasnt one of the "happy times" for the U-Boats down to the fact that the US didnt practice the lessons the British had learnt in the previous 2 years?
Regards Vf
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