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Allied mistakes in WW2
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Message 1.
Posted by Idamante (U1894562) on Wednesday, 16th September 2009
There are many 'What Ifs' about WW2 but they are nearly always from the German point of view, ie what should Hitler have done to win the war?
But the Allies made lots of mistakes as well which arguably made the war go on much longer than it could have and so affected the outcome.
One example: the Allies demanded unconditional surrender from Italy as well as Japan and Germany. What if Britain & the US had secretly done a deal with the Italians to topple Mussolini & declare war on Germany before the Germans had a chance to reinforce their troops in Italy?
Could the Western Allies have invaded Austria & Germany from Italy, ending the war before Russia had time to conquer the East? -
Message 2
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Wednesday, 16th September 2009
Hello Idamante,
I think the biggest mistake was when the UK and France didn´t attacked Germany in September 1939 and so opened a second front while most of the German tropps invading Poland.
What if Britain & the US had secretly done a deal with the Italians to topple Mussolini & declare war on Germany before the Germans had a chance to reinforce their troops in Italy?
Could the Western Allies have invaded Austria & Germany from Italy, ending the war before Russia had time to conquer the East?
In one hand, this would had been against the agreements with the SU and in the other hand, to invade Austria and Germany from Italy via the Alps would had been more difficult than D-Day. Imagine to transfer all the troops - which has landed on D-Day in Normandy - via the Mediterianean to Italy. Maybe Mussolini had abandoned Hitler and pacted with the Western Allies, but in 1943, when he already lost his power, it was too late for him to change the sides. -
Message 3
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 16th September 2009
Thomas I think the biggest mistake was when the UK and France didn´t attacked Germany in September 1939 and so opened a second front while most of the German tropps invading Poland. I disagree. That would be exactly what Stalin had planned for, and it would result in the massive Red Army offensive at the time both sides on the Western front reached the exhaustion point. As I said before, the British and the French inadvertently helped themselves by folding so fast and miserably.
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Message 4
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Wednesday, 16th September 2009
suvorovetz,
I disagree. That would be exactly what Stalin had planned for, and it would result in the massive Red Army offensive at the time both sides on the Western front reached the exhaustion point. As I said before, the British and the French inadvertently helped themselves by folding so fast and miserably.
I often wonder from which sources you take your informations to your opinions, regarding to Stalins plans and so far. It is always contrary to who he and his policy is described in history. Not because you disagree, that is o.k., but for your assertions and the sources you not every time mention in your posts.
Maybe, if you don´t mind, you could tell about your sources. -
Message 5
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 16th September 2009
Hi, again, Thomas. Looks like we're engaged in two conversations at once and that's ok Maybe, if you don´t mind, you could tell about your sources. There's a whole host of historians that I'm following on this: Viktor Suvorov (aka V. Rezun), Y. Felshtinsky, Mark Solonin, Richard Raack, Keistut Zakoretsky, etc, etc. But specifically about Stalin's plans, there are minutes from Stalin's speech as of August 19, 1939 at the Politburo Session reported by several European news agencies in the ensuing autumn. Somebody has actually posted a link to this text in some other thread here. I've quoted these minutes too. Bottom line, Stalin was clear and unequivical in that he wanted Germans, British and French to exhaust themselves by prolonged fighting and thus creating conditions for the Communist takeover - sorry, "liberation" - of Europe.
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Message 6
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 16th September 2009
Thomas Somebody has actually posted a link to this text in some other thread here. This is the link to the post containing the link to the minutes:
Best Regards -
Message 7
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Wednesday, 16th September 2009
What if Britain & the US had secretly done a deal with the Italians to topple Mussolini & declare war on Germany before the Germans had a chance to reinforce their troops in Italy?
This was, in fact, what happened although Mussolini's deposition by the Fascist Grand Council in July 1943 following the Allied invasion of Sicily was somewhat fortuitous but it was immediately by intense diplomatic negotiations with the new head of the Italian Government, Marshal Badoglio (including probably to deal not to prosecute him, nor any Italian, for war crimes in Abyssinia), which did lead to Italy changing sides in September.
However Hitler got wind of the deal thanks to an enterprising German submarine tapping the transatlantic cable carrying the telephone conversations between Churchill and Roosevelt. Hitler was thus able to occupy Italy in good time turning the Axis' "soft underbelly" into "a tough old gut" resulting in a 19-month long campaign to liberate the peninsula instead of a speedy Allied passage to the Alps and the French border.
This was perhaps the greatest German intelligence coup of the war and whilst not as significant as the Allies' breaking of the Enigma code it almost certainly prolonged the war and ruined a piece of Allied grand strategy. -
Message 8
Posted by Laura988 (U14088665) on Wednesday, 16th September 2009
I think the biggest mistake was when the UK and France didn´t attacked Germany in September 1939 and so opened a second front while most of the German tropps invading Poland.
I would agree on that, Thomas. What I regard as a big mistake is the fact the Allies didn't bomb railroads to Auschwitz although there was such a possibility. -
Message 9
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Thursday, 17th September 2009
suvorovetz,
Thank you for that link to the interesting page. It shows that Stalin calculated his aims without regarding the reaction of the French Communists for his purpose to start the "World Revolution". The French turned their back to Stalin because they didn´t understand that he pacted with Hitler.
To know that, rationally must had given the Nazis an allert to do not pact with Stalin. But for the reason that just four days after that, the pact has been signed, there was no chance for the Germans to get informed about that. -
Message 10
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Thursday, 17th September 2009
Laura988,
What I regard as a big mistake is the fact the Allies didn't bomb railroads to Auschwitz although there was such a possibility.
Agree, it is an pitty they didn´t, but they also took a long time to believe in what happened there and in other camps. -
Message 11
Posted by Backtothedarkplace (U2955180) on Thursday, 17th September 2009
its difficult to hit a railway from a bomber at height and the sort of tactical bombers that could have done the job were out of range.
You can attack railway junctions, but in any event they can normally be fixed in a matter of days. You would need to go back again and again and again. One or two raids would just delay the inevitable and repeated raids just divert effort away from other areas that need the bombers.
if they had known an effort would have been made but i doubt it would mean much more than the inmates who would have been gassed dieing of thirst and hunger in the delayed railway cars. -
Message 12
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 17th September 2009
Hi, Thomas It shows that Stalin calculated his aims without regarding the reaction of the French Communists for his purpose to start the "World Revolution". The French turned their back to Stalin because they didn´t understand that he pacted with Hitler. I don't necessarily think that there was mass dissention among European Communist. There were obviously a few dissidents, which explains how the minutes were leaked to a French news agency first, I believe. That is a topic of a separate research - Richard Raack (history professor at Hayward California State University) has a paper on that, by the way. I saw somewhere that Czech Comintern members were the ones who leaked the minutes first.
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Message 13
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 17th September 2009
Hi, Laura I would agree on that, Thomas. What I regard as a big mistake is the fact the Allies didn't bomb railroads to Auschwitz although there was such a possibility. On Auschwitz, I read somewhere that Harris refused to divert any assets on such missions purely based on the cost-benefit consideration from military return stand point. But, on larger point, I personally believe that the French and the British had a "fighting" chance of stalling the war had they not acquiesced to Hitler's occupation of Czechoslovakia. Barring that, by the time of Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact signing, it was too late. Stalin had every intention to keep Hitler afloat by any means necessary until the warring factions in the West would exhaust one another. Needless to say that Red Army would occupy East Poland and be patiently waiting for marching orders on the bank of the river San all the same.
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Message 14
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Thursday, 17th September 2009
Hi suvorovetz,
I know that from an French documentary about the French Communists in the pre-war, war and past-war time. They were be shocked upon the Hitler-Stalin-Pact and this lasts throughout the war years. Even in the past-war years, they seeked to get their own way in France to take part in the French political society and parliament.
According to Stalins speech, he wanted to provide his French Fellows to start the revolution in France, but for the reason that the majority of the French Communists joined the French resistance, and the invasion of the USSR in 1941, I couldn´t imagine that the USSR has been able to supply the French Communists with weapons and other equipement.
I think that Stalins calculation wouldn´t had worked in the UK because the British Communists were an minority, not much bigger than its counterpart, the BUF.
About the Comintern, in the book from Wolfgang Leonhard, which I´ve mentioned in another thread to you, there are several chapters in which he describes his experiences and how that institution worked. Leonhard has also written books about Stalin, but I haven´t read one of that yet.
By the way, the last thread with the Palestinian defender has been closed. But I´ve sent in an longer reply and in his response, there was nothing new to read. -
Message 15
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Thursday, 17th September 2009
Allan D,
However Hitler got wind of the deal thanks to an enterprising German submarine tapping the transatlantic cable carrying the telephone conversations between Churchill and Roosevelt.
Interesting to know where the US learned that future cold-war trick. Where'd you read it? -
Message 16
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Thursday, 17th September 2009
Did not we Brits cut the German transatlantic cables to deny them that resource?
Regards Spruggles -
Message 17
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Thursday, 17th September 2009
"...What I regard as a big mistake is the fact the Allies didn't bomb railroads to Auschwitz although there was such a possibility..."
Actually, some people, including prisoners in the camp, wanted the actual camp bombed, not just the rail links.
But, as Suvo pointed out, this was not a military target that would have shortened the war.
The question here is a matter of morality rather then military necessity.
The question is whether bombing the camp was worth the loss, which would have been the lost opportunity to bomb another target instead, and any lost bomber crews.
For my part, I think they took the right decision, though I understand why people might dis-agree. -
Message 18
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 17th September 2009
Hi, Thomas According to Stalins speech, he wanted to provide his French Fellows to start the revolution in France, but for the reason that the majority of the French Communists joined the French resistance, and the invasion of the USSR in 1941, I couldn´t imagine that the USSR has been able to supply the French Communists with weapons and other equipement.I think that Stalins calculation wouldn´t had worked in the UK because the British Communists were an minority, not much bigger than its counterpart, the BUF. I think - and this is probably a school repetition-like phenomena based on the years of being exposed to the so-called 'conventional' history - you're over-emphasizing Stalin's reliance on local Communist movements for effecting "the Revolution." As Felshtinsky brilliantly showed in his book Big Bosses about Bolshevik leadership in Russia, from its inception, Lenin's Bolshevik government firmly placed Moscow at the center of the World Communist Revolution. Stalin's speech contains the following line - I am paraphrasing, but I'm sure that it's very close to the original, - "the last 20 years showed that it is impossible to generate Bolshevik movement in Europe strong enough to take power and maintain it." This is the key. Not to mention 26 thousand tanks, well over 20 thousand military aircraft, etc, etc, that Stalin pillaged his own country to produce.
By the way, the last thread with the Palestinian defender has been closed. But I´ve sent in an longer reply and in his response, there was nothing new to read. I thank you again for taking a stand. I'm not afraid of nastiness, but - rightly or wrongly - I do feel the double standard making the playing field uneven. But, what's interesting - sorry I can't help this observation, - it's this line that came from nowhere:
Now where is this evidence of my anti-semitism SUV? I never called this person anti-Semite. Apparently, the evidence is there nonetheless. -
Message 19
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Thursday, 17th September 2009
Hi suvorovetz,
I noticed that most of the books and those authors you cited are Russians. I never heard about them and so you can use sources which are probably not available in other countries, if they are not translated in foreign languages.
But I find it interesting what you know about the contains of that books to get new considerations on matters related to Stalin and the USSR. It is also interesting that, despite the treatment of the press by the Russian government, the archives are open for histrians for researches without - as I assume - restrictions.
I'm not afraid of nastiness, but - rightly or wrongly - I do feel the double standard making the playing field uneven.
I think I understand what you mean and I would agree with your opinion. The problem is, that in the past time on these boards, some trolls abused these boards for their own purposes and therefore, the hosts are more eager to watch the boards according the house rules.
But, what's interesting - sorry I can't help this observation, - it's this line that came from nowhere:
Now where is this evidence of my anti-semitism SUV?
Quoted from this message
I never called this person anti-Semite. Apparently, the evidence is there nonetheless.
This is standard by those who set up arguments like he did. -
Message 20
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 17th September 2009
Thomas But I find it interesting what you know about the contains of that books to get new considerations on matters related to Stalin and the USSR. It is also interesting that, despite the treatment of the press by the Russian government, the archives are open for histrians for researches without - as I assume - restrictions. Not quite. There was a brief period of openness in the 90s followed by the return to the "dark ages." Moreover, some overly zealous Duma members drafted a statute explicitly threatening insolent historians who dare challenge the official party line. I'm not sure where it stands now, but we know that Putin does not joke around if he dislikes somebody. In this regard, one of the intened targets of this campaign, Viktor Suvorov himself, in an interview to Radio Freedom in May of this year said the following:
Q: ...What sort of interpretations this mandate is directed against? Vladimir Bogdanovich [aka Viktor Suvorov], what do you think they will control now?
VS: You see, that I don't really know. Sometimes I'm told, "You're history falsificator." I say, "Citizens, comrades, gentlemen, and what have you, what is it there to falsificate? Where is your history? Lets write history. And then, if I change something and all, then, by all means, do accuse me." However, look at how curious the situation is. On one hand, there were colossal casualties in that war - tens of millions. Horrendous carnage, unheard of toll. The country is still in a ghastly state, the people are extinguishing. We have countless hordes of scientists, countless funds. 10, 20, 25, 50, 60 years have passed, and yet the history is still not written!
The problem is, that in the past time on these boards, some trolls abused these boards for their own purposes and therefore, the hosts are more eager to watch the boards according the house rules. I would not complain about it if I felt that the rules were applied fairly. But I don't, and so I voiced it here:
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Message 21
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Friday, 18th September 2009
Hi suvorovetz,
VS: You see, that I don't really know. Sometimes I'm told, "You're history falsificator." I say, "Citizens, comrades, gentlemen, and what have you, what is it there to falsificate? Where is your history? Lets write history. And then, if I change something and all, then, by all means, do accuse me." However, look at how curious the situation is. On one hand, there were colossal casualties in that war - tens of millions. Horrendous carnage, unheard of toll. The country is still in a ghastly state, the people are extinguishing. We have countless hordes of scientists, countless funds. 10, 20, 25, 50, 60 years have passed, and yet the history is still not written!
This statement makes sense and I assume that there are some many things regarding the Russian history, especially during the USSR, which some people do not like to be brought on public.
I also think that there might be some passages which might be re-written because the Communists in most (if not all countries) where they has been in power, has re-written the history of their own country so that it fits into their ideological picture. Mistakes in their policies are kept secret and just those who personally experienced it, know about that, except the facts which had not could be hidden to the world.
I would not complain about it if I felt that the rules were applied fairly. But I don't, and so I voiced it here:
ɷɷ...ܰ/Բ/...
I´ve noticed that the day you´ve started that question thread and I´ve read it. In the end, it depends always on the hosts and the moderators of each message board to interprete the house rules according to the inposts and set the limits of tolerance.
I think that it is dusturbing to set up an new thread about an matter that occures within one debate and interupt it when the debate is going to switch to an new thread just for the sake of sticking on the OP. This, for one example, indeed has changed into an restriction. -
Message 22
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Friday, 18th September 2009
Actually, some people, including prisoners in the camp, wanted the actual camp bombed, not just the rail links.
But, as Suvo pointed out, this was not a military target that would have shortened the war.
It is a bit more complicated than that. Like many other camps, Auschwitz was more than a complex of camps were people were imprisoned and killed. The inmates were also used to build and operate a huge complex of chemical plant, owned by IG Farben. By 1944, as the Allied bombing refineries and synthetic fuel plants elsewhere had its effect, the plants at Auschwitz were increasingly important for the German war production, contributing 15% of the methanol production by the end of the year. These, therefore, became a target for allied bombing.
Even today, the city has large chemical works, the foundations of which were laid by concentration camp inmates during WWII -- who, in doing so, died in staggering numbers.
As the plant would have been difficult to construct, repair or operate without railway links, bombing the railways on the region would have been militarily justifiable, if perhaps not particularly effective. Bombing the camps would probably have delayed construction work as well.
However, that would have been a very difficult decision, with an obvious risk that Goebbels would have been quick to exploit any such attack. -
Message 23
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 18th September 2009
Hi, Thomas I also think that there might be some passages which might be re-written because the Communists in most (if not all countries) where they has been in power, has re-written the history of their own country so that it fits into their ideological picture. Exactly. Particularly with respect to WWII there were two documents that defined the official story line: Stalin's overseen publication of "History Falsificators" (note the Orwellean languge again) in 1948, and then - years later - Zhukov's memoires "Memories and Thoughts" in 1969. The latter went through like 13 editions, all but the first one released after Zhukov's death. Yet every time there was something new in there - like the horse story discussed here on one of the thread. As I said, legendary commander gave the expression "ghost writing" a whole new meaning. It is sad that many lauded history laureats in the West are all too happy to grab an obvious fraud - as Zhukov's memoires have certainly been proved to be - and run with it.
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Message 24
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Friday, 18th September 2009
Thomas,
I don't think that in September 1939 the Allies really had the option of going on the offensive on the Western Front. In 1935, De Gaulle had advocated the creation of a professional French army with a real offensive capability, but this option had been rejected by parliament and the general staff. The actual army they had in 1939 was a mass army with large numbers of conscripts and reservists, but only modest mobile forces. Its first armoured divisions were only created in January 1940, after the lessons of the German attack on Poland had been digested. The structure, logistics and command organization of this army were geared to the static frontline concept of 1914-1918. If the leadership believed in the ability of the Maginot Line to halt the Germans, it also implicitly accepted that the German "Siegfried Line" would be able to halt any French advance.
As for the British army, this was more professional and more mobile than the French force, but in September 1939 the British Expeditionary Force amounted to only 4 divisions. It grew to 11 division by May 1940.
Giving these limitations, the decision to remain on the defensive made good sense. What did not make any sense at all was the plan to react with a German attack with a forward sweep of the left wing through Belgium and into the Netherlands, committing all mobile forces of the French army and the well-equipped BEF to this operation: With this, the Allies combined a defensive posture with a plan that denied them the reserves to launch a counter-offensive. It was an absurdity, because if the Germans managed to break through (as they did) there would be no possibility to plug the gap. The expectation that this move would meet a German attack through the low countries head-on only partially justified it.
I think that that certainly qualifies as a mistake. There are others: Market-Garden; Stalin's refusal to accept the clear signs of the coming German attack in June 1941; Churchill's weakening of the British position in the Middle-East in favour of a hopeless mission in Greece; the US arms embargo of September 1939, which interrupted supplies to the Allies at a critical moment; the continuation of "area bombing" city raids long after more effective means to employ the strategic bomber force had been discovered; the neglect and complacency of US commanders at Pearl Harbour; the doomed mission of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse from Singapore; and so on.
However, overall the Allies fought the war much more intelligently than the Axis. -
Message 25
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Friday, 18th September 2009
Hi suvorovetz,
It is sad that many lauded history laureats in the West are all too happy to grab an obvious fraud - as Zhukov's memoires have certainly been proved to be - and run with it.
It is indeed, because they believe to know already everything and that is the point.
I admit that in our first conversations I myself have thought in that way too. So I apologize to you for the misthoughts upon your posts. I must have forgotten that when it came to debate about Stalin, it is necessary to bear in mind that he himself was one of them who twisted the truth and even his successors haven´t been abel enough to tell the people the whole truth about the Stalin eara.
How many and which books from those Russian writers you´ve mentioned have been translated in foreign languages, especially into English? -
Message 26
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Friday, 18th September 2009
Mutatis_Mutandis,
I don't think that in September 1939 the Allies really had the option of going on the offensive on the Western Front. In 1935, De Gaulle had advocated the creation of a professional French army with a real offensive capability, but this option had been rejected by parliament and the general staff. The actual army they had in 1939 was a mass army with large numbers of conscripts and reservists, but only modest mobile forces. Its first armoured divisions were only created in January 1940, after the lessons of the German attack on Poland had been digested. The structure, logistics and command organization of this army were geared to the static frontline concept of 1914-1918. If the leadership believed in the ability of the Maginot Line to halt the Germans, it also implicitly accepted that the German "Siegfried Line" would be able to halt any French advance.
As for the British army, this was more professional and more mobile than the French force, but in September 1939 the British Expeditionary Force amounted to only 4 divisions. It grew to 11 division by May 1940.
That´s right, it was the price of the appeasement policy both by the French and the British in the 1930s.
The time brought that two men from each country together in their fight against Hitler. De Gaulle and Churchill had both attempted to convince the people in their countries that with Hitler in power, it would be better to be prepared. Ironically, the books De Gaulle has published on his suggestions about military affaires has been read by the German High Command and the informations they took from those books, has been regarded as "helpful" for plans by the German Forces.
In newer documentaries about the military situation of the German Forces in the first weeks of WWII in 1939, it has been stated, that if the British and the French had attacked Germany in the West, it might had caused at least some logistic problems for the advance of the Germans in Poland. Those months from September 1939 to May 1940, which are called here as "Der Sitzkrieg" has been a waste of time in regard to aid the Polish. Therefore the Polish has been very disappointed by the British and the French. The question might be set up, whether the Polish knew about the military strenght of the British and the French when they signed their treaty of military aid in case of an German Invastion in Poland. This has been just a few months until the war has started. As a know about that treaty, it has been agreed there, that in case of an German attack against Poland, the British and the French had been in obligation to attack Germany on their Western frontiers. Instead to follow their obligations, the French did nearly nothing and the British has to prepare themselves to defend their own country in case of an German attack to Britain.
Giving these limitations, the decision to remain on the defensive made good sense. What did not make any sense at all was the plan to react with a German attack with a forward sweep of the left wing through Belgium and into the Netherlands, committing all mobile forces of the French army and the well-equipped BEF to this operation: With this, the Allies combined a defensive posture with a plan that denied them the reserves to launch a counter-offensive. It was an absurdity, because if the Germans managed to break through (as they did) there would be no possibility to plug the gap.
The British and the French would have to apply for permission to go through Belgium and the Netherlands, but for their neutrality, they both had to reject it for fear of being involved in the war in case the Allies had failed. As you pointed out, it happend to opposite way.
Churchill's weakening of the British position in the Middle-East in favour of a hopeless mission in Greece ...
As I assume from your nick-name, you may know better the reasons of the British for that in regard to Greece. I am not sure, whether the Germans had interfiered in Greece if not the Italians had attacked Greece already. To send German troops to the Balkan and the Greek Islands was just necessary by the mistakes of the Italians. It has disturbed Hitlers plans, although sooner or later he might had also an go on those countries, "when he had been finished with the USSR".
I think that the part of WWII regarding the involment of Greece would be worth an separate thread (have to be alert for not drifting to far because of the house rules).
Regards
Thomas -
Message 27
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 18th September 2009
Thomas I admit that in our first conversations I myself have thought in that way too. So I apologize to you for the misthoughts upon your posts. I must have forgotten that when it came to debate about Stalin, it is necessary to bear in mind that he himself was one of them who twisted the truth and even his successors haven´t been abel enough to tell the people the whole truth about the Stalin eara. No need to apologize, my friend. We all were in this situation. I certainly was. An open mind and some tidbits of critical thinking is all it takes.
How many and which books from those Russian writers you´ve mentioned have been translated in foreign languages, especially into English? Richard Raack is an American historian, so he writes in English to begin with. Suvorov was published in many languages, English and German included, particularly Icebreaker, which is like the grand opening of the very different outlook on the second world war from the stand point of previously largely overlooked Stalin's role in it.
Felshtinsky - as the PHD holder in both USA and Russia - has been published everywhere, but his English publications are mostly related to contemporary history, like Blowing Up Russia. I am very impressed by his work Big Bosses (Vozhdi v Zakonye in Russian) about the Bolshevik leadership history, but I haven't seen it published in English. It certainly must be. -
Message 28
Posted by hotmousemat (U2388917) on Friday, 18th September 2009
Churchill's weakening of the British position in the Middle-East in favour of a hopeless mission in Greece
We had given Greece a guarantee in 1939. We had to. The alternative to our supporting Greece would have been that the Italian navy would be free to take bases like Corfu and Crete.
Later, there was still a hope that Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey would co-operate and resist - if they thought they would be supported.
Also, since the Greeks had successfully resisted the Italians, the necessary German assistance would be directed through Bulgaria. Once Germany had air forces in Bulgaria, they could control the straits and threaten Turkey into submission. And it was judged that if the Axis had hegenomy over the entire Balkans, then there would be no prospect that Russia would ever dare enter the war.
All that to play for - or alternatively we could carry on and capture yet more miles of empty desert in North Africa to no great startegic purpose. It seems a pretty reasonable decision. -
Message 29
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Saturday, 19th September 2009
Hi suvorovetz,
I am very impressed by his work Big Bosses (Vozhdi v Zakonye in Russian) about the Bolshevik leadership history, but I haven't seen it published in English. It certainly must be.
I just did some research about it, but I didn´t found it available for purchase, not even on abebooks.co.uk, nor by amazon.com.. I found his website, but only his biography is in English, all other pages in Russian. On the English page there are some links for several books of him, but not for the one you are in favour of. The book has been published in Moskow in 1999, but I´ve not got any notice of the year when it was published in English.
But for further research and for interest of its contains, it might be helpful if you could give an overview about the chapters and the timeline on which the books refers.
No need to apologize, my friend. We all were in this situation. I certainly was. An open mind and some tidbits of critical thinking is all it takes.
Thanks for that.
Till the next time.
Kind Regards
Thomas -
Message 30
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 19th September 2009
Hi, Thomas But for further research and for interest of its contains, it might be helpful if you could give an overview about the chapters and the timeline on which the books refers. Let me try my best. Here's the Table of Contents (in some way it is self-explanatory):
Preface
Conspiracy One. Money of the Revolution
Conspiracy Two. Brest Treaty
Conspiracy Three. The Murder of Mirbach and the Purge of Left Social Revolutionaries [Party]
Conspiracy Four. Lenin and Sverdlov
Conspiracy Five. Wheather or Not Radek Was Involved in the Murder of K. Liebknecht and L. Luxembourg
Copnspiracy Six. The Mystery of Lenin's Death
Epilogue.
Note a nice touch, whereas Felshtinsky replaces the word "Chapter" with "Conspiracy". Basically, his point is that Lenin created mafia-like structured Bolshevik fraction that split up with the parent Russian Social Democratic Workers Party in the early 20th century, and it did operate as a mafia extorting money wacking people left and right, etc, etc. The first "Conspiracy" is largely devoted to the extortion and eventual murder of very wealthy Russian industrialist Savva Morozov by Lenin's henchman Krasin. It goes on to superbly analyze Brest-Litovsk Treaty and the rift it caused among the Bolshevik brass. Let me leap to the final paragraph. Felshtinsky describes the murder of Vyshinsky in New York on November 19, 1954, where he was heading Soviet Delegation at the UN at the time, as the last murder of the "Stalinist era." He writes [translation is mine, sorry], "Party leaders replacing Stalin, Beria and Vyshinsky reformed the system at its core. They afforded themselves the right to die from natural causes, even if they were "demoted." It was a new and unseen before trend in the Soviet history. Big Bosses stopped mass murders of members of their organization. Having dismantled the system of mass terror for themselves and for the rest of the population, they tasted peaceful life and from time to time entertained themselves with the local military conflicts on a smaller scale. However, those replacing Brezhnev, refused to mark their role in history as bloody executioners even on the scale of Afghanistan war. The Communist leadership of the USSR lost its nerve. Having hung on for three quarters of the century, it dropped the power as hastily as it had seized it." -
Message 31
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Saturday, 19th September 2009
Suvorovetz,
I think it time to remind people that Russian 'openness' is no more open than other countries and when it comes to State secrets that might be embarrassing, then the Soviets exhibit marked sensitivity(to save ours we have the fifty years rule). I think it too a mistake to believe that the KGB has entirely disappeared from the picture in modern Russia - they have just changed their shirts - and the raking over of the interned secrets would not serve their purpose.
Is it not also important to remember the co-operation between Russia and Germany after 1918 in the development of both aircraft and tanks where secret sites were set up in the USSR in order that Germany contravene the Versailles Treaty?
I now see that the 'Non Aggression' pact should not have come as a surprise to the West and although it might have been seen as an assistance for Germany, it in fact eventually proved a greater service to the USSR.
Regards Spruggles. -
Message 32
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 19th September 2009
Hi, Spruggles I think it too a mistake to believe that the KGB has entirely disappeared from the picture in modern Russia - they have just changed their shirts - and the raking over of the interned secrets would not serve their purpose. The 'Siloviki', or 'Power' organs created by the Bolsheviks (VChKa, NKVD, KGB) eventually grew apart from the Party nomenclature indeed. The highest ever ranking Warsaw Pact intelligence officer defecting to the West, General Pacepa claims that these organs set the stage for seizing power after the eventual collapse of the Communist regimes. This is an interesting exchange that he has participated in:
Is it not also important to remember the co-operation between Russia and Germany after 1918 in the development of both aircraft and tanks where secret sites were set up in the USSR in order that Germany contravene the Versailles Treaty? Absolutely. Brest-Litovsk, Rapallo and Molotov-Ribbentrop Pacts are essentual to understanding the evolvement of Bolshevik and, by extention, the Comintern policies. Both Suvorov and Felshtinsky brilliantly explained it in their work. -
Message 33
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Saturday, 19th September 2009
Hi Thomas,
That´s right, it was the price of the appeasement policy both by the French and the British in the 1930s.
Not really of the appeasement policy, but of what came before: Both appeasement and the relative weakness of the French and British had the same cause, a head start of German rearmament that gave the Third Reich a window of military superiority lasting several years.
During the 1930s, appeasement and re-armament were actually pursued in parallel: The British and French governments starting rearming quickly enough after Hitler came to power. However, because of the low military budgets of the 1920s and the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 1929, they did not have the arms industry needed to create and support large military forces. In the mid-1930s both the British and French took serious steps to boost war production, but it took time to see a result from that. For example, it took two years before the first Spitfire was rolled out from the large new factory at Castle Bromwich, construction of which had begun in July 1938. The same was true for the large orders both the French and British had placed in the US before the war, they discovered that they would have to pay for the expansion of US factories before they could get significant deliveries.
As a know about that treaty, it has been agreed there, that in case of an German attack against Poland, the British and the French had been in obligation to attack Germany on their Western frontiers.
It was not really an obligation, as this military agreement was never backed up by the expected treaty of alliance. But anyway, the basis of this concept was that Poland would be able to hold out long enough to enable France and Britain to gather forces. It specified that French forces would cross the German border four days after mobilization to do a kind of reconnaissance in force (which they did, not very successfully), followed by a serious offensive after fifteen days. But due to Germany's military superiority (and the blunders of the Polish command) the battle of Poland was already lost after two weeks, making an French offensive in its support pointless. Gamelin's decision to abandon this plan was cynical, but not unjustified.
I am not sure, whether the Germans had interfiered in Greece if not the Italians had attacked Greece already.
Probably not. A plan for major operations in the Mediterranean had already been abandoned by the Germans because the Spanish and French refused to cooperate. The Greek dictator Metaxas followed the same foreign policy of cautious neutrality as Franco, and probably would have stuck with it if Mussolini had not decided to invade Greece. Ideologically, the regime was aligned with fascism, giving the Germans little cause for alarm. -
Message 34
Posted by Grand Falcon Railroad (U3267675) on Sunday, 20th September 2009
Personally I think the two major failiures by the WESTERN allies were (a) not to invade Southern France instead of Sicily and (b) not to try and invade Holland to assist with Market Garden operation i.e take Antwerp and then fight along Dutch coast and along the line of the Danish border.
I know (a) would have been a major risk but surely enough air cover could have diverted into that part of the Med when you think just how much sacrifice was used to slog up Italy - and (b) was patently possible. -
Message 35
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Monday, 21st September 2009
Hi suvorovetz,
Thank you for your efforts about the contains of the book which are very interesting. I´ll look up to the internet for some occation to get it some time when available.
Conspiracy Five. Wheather or Not Radek Was Involved in the Murder of K. Liebknecht and L. Luxembourg
Copnspiracy Six. The Mystery of Lenin's Death
Epilogue.
Who is (was) Radek? I´ve got the picture of that assassination that those Free Corps soldiers got their information about where K. Liebknecht and L. Luxembourg were to find by an Informer who wasn´t an Russian. It depends on the version of which side had wrote that story. By the Communists, it had been by the Social Democrats, by the others, by some of an touchable soldier.
There are two films, made by the GDR about Ernst Thälmann and Karl Liebknecht. I watched both and besides that it should be considered that in the regard on how those people has been admired by the Communists in the GDR, their biographies has been passed to the effects for ideologically indoctrination, the films are not bad made (in compare to other - more boring - films). There is only one film, made by the FRG in the 1980´s about Rosa Luxembourg and I regard it as the one and only film, made in West Germany about the biography of an Socialist Woman. Although the whole truth can´t be reconstructed on that, it could be taken as the nearbyest reconstruction. Even when that film shows the whole biography of her.
The problem to find good biographies, and which I regard as good are those without any ideological colour, is very difficult. Either because there are too much left from the GDR, or newer ones hasn´t been written yet. Espacially about Thälmann.
I´ve just seen an documentary about Thälmann on the TV. In that newes documentary there has been shown sides of his character which doesn´t have suited to the picture of the Working class hero as which he has been made by the KPD/SED. It was further stated, that he has been sacked by the KPD Central Commitee for being their leader, but with the intervention of Stalin, Thälmann remained until he has been arrested after the Reichstagsbrand in 1933. From then on, he was in Stalins regard "someone who never existed, like an dead" and an planned plot to free him has been canceled by Stalin in the last minute before the plot had started. Thälmann has been remained as honourable head of the KPD, but was succeeded by Wilhelm Pieck, on Stalins Order.
With the advance of the Red Army in August 1944, the Nazis killed him in the KZ Buchenwald.
I think that there are many things hidden about that time in Russian Archives and on different reasons they might be not lifted too soon in the next decades to come.
Regards
Thomas -
Message 36
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 21st September 2009
Hi, Thomas Who is (was) Radek? I´ve got the picture of that assassination that those Free Corps soldiers got their information about where K. Liebknecht and L. Luxembourg were to find by an Informer who wasn´t an Russian.. Quoting Felshtinsky here: "Succesful revolution in industrial Germany was not in Lenin's interests, because in that case agricultural Russia would take the back seat. Libknecht and Luxembourg headed the new-borne 3rd International. One can only guess what role under this schema would be reserved for Lenin, who has just signed peace treaty with the German Imperial government and – before that – had accepted monetary subsidies from the Germans. Obviously, neither "Left Communists" in Russia, nor “Spartacus” members in Germany would reconcile with Lenin. Lenin’s political career could only be saved by the defeat of the German revolution. That's why Lenin had signed the Brest Treaty in March of 1918; that's why he insisted on adherence to it until the last minute. It is not coincidental that Brest Treaty was dissolved by the VTZKa Decree signed by Sverdlov, and not by the SNK Decree signed by Lenin: Lenin had not been ready to do it even n November of 1918, when Germany lost the world war. For the sake of holding on to power in Russia, Lenin dared to sabotage the German revolution…"
I'll get to Radek and mechanics of the murders later - I'm running out of time now. Sorry -
Message 37
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Tuesday, 22nd September 2009
Hi again, Thomas. Moving on Who is (was) Radek? I´ve got the picture of that assassination that those Free Corps soldiers got their information about where K. Liebknecht and L. Luxembourg were to find by an Informer who wasn´t an Russian Quoting Felshtinsky, "It was important for Lenin that the Revolution was directed by him. Not only the Russian Revolution, but the World Revoulution as well. Neither Lenin, nor Stalin later on, needed autonomus revolutions...Influential wing of the German Communist Party with Rosa Luxembourg at the head opposed to that...Lenin's method was all the same: he fought for his views by splitting those whome he could not control. This is why at the end of December of 1918 Karl Radek - Luxembourg's personal rival from pre-revolutionary times - was sent to Berlin illegally." Felshtinsky further invokes someone Nikolayevsky - a historian and archives collector - who contacted Karl Liebknecht's brother Theodor for unrelated reason in 1947. The latter gave Nikolayevsky some interesting information, which Nikolayevsky repeatedly quoted for years to come (Felshtinsky quotes him alone on a few pages). These are just some snippets:"Theodor told me about his last conversation with Karl Liebknecht, who had told him that he had been sure about Radek's relations with Reichswehr...and considered Radek a traitor. They [Karl and Theodor] planned to meet on the next day, so that Karl would relay all the details, but Karl Liebknecht was arrested and murdered overnight..." And on and on - along with some other names like the mentioned by you Pieck, Karl Moor and other characters. Let me quote the last paragraph of this chapter, though:
"...[at the end of 1919 Radek] discussed National-Bolshevism with the officer of the German Military Intelligence Colonel Bauer and Rear-Admiral von Hintze arguing that..."Lenin wishes an alliance with Germany against the victorious Western states." This was a continuation of Lenin's Brest policy. The pre-revolutionary secret German-Bolshevik relations had been its basis. Rapallo Treaty and secret German-Soviet military cooperation undermining Versailles Treaty would be its future. The Soviet-German Pact dividing Europe signed in 1939 by Molotov and Ribbentrop would become its apogee. 'The line of political relations between Germany and Russia stretching from Brest-Litovsk to August 23, 1939 and June 22, 1941... although seemingly convoluted, is a straight line in actuality. It is the line of a secret agreement, a criminal conspiracy!' This is how Theodor Liebknecht, who investigated the murder of his brother for the rest of his life, concluded his diary." Felshtinsky then provides his source for this one: "Theodor Liebknecht's Notes" - along with 40 other sources. -
Message 38
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Wednesday, 23rd September 2009
Hi suvorovetz,
Thank you for your long reply and the quotes from the book. This quotations makes sense and as far as I remember from the documentaries / films I´ve seen, it suits to them.
In the depictions of Lenin, according to the most told parts of his biography, the spot has been mostly on his practice on those of "whome he could not control". I can´t remember of any link in that neither towards Karl Liebknecht nor to Rosa Luxembourg.
I take the quotations from the book as probably the way how it could have went. The mentioned co-operation between the Reichswehr and the Red Army after WWI might be one thing to add on the traces and its affects of the time line from 1918 to 1941.
I found it always very remarkable that just those militarians of the German Reichswehr, in which surely some soldiers might have served who brought the revolution of 1918/1919 in Germany down, dealt with the hated Bolshevics. More remarkable than this is, that even after Hitler came to power, the co-operation continued. What I´ve read about that wasn´t so much in that details. But the things that are written in Felshtinsky´s book, which describes the point of view and the aims from the Soviet side, brings more up which is worth to think about.
I´ll still searching from time to time to get a copy of that book in English or in German language. -
Message 39
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Wednesday, 23rd September 2009
Hello Mutatis_Mutandis,
Excuse the late reply to your message, but nevertheless, thanks for that.
Not really of the appeasement policy, but of what came before: Both appeasement and the relative weakness of the French and British had the same cause, a head start of German rearmament that gave the Third Reich a window of military superiority lasting several years.</quote>
They both might had at least to recognize the rearmament of Germany first in 1936 when they re-occupiet the Rhineland for stationing German Forces in the de-militarized zone. But they did nothing, because it has been regared by both to handle it as an inner German affaire. The second occation was two years after, March 1938 the annex of Austria, the third the big military parade at Hitlers 50th birthday in Berlin in April 1939.
<quote>For example, it took two years before the first Spitfire was rolled out from the large new factory at Castle Bromwich, construction of which had begun in July 1938.</quote>
This might had been avoided by an strikly reaction of the British and the French towards Germany regarding the Rhineland affaire, if it had taken place in 1936.
<quote>It was not really an obligation, as this military agreement was never backed up by the expected treaty of alliance. But anyway, the basis of this concept was that Poland would be able to hold out long enough to enable France and Britain to gather forces. It specified that French forces would cross the German border four days after mobilization to do a kind of reconnaissance in force (which they did, not very successfully), followed by a serious offensive after fifteen days. But due to Germany's military superiority (and the blunders of the Polish command) the battle of Poland was already lost after two weeks, making an French offensive in its support pointless. Gamelin's decision to abandon this plan was cynical, but not unjustified.</quote>
I regard that military agreement more as an deterrence towards Germany to do not risk a war with Poland, but the French and the British did within the then past three years to many good will actions to appeace Hitler as that he might regarded that agreement for serious. The Hitler-Stalin-Pact cleares for him the way to have a go on Poland without to fear an second front in the West while invading Poland. Regarding to how it went in the West in 1939, he might had been nearly right, but the war declaration of the UK and France shocked him. Maybe the last chance to bring the starting WWII to an early end before its developing has started.
<quote>The Greek dictator Metaxas followed the same foreign policy of cautious neutrality as Franco, and probably would have stuck with it if Mussolini had not decided to invade Greece. Ideologically, the regime was aligned with fascism, giving the Germans little cause for alarm.</quote>
I know too less about Greek history than I could response on that paragraph. -
Message 40
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 23rd September 2009
Hi, Thomas I found it always very remarkable that just those militarians of the German Reichswehr, in which surely some soldiers might have served who brought the revolution of 1918/1919 in Germany down, dealt with the hated Bolshevics. More remarkable than this is, that even after Hitler came to power, the co-operation continued. This is exactly the point that had been completely neglected until Suvorov, Felshtinsky and Co zoomed in on it. There were parties and fractions in both Russia and Germany that cooperated against their respective rivals in both countries regardless of the supposed political orientation as in "left vs right." As Anthony Sutton perceptively remarked in his book "National Suicide", "left vs right" is but a Hegelian trap. Political expediency and power struggle shaped ideology more so than the other way around. But here's the link to this thread: it is impossible to even begin to understand the origins of the Second World War without considering the line from Brest-Litovsk on to Rapallo and on to Moscow, August 23, 1939.
-
Message 41
Posted by Thomas_B (U1667093) on Wednesday, 23rd September 2009
Hi suvorovetz,
To continue our conversation I´ve opened an extra thread on the history hub board with the title:"Suvorov, Felshtinsky and the history of the USSR".
I had no better idea about the title, but it might gives us more freedom to discuss matters which are all related to the history of the USSR, without regarding any narrow sighten path on an specific topic.
I like to invite you to continue our posts there. My response to your last post on these thread you can found on the new thread.
Regards
Thomas -
Message 42
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Friday, 25th September 2009
Would it be possible to have more of a public debate and less of these private conversations that are designed to exclude rather than include?
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