Wars and ConflictsÌý permalink
Sept 1, 1939
This discussion has been closed.
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Message 1.Ìý
Posted by Grand Falcon Railroad (U3267675) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
70 years since the Wehrmacht attacked Poland - it's weird as I sit here that vast tracts of Poland (given time difference) were already under the jackboot of Nazi control and that they would remain under dictatorial dominsation for about 55 years (1939-1992).
What's worse is knowing that for 6 months we did effectivly nothing to solve the problem - I can live with appeasement pre-War (it was wrong but rose-tinted spectacles and all that) but during the war, doing nowt to solve the problems in the key Theatre of Operations are unforgivable. -
Message 2
Posted by poppyanddaisy (U14107848) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
Dont think there was a lot that could have been done realistically. Time to have acted was at Munich as Germany would have probably backed down - though there was neither the will or the will to do anything particularly with the French whose tactics and attitude to the coming conflict was defeatest and negative
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Message 3
Posted by Vizzer aka U_numbers (U2011621) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
they would remain under dictatorial dominsation for about 55 years (1939-1992)Ìý
Let's not forget that the Second Polish Republic (despite the name) was no democracy in 1939. It had effectively been a military dictatorship since the May Coup in 1926. So in terms of democracy Poland was out of the picture from 1926-1990 (i.e. 64 years).
What's worse is knowing that for 6 months we did effectivly nothing to solve the problem - I can live with appeasement pre-War (it was wrong but rose-tinted spectacles and all that) but during the war, doing nowt to solve the problems in the key Theatre of Operations are unforgivable.Ìý
The irony of this, of course, is that neighbouring Czechoslovakia (which was indeed a democracy) had been carved up with the collusion of the UK. In fact Poland had joined in with Germany in the carve up and Poland had invaded and annexed the Czech region of Teschen. -
Message 4
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
Proof again that the concept of 'Right and Wrong' has no meaning in politics or warfare.
There is 'Desirable', 'Possible', 'in our interests', etc, but any politician allowing 'right & wrong' to influence their decision making is imposing a severe handicap on themselves and their countries. -
Message 5
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
"...Proof again that the concept of 'Right and Wrong' has no meaning in politics or warfare..."
Well, there is certainly wrong. Unless you take a neutral stance on wars of aggression and war crimes, which I suppose was not your intention.
Politics is the art of the possible. Interfering in Czechoslovakia and, directly, in Poland was simply impossible.
What must be remembered is what the self interests of the British and French were in 1938/9. Nazism was a direct threat to both countries. That is why we gave the guarantees to Poland, not some sense that we ought to make a sacrifice for the sake of the Polish people. British, French and Polish interests coincided.
Protecting small states from larger ones, as happened in Kuwait in 1990/1 only happens if the protectors can muster sufficient strength to overwhelm the aggressor. Otherwise, self interest kicks in. -
Message 6
Posted by Laura988 (U14088665) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
<quote>Dont think there was a lot that could have been done realistically. <quote/>
Please do not tell me that one of the greatest world powers of that time was not able to do more to help Poland. The inconviniet truth is that England and France simply didn't want to do anything. Remember the famouse sentence "We are not going to die for Danzig" ?
But that's ok, I can understand that. Something I cannot understand is that first you give guaranees to sb and then you act as if those guarantees didn't exist. It's not a very honourable behaviour.
and - by the way - democracy in so-called Eastern Europe was restored in 1989, not in 1992. -
Message 7
Posted by Vizzer aka U_numbers (U2011621) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
The inconviniet truth is that England and France simply didn't want to do anything.Ìý
When you say 'England' here do you mean the UK? -
Message 8
Posted by poppyanddaisy (U14107848) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
Surely History should be interpretation of facts from an impartial viewpoint - once morals are mixed in we get very clouded views - it is meant to be a purely objective study
Remember that there is a danger of judging people throughout history by our standards - what ever they may be - which is in itself a misconception of history - people are a product of their times - values and beliefs often no longer exist in the present day - and many of ours may be discredited in the future -
Message 9
Posted by Laura988 (U14088665) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
Surely you are right. I just think that there is a set of universal values that should be respected in any times. Keeping one's promises is one of them.
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Message 10
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
"...Surely History should be interpretation of facts from an impartial viewpoint - once morals are mixed in we get very clouded views - it is meant to be a purely objective study
Remember that there is a danger of judging people throughout history by our standards - what ever they may be - which is in itself a misconception of history - people are a product of their times - values and beliefs often no longer exist in the present day - and many of ours may be discredited in the future..."
Understanding history should, in my view, entail a process. You first must obtain as many facts as possible, then you must apply interpretation. Interpretation MUST include morality, at least to some degree.
The facts include understanding the world view of the participants, but to think that we can discard morality is to miss the point of studying history. Hitler was no more acting by the standards of his day than a modern day murderer is. Whatever anyone says, I intend to take a moral viewpoint.
However, that does not mean that the British and French behaved immorally in failing to support Czechoslovakia. If the practical situation means that interfering was impossible, then failing to interfere is not immoral, but counter productive. A very different conclusion. -
Message 11
Posted by Laura988 (U14088665) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
Why it was impossible?
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Message 12
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
Laura,
It's been an interesting exchange in the media between Putin and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former stating that Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was wrong, but it would not have been "necessary" without the Munich Agreement, and Brzezinski essentially agreeing with some reservations. I was going to ask how he (Brzezinski that is) is being viewed in Poland? -
Message 13
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
In 1938 the British and French were simply not equipped to take on the Germans. Un-like the Germans, we had not been re-arming , as they had by then, for 6 years. The British and French only really started around 1937/ early 1938.
We were busy re-arming, but had not progressed nearly enough.
In 1939, when we did declare war to 'help poor little Poland', we had barely enough to look after ourselves. The French, rather famously, could not even do that.
Providing military assistance to the Poles in such a way as to prevent their being over-run was impossible. We could neither send men, who would have been cut off and destroyed if they arrived, nor send sufficient war supplies, even if we could actually get it there. -
Message 14
Posted by poppyanddaisy (U14107848) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
Surely you are right. I just think that there is a set of universal values that should be respected in any times. Keeping one's promises is one of them.
Machiavelli might disagree with you on that one ! Sometimes the most apparently virtuous of historical figures fall way short of this.
In my experience (cynical I know) where a figure appears squeaky clean - almost saintly - it is too good to be true - Mandella, Kennedy, King - point is I am suspicious of great men/women. Historical figures are flawed as much as anybody else - and in many cases moreso - Churchill, voted the greatest Briton (even though half American)- may have been the man of the moment in WWII - but also supported the mobilisation of the army against the General Strike - which leaves him falling short to many !!. Elisabeth I - Golden Age etc - let her sailors perish of desease and starvation after the defeat of the Armada as she could not afford to pay them .............. -
Message 15
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
poppyanddaisy,
Whilst I might agree with your sentiments concerning morality I think it right to point out that international diplomacy has no moral basis. It exists solely to squeeze as much benefit for the home country as possible by what ever means at its disposal. That includes negotiation by stealth or coercion with other states despite their human rights history or their politics.
A history of the Twentieth Century will prove how many times so called democracies have allowed themselves the luxuries of supporting regimes(and killing women and children in the process)with appalling records because it was either economic or politically expedient.
A furore has exploded in the press recently because a convicted terrorist has been released from prison but did he act alone or was it with the tacit agreement with the head of state or his representatives? But we will continue to trade with them because they have something we need badly. Anyone remember a woman police officer who was shot and killed outside a certain embassy? Politicians will not remember because moral justice for her and her family will not be allowed to stand in the face of future trade.
And if we insist(for example)on this country providing us with the guilty party and this results in a loss of trade agreements, will you join the protests at the inevitable rise in fuel prices? -
Message 16
Posted by Charles Babbage (U2239092) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
I've often wondered how the Poles would have reacted had France and Britain not made their guarantees. Surely they would have realised that their situation was hopeless and been prepared to make some major concessions to Germany and/or the Soviets as a result.
Believing that the French, with what was believed to be the strongest army in Europe, would throw "le gros de nos forces" (the bulk of our forces) against Germany in the West if they held out the Germans for 15 days - something the French never intended - put the Poles in the worst of all possible worlds. -
Message 17
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
No amount of concessions would have prevented the Poles being swallowed up by Hitler and Stalin.
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Message 18
Posted by Charles Babbage (U2239092) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
Probably not. But maybe a quick surrender might have meant a somewhat less brutal occupation as existed say in the Czech republic? Who knows?
Getting the Poles on the allies side was somewhat valuable in defeating Hitler. But from a purely Polish perspective, giving the guarantees and not acting on them was, in the short term at the very least, the worst of all possible alternatives. -
Message 19
Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
i always do a what if when this is mentioned - ie what could we have done for poland
my "what if" is - what if france was led by someone as aggressive and capable as Napoleon
2/3 of the wehrmacht and all its panzer divisions are away in poland - its a dead cert that he would have thrown every french division into germany and ww2 is over - unless they decide to colonise poland lol
st -
Message 20
Posted by Charles Babbage (U2239092) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
<QUOTE/> its a dead cert that he would have thrown every french division into germany and ww2 is over </QUOTE><BR /><BR />Never to be called WW2.<BR /><BR /><QUOTE/> unless they decide to colonise poland </QUOTE><BR /><BR />or maybe it would be.....
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Message 21
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
France was in a "Maginot Line" mentality so even a Napoleon would have made no difference. The best general (or colonel) in the French Army was sentenced to death in absentia. No country such as Poland which had the largest Jewish population in Europe could have expected "a less brutal occupation".
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Message 22
Posted by Laura988 (U14088665) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
TimTrack,
Ok, you presented your version but let me tell you what I (and Poles in general) know about the issue:
In September 1939 almost all German forces were engaged in Poland. On the other hand France had 74 divisions vs. only 40 units of Wehrmacht (those units had enough munition merely for a 3-day- fight). If British air forces might have not been strong enough to get to Poland they could have at least bombed German cities (instead they were dropping leaflets). if such a combined action had taken place Hitler would have been in big troubles (what himself he admitted).
But our allies didn't do anything though they were obliged to such action by security guaranees. In brief that's why we feel betrayed.
This is not only Polish opinion. For example Alphonse Juin (considered one of the most outstanding commanders during WWII and the future marshal of France) said; " Why didn't we attack immediately on our front, when German forces invaded Poland? What an unimaginable mistake! What a dishonour ! From the strategic point of view we committed a serious mistake. There was no risk. All the German panzer divisions, except for one, were busy in Poland. Germans had almost no forces against us. It was the moment to assume an offensive and break through the Siegfried line which was merely a bluff" (The source is R. Chambe, 'Le Marechal Juin'). -
Message 23
Posted by Laura988 (U14088665) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
I've often wondered how the Poles would have reacted had France and Britain not made their guarantees.Ìý
Charles,
I guess the war would have started anyway. But perhaps the so-called 'September-campaign' wouldn't have lasted as long as it did in fact when "poor little Poland" was waiting in vain for any help from the part of its allies. Probably after a couple of days the country would have surrendered. Therefore Polish losses (70 000 killed, 130 000 wounded and missing, 620 000 POWs not to mention ruined cities and villages)would have been much smaller. -
Message 24
Posted by Laura988 (U14088665) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
I was going to ask how he (Brzezinski that is) is being viewed in Poland?Ìý
Suvorovetz,
Brzezinski is considered as one of those 'great Poles' and a true authority on international relations. He is especially appreciated for a job he did lobbying for the Polish membership in NATO. -
Message 25
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009
Brzezinski is considered as one of those 'great Poles' and a true authority on international relations.Ìý Good for him, but I can't help but point out that he was in charge of one of the most hapless foreign policy stints in American history under Carter. How is he getting away with this?
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Message 26
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Wednesday, 2nd September 2009
Laura : "...In September 1939 almost all German forces were engaged in Poland. On the other hand France had 74 divisions vs. only 40 units of Wehrmacht (those units had enough munition merely for a 3-day- fight)...."
40 units (actually, divisions) in the West, is not the same as saying 'almost all German forces were engaged in Poland'. If Britain and France had attacked in 1939, those 40 divisions would have held their line for long enough for Poland to be defeated and the units fighting there to be brought across Germany. I doubt that the allies knew the German ammunition situation.
No amount of bombing of cities would have made the slightest difference to Poland's situation. Actually, city bombing did not get going until after the Battle of Britain, when Germany started such raids, legitimising city busying raids for the allies. But this is a long term attritional policy. It is not a tactical battle winner.
When French generals talk about honour, it is time for their men to find a ditch to hide in. Honour losses modern wars, it does not win them. I suspect marechal juin was posturing for the sake of his own reputation. -
Message 27
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Wednesday, 2nd September 2009
Actually, city bombing did not get going until after the Battle of Britain, when Germany started such raidsÌý
Errr, no. City bombing got started in 1915 with the first Zeppelin raids on London and the east coast ports which continued throughout WWI (this followed on from the naval bombardment of Hatrlepool, Whitby, Scarborough and Great Yarmouth in 1914 - Paris had also been indiscriminately shelled by artillery in the siege of 1871). The first raid by aeroplanes on a civilian target was on Folkestone on 25 May 1917 in which 300 were killed by Gotha bombers carrying 1100lb bombs. 3 weeks later London was attacked and 600 were killed.
Guernica, a small town in the Basque region of Spain, was almost totally destroyed on 28 April 1937 in three raids by 43 bombers of the Condor Legion dropping 40 tons of bombs. The Condor Legion also subsequently bombed Madrid and Barcelona. The Japanese Air Force also indiscriminately bombed Shanghai and Nanking and many other cities during the Japanese invasion of China from 1937 onwards.
If you meant to add "in WWII" what about Warsaw? Rotterdam? Churchill was right about German bombing tactics when he said in a speech given in 1941:
"Where you were the least resisted, there you were the most brutal." -
Message 28
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Wednesday, 2nd September 2009
"...If you meant to add "in WWII" what about Warsaw? Rotterdam?..."
Well, yes, I meant WW2. The attacks on civilians in WW1 were part of the moral revulsion against such bombing* that the British military were still to overcome. Rotterdam occurred during the Battle of Britain, Warsaw happened as part of the events that we are talking about.
Neither event could really have influenced bomber tactics in September 1939. It was attacks on British cities that influenced the public to go along with city busting tactics.
* Of Europeans, that is. What happens in Afghanistan stays in Afghanistan. -
Message 29
Posted by Laura988 (U14088665) on Wednesday, 2nd September 2009
40 units (actually, divisions) in the West, is not the same as saying 'almost all German forces were engaged in Poland'.Ìý
Not exactly. Those units or divisions were mainly reserve ones. ALL the panzer divisions were sent to Poland. if you think of 74 French divisions it's still twice as many as on the German side...
No amount of bombing of cities would have made the slightest difference to Poland's situation.Ìý
In my opinion it would have made a difference (like any bombing of enemy's territory). At least Hitler would know he cannot go on unpunished.
Anyway: did the allies have means to help Poland in 1939? YES
Did they do it? NO
We regard it as a betrayal but you of course may view it in a different way. -
Message 30
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Wednesday, 2nd September 2009
Spruggles,
You sum it up beautifully - politics is the art of expediency, (usually short-term expediency in a democracy!) where an 'valid reason' can be found for almost any action that 'needs to be done' in the view of those in power. Horror at any action, or gratitude for any help, can be quietly brushed under the carpet at a later date, if 'the wind changes'.
I do not rule out the need for a moral perspective on history, an idea of 'right and wrong' - I just seldom see it having been a major influence on the actions of world leaders.
In the case of 1939, Britain did not have any troops 'sur le continent' (as JY used to say), and by the time they could have been mobilized, the battle for Poland was unwinnable.
Maybe throwing every French soldier across the Rhine in the first week in Sept might have helped, but that is not something that can be done at a moments notice, even if the political will and agressive military leadership were present, and would have been inviting disaster. They tried that in 1914, and I think it resulted in their worst month's casualties in the entire WW1!
OK, Maybe they should not have made promises they could not keep, but they probably hoped Hitler would not realise they were bluffing. Notice how much help the USA gave it's 'friend' Georgia when Russia invaded a while back? -
Message 31
Posted by Vizzer aka U_numbers (U2011621) on Wednesday, 2nd September 2009
City bombing got started in 1915 with the first Zeppelin raids on London and the east coast ports which continued throughout WWI (this followed on from the naval bombardment of Hatrlepool, Whitby, Scarborough and Great Yarmouth in 1914Ìý
The UK navy had been bombarding coastal cities around the world throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. One of the worst incidents was in 1807 when during 3 days of shelling of Copenhagen over 2,000 Danish civilians were killed.
And it wasn't just the British who were at it.
The military bombardment of cities had also been a common feature during the wars of the 16th and 17th centuries such as during the Thirty Years War and the Nine Years War etc. For example there was the bombardments of Magdeburg in 1631 and of Brussels in 1695. In the case of Magdeburg thousands of civilians died during the siege and over 20,000 civilians were then massacred after the fall of the city. -
Message 32
Posted by poppyanddaisy (U14107848) on Wednesday, 2nd September 2009
Understanding history should, in my view, entail a process. You first must obtain as many facts as possible, then you must apply interpretation. Interpretation MUST include morality, at least to some degree.
I think we may disagree to some point on "should". I admit it would be impossible (from a decent human viewpoint) to speak of Hitler without regard to morality - out of the ordinary - perhaps so - though not a freak of nature given Stalin, Lenin, Franco, Vichy, Musselini. Bullock made a valiant attempt in his work - whilst including chapters that presented his feelings on the matter. That would be the approach I would favour. We should avoid any historical discussion /argument becoming a moral crusade or rant (nothing inferred) - leave that for the Ethics Messageboard.
Of course History is interpretation - otherwise it would simply be a list of facts - and it is with this interpretation where there is the interest !
Morality changes with time and therefore if any hostorical writer insists in including it - if limits the value of their work over time. -
Message 33
Posted by poppyanddaisy (U14107848) on Wednesday, 2nd September 2009
On my last point I recall studying for A-Level on the struggle for India - referring to a book by Basil somebody or other - think it was called "The Struggle for India" - or something ....... great book for the facts and putting them all in order - pretty amusing for the Rule Brittania ethics - very Victorian
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Message 34
Posted by Steelers708 (U1831340) on Wednesday, 2nd September 2009
Laura988 & Timtrack,
You are both throwing numbers of divisions about without looking at the facts behind the numbers.
Facing the French the Germans had ArmeeGruppe C, consisting of:
1st Armee:
16 Infantry divisions of which:
7 were 1st Welle (wave)
4 were 2nd Welle
5 were 3rd Welle
5th Armee:
11 Infantry divisions of which:
3 were 1st Welle (wave)
5 were 2nd Welle
3 were 3rd Welle
7th Armee:
5 Infantry divisions of which:
2 were 1st Welle (wave)
1 were 2nd Welle
2 were 3rd Welle
ArmeeGruppe Reserve:
1 Infantry division - 2nd Welle
Also Assigned were 11 Infantry divisions from OKH Reserve all of which belonged to the 4th Welle.
That a total of 44 Infantry divisions of which:
12 were 1st Welle
10 were 2nd welle
11 were 3rd Welle
11 were 4th Welle
Geman mobilization Welle (waves)
Welle
1 formed 1934-38 peace time army units.
2 formed Aug 1939 from reservists
3 formed Aug 1939 from Landwehr (older personnel)
4 formed Aug 1939 from reserve units
You can see from the above that only the 1st Welle divisions would have been at full strength and fully trained, the further down the Welle you go the more training would be required to bring it upto fully active status.
The same is true of the French Army.
The French didn't start to mobilize until midnight on the 1st September.
At that point the 'Regular' Metropolotan Army consisted of 33 divisions:
7 Motorised Infantry
10 Infantry
3 Mountain Infantry
4 North African Infantry
4 Colonial infantry
3 Cavalry
2 Light Mechanized
The scheduled mobilisation plan for France, North Africa and the Levant was as follows:
Mobilisation day being midnight 1st september.
M+7
36 Infantry
2 Motorised Infantry
3 Cavalry
Total 41
M+12
58 Infantry
2 Motorised Infantry
3 Cavalry
Total 63
M+17
78 Infantry
2 Motorised Infantry
3 Cavalry
Total 83
M+22
81 Infantry
2 Motorised Infantry
3 Cavalry
Total 86
By M+22, 24th September, the plan called for the following deployment:
North East & Jura
23 Infantry (Regular)
19 Infantry (Series A)
9 Infantry (Series b)
2 Motorised Infantry
3 Cavalry
South East
5 Infantry (Regular)
2 Infantry (Seriers A)
2 Infantry (Series B)
French Interior
7 Infantry (Series B)
With a further 14 divisions in North Africa.
As with the Germans the 'regular' Metropolitan Army were peacetime troops with full complements of Officers and NCO's.
Series A divisions had a slightly smaller complement of Officers and NCO's and were made up of reservists.
Series B divisions had an even lower complement of Officers and NCO's, only a few regular officers per regiment, and were made up of the oldest military classes, their ranks having an average age of 36.
Colonel Goutard commented that the regular divisions and those in the Series A "were generally in good shape", but the Series B divisions "were very mediocre, and were quite incapable of taking part in a campaign before further training".
The French did mount a minor attack into the Saar area, and had plans to expand the attack at a later date, but by then Poland had almost fallen and so it was called off.
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Message 35
Posted by Steelers708 (U1831340) on Wednesday, 2nd September 2009
TimTrack,
"Rotterdam occurred during the Battle of Britain"
Rotterdam was bombed on the 14th May 1940, the Battle of Britain didn't start until 10th July 1940. -
Message 36
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Wednesday, 2nd September 2009
Quite, as "Bomber" Harris said in one of the most widely cheered newsreel films of the war:
"The Germans have been under the illusion that they can bomb anyone they like but noone can bomb them, well they have sown the wind the time has come for them to reap the whirlwind." -
Message 37
Posted by factor13 (U14125104) on Wednesday, 2nd September 2009
TimTrack: "Actually, city bombing did not get going until after the Battle of Britain"
City bombing in WW2 actually began with the very first act of the war - the German attack on the Polish town of Wielun at 04:40 on 1st September 1939.
German carpet bombing killed an estimated 1300 civilians, injured hundreds more and destroyed 75% per of the town centre. It is widely acknowledged that there were no targets of any importance in the area such as military installations or industrial facilities. The casualty rate was more than twice as high as Guernica.
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Message 38
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Wednesday, 2nd September 2009
Its a terribly unhistorical and way of putting it........
But in regards to Poland I sometimes feel that Chambeleine called Hitlers "bluff" so to speak.
Hitler didnt expect the UK to go to war. -
Message 39
Posted by Grand Falcon Railroad (U3267675) on Thursday, 3rd September 2009
Ive not had a chance to contribute til now but here goes....
I can (a) not understand why the French and British didn't get as much accross the Channel and then attack Germany whichever way they could - after all that's what war is all about. Surely if they couldn't have invaded accross the "Siegfried Line" then they should have used the Â鶹ԼÅÄ Fleet to shell the Northern coast of Germany (after all it's only 2 days steaming from most of the North Sea coast).
(b) if neither of the above were going to happen then we should have at least tried to bomb the obvious targets in Germany e.g. major rail junctions, airfields - a high price might have been paid but if airfields around say Munich and Nuremburg were being bombed from Day 1 i.e. Sept 3/39 then maybe Hitler might have known straight off that we meant it (rather than wait in effect 4 months to find that out).
A what if....if Chamberlain and the French had said we can't atatck Germany yet and then the Sovs had gate-crashed the party in Mid September then how would that have altered our perception of "the war"? -
Message 40
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Thursday, 3rd September 2009
I can (a) not understand why the French and British didn't get as much accross the Channel and then attack Germany whichever way they could - after all that's what war is all about. Surely if they couldn't have invaded accross the "Siegfried Line" then they should have used the Â鶹ԼÅÄ Fleet to shell the Northern coast of Germany (after all it's only 2 days steaming from most of the North Sea coast).
Ìý
The chances of the Â鶹ԼÅÄ Fleet getting that close without being detected in 1939 are extremely low.In 1914 maybe,but not 1939.Aircraft would have it nigh on impossible.Ok the supremacy of aircraft had yet to be proved ,but even the most "pro gun" admiral would be loathe to sail that close to Germany within the range of a very large number of aircraft.Even if the aircraft didnt sink the ships,they would spot them and although aircraft may have been an unknown quantity at this point,u- boats would not be.Even in 1914 sailing close to the German coast was recognised as very high risk,yes their was the Battle of Heligoland Bight,but that could have ended up a real disater for the RN.
b) if neither of the above were going to happen then we should have at least tried to bomb the obvious targets in Germany e.g. major rail junctions, airfields - a high price might have been paid but if airfields around say Munich and Nuremburg were being bombed from Day 1 i.e. Sept 3/39 then maybe Hitler might have known straight off that we meant it (rather than wait in effect 4 months to find that out).Ìý
Because I think that both the UK and France hoped that they could step away from the precipice of total war through diplomacy or bargaining.That would be nigh on impossible if Germany was bombed.
What would have been intersting is what would have happened if the "Saar" offensive had actually pushed into Germany whilst she was beating up Poland. -
Message 41
Posted by Grand Falcon Railroad (U3267675) on Thursday, 3rd September 2009
I'll grant you on consideration the first point - maybe a bit iffy (tho the RAF maybe could have given some protection flying from France possibly?)
but "Because I think that both the UK and France hoped that they could step away from the precipice of total war through diplomacy or bargaining."
Then they could have let Poland go (and then they'd have seen Sovs invade) and we might have fought WW2 against the Sovs allied to Germany and Finland! -
Message 42
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Thursday, 3rd September 2009
The only aircraft the RAF could realistically have used as 'protection' were Hurricane fighters, which had a very short range. Only a few squadrons were in France, and they were only sent over after the outbreak. (The German ME109s had hardly enough range to protect their bombers over London in the Battle of Britain)
There is no way the RAF could have maintained any sort of permanent cover over the fleet off Bremen or Hamburg, and any less than a permanent cover would be useless. They sent a few daylight bomber raids to N. Germany early in the war, and they suffered very heavy losses.
It is easy to see the 'mistakes' 60 years on - not so easy to pick the correct option when faced with inadequate information, and inadequate resources. -
Message 43
Posted by Idamante (U1894562) on Thursday, 3rd September 2009
I'm just guessing but ... I would assume that the reason the French & British didn't help Poland was because they were following the strategic plan they had worked out before the war started, and that plan was about defending France rather than helping Poland. Making random attacks on German targets with ships or aircraft would have prevented them playing whatever role they were supposed to play in the agreed overall strategy.
War plans take a long time to work out because you need detailed orders for all the different units involved - you can't just make them up as you go along after the war has started.
Of course in retrospect the Allies should have had a 'plan B' ready to cover the possibility of a German attack in the East. But maybe they thought (a)the policy of appeasement would prevent that happening anyway or (b) the USSR could be relied on to deter any German move Eastwards? -
Message 44
Posted by Idamante (U1894562) on Thursday, 3rd September 2009
Following on from previous post - Another obvious point is that even if a French invasion of Germany was feasible it would have looked far more risky than the defensive option that they actually went for. After all the reason they adopted the defensive Maginot Line approach was because the offensive strategy they had used at the start of the previous war had been so disastrous.
Given the choice, as French commander which option would YOU have preferred? -
Message 45
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Thursday, 3rd September 2009
It was thought that the guarantee itself, with the implied threat of war with France and Britain, would be sufficient to deter Hitler from attacking Poland as were simillar guarantees given simultaneously by Chamberlain in April 1939 to Rumania and Greece which Britain could not help militarily either (although in fact Churchill, mindful of the failure to assist Poland, did send support to Greece, after the Greeks had asked for it on the basis of Chamberlain's guarantee, when they were invaded by Hitler in April 1941, despite the fact that it jeopardised our position in North Africa.
However as the summer of 1939 wore on and it was clear that Hitler was increasing, rather than reducing, his threats against Poland the British pressed the Poles to accept Russian military support. However Stalin was only prepared to offer such support if the Poles were to accept Soviet troops in Poland in advance of any German invasion. In view of the fact that they had only beaten back the Red Army from the gates of Warsaw as recently as 1920 the Poles were considerably reluctant to accept plus the fact that they reasonably considered that such a move, far from deterring Hitler, would provide him with a casus belli.
Britain and France had in mind an agreement between the Soviet Union and Poland similar to that they which they had with Belgium whereby the Poles would admit Soviet troops to take up prepared positions in the wake of a German invasion. A military mission under Admiral Drax was sent to Moscow mainly to discuss possible aid to Poland in August 1939.
However, Stalin, suspicious of Allied motives, decided to respond to overtures from Ribbentrop instead and Drax returned home without seeing the Soviet leader. With the cancellation of Soviet aid there was no realistic possibility of Poland being assissted. Appeasement as a diplomatic policy had been abandoned after Hitler had occupied the remaining part of Czechoslovakia in violation of the Munich Agreement in March 1939. -
Message 46
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Thursday, 3rd September 2009
I sometimes feel that Chambeleine called Hitlers "bluff" so to speak.
Hitler didnt expect the UK to go to war.Ìý
Having met Chamberlain on three occasions Hitler formed the correct assessment of Chamberlain that he had no taste for war and would be unlikely to sustain Britain in any war for any prolonged period particularly if it went unfavourably. However Hitler had always planned to attack and defeat France and avenge the shame of 1918 (he himself had fought on the Western, not the Eastern, Front as a soldier in WWI). He would have been very naive to assume that an attack on France and the Low Countries would not have also involved Britain in the war as it had done on several occasions previously.
His only surprise was that Britain attached so much importance to Poland. However Britain posed no great military threat since her land forces were insignificant, her air force primarily defensive and Germany's increased U-boat fleet counteracted the strength of the Royal Navy. Hitler thought that once France fell Britain would make a peace deal. Had Chamberlain remained in office that judgment might well have been borne out too.
I believe it was rather Hitler who called Chamberlain's bluff since his personal judgment of Chamberlain was largely vindicated whereas Chamberlain's judgment of Hitler, whom he thought, for all his bluster, would always consider an all-out war too risky, proved hopelessly wide of the mark.
In the end what Hitler misjudged was the British political system which was able to remove Chamberlain relatively swiftly when disaster beckoned and replace him with a leader in no mood for compromise and the spirit of the British people themselves which stood in stark contrast to that of the French. -
Message 47
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 3rd September 2009
Allan D A military mission under Admiral Drax was sent to Moscow mainly to discuss possible aid to Poland in August 1939. However, Stalin, suspicious of Allied motives, decided to respond to overtures from Ribbentrop instead and Drax returned home without seeing the Soviet leader.Ìý It is quite naive to believe that Stalin had any misgivings about the "Allied motives" or their intentions. Keistut Zakoretsky in his usual meticulous manner showed quite convincingly that Moscow negotiations with the French and the British missions were a sham from the beginning to the end. Stalin had been in contact with Hitler at least since the autumn of 1938 already, and Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was not put together in a hurry, as it may appear.
-
Message 48
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Thursday, 3rd September 2009
"...I believe it was rather Hitler who called Chamberlain's bluff since his personal judgment of Chamberlain..."
I dis-agree. Hitler thought that neither Britain nor France would go to war over Poland. Hitler's immediate ambitions lay not in France, but to the East. That is why Poland had to be attacked. It was a stepping stone to the great farming lands of the western Soviet Union. He thought that the western democracies could be dealt with afterwards, once the resources to the East were secured.
It is a little strange to suggest Hitler called Chamberlain's bluff, given that it was not a bluff. We did go to war when Poland was attacked.
Hitler allowed his distaste for the racial make up of Poland to colour his interpretation of what Britain and France would do. Why should anyone, after all, fight for such obviously 'racially inferior' peoples ? -
Message 49
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Thursday, 3rd September 2009
Quite right, Suvo, but I believe Stalin kept his options open until the last minute and at least gave the appearance of playing one side against the other in order to extract the best possible price.
In the end, Chamberlain had only been driven to dealing with the Soviets by the geographical imperatives of the Polish guarantee and by political pressure from the official opposition and within his own party (Churchill was an enthusiastic advocate of a Soviet alliance) and it was against his instincts and better judgment as he saw Stalin as no different from Hitler or Mussolini. Hitler, on the other hand, was keen to grant Stalin anything he wanted knowing full well that he would be able to retrieve any concessions at a later date. -
Message 50
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Thursday, 3rd September 2009
Hitler thought that neither Britain nor France would go to war over PolandÌý
Not true, in an address he gave to the Chiefs of Staff on 23 May 1939, a month after the Polish guarantee and after he had ordered plans for Operation White, the attack on Poland, to be drawn up Hitler considered the prospects of a war with the Western Powers:
"England is the driving force against Germany. The British are proud, courageous, tenacious, firm in resistance, and gifted as organizers. They know how to exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure and bravery of the Nordic race. The war with England will be a life-and-death struggle. the aim will always be to force England to her knees, but she will not be forced to capitulate in one day. I doubt the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for conflict."
(quoted from Munich: A Prologue to tragedy, Sir J.Wheeler-Bennett, pub.1948).
Hitler was right in forecasting that Britain and France would not intervene in the war against Poland and that Germany would strike the first blow against them.
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