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Wars and ConflictsΒ  permalink

Nemesis By Max Hastings

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Messages: 1 - 6 of 6
  • Message 1.Β 

    Posted by Grand Falcon Railroad (U3267675) on Monday, 31st August 2009

    Just got this book - a bargin at Β£2.99 RRP Β£9 - but controversially the author seems to suggest that the 14th Army aka "the forgotton Army" were so forgotton because they were there precisely because there wasn't too much to do and there are questions whether or not it was needed effort?

    He argues that as the UK wasn't going to get back Burma and Malaya then we shouldn't have wasted good troops and resources there.

    He also states that the only reason the US put up with 14th Army ops there was to support the pish to China.

    What do people thing? a deviant diversion? Or vital to British efforts war-wide?

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  • Message 2

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Monday, 31st August 2009

    I haven't read Nemesis yet, but the view you describe is reasonably accurate, although overly harsh.

    Burma's oil and rice was useful to the British Empire, but not, in the context of 1943, vital to the Allied war effort (more vital to the Bengalis who were facing imminent famine, though).

    The Americans were reluctant to suuport the restoration of Imperial territory. Their only interest in Burma was in capturing enough of it to allow the opening of a land route to China. Thus, their support to operations in Northern Burma would be limited to that aim; it would be withdrawn once Mytikina was taken. To get even this support, the British had to pledge two of their only three British divisions to that part of the operation (70th - split up into Wingate's Special Force - and 36th, put together from British battalions in India). Stilwell wouldn't have Indian divisions.

    For the British, the principle objective was Singapore, and then points East. The quick way to retake Burma (or rather, the important bits) was a seaborne assault on Rangoon, which could then become a base for clearing Burma and a jumping off point for Malaya.

    14th Army thus originally had the limited role of clearing Northern Burma. Forces in India, reinforced from Europe were to mount the seaborne assaults. It was a combination of a lack of assault shipping and the need to retain troops in Europe that scotched this approach and made EXTENDED CAPITAL a viable option.

    The great benificiary of the change of plan was, of course, Slim. If the shipping had been available, he would have been left in Burma (as Leese tried to do to him anyway)and a new Army under (Britsh Army) General Stopford would have carried out Mountbatten's amphibious campaign.

    Engaging the Japanese Army in Burma was necessary, but the way it was done was not the best way, at least on paper. On the other hand, it was Kitchener who observed "we make war as we must, not as we should."

    Dear old Max H is a bit fond of pandering to US chauvinism in the interest of book sales (perhaps), it seems to me.

    Must read my copy, been on the shelf for months.

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  • Message 3

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by delrick53 (U13797078) on Monday, 31st August 2009

    GFR,

    Excellent typo.

    Made me smile for the first time today.

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  • Message 4

    , in reply to message 3.

    Posted by Grand Falcon Railroad (U3267675) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009

    Are you referring to war-wide? I meant it tho I know it's not correct English - I meant in the "war-wide" i.e. operations over numerous theatres.

    I'm 2/3 through and it is very good - I don't think it does pander to anyone's chauvenism to be honest - I have to say that not many people come out of the affair with much intact - although I do feel there's a lot of written stuff seemingly direct from war diaries of the units invovled.

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  • Message 5

    , in reply to message 4.

    Posted by delrick53 (U13797078) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009

    GFR,

    No, it was your "to support the pish to India".

    Other than that, it's an interesting OP and I'll be following the thread.

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  • Message 6

    , in reply to message 5.

    Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Tuesday, 1st September 2009

    I do not think re-taking Burma was vital to the British war effort, given that the war was already being decided elsewhere, by the US Navy/Marines, and a tall fellow called Oppenheimer.

    But preventing the invasion of India (Imphal & Kohima) might have been more important, at that stage of the war, when the Axis powers were still a realistic threat?

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