Wars and ConflictsΒ permalink
Why do large armies meet?
This discussion has been closed.
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Message 1.Β
Posted by elderberry (U13512571) on Saturday, 17th October 2009
What are the various reasons for armies clashing in large, set-piece battles? I ask because I wonder if armies have ever met just for the convenience of the generals, or even for their sport, or other non-strategic reasons.
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Message 2
Posted by LairigGhru (U5452625) on Saturday, 17th October 2009
Because their leaders really, really want to win, and that is how force is best applied.
I can't think of any battle that was fought for a trivial reason. It is life and death after all. -
Message 3
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Saturday, 17th October 2009
Sometimes by accident, but usually because at least one of them wants to!
Armies do blunder into each other sometimes, and an 'encounter' battle develops, when neither of them really knows where the other is, or what they are trying to do.
Usually some commander decides 'if I have to fight, this would be a good place to do it', and either attacks there, or stands there till he is attacked, or tries to con his enemy into doing what he wants.
The guys who are good at that often win! -
Message 4
Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Saturday, 17th October 2009
strange question
because that is what a war is about - if france and england go to war - at sometime the armies of france and england will have to fight - how else will the war be decided ??
i love the "armies blundering " bit -
what about Isandhlwana - the zulu army wasnt going to fight on a dead moon so they had a rest day - couple of beers - quick draw of snuff etc lol
british scouts came across 20000 warriors resting up in a donga (ravine sort of thing)
when they were spotted the entire zulu army leapt to its feet and spilled over the plain into a very messy battle - no orders were given - they just went for it
that is one of the "I would have liked to have seen" moments
st -
Message 5
Posted by elderberry (U13512571) on Saturday, 17th October 2009
Sat, 17 Oct 2009 20:20 GMT, in reply to stalteriisok in message 4
how else will the war be decided ??Β
Guerilla warfare; or by avoidance, such as the Romans did quite effectively against Hannibal. -
Message 6
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Saturday, 17th October 2009
Battles are costly and risky, and intelligent commanders will decide fight a battle only if they have a goal in mind which they can only achieve by giving battle. The goal must be important enough, to both sides, to make it worth the effort of concentrating a large force and perhaps losing it. Motivations for battle vary widely, but I think we can identify a number of important categories; only rarely is the battle a goal in itself.
A traditional reason for bringing a large force into the field for a battle is to lift a siege. The besieged point might be a city, a castle, or simply high ground. It must be important enough to justify both a substantial siege force and a strong force attempting to lift the siege. A good example of this is the Battle of Vienna in 1683, in which a Polish and Imperial army fought the Ottoman siege army. In modern times the increasing power of artillery meant that armies often clashed at greater distance of the points they sought to defend, and cities and fortifications lost something of their importance in favor of high ground and "strategic resources" such as oil.
Armies may also seek battle to defend or take a road, bridge, waterway, mountain pass, or other supply line. This overlaps with the previous category as the important points on the supply line might well be marked by cities or fortifications, but that is not necessarily the case. Thermopylae was, after the famous battle against the Persians in 480 BCE, the location of a whole series of battles, until WWII.
This again overlaps with perhaps the most modern reason for battle: Simply to seek the destruction of large numbers of enemy forces. A condition for this is that the enemy cannot avoid battle, either because that would make his position too vulnerable, or because you control his way out. Agincourt in 1415 was fought for this reason; the French Army blocked the road between Henry V's army and the (English-held) city of Calais.
From this the next step is the battle for political supremacy. Its original form is the direct clash between the armies of two leaders, in which the winner is assumed to have God on his side. Bosworth in 1485 is a good example: I think both sides must have gone into battle on the assumption that the winner would be king. But even in modern times, battles may be fought to achieve mostly political ends: The Falklands campaign of 1982 was, for both sides, motivated primarily by political goals more than the worth of anything that was being fought over.
More complex variations of the latter two types are produced by coalition warfare, as demonstrated by the campaign of Napoleon. The French emperor profited from the lack of coherence of the series of coalition against him, either by attempting to defeat the opposing armies one by one before they could join, or by offering battle in the hope of bouncing on or more of his enemies out of the war.
As a final category we have what on could call the battle of protection: The goal of that is to stop the enemy before he can lay waste to large tracts of territory, often undefended countryside. Perhaps there have not been so many of those, rulers often being indifferent towards the suffering of the peasants, but at times this has been a motivation to try to stop invading armies. The best example I can think of was the so-called Gugler War in the 14th century, in which the French tried to get rid of the mercenaries that were plundering their countryside, by leading them to Switzerland to continue their activities there. The Swiss fought a number of successful small battles to defend their country.
Of course battles can be fought for a complex mixture of reasons. Stalingrad in 1943 began as a battle for a strategic city on the Wolga river, but then became a battle for the survival of the German 6th Army, and was influenced throughout by Hitler's fear that abandoning Stalingrad would affect his political prestige.
All that said, there certainly have been cases in which battle have been precipitated, not by military necessity, but by the desire of the commanders to enhance their careers (or at least to prevent the rapid decline of their careers). The most notorious example if it is a sea battle: Admiral Villeneuve took his Franco-Spanish fleet to sea and to the battle of Trafalgar in 1805, because he was informed that his displeased emperor had sent a replacement commander, who could arrive any day. -
Message 7
Posted by elderberry (U13512571) on Sunday, 18th October 2009
Great answers, thanks.
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Message 8
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Sunday, 18th October 2009
One of the best examples of two armies 'blundering' into each other must be the Battle of Gettysburg in 1863 where both armies descended on a shoe and boot warehouse in search of replacement footwear for their infantry.
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Message 9
Posted by elderberry (U13512571) on Sunday, 18th October 2009
Sun, 18 Oct 2009 19:50 GMT, in reply to Allan D in message 8
I read that in fact there was no shoe factory or warehouse in Gettysburg, and that this story is a myth. -
Message 10
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 18th October 2009
quotes
whether or not they were there, that was the reason Confederate forces entered the area.
The fundemental reason large battles happen is that one force is intending to get to somewhere,and the other force wants to stop them. The purpose of the battle may be to destroy the enemy army, but you have to create a reason for that army to oppose you at that point.
Encounter battles do occur, but even then the two sides are normally already sparring with each other with some strategic objective as the focus.
At Gettysburg, the Army of Northern Virginia were seeking to create a threat to Washington that would force the Army of the Potomac to give battle in unfavourable circumstances. At Quatre Bras, Napoleon was creating a threat to Brussels in order to split his opponents. Meade was lucky that (thanks to Buford)he was able to occupy favourable ground at the point of contact. Wellington was also fortunate (although careful recce had a lot to do with it) that he had the Mont St Jean position further along the Brussels road to fall back on.
If the threat is not big enough, the enemy won't react. The French sortie into the Saar at the beginning of the war was a case in point. the Germans knew it was a sham, so didn't react with more than screening forces. Similarly, the Wehrmacht command decided fairly quickly in August 1944 that Patton's great sweep to the East was not the main threat (it was going too far east to threaten the immediate approaches to the Reich) so concentrated on thickening up the defences against 2nd (BR) Army and 1st (US)Army.
Commanders do not fight major battles on a whim; too much is at stake. You might have more luck looking for incidents of more junior commanders winding something up for their own aggrandisment. For instnace, there have been claims that some US commanders in Vietnam would mount ad hoc operations if they were to be visited by senior generals or delegations from Congress (for instance, in Michael Herr's "Dispatches").
LW -
Message 11
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Sunday, 18th October 2009
Quite right, q, the story seems to have surfaced in Harry Heth's memoirs to explain how he blundered into Buford's cavalry at Gettysburg. It seems that Lee had ordered the Confederate armies to converge on Gettysburg, a major crossroads, by July 1 but the Army of the Potomac, or at least elements of it, beat them to it. No shoes, but still a "blunder". Thanks for the correction.
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Message 12
Posted by hotmousemat (U2388917) on Monday, 19th October 2009
An interesting question! One that asks you to try to generalise about so many different historical periods. Here is my effort:
Generally speaking, a strong force will beat a weaker force more easily (i.e. at less cost) and more comprehensively than if the two sides are equally matched. It is therefore important not to let an equally sized enemy come on your forces while they are scattered and defeat them 'in detail'.
The reason for this is mainly that it is very difficult to withdraw when under pressure from the enemy. The attackers will take many casualties, but if they can turn the defenders out of their position they will then inflict far more damage. A 'fighting retreat' that keeps order and safeguards the unit's supplies etc. is very difficult. In other words, you should try to avoid any engagements you are ultimately going to lose!
And if you do lose a big set-piece, evenly matched battle, at least your enemy is also likely to be disordered and so you have a chance of getting some of your forces away.
(Of course, it is all easier said than done. You cannot move a big force as one unit, it is more difficult to supply, you are likely to have several tasks to do at once and so on.) -
Message 13
Posted by Grand Falcon Railroad (U3267675) on Monday, 19th October 2009
To attack & capture a defined strategic target in the main - however if you look at Stalingrad, many large armies met but the actual fighting for the main happened with small units in the end.
I think the word "large" is pretty vague though.
Maybe on "blind" or "blundering" how many ships met an end without search radar and just ran into a single larger unit that promptly blew them out of the water? -
Message 14
Posted by elderberry (U13512571) on Monday, 19th October 2009
Mon, 19 Oct 2009 14:26 GMT, in reply to hotmousemat in message 12
Generally speaking, a strong force will beat a weaker force more easily (i.e. at less cost) and more comprehensively than if the two sides are equally matched. It is therefore important not to let an equally sized enemy come on your forces while they are scattered and defeat them 'in detailΒ
Yes, so if you have a large force of your own, the last thing you want to do is to put them up against another large force. Much better to have them deal with a number of smaller forces; hence the OP. -
Message 15
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Monday, 19th October 2009
stalteriisok
that is one of the "I would have liked to have seen" momentsΒ
From which point of view? -
Message 16
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Monday, 19th October 2009
Armies rarely meet up at an appointment. As it is usual, one attacks, the other defends. The attacker either wants to impose his own will, or just invade and take chunks or the whole of the defender's territories. The defender at some point will have to defend. This will lead to clashes. In general it is mainly the attacker that wants pitched battles.
Now say the attacker has around 100,000 men and the defender around 60,000. For them to avoid "battle-size violent meetings" the attacker will have to split his men into groups of smaller than 1000 men and spread them in a large territory. However this is a strategy which is very risky as locally these small forces might not have the "upper hand" while they will not be able to have any equipment or provisions with them. Unless they are self-reliant (and few armies were so - Mongolians and Alexander's army one of the very few), their needs will rise to an unsolvable logistical problem. Let alone co-ordination chaos.
Therefore, the only case that this happened was with the 1) Mongol armies - consisting only of cavalry, fast and flexible enough to permit co-ordinated attacks by small gangs of 100-300 men on a wider territory terrorising mainly virtually unarmed civilians and generally avoiding pitched battles with the enemy army (Romans or later muslims) 2) Goths - they had employed this strategy in the territories of modern day Romania and Bulgaria and to a smaller extend elsewhere in the west. Still both Goths and Mongols could not avoid pitched battles as they approached the centers of their ennemies where they met larger chunks of the enemy army and therefore the "sparse attacks" strategy was way too risky.
On the defenders' side however, the "sparse attacks" strategy is much more common, present usually in guerilla warfare. -
Message 17
Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Wednesday, 21st October 2009
Actually they were hoping to find shoes in Gettysburg, but Buford and his cavalry stopped them before they could enter the town. And they held the high ground.
On the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg, with a serious assault, they army of Virginia could have taken the high ground. The commander was timid. Once the Feds were entrenched on the high ground the Southerners had to try to out flank them on the right to try to take a hill called 'Little Round Top.' The Feds were able to hold on, but only just.
This brings us to arguably one of the greatest wrong decisions of the Civil war, Picket's Charge in the center of the Federal lines across an open field.
The Northerners slaughtered three divisions of the army of Virginia in a single hour.
Tas -
Message 18
Posted by Stoggler (U1647829) on Wednesday, 21st October 2009
Why do large armies meet?Β
Is is something to do with large handies clapping...?
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Message 19
Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Wednesday, 21st October 2009
hi white camry
<quote>
stalteriisok
<quote>
that is one of the "I would have liked to have seen" moments
</quot
From which point of view?
</quote>
i think from a neutral point of view - just seeing it
definitely NOT from a british point of view lol
u are sitting there in the camp cleaning your rifle and then suddenly the whole horizon is full of zulus - how do you feel - probably NOT happy and relaxed lol
st
hey i think this could be a post -
Message 20
Posted by Tim of Acleah (U1736633) on Wednesday, 21st October 2009
Hi Tas
many southerners consider that they would have won the battle if Stonewall jackson had still been alive, he certainly would not have hung around.
regards
Tim -
Message 21
Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Thursday, 22nd October 2009
Hi Tim,
I think Longstreet was the General of the battle. He strongly advised Lee to not engage at Gettysburg, again he advised attacking farther to the right at Big Round Top. He finally told Lee that a Charge in the center of the Union army was suicidal. He wanted Lee to leave Gettysburg and position himself between the army of the Potomac and Washington DC, at a ground of his choosing. But all to no avail. The old man had his dander up.
Later the Southerners blamed Longstreet for being right each time. They were emotionally with Lee even though he was wrong throughout that battle. When people are so emotionally involved they will do anything for their General, even charge a totally fortified position, across an open field.
Tas -
Message 22
Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Sunday, 25th October 2009
Hi Quotes,
There are many on this board who could provide more definitive answers, but let me make a stab at it:
(1) When one army is going in a certain direction and the other imposes itself to block the way, sometimes battles take place. (2) Another reason may be that if one army is trying to move into another country's interior,the other side may want to protect its people from devastation. (3) A third reason may be that an army may want to take a particular city and another army may wish to protect the city.
Those are the only good reasons I can think of. (4)One last may be because the other army is there.
Examples of each are: In 16th century India, the first Mughal Emperor Babar wanted to go into the deep interior of India and his opponent, Ibrahim Lodi imposed his army at Panipat giving us the 1st Battle of Panipat.
Exmaple of the second is the Battle of Hastings in 1066.
An Example of the third is the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942.
An example of the fourth is the Battle of Gettysburg during the American Civil War. That was the reason given by General Robert E. Lee to General Longstreet.
Tas -
Message 23
Posted by hotmousemat (U2388917) on Sunday, 25th October 2009
The question you need to answer is how the invading force is going to win the war. If you can't see how they can, then it is a mistake to have a pitched battle.
For example, when you invade Russia, are you ever going to find a single objective that once you take it will win the war? Because, if there isn't one, but only a large selection of minor targets to occupy, then it will be the invader who ends up having to spread themselves too thin, with over extended lines of supply.
Another example is the 'fleet in being'. Where you have a potential to attack in one place that forces the enemy to expend disproportionate resources defending everywhere. This is also the idea behind 'hit and run' type strategies.
But too often perceived political necessity gets in the way of rational analysis. In Vietnam, a very marginal choice was made for limited US intervention. But that choice needed a robust political justification. But this robust justification made it impossible to back down even when it was obvious that the game was no longer worth the candle.
I would suggest that many battles take place for such political reasons. Stalingrad was not that important as an objective. The Battle of Borodino added nothing to Russian strategy against Napoleon. (And what on earth are we trying to achieve in Afghanistan?) -
Message 24
Posted by Tim of Acleah (U1736633) on Sunday, 25th October 2009
Hi Tas
I agree with you about Longstreet at Gettesburg but his corps did not arrive to the second day. If the Confedereates were going to win they had to stop the Union forces setting up astrong defensive position on the first day and this they failed to do. the arguement of those who consider that jackson notr being in command of his corps due to his death is that Lee told Ewell to take cemetery Hill if practicable. Ewell decided it was not; Jackson would have stored cemetery Hill.
regards
Tim -
Message 25
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 25th October 2009
Tas/Tim
If Jackson had been there to command the wide right hook, Lee might have agreed to the manoeuvre. Without Jackson, Lee had no other Corps commander, not even Longstreet, who could be trusted with the risk.
LW -
Message 26
Posted by cthulhu1 (U13911150) on Sunday, 25th October 2009
The key to Gettysburg was the absence of any reliable information from JEB Stuart, who seemed to be sulking after his failure at Brandy Station.
As a result Lee bludered into the lead elements of Bufords cavalry and by the time Heth had shook out his columns from the single road, the !st Corps under Reynolds.
yes, you would have expected Jackson to be a lot more agreesive than Dick Ewell(who was promoted above his ability) and so the REbs probably would have held a strong postion by DAy two, allowing Longstreet to consolidate the ground and force Meade onto their guns.
As it was Lee, knew this was the last throw of the dice (maybe even before after Anteitam) and had little choice but to vainly force the issue. Allowing Meade the luxury of the defensive fight.
Pete Longstreet comes up smelling of roses in the film Gettysburg, but....... -
Message 27
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 25th October 2009
Longstreet does have a track record of not trying very hard to make a plan he disapproved work, I'd agree. Perhaps if he had insisted on leading the final attack in person, despite his qualms,Lee would have called it off.
Mind you, if you're played by Tom Berenger against the worst impersonation of Massa Bobby ever committed to film, you're bound to come out it well.
(Actually, I'm something of a Longstreet fan in terms of his tactical ability. But the man was a bounder - and a post-war Republican to boot!) -
Message 28
Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Sunday, 25th October 2009
Hi Tim, Others,
I think if Stonewall Jackson had been alive he would definitely have taken Cemetery Hill. And you are absolutely correct that Jeb Stuart never provided the key information to Lee who was thus blind during the start of the battle.
However, Pickett's Charge was totally of Lee's making. Some of the men of the South did reach the clump of trees under General Armistead before they were cut down. This is considered "the High-water Mark of the Confederacy."
Just a few days ago I saw a gunnery expert examine the two main guns in the hands of the Confederacy and the Union. The Confederates used the British Enfieled Gun, which is slightly rifled and fires a .44 caliber bullet. The Union predominantly used the Springfield gun, which also fires a .44 caliber bullet.
There is not much to choose in the loading routine for the two guns, nevertheless the Southern soldiers loved the Union gun and took it off the dead and the wounded or imprisoned, with its amo, as much as they could.
In accuracy they seem to have been about equal.
However, in the American revolutionary war, although the Brits used a gun that could fire a lot more rounds in a given time, it was only accurate up to 50 yards. The American gun, called "the Kentuckian" was accurate at up to three times that range.
That explains the American tactics of hiding behind woods or any where far out of range of the British gun and firing their guns at their leisure, with deadly effect.
Tas -
Message 29
Posted by cthulhu1 (U13911150) on Tuesday, 27th October 2009
There are a couple of key factors of Pickets charge that are often overlooked. Lee (like his soldiers) believed they were far superior to any 10 yankees and so believed implicity that they would break the union line. Secondly and crucially the Confederate bombardment of the union lines stopped well before the charge starts in earnest due to a lack of ammunition, so the counter battery fire that might of made a difference was not there.
Jackson although tactically briliant in the valley was a real in and out commander, he was great or totally ineffective (compare his performance in the Seven days battles) so yes he might of been agreesive but then again maybe not.
Gettysburg in many ways the classic encounter battle, both sides converging on the same road hub, in preparation of seizing the initiative. -
Message 30
Posted by Grand Falcon Railroad (U3267675) on Wednesday, 28th October 2009
How about Khe Sanh?
The apparently "major concentration" of VC and NVA forces took on the under siege US Marines at KSCB - David in the form of the USMC admittedly with support of Goliath's estranged brother-in-law from the USAF SAC B-52's withstood the hammer blows of the NVA.
The reason I say this is because the USMC could have ignored Khe Sanh altogether - I know it's arguable whether it counts but one for the record for judgement. -
Message 31
Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Wednesday, 28th October 2009
Hi Cthulhu,
In hindsight does not Longstreet's strategy seem a lot better than Lee's. He advised Lee to withdraw from Gettysburg and position his army between Mead's forces and Washington with ground of his own choosing. His second recommendation a day earlier to move to the right and take over Big Round top and thus outflank the union army.
Why was Lee so adamant on a full frontal charge on open ground at the center of the Union line. The Confederate Cannon fire was over the Union lines and not very adequate. A lot of wasted ammunition!
He acknowledged his mistake when it was too late.
I think that was an off day for that great General. I think he was not at his best during that entire battle.
Tas -
Message 32
Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Wednesday, 28th October 2009
hi GF
good call - Khe Sanh - apparently the conflict between a poor little marine garrison against a major unit of the nva
the nva had trudged on foot through jungle paths carrying everything on their backs- including heavy guns broken down into man packs- dug by hand artillery positions - and then laid siege to an outpost - as u say , supported by the worlds greatest power
the marines were supported by b52s, helicopter gunships, casevac, long range artillery and reupply by c130s even in the heat of battle
against people who had rifles mortars and artillery supplied by hand
this was presented to us as the meeting of 2 major forces
in my view it doesnt count lol
st -
Message 33
Posted by Tim of Acleah (U1736633) on Saturday, 7th November 2009
One reason can be when one army ambushes the other such as at the battle of Lake Trasimene in 217BC.
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