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The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 1.Â
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 23rd September 2009
The header of this thread is the same as the title of Keistut Zakoretzky's article, which along with Mark Solonin's article Three Plans of Comrade Stalin among other materials, examine Red Army's General Staff orders days and hours prior to the launch of Barbarossa by Wehrmacht on June 22, 1941. Particularly, the so-called "Directive One" originally issued without any number by the Chief of General Staff Zhukov at the very end of June 21, 1941 and transmitted over night to the front-line control and command staff just a few hours prior to the strike. I'll try to keep it very concise here given the format, but some quotes are essential. For example, the first paragraph says, "1. On June 22-23 1941 it will be possible for the German troops to suddenly attack [our] fronts at Lvov, Baltic, Western and Kiev Military Districts. The attack may begin with provocative actions." Along with this strange Directive given the supposed urgency of the situation, Solonin points out that at the same very time Red Army General Staff conducted actions that could be clearly described as the temporary reduction of readiness level, such as the infamous "field trip" of the Western Special Military District Command with General Pavlov at the head to a theater in Minsk on the night of June 21.
This is how Solonin interprets this and many other "strange" events of that fateful weekend:
"In June 1941 Soviet intelligence registered the deployment of Wehrmacht striking forces at the borders of the USSR. As a result, correct conclusions were made, i.e., Hitler is preparing an invasion pending in weeks or even days. The fatal mistake was made as to the determination of the time Wehrmacht OKV needed to complete the deployment and therefore the exact time of the invasion.... It is plausible that Red Army offensive was scheduled at the end of June. Under this plan, the open mobilization was slated for June 23, 1941....In the Soviet Union a working place was the center of all life. A factory. That is where precincts were concentrated, and where on June 23, 1941 "spontaneous meetings" of workers were to take place and the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's Decree declaring mobilization were to be announced. Because the Decree had been prepared in advance, it had no mentioning of any Hitler's invasion. But Comrade Stalin was wise and he understood that the Decree alone was not enough..."Noble rage" burning hearts was needed. In other words, it was necessary to organize and execute major and bloody provocation....Preceding the open mobilization by just one day, the Sunday of June 22, 1941 was perfect for this purpose..."Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 2
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Thursday, 24th September 2009
Hi suvorovetz,
In regard to your post, it could be taken as if the Germans took the pre-strike against the USSR in awaiting an strike from the USSR. This could be meant as if Goebbels had been right in his propaganda, broadcasted on the morning of June 21, 1941.
So is it really an myth that Stalin has been paralized when he received the message that the German troops has crossed the demarcation line and invading Soviet territory.
I think that when all documents which are in Russian archives will be released to historical research, some chapters of history might have receive an re-writing.
In that point of few, it would be interesting about how history had developed if the USSR had done the first strike in 1941. I suppose that the European war might had ended before it developed into an World War with the Japanese Attack on Pearl Habour in December 1941. The further guestion, and therefore important is, whether the USSR had joined the Anti-Hitler-Alliance on their own offer to the UK. Before the Japanese attecked the USA in Dec. 1941, FDR had no need to join the war. But also important is the point of suppling the USSR with weapons, like they received from 1942/1943 onwards from the USA.
Supposed that the Red Army had the same strenght in 1941 as it had in 1944/1945, it might had took them the same time to reach Berlin in 1941 as in 1945. Just the circumstances has been different in 1941 to those in 1945.
The other interesting question would be how the UK would had been able to start something like D-Day three years earlier.
The fatal mistake was made as to the determination of the time Wehrmacht OKV needed to complete the deployment and therefore the exact time of the invasion.... It is plausible that Red Army offensive was scheduled at the end of June.Â
This is giving the most explanation for why it went as it went.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 3
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Thursday, 24th September 2009
I suggest you read C.Pleshakov's "Stalin's Folly: The Secret History of the German Invasion of Russia, June 1941" published in 2005 based on released Russian archives (which are sadly once again becoming closed to general historians). Pleshakov indeed shows that Stalin was planning to invade Germany some time in 1942 and was preparing a pre-emptive strike into Nazi-occupied Poland but he remained in complete denial of the idea that Hitler would break the terms of the 1939 Pact unilaterally and invade the Soviet Union without any provocation. This failure almost resulted in a catatstrophic collapse of the Red Army and 2m Russian soldiers falling into the hands of the Wehrmacht.
The situation was only salvaged by a combination of Zhukov's strategy, Hitler's blunders, the timely reinforcement of the Moscow garrison and the incredible resistance and courage of the Russian people. It owed little or nothing to Stalin who had placed Hitler's troops on his borders and enabled him to knock France and (almost) Britain out of the war by signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 4
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 24th September 2009
Allan D
Pleshakov indeed shows that Stalin was planning to invade Germany some time in 1942Â Solonin addressed all this. Stalin had several plans along the way. The "master" plan was indeed outlining offensive deployment by the summer of 1942. However, as the French and the British collapse came so unexpetedly fast, he had to improvise. The last known plan, a copy of which is plastered all over the media was dated as of May 15. It already shows that Stalin directed his General Staff to strike no later than at the end of the summer. But in the last hours before Barbarossa, as Suvorov, Solonin, Maltyukhov and Zakoretzky convincingly showed, Stalin probably moved it to the end of June, probably July 7, but no later than July 15 of 1941. I'm short on time now, but I'll get to the details of their logic later in due course, rest assured.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 5
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 24th September 2009
Thomas, before I get off, I want to address this really quick Supposed that the Red Army had the same strenght in 1941 as it had in 1944/1945, it might had took them the same time to reach Berlin in 1941 as in 1945. Red Army had been much better equipped and trained for offensive warfare in 1941 than in 1944. In June through December of 1941 practically ALL regular Red Army, most of its assets and 85% of production capacity supporting it, was lost.
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Message 6
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Thursday, 24th September 2009
Still does not explain why Stalin chose to disregard the clear intelligence about the build-up of German forces coming to him directly not only from Churchill and Roosevelt but also from his own agents as well as the continual breaches of Soviet airspace by German reconaissance aircraft and took no defensive precautions, giving detailed instructions to the commanders of the troops stationed on the western border to avoid 'provocative' acts.
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Message 7
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Thursday, 24th September 2009
Red Army had been much better equipped and trained for offensive warfare in 1941 than in 1944. In June through December of 1941 practically ALL regular Red Army, most of its assets and 85% of production capacity supporting it, was lost.Â
Sounds a total non sequitur, if anything does. If they were that much better trained how come they were so overwhelmingly defeated? The Red Army couldn't even defeat the Finns in 1939-40 except through the use of overwhelming air- and artillery-power which the Finns, unlike the Wehrmacht, were unable to counter.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 8
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 24th September 2009
Alan Still does not explain why Stalin chose to disregard the clear intelligence about the build-up of German forces coming to him directly not only from Churchill and Roosevelt but also from his own agents as well as the continual breaches of Soviet airspace by German reconaissance aircraft and took no defensive precautions, giving detailed instructions to the commanders of the troops stationed on the western border to avoid 'provocative' acts. Apart from this nonsense about intelligence from Churchill and Roosevelt, which I've already addressed many times; you saw it here, as I recall; and I won't even dignify my time to recycle it - with all due respect - I've just explained what Stalin and his General Staff with Zhukov at the head and subordinate to the General Staff GRU (Military Intelligence with General Golikov at the head) thought about all the data they were lookinf at non-stop for the entire week prior to the invasion.
Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 9
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 24th September 2009
Alan If they were that much better trained how come they were so overwhelmingly defeated? I thought that Wehrmacht was defeated in WWII. I must have missed something.
The Red Army couldn't even defeat the Finns in 1939-40 except through the use of overwhelming air- and artillery-power which the Finns, unlike the Wehrmacht, were unable to counter. Again, as far as I know, Red Army defeated Finns too.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 10
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Friday, 25th September 2009
I've just explained what Stalin and his General Staff with Zhukov at the head and subordinate to the General Staff GRU (Military Intelligence with General Golikov at the head) thought about all the data they were lookinf at non-stop for the entire week prior to the invasion.Â
Quote from Pleshakov:
"...Zhukov knew that Hitler was winning the race for the first strike. The army divisions so desperately needed on the frontier were still inching across the Russian plains. The military plants still had to increase the production of modern aircraft and tanks. The reservists still had to reach their destinations, Hitler's Wehrmacht, in contrast, looked fit. In Zhukov's view, the frontier military districts had to be put on combat alert immediately. But Stalin kept saying that was too risky, since Hitler might become alarmed and actually order an attack."
Doesn't sound like a war machine galvanised to strike to me.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 11
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Friday, 25th September 2009
I thought that Wehrmacht was defeated in WWII. I must have missed something.Â
Only in 1944-5 when you say the Red Army was less well-organised for offensive warfare than it was in 1941.
Again, as far as I know, Red Army defeated Finns too.Â
Only when it used its air and artillery resources. Finland remained independent (as it does today) and invaded the Soviet Union in turn, along with Germany, in June 1941.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 12
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 25th September 2009
Alan Quote from Pleshakov:
"...Zhukov knew that Hitler was winning the race for the first strike. The army divisions so desperately needed on the frontier were still inching across the Russian plains. The military plants still had to increase the production of modern aircraft and tanks. Alan, it looks like Pleshakov is ok that Zhukov could not count his tanks and aircraft in his capacity as the Chief of General Staff. But now we know all the numbers to the last one. Do you? It does not really look that way. Perhaps, you should try to catch up with the latest info on that rather than filibuster the topic of this thread.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 13
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 25th September 2009
Alan Only when it used its air and artillery resources. Finland remained independent (as it does today) and invaded the Soviet Union in turn, along with Germany, in June 1941. It strikes me as a true non sequitur, whereas my comparison of the Red Army of June 1941 to that of 1944 was a direct reply to Thomas' point.
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Message 14
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Friday, 25th September 2009
Perhaps you should try to be a little less patronising, too. This forum is designed to encourage debate not to be a private conversation between self-important know-it-alls. Try a little courtesy and humility in future.
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Message 15
This posting has been hidden during moderation because it broke the in some way.
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Message 16
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Friday, 25th September 2009
I wasn't the one inserting a "non sequitur" [snyde, if you ask me] remark into other people's conversationÂ
This forum, as far as I am aware, is designed to offer public debate not private conversations. Justifying one's own bad behaviour as a response to others should have been left behind in the school playground. It is how Hitler and Stalin behaved towards each to the detriment of the millions they ruled.
The directive I assume you are discussing was composed by Stalin himself on the evening of 21 June 1941 after he had rejected drafts by Zhukov and Timoshenko as too belligerent.
After Hess' flight to Britain in May, suspecting that Britain and Germany might be preparing a compromise peace he brought forward the pre-emptive strike against Germany to July. However the Soviet military and armaments industries were hopelessly unprepared, an unpreparedness that was added to by Stalin's purge of some of his leading commanders, including the head of the Soviet Air Force, the commander of Red Army Air Defence and the commander of the Baltic Military Distirct, all of whom were tortured personally by Lavrenty Beria, the head of the secret police, before being shot, along with 300 others, on the grounds that they were German spies.
Thus, less than a week before the Wehrmacht was poised to invade Stalin was engaged in his favourite pursuit of indulging his own paranoia and twisted fantasies and permanently removing his own senior commanders. The OKW could not have had a more competent or trustworthy ally.
Unfortunately the directive which Stalin composed on the night of 21 June to which such importance is attached failed to reach most of the frontline commanders as "in something approaching criminal negligence", according to Pleshakov, the telegraph lines had been left unprotected on the night of 21 June and had been cut by German paratroopers landed ahead of the invading armies.
Nor did Stalin's directive reach the air force commanders whose planes were right on the border in preparation for the preemptive strike on overcrowded airfields still under construction. The destruction of the Soviet air force was, again according to Pleshakov, "surely one of the easiest missions of the Luftwaffe pilots' careers." After repeated urgings Stalin had finally consented to the aircraft being painted in matte camouflage. However this directive was not due to come into force until the following month.
Again, as Pleshakov points out the effects of Stalin's constant equivocation was catastrophic for the Red Army in the first months following the invasion:
"In the Baltics, the Soviet army lost roughly 5,000 men per day. In Ukraine it was 16,000, in Byelorussia it was 23,000. On average a soldier died every two seconds.
Thanks to Stalin's yearlong equivocation, the troops found themselves prepared neither to attack Germany nor to defend the motherland. The results were catastrophic. The troops on the border were being decimated, and by the time the reserves reached the battlefield, the main force would be battered, if not destroyed."
It's spelt "snide", btw.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 17
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 26th September 2009
Alan This forum, as far as I am aware, is designed to offer public debate not private conversations. Justifying one's own bad behaviour as a response to others should have been left behind in the school playground. It is how Hitler and Stalin behaved towards each to the detriment of the millions they ruled. So what does it make you? But seriously, I'll try to be as sensitive as I can. Not at the expense of the facts, though. As some character, who himself does not feel obligated to refrain from compulsive name calling around here, asked me once how did I think the theory I was outlining made [him] feel. The answer is, I don't care. An honest historian - an amateur or a pro - should not. Sorry.
The directive I assume you are discussing was composed by Stalin himself on the evening of 21 June 1941 after he had rejected drafts by Zhukov and Timoshenko as too belligerent. What exactly your assumption is based on?
After Hess' flight to Britain in May, suspecting that Britain and Germany might be preparing a compromise peace he brought forward the pre-emptive strike against Germany to July. However the Soviet military and armaments industries were hopelessly unprepared, an unpreparedness that was added to by Stalin's purge of some of his leading commanders I don't understand what Hess has to do with the Directive One, but - as I pledged - I am trying to stay patient, Alan. About the readiness: acording to Yury Felshtinsky, Soviet 1938-1940 military expenditures amounted to 26.4% of the national budget on average, with 32.6% spent in 1940 and 43.4% planned for spending in 1941, the military spending growth amounting to 39% annually (3 times as much as that of the entire production growth nation-wide). By contrast, Germany was spending 15% of its GDP on armaments, about the same portion as the UK did. In August of 1939 Red Army has begun secret mobilization with the goal of 8.9 million troops drafted by the end of the summer of 1941. 'By the summer of 1941, the armed forces of the USSR were the largest in the world. By the beginning of the war [with Germany] they included 5,774,200 troops, of which 4,605,300 were ground troops; 475,700 air force personnel; 353,800 navy personnel; 167,600 border guards; and 171,900 NKVD interior troops. Ground forces included 303 divisions, 16 paratrooper and 3 infantry brigades. The armed forces were equipped with 117,581 cannons and mortars, 24,488 air craft and 25,886 tanks. In the first half of 1941, 100% of tanks and 87% of air craft produced by the soviet industry were the newest models, the production of all other models having been discontinued. Annual growth of the military production reached 39% in 1938-1940, three times as high as the overall industrial production nation-wide.' (Beshanov, The Myth of Unpreparedness.) Now the infamous Red Army purges we already have discussed to death here: and here:
Unfortunately the directive which Stalin composed on the night of 21 June to which such importance is attached failed to reach most of the frontline commanders as "in something approaching criminal negligence", according to Pleshakov, the telegraph lines had been left unprotected on the night of 21 June and had been cut by German paratroopers landed ahead of the invading armies. This is a straight away lie. Even Zhukov's fraudulent memoires, which Pleshakov appears to be fishing most of his information from, did not go this far. For example, Zhukov wrote in chapter 10 that on the night of June 21 - 22, 'People's Commissar of Defense and I repeatedly talked over secure lines to District commanders Kuznetzov, Pavlov, Kirponos and their chiefs of staff who, except for Pavlov stayed in their control and command sites.'
It's spelt "snide", btw Alan, I accept your correction here, although it made me feel bad. See, it's easy to do.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 18
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Saturday, 26th September 2009
Allan D,
What are your critics worth for? You surely have noticed by yourself that the activities on these boards are not so buissy as that your critic must pop up to remind members according your sentence:
This forum is designed to encourage debate not to be a private conversation between self-important know-it-alls.Â
I personally would reject any attempt from others by any complaine when just two or a little more discussing matters, because this is NOT the reason why the activities here has gone as it is since the last months.
You may think about whether the topic restrictions which are in my opinion in the last time a bit too striktly taken here the reasons for how it is going on here.
Everybody can join every debate if interesting. The response follows on the same level of interest.
I am really fed up about those complaines that make me think to what kind of level these boards has developed.
I am at least do not interfiering on topics in which I have no interest and therefore, not complaining when even two members have an conversations about what ever they like.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 19
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Saturday, 26th September 2009
In your effort to prove Stalin as some kind of war hero and the Red Army in 1941 as some sort of well-oiled military machine poised to strike in defiance of all known facts and the actual course of war you not only resort to ad hominem abuse but also deliberately distort your opponents' arguments for your own purposes. Zhukov may well have been able to talk over secure lines to the district commanders (although not about Stalin's directive of which he was totally ignorant) but how did the district commanders communicate with their front-line troops from their control and command centres on 21-22 June when communications had been cut? Again, to quote Pleshakov:
"Cable communications were mistakenly believed to be more reliable [than radios]. In fact, only the last few miles of cable, in the immediate vicinity of front headquarters, ran underground. Most of the hundred miles of telegraph wires hung on poles lining the country's highways and railroads - an obvious and easy target for Hitler's commandos. All a saboteur had to do to disable a division was to cut out 100 feet of cable at the highway nearest its headquarters."
Again you conflate the removal by Stalin of 300 senior commanders in the week before Barbarossa when, according to your account, the Red Army was poised to go on the offensive with the earlier purges conducted in 1937-9 - a deliberate distortion. Is it a "lie" that the air force commander, Rychagov (whose denunciation by Stalin and arrest in May after criticising the quality of Soviet aircraft due to the high number of pilot fatalities had triggered the purge) Shtern, Smushkevich. and 300 others were arrested, tortured to provide false confessions and then executed?
Loktionov, the commander of the Baltic Military District, wrote to Stalin on 16 June, having been tortured but still unwilling to confess, in a missive reminiscent of the victims of Henry VIII, begging to die "an honourable death".
Another who was removed was Vannikov, the Minister of Armaments, who had earlier criticised Stalin's decision, on the advice of his artillery adviser, Kulik, to equip the latest range of Soviet tanks with the heavier, shorter-range 107mm cannon rather than the more rapid-firing USV-39 cannon which used 76mm shells on the grounds that "bigger was better". Vannikov carelessly remarked that this was equivalent to "disarming" the tanks. Stalin did not forget this remark and Vannikov paid the penalty (although for good measure Kulik was removed as well) in June.
As far as the purges of 1937-9 are concerned, even Pleshakov admits that these probably strengthened the regime as the likelihood would have been that in the wake of the collapse following Barbarossa Stalin would have been removed in a military coup and a compromise peace negotiated with Hitler. In the absence of any possible change of leadership after June 1941 there was no alternative for the Russian people but resistance (although many parts of the Soviet empire welcomed the Germans initially as liberators and it was only Nazi brutality that lost this asset - although 300,000 Russian troops fought on the German side - and it was a feature of the Soviet war machine, just like the Nazi one, that even at the most critical junctures of the war much of it was still engaged in internal repression and racial genocide) but they paid a terrible price for the substitution of political servility in place of competence as the test for higher military command.
However the "mini-purge" of June 1941 does not indicate the mind-set of anyone poised to strike at his enemy.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 20
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 26th September 2009
Alan In your effort to prove Stalin as some kind of war hero and the Red Army in 1941 as some sort of well-oiled military machine poised to strike in defiance of all known facts and the actual course of war you not only resort to ad hominem abuse but also deliberately distort your opponents' arguments for your own purposes. Thomas is obviously right about you. I'm getting fed up by your endless and baseless whining as well.
Zhukov may well have been able to talk over secure lines to the district commanders (although not about Stalin's directive of which he was totally ignorant) but how did the district commanders communicate with their front-line troops from their control and command centres on 21-22 June when communications had been cut? The point is that it is a lie. There is absolutely no basis for this statement. Besides, allegation was that General Staff either gave incompetent orders to the field commanders or presumably could not reach them. The means of communication between the front-line command and control centers and the troops has nothing to do with these allegations.
However the "mini-purge" of June 1941 does not indicate the mind-set of anyone poised to strike at his enemy. Solonin writes, “[close to mid-June] under conditions of total secrecy, there began the implementation of actions that could not be interpreted other than the preparations for war. The war was expected not in some ‘foreseeable future,’ but in very imminent days and hours. The most significant fact was that front command and control sites were deployed. In peace time Red Army front command and control sites were never created…By contrast, prior to every “liberation march†front command and control sites did get created (September 11, 1939, 6 days prior to invasion of Poland; January 7, 1940, just after the ‘triumphal march on Helsinki’ turned into a real war; June 9, 1940, 19 days prior to the occupation of Bessarabia and Bukovina). The formation of active fronts based on the respective districts’ troops, as well as redeployment of command and control sites away from the district centers (Riga, Minsk, Kiev, Odessa) this was a specific preparation to imminent and inevitable war. Not less telling were other decisions and actions of the Soviet command, unequivocally testifying about intense preparations toward military actions slated for upcoming days and hours. For example, the following were orders given by the command of Baltic Special Military District: Order 0052 as of June 15, 1941 [excerpts are quoted]; Order 0029 as of June 18, 1941 [excerpts are quoted]. On the same day, June 18, the commander of 12th mechanized corps Major-General Shestoplalov issued Order 0033. The order is marked with the highest level of secrecy, which is very rare for the corps level document. The Order 0033 begins as follows: “Upon the receipt of this order, heighten the readiness level of all units to combat level….Take only essentials necessary for survival and combat… Begin deployment at 23.00 [military time] on June 18 to the assigned positions [all in the thick forrest].Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 21
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 26th September 2009
By the way, Alan Zhukov may well have been able to talk over secure lines to the district commanders (although not about Stalin's directive of which he was totally ignorant)Â How could Zhukov be totally ignorant of "SDtalin's Directive", which Zhukov himself signed in Stalin's presense?
I can only hope that you won't take this question as an insult.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 22
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Saturday, 26th September 2009
...allegation was that General Staff either gave incompetent orders to the field commanders or presumably could not reach them. The means of communication between the front-line command and control centers and the troops has nothing to do with these allegations.Â
On the contrary, I would have thought that "the means of communication" between the front-line command and control centres and the troops and whether or not it existed was central to the "allegation". That Stalin (who authorised all General Staff orders) gave incompetent orders before, during and after Barbarossa I would have thought was a commonplace accepted by all authorities save yourself.
I once had a post on these boards in response to one of your turgid and arcane arguments deleted because it used too lengthy a quotation (which might also have been a violation of copyright which I suspect is the reason the Â鶹ԼÅÄ is so keen to monitor this fault). However, so far, you seemed to have escaped this sanction despite the fact that most of your posts seem to consist of long, involved, untabbed quotations from books noone has ever read or has any desire to that don't even support or add weight to the argument you're trying to make.
This may be "whining" but once in a while try using ordinary, standard, plain English and rational logic to make your point rather than involved and lengthy quotations so the rest of us can maybe understand and appreciate your argument a little better and then the standard of debate might rise above the name-calling to which it has unfortunately sunk (and I accept my own responsibility in this). This may be the copper calling the kettle black, but as Marcia Clark used to say during the O.J.Simpson trial:
"Saying it's so doesn't make it so."Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 23
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 26th September 2009
Alan On the contrary, I would have thought that "the means of communication" between the front-line command and control centres and the troops and whether or not it existed was central to the "allegation".  This is what you’ve alleged in your message 16: Unfortunately the directive which Stalin composed on the night of 21 June to which such importance is attached failed to reach most of the frontline commanders as "in something approaching criminal negligence", according to Pleshakov, the telegraph lines had been left unprotected on the night of 21 June and had been cut by German paratroopers landed ahead of the invading armies.  Not a word about the communication between frontline commanders and troops. It’s clearly about communications between the General Staff and frontline commanders, which was done via secure lines vs radio exactly for the purposes of concealment of the offensive deployment; and it worked just fine, as Zhukov himself admitted.
That Stalin (who authorised all General Staff orders) gave incompetent orders before, during and after Barbarossa I would have thought was a commonplace accepted by all authorities save yourself. I certainly apologize for being such an insolent pest. Even though, I’m in a good company. I would think that Doctors Raack, Felshtinsky, Pavlova, as well as military experts such as Suvorov, Zakoretzky, Solonin, Beshanov, etc, etc, etc are authorities enough.
However, so far, you seemed to have escaped this sanction despite the fact that most of your posts seem to consist of long, involved, untabbed quotations from books noone has ever read or has any desire to that don't even support or add weight to the argument you're trying to make. I’m not holding a gun to your head, Alan. If you have better things to do this weekend, be my guest. Or, rather don’t be. Thomas is very right in this respect.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 24
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Saturday, 26th September 2009
I shall ignore the ad hominem abuse which seems to be your stock-in-trade. As regards your only substantive point don't frontline troops have commanders? Aren't they usually in the same place? Communicating orders to Divisional HQs that are impossible to transmit to the front-lines is totally useless as the British Army found in WWI. Perhaps you should ask your military "experts" as to how an army actually operates in practice.
You are right that the officer corps were suspicious about radios on security grounds but this had more to do with fear of the NKVD than the Germans. The military districts were only acquiring radios slowly. Each radio network needed to have specific operational and reserve airwaves and each radio needed its own call sign. Call signs needed to be changed from those usually used and it would take at least a week to communicate these down to battalion level which is further evidence that the Red Army was hardly poised for a pre-emptive strike.
Consequently, radios which might have overcome the difficulties, if only partially, caused by the excision of the telegraph wires were useless on 22 June and the Red Army was effectively disabled. The idea that control and command "worked just fine" on 22 June and for some weeks afterwards is risible.
You were right about Zhukov being present, along with 7 others including Molotov, Timoshenko and Beria when Stalin signed the directive on 21 June following the news that a defector had given the information that Barbarossa was about to start and I apologise to you for my error if that is indeed what you are referring to but Zhukov was personally appalled by it as it provided for no rules of engagement but the order swiftly became academic anyway.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 25
This posting has been hidden during moderation because it broke the in some way.
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Message 26
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 26th September 2009
Alan You were right about Zhukov being present, along with 7 others including Molotov, Timoshenko and Beria when Stalin signed the directive on 21 June following the news that a defector had given the information that Barbarossa was about to start and I apologise to you for my error if that is indeed what you are referring to but Zhukov was personally appalled by it as it provided for no rules of engagement but the order swiftly became academic anyway. Now that you're closer to the contents of the very Directive in question, perhaps it's time to review what Russian born military experts have to say about its contents and context - right from the top of this thread.
Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 27
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Saturday, 26th September 2009
The idea that Stalin somehow "organised" the collapse of the Red Army as a means of encouraging resistance to the German invasion is, however, fatuous. The Red Army collapsed in the first months of the war due to incompetence and unpreparedness.
The much-vaunted "preemptive strike" had not got much beyond the planning stage and was largely a product of Stalin's febrile imagination. For a year Stalin had oscillated between an offensive and defensive strategy without deciding in favour of either with the result that the military was unprepared and the commanders were uncertain of which strategy they should pursue.
The idea that Stalin foresaw the events following Barbarossa is of the same kilter, if not on a grander scale, of conspiracy theory as that which asserts that Roosevelt allowed the attack on Pearl Harbour to take place in order to secure public support for US intervention in the war.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 28
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 26th September 2009
The idea that Stalin somehow "organised" the collapse of the Red Army as a means of encouraging resistance to the German invasion is, however, fatuous. It probably is. However, neither Solonin, nor Zakoretzky put forth this idea. Their idea is much different. Apparently, open-minded people - like Thomas or Paul, for example - don't have any trouble comprehending what their idea is.
Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 29
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Saturday, 26th September 2009
Well, good for them. I hope you invite them to your 12th birthday party. Why not try presenting your own views instead of the ill-digested views of sources you cannot even identify properly and try proving you can think as well as read?
Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 30
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 26th September 2009
Why not try presenting your own views instead of the ill-digested views of sources you cannot even identify properly and try proving you can think as well as read? As soon as Thomas has trouble with identifying my sources and/or digesting these sources' views, I will address the problem. Until then, I'm not too worried, frankly. As for my own views, I figured, I only express them when I have something meaningful to express. That's what separates us from the animals, doesn't it?
Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 31
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Saturday, 26th September 2009
This forum is not intended for private conversations for which you have email but public debate nor is it intended to serve as notice board to copy out great chunks of books that happen to be in your library. We have copyright laws in this country to deal with that. If you can't engage in debate without personal abuse I suggest you go elsewhere.
Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 32
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 27th September 2009
nor is it intended to serve as notice board to copy out great chunks of books that happen to be in your library. We have copyright laws in this country to deal with that. If you can't engage in debate without personal abuse I suggest you go elsewhere. Apparently, the copy right laws in this country distinguish between the chunks of good books - like Pleshakov's - and the bad ones - like Solonin's. What a joke this board has become, when people that cannot debate on merits start insulting an opponent and then follow it up by crying out "wolf!"
Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 33
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Sunday, 27th September 2009
If this board is such a joke why do your postings occupy such a large part of it? It is you who resort to childish taunts and abuse rather than argue an issue on its merits. Whilst I agree with many of your views such as on Israel and that Stalin's terror was a continuation of what had already been put in place by Lenin your habit of blackguarding and personally abusing anyone who happens to disagree with you and the attempts by you and your friends to hijack threads for a discussion on what is becoming an obsessive issue makes what should be a pleasant experience for those who participate on these boards very unpleasant and nasty.
Obviously you would prefer it if you and your acolytes were the only ones who were allowed to feature on these boards but unfortunately that's not the way the system works. This site is paid for out of licence-payers' money and licence-payers, like myself, are entitled to use it without fear of being abused and insulted. Again I would suggest you try adopting a little humility. As someone once said, not one of your favourite authors no doubt that
"Courtesy costs nothing"
However it seems too high a price for you to pay.
Btw, historians, especially those who refer to "Comrade" Stalin, 'prove' nothing. They only have a view which readers, and other historians, are free to accept or reject based on their understanding oo the known facts. If there was only one accepted historical view about anything there would be no point in having a forum devoted to historical debate.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 34
This posting has been hidden during moderation because it broke the in some way.
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Message 35
This posting has been hidden during moderation because it broke the in some way.
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Message 36
This posting has been hidden during moderation because it broke the in some way.
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Message 37
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Sunday, 27th September 2009
Now you're just becoming surreal. It was after all you who objected to this statement:
That Stalin (who authorised all General Staff orders) gave incompetent orders before, during and after Barbarossa I would have thought was a commonplace accepted by all authorities save yourself.Â
Before you object so furiously to other posters you should try to understand the point they are trying to make. You might also re-read the House Rules and avoid using words such as "lie" and "dishonest" if you wish to continue on here.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 38
This posting has been hidden during moderation because it broke the in some way.
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Message 39
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Sunday, 27th September 2009
Strange dictionary you have.
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Message 40
Posted by Andrew Host (U1683626) on Monday, 28th September 2009
Hello all,
This thread seems to be going in a rather 'tit-for-tat' direction, wouldn't you say?
In terms of keeping the boards a pleasant place for members to post...
We reserve the right to fail messages which
* Are considered likely to disrupt, provoke, attack or offend others
* Are racist, sexist, homophobic, sexually explicit, abusive or otherwise objectionable...
Equally the Mods reserve the right to take action against members who persistently ignore the House Rules in this regard. I have flagged this up before in threads that have got too personal and abusive in the last few weeks.
Please can everyone keep their messages civil and polite in future debates so that they are a constructive experience for all who wish to participate in them.
Many thanks
AndrewLink to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 41
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Monday, 28th September 2009
Allan D,
Well, good for them. I hope you invite them to your 12th birthday party. Why not try presenting your own views instead of the ill-digested views of sources you cannot even identify properly and try proving you can think as well as read?Â
You are making a show of yourselfe with this message.
The only thing which you are going to prove yourself is, that you are obviously not capable to accept newer sources which had been hidden for centuries for the reason of the selfish written Russian History by the Stalinists and other Communists themselves to keep that picture of the God-Father Stalin, so that even after 1956, he is still admired by not less Russians even in the present.
Who else should write these books about Stalin if not the people from and in Russia, because they have better access to that written sources and documents than any other of our Western Historians?
If you are not interesting in that, so why do you take part in this thread? I suppose not for the reason to defend Stalin?Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 42
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Monday, 28th September 2009
Hello Andrew,
Please can everyone keep their messages civil and polite in future debates so that they are a constructive experience for all who wish to participate in them.Â
Although I fully agree with you on that, I just like to tell you that following German phrase we use for the efforts to bring the aforesaid from you to an staddy kind of level on these boards:
"Da war der Wunsch der Vater des Gedankens." Means "There was the Wish the Father of the thought."Â
It´s a sad thing that you have to remember these too often on these boards towards the posters.
Regards
ThomasLink to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 43
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Monday, 28th September 2009
Dear Thomas
I have never defended Stalin. I am not the poster who is claiming that the Red Army was a well-oiled, well-equipped military machine poised to strike at the heart of Nazi Germany in June 1941. The disasters that befell the Red Army in the second half of 1941 were a direct result of Stalin's lack of preparedness and confused military strategy. Nothing that has been "discovered" since has altered that view.
The current historical debate in Russia has more to do with the events of 1956 rather than those of 1941. Your friend is well-informed but rather confused. He wants to get his ideas sorted out in his own mind before he starts attacking and vilifying other people.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 44
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Monday, 28th September 2009
Hello Allan,
I have never defended Stalin. I am not the poster who is claiming that the Red Army was a well-oiled, well-equipped military machine poised to strike at the heart of Nazi Germany in June 1941. The disasters that befell the Red Army in the second half of 1941 were a direct result of Stalin's lack of preparedness and confused military strategy. Nothing that has been "discovered" since has altered that view.Â
Well, that is what we all learned from history books and documentaries about that part of WWII. I would not take it as definite proved because neither you or me can say that there wouldn´t be any documents in the Russian archives which hasn´t been released to the public and therefore aren´t published yet. In this short time of information freedom in Russia, it might be possible that some things have been "digged out" from the archives which has been top secret for centuries. There are always things discovered from time to time which have spotted a light on matters and brought the things on different points of views.
You may know as well that the Russian tactic during the Napoleon wars was to withdraw and burn all villages by the Russians themselves to leave nothing behind on which the French could have any advantage, especially food and other equipment. Stalin followed the same tactic and despite the fact that he wasted too much time until he ordered general mobilization, it worked in the end for the Red Army.
Another thought is, that with being attacked by the Germans, the Soviets had more the chance to join the Anti-Hitler Alliance as an victim of the Nazis. Vice versa it surely might had worked too, as long as Britain with its Commonwealth members stands alone against Germany.
This Hitler-Stalin-Pact was such unnaturally that every side expected sooner or later an attack from each other side. It was just a question of time until Hitler has started his go on the USSR. Hadn´t Mussolini attacked the Balkan states, on which Hitler came to help him and the Germans occupied that area, the Cause Barbarossa had started in time, means one month earlier than it started.
Although it has always been stated that the justification of the strike against the USSR was to avoid an attack by them against Germany, was an propaganda lie from Goebbels, I would not absolutely deny that "if" Stalin had got more time to prepare, the first strike had been done by the Red Army on his order. Further it is not unlikely to him and also it had given the UK the advantage that Hitler had been forced to defend his own occupied territories in Poland against the Soviets and with the British in the West, Germany again had faiced another two-front-war in defence and not in leading charge as it happens in June 1941. The question is just, whether Churchill had come to an arrangement with Stalin in June/July 1941 before the USA joined the war.
There is one important difference between Stalin and Hitler in their style of warfare. Stalin didn´t interfere on military operations generally, but in particulare to some aims and targets. Hitler interfiered since 1941 every time in military operations.
This part of history isn´t cleared up yet for once and all. I suppose that there might be some further documents about we don´t know and which can bring up some answers or at least some explanaitions.
Would you take the opinion for yourself that it isn´t important what those secret services on both sides achieved on informations about each counterpart on differenct and secret ways? I think that history has shown us often that nothing is impossible and some as vanished taken documents appeared on odd places or has been discovered.
The current historical debate in Russia has more to do with the events of 1956 rather than those of 1941.Â
Maybe, but both are close related to each other. It was just an stepping stone towards the whole crimes of Stalin and there was some continuance afterwards, because of the fear by the leading Soviets that if this had gone further, it only had encouraged the "Satelite-States" of the USSR within the Warsaw pact to gain their independence from that military and ideological cage. You know the uprising 1956 in Poland and in Hungary.
Your friend is well-informed but rather confused. He wants to get his ideas sorted out in his own mind before he starts attacking and vilifying other people.Â
I myself rather think that he wants to get this to an international public and to bring them to think about the mentioned opinions of those writers.
To understand the Russians it is also important to understand their history and the problems they have to write the real history, just based on facts. But we all might know about the sense of democracy the current political leaders of Russia have (both of them).Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 45
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Monday, 28th September 2009
Dear Thomas
There is much of your post I can agree. However to deny that Stalin was about to launch a pre-emptive strike on Germany is hardly to exculpate Stalin from his role in WWII.
No one doubts that Stalin would have attacked Germany if he could have felt assured of the outcome just as he had invaded and attacked Poland, Finland and the Baltic States in 1939-40. The problem was that Stalin couldn't make up his mind between organising for an offensive or defensive war with the result that the Red Army was unprepared for either. Defensive fortifications had been dismantled whilst the forces on the frontier were ill-trained and ill-prepared for offensive war.
In the first half of 1941 Stalin became more obsessed with not offering provocations for Hitler to use as an excuse to launch his attack. Even in the first few hours after Barbarossa had been launched Stalin issued a directive forbidding troops from crossing the German frontier (an academic possibility) and forbidding Soviet aircraft from flying over Finland or Rumania and only allowing incursions into German airspace upto 60 miles.
You are mistaken in believing that Stalin did not constantly override and interfere with his military commanders although not as disastrously as Hitler did, admittedly. Had the Kutuzov strategy been followed some of the catastrophic losses suffered by the Red Army in the second half of 1941 might have been avoided. However the order went out to defend at all costs with the same disastrous consequences for the defenders that a similar order issued by Hitler in 1943-44 had on the Wehrmacht.
I agree with your point that the fact that Hitler struck first made it easier for the Soviet Union to join what Churchill called "the Grand Alliance" and assume a role as a major partner in an anti-fascist alliance and the Stalin's role as Hitler's ally in 1939-41 could be passed over and I made the same point myself in the thread on the USSR on this board.
I think where the confusion arises with you and your friend is that in Russia when the thesis you are both advancing is attacked it is seen as undermining the role of the Soviet Union in what is still called The Great Patriotic War when Russia, according to the accepted myth, by a supreme heroic effort, threw out a foreign invader who had attacked in an act of unprovoked aggression. In the West, however, the thesis appears to rehabilitate Stalin as some kind of master strategist instead of the paranoid incompetent self-deluded as to Hitler's real intentions he actually was.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 46
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Monday, 28th September 2009
Hello Allan,
I think that all the bother is because we are talking about two things on which misunderstandings has been taken.
You are maintane on the historical facts according how the story went. I have those facts in mind but talking on the planes Stalin had and doesn´t worked because the Germans started the first strike. To me it is interesting just to think about the way this all had could went if Stalin had started first. That is all what I´ve been considering on that matter. The question about whether the extracts from the books of the mentioned Russian writers are to be taken as proved evidences is one, which we both may not have the chance and abilities to prove it (I can´t read nor understand Russian language and scriptum, I don´t know whether you can, but I suppose not many native-born British people can).
The problem was that Stalin couldn't make up his mind between organising for an offensive or defensive war with the result that the Red Army was unprepared for either. Defensive fortifications had been dismantled whilst the forces on the frontier were ill-trained and ill-prepared for offensive war.Â
Well, this is also based on those facts which has been told for many times and I wouldn´t doubt it either. It suits into the explanation towards Stalins waste of time until he has addressed the Soviet public. These explanations has been made by some of his Generals Staff and even that some years after WWII. It also suits to your last paragraph
... Stalin as some kind of master strategist instead of the paranoid incompetent self-deluded as to Hitler's real intentions he actually was.Â
and I think that it is always questionable on dictatorships and their censorship which part and what "kind" of the truth is "allowed" to be published. Therefore I am always sceptical and think that in the time of the Soviet regime, the truth has been twisted on many occations and events.
... it is seen as undermining the role of the Soviet Union in what is still called The Great Patriotic War when Russia, according to the accepted myth, by a supreme heroic effort, threw out a foreign invader who had attacked in an act of unprovoked aggression.Â
I think that this might had been an part of Stalins strategy to ensure himself that the people will stay behind him.
In the West, however, the thesis appears to rehabilitate Stalin ... instead of the paranoid incompetent self-deluded ...Â
It is evident that Stalin was an paranoid, because there is the core of the reasons for all the prosecutions which occured during his time of rule. Cleansing of the Politbureau, the Generality, then to suspect every Russian Jew to be an Israeli spy, regardless whether they did their bid during the war and so on.
The people who served him personally has been so frightened upon him, that even on the day when he struggled with death, nobody tried to enter the room and help him. Every medizin brought to him by an doctor, Stalin sent one of his staff to buy the same in an pharmazy shop, for fear, the doctors tried to poisen and kill him.
I admitt that my interests are not so close to battles, but more on the biographies of the characters in history. From there you might estimate some persons decisions and actions better and maybe weigh up whether some theory is plausible to them or not.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 47
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Monday, 28th September 2009
Dear Thomas
I think we can all agree on the above. If you are interested in biography might I recommend the two following books in English if you can get hold of them or have not seen them already?
One is Simon Sebag-Montefiore's excellent "Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar":
The other is Donald Rayfield's "Stalin and his Hangmen":
Both give a remarkable insight into the motivations and methods of rule of one of the two great megalomaniacs in 20th century history and both are in my possession which may seem odd for a would-be KGB agent! My sincere apologies, Thomas, if I have inadvertently caused you any offence but I think we all "get hold of the wrong end of the stick", as we say in English, from time to time
Best Wishes
Allan D.Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 48
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 28th September 2009
Thomas Russian tactic during the Napoleon wars was to withdraw and burn all villages by the Russians themselves to leave nothing behind on which the French could have any advantage, especially food and other equipment. Stalin followed the same tactic and despite the fact that he wasted too much time until he ordered general mobilization, it worked in the end for the Red Army. It happens to be an easy and common misnomer, but Stalin's military doctrine was based on very different postulates. Primarily, it is spelled out in Shaposhnikov's work "The Brain of the Army," which was the extension upon another Russian military strategist Triandofilov's work. To be short and to the point, it was an offensive strategy involving two phases of mobilization: secret and open, the latter being implemented simultaneously with the execution of the offensive action.
Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 49
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Monday, 28th September 2009
In the first half of 1941, 100% of tanks and 87% of air craft produced by the soviet industry were the newest models, the production of all other models having been discontinued.Â
This is the kind of statement that, while not wrong, demonstrates a remarkable economy with the truth. It is worth inspecting in more detail.
Consider for example the fighter production and availability situation: Production of the old I-16 and I-153 had indeed been discontinued. The last M63-engined aircraft of these types were delivered early in 1941. The production of the biplane I-153 actually ran a little longer than that of the monoplane I-16, and the last ones were received in April 1941. In June 1941, they were no longer in production. But on the 22nd of June these obsolete fighters still accounted for more than half of the frontline strength. Even the I-153 and I-15bis biplanes still accounted for 30% of the available fighters, or about 1600 aircraft.
Of the modern fighters, the most numerous was the MiG-3. Of this type, 917 aircraft had reached 19 regiments, 17 of which were near the border. Unfortunately, only in five of these had pilot conversion to the MiG-3 also been completed. Many units, having both their 'old' and 'new' aircraft still available to them, actually chose to go to war in the old ones. Besides, while the MiG-3 was an excellent performer at high altitude, it was at a disadvantage at the low and medium altitudes were most combat was, and its handling characteristics left something to be desired even for pilots familiar with the tricky I-16. The MiG suffered further because pilots unfamiliar with the type flew with the canopy open and often mismanaged their cooling systems.
A similar situation handicapped the Yak-1, which was no doubt the best of the new fighters. By June, its production rate was 3-4 per day, the aircraft had reached five regiments, and 105 of these modern fighters had been delivered to the Western military districts. But again, the 20th regiment excepted, in most cases only the commanders had been converted to the new type. A few months would have made a very important difference.
The third modern fighter in production was the LaGG-3, but although at the end of May 593 had been scheduled for delivery only 39 actually were.
Nor was it the case that after the war broke out, the situation rapidly improved thanks to the delivery of new aircraft. In June 1941 the large new factories that Stalin had ordered to be constructed in safe locations were still incomplete and not ready for production. Factories located in European Russia were of course vulnerable to be overrun by German attack, and the emergency movement of production lines had a negative impact on production. Filling the factories with untrained workers had a disastrous result in production quality, despite the though and simple design of many of the new types. In the winter of 1941, the Soviet fighter force still included about 40% I-16s and 20% I-153s. In December, at the eve of the battle of Moscow, the VVS had a grand total of 47 serviceable Yak-1s.
Thus Soviet aviation in June 1941 was in some ways worse off than French aviation in May 1940. The French were also overwhelmed by an attack while the re-equipment of their air force was still ongoing, and suffered heavily as a result. But at least they still received more modern aircraft during the fighting, and they had no biplane fighters in the first line.
Thus the supposed modernity of the Soviet aircraft production did not, in reality, produce a modern air force. It can be argued, with some justification, that the about 1700 modern aircraft -- on a total of 9700 -- arrayed by the VVS, PVO and Naval Aviation were not a great numerical disadvantage against the about 2000 aircraft committed by the Luftwaffe. However, these German aircraft had mostly been in service for several years, had been tested in combat, and had trained and combat-experienced crews. They were also in most cases technically superior to Soviet types.
The situation was actually described accurately enough by Alexander Yakovlev in the 1960s, when he published his autobiography. Besides the designer of the Yak-1, Yakovlev was Deputy Commissar for the Aviation Industry from January 1940 onwards. "The plants were just starting production and were unable to meet the requirements of the vast front."Link to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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Message 50
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Tuesday, 29th September 2009
Helle Allan,
My sincere apologies, Thomas, if I have inadvertently caused you any offence but I think we all "get hold of the wrong end of the stick", as we say in English, from time to timeÂ
No need for your apologies, because non of that has been taken at all.
I admit that I´ve had the same problems when I read the messages of our Russian contributors on these boards the first time. It was disturbing because we have an built picture about some historical events and persons, therefore it isn´t easy to change it quickly.
Thank you for your recommendations about the books. I have my sources about Stalin more from documentaries than from books. Last year there has been published also books about Stalin in German language. But I have too less time to read them all. Currently I am reading a paperbook about WWII in English.
Kind Regards and best wishes to you too.
ThomasLink to this forum: The Mystery of the Directive (without number) One
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