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Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 1.Ìý
Posted by QuakerPete (U14080784) on Friday, 24th July 2009
Just watched a TV programme about Ulysses S. Grant which described him as the First Great Modern Military Commander; and which also described Robert E. Lee as the Last Great Old-style Commander (gentleman). Grant was also said to be the father of modern American military tactics. It was an angle of the American Civil War which I hadn't really heard before - anyone have any views on this?
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Message 2
Posted by MattJ18 (U13798409) on Saturday, 25th July 2009
I've certainly heard this argument before. Lee was supposedly the last of the old-style, lead-from-the-front generals. Certainly on a number of occasions he attempted to lead a charge and Confederate troops had to force him to stay behind. Grant on the other hand was very much a general who stayed back from the front line in order to direct operations that were taking place on a much larger scale than previously and needed more of a 'big picture' handling.
I don't know enough about American military tactics to say whether or not Grant was the main reason behind them. Seems unlikely though as more tactics are more international and driven by changing technologies. Also Grant was somewhat unusual in American military history in being prepared to accept large numbers of deaths in a short period of time in order to achieve a decisive victory. In the 20th century the American military has always safeguarded the lives of its men as far as possible.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 3
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Saturday, 25th July 2009
Not sure about the 'safeguarding the lives of it's men' bit, Matt.
A lot of Americans died in WW1 because their Generals refused to listen to the British experience, and did things in the 'old fashioned' way, at times.
Similarly in WW2, Omaha Beach could have been different if better use had been made of the special tanks, etc, the Brits used farther east, as a result of their experience at Dieppe, and other places.
They learned from experience, same as us, but some of the experiences we had already had, and they could have learned from ours if they had been less pig-headed at times.
US Grant changed the World to some degree, as he was willing to 'maintain the objective' in spite of casualties, and so win the war. He saw that the vast superiority of the Union in men and materiel was their only advantage, and he was willing to fight on in the same place, no matter how many battles he 'lost', until Lee simply ran out of men to oppose him.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 4
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Saturday, 25th July 2009
In fact, Grant was not prone to send his men to the slaughter. This was a falsehood promoted by subsequent pro-southern historians, desperate to find some discreditable reason why an uncouth tanner's son could defeat the cream of Southern military manhood.
in the 1930s, J F C Fuller set out to write a book comparing Lee and Grant's command styles, intending at bthe outset to demonstrate Grant's "butchery". His researches led him to reverse hisoriginal conclusion. The book is still worth a read (and is in print, in the USA at least). Grant did lose more men than Lee overall, but his comparative losses were smaller - he risked his men less.
I think Grant has a claim to be one of the first modern generals, in that he recognised that, with the logistic adavantage held by the northern States a single overwhelming decisive battle was not necessary for the Union to win, a series of smaller but cumulative engagements would do the trick just as well. He also understood the need to properly co-ordinate action in the two main theatres.
But he was not a battlefield innovator; he sent his men onto the battlefield in the same old style, as did they all.
Arguably the first modern thinker in the US Army was Winfield Scott, with his "anacvonda" plan at the start of the war; a military blockade designed to strangle the sessecionists without pitched battles.
Lee's style was very traditional, virtaully C18th, especially in his neglect of logistics and artillery, and his attempts to achieve single decisive battles (althgouygh, as the weaker force, it could be argued he had little choice).
Lee's reliance on the force of morale (a Napoleonic concept) over materiel caused him to accept high casualties, higher than the South could afford. His ordering of Pickett's charge, a desparate attempt to buy the victory that had eluded him with the bodies of his men was the epitome of this, and demonstrated how interllectually and tactically bankrupt he was on the third day - he himself recognised this.
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Message 5
Posted by QuakerPete (U14080784) on Saturday, 25th July 2009
Thanks guys for your thoughts on this, you seem to be suggesting that Grant was the first of Lincoln's commanders to use his overwhelming men and materiel superiority properly to the North's advantage?
I know it's an impossible question, but it would have been interesting to see Grant's competency against Lee had the numerical superiority not been as great.
I guess it was always going to count against the South in the end once Lincoln's commanders got their act together. I'm kinda surprised the war, in that respect, lasted as long as it did . . . and possibly how close the South were in either achieving their own victory or a peace deal on reasonable terms to themselves.
Any further thoughts from anyone would be much appreciatedLink to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 6
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 26th July 2009
The war took as long as it did because it took that long to mobilise the Union's resources against the South. There was also a considerable element within the Northern Establishment (and the Army) who preferred a compromise solution. Had Lincoln prevailed earlier, the war might have been concluded earlier, but not by much. The commanders who could deliver what he wanted only emerged in 1863.
Had Meade followed up properly after Gettysburg, he could have destroyed Lee's Army, but it would probably have taken another year, and invasion, to persuade the CSA it was beaten.
As to how well Grant would have fared against Lee on shorter odds. Shiloh probably offers the closest thing to an answer. Lee's great tectical genius was getting inside his opponents' decision loop, and often getting them to react to their own fears rather than his actions. As several commentators (including ordinary soldiers) observed of Grant, he didn't "scare a damn" and he concentrated on what he was going to do to the enemy, not what the enemy was going to do to him.
I would recommend the Fuller book (if you ignore the silly preface where Fuller suggests that Lee should have declared himself Dictator of the South)
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Message 7
Posted by MattJ18 (U13798409) on Sunday, 26th July 2009
Giraffe, you're right, I should've explained that a bit better. I meant that in the 20th century the American public didn't accept a high body count so the Generals generally tried to use industrial might as a way of compensating. Tactically I'm sure they got it wrong at times or weren't as innovative as they could've been. But in more general terms they were unwilling to risk the lives of their men if they could go slower and use technology instead. They are pretty lavish in terms of equipment for their men in comparison to other nations.
With regard to Grant, I remember reading a book several years ago which decribed the aftermath of the Battle of the Wilderness. It said something like: 'for years the Army of the Potomac and the Army of North Virginia had been fighting battles in which no decisive victory was gained. The AoP would advance, the ANV would fight them, and then the AoP would retreat. Grant changed this approach. After a stalemate he would just advance instead of retreating. It was an approach which would destroy the South'.
If you look at Grant's battles he certainly wasn't a 'butcher'. What he did was make his army fight again and again without breaking off. In that sense I guess he was the first modern general - one who saw the army as part of the bigger industrial machine of a country. I think Lee was the better general, certainly if you had the Second Manassas-era ANV against a Federal force of equal size under Grant I think Lee would've won.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 8
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Sunday, 26th July 2009
LW,
Fuller's book is very good and certainly explodes the myth that Grant was a butcher - his percentage losses were frequently below Lee's for offensive campaigns. Grant also has a grand strategy which Lee never really bothered with beyond "defend Virginia". Grant's ability to see the whole picture of logistics, co-ordinating vastly separated fronts and constant engagement with a weaker enemy at all points is distinctly more modern than Lee aiming for a campaign which brings the enemy to a single decisive battle (which he never really managed - beaten Union armies fell back and regrouped without Lee exploiting his wins).
And I'd echo your warnings that once Fuller steps outside the narrow discussion of warfare his comments do start to look a little despotic.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 9
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Monday, 27th July 2009
Read Grant's Memoirs; they're one of the finest examples of the military memoir genre.
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Message 10
Posted by Steelers708 (U1831340) on Monday, 27th July 2009
Cloudyj,
"his percentage losses were frequently below Lee's for offensive campaigns. Grant also has a grand strategy which Lee never really bothered with beyond "defend Virginia". Grant's ability to see the whole picture of logistics, co-ordinating vastly separated fronts and constant engagement with a weaker enemy at all points is distinctly more modern than Lee aiming for a campaign which brings the enemy to a single decisive battle (which he never really managed - beaten Union armies fell back and regrouped without Lee exploiting his wins)."
I think your being unfair to Lee on several points.
The ANV generally fought with inferior numbers, quite often 2:1 in the Unions favour, therefore Lee's losses as a percentage would be greater.
Grant had a grand strategy because he was made General in Chief of all the Armies on 12th March 1864, his job was to co-ordinate the forces of the East & West, Meade was still the commander of the AoP.
Lee didn't become General in Chief of all Confederate forces until 31st January 1865, when to all purposes it was to late. Up until that date he was only responsible for the defense of Virginia.
He did try to exploit his victories hence the invasion of Maryland after 2nd Mannassas and the invasion of Pennsylvania after Chancellorsville.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 11
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Monday, 27th July 2009
Steelers
The inferiority in numbers that the Confederacy laboured under does not automatically mean that Confederate forces would suffer proportionately greater casualties.
Rather, it was a good reason for Lee to avoid suffering casualties where he could. Given he and his subordinates consistently were able to out-manoeuvre their opponents, he should have been able to follow the Wellingtonian principle of manoeuvring to offer battle on the tactical defensive (allow the enemy to take greater casualties attacking you). This was, after all, the agreed principle when he launched the Gettysburg campaign).
Instead, Lee repeatedly won his battles in the Napoleonic manner by expensive but crushing attacks. At Gettysburg, where he was out-manoeuvred in his choice of battlefield, he did not even have the solace of victory.
Fuller's research is thorough on this point. Loved by his men though he might have been (and so was Grant), Lee was not one to husband their lives.
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Message 12
Posted by Steelers708 (U1831340) on Monday, 27th July 2009
Hi Longweekend,
I wasn't assuming, more hazarding a guess, I've just done some quick calculations and the % loses for the major battles fought by Lee are:
2nd Mannassas
Union 22%
Conf. 15%
Antietam
Union 17%
Conf. 27%
Fredericksburg
Union 11%
Conf. 7%
Chancellorsville
Union 14%
Conf. 21%
Gettysburg
Union 14%
Conf. 21%
Wilderness
Union 16%
Conf. 18%
Spotsylvania Court House
Union 16%
Conf. 16%
Cold Harbour
Union 11%
Conf. 8%
So they were worse for Lee in 4, equal in 1 and better for Lee in 3.
Barring the Peninsula Campaign, Lee only fought two offensive battles, 2nd Mannassas and Chancellorsville. Gettysburg was a meeting engagement, if Heth and Ewell had obeyed Lee's order to 'not bring on a general engagement' there wouldn't have been a battle at Gettysburg.
The other 5 major battles mentioned above were all defensive battles, albeit from the Wilderness onwards Lee didn't have a choice as much as he tried.
Most battles of that time were fought in the Napoleonic manner, you only have to look at Grant's Grand Assault at Spotsylvania using a powerful column. Not to mention European battles such as Konnigratz, Solferino and Gravellote.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 13
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 28th July 2009
Steelers708,
Grant had a grand strategy because he was made General in Chief of all the Armies on 12th March 1864, his job was to co-ordinate the forces of the East & West, Meade was still the commander of the AoP.Ìý
In the strictest technical sense, yes, but Grant parked his field HQ next door to Meade's. For the last 13 months of the war Meade was little more than what the 1900s would call chief-of-staff for the AP.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 14
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Tuesday, 28th July 2009
The ANV generally fought with inferior numbers, quite often 2:1 in the Unions favour, therefore Lee's losses as a percentage would be greater.Ìý
But often on the defensive where those inferior numbers didn't matter so much.
But I'm in danger of being side-tracked here. My piont was that Grant wasn't careless or wasteful of his men, not to show that Lee was. Both generals have similar rates of losses, so either the charge sticks to both or (in my opinion) neither.
Grant had a grand strategy because he was made General in Chief of all the Armies on 12th March 1864, his job was to co-ordinate the forces of the East & West, Meade was still the commander of the AoP.
Lee didn't become General in Chief of all Confederate forces until 31st January 1865, when to all purposes it was to late. Up until that date he was only responsible for the defense of Virginia.
Ìý
That's where it becomes more difficult to compare the two. But even with Lee's limited responsibilities, his long term plan seems to have been wait for the Union offensive, then move round his flank and inflict a defeat on him. Brilliant in theatre, its only hope of long term success is that the Union will give up. But the entire confederacy is to blame for this. I just can't help but think Napoleon or Marlborough would have been more pro-active in trying to drive grand strategy.
He did try to exploit his victories hence the invasion of Maryland after 2nd Mannassas and the invasion of Pennsylvania after Chancellorsville.Ìý
But not by trying to re-engage an enemy which was only tactically beaten and would be readily reinforced and back in the field as soon as Lee was able to move again.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 15
Posted by MattJ18 (U13798409) on Tuesday, 28th July 2009
Lee didn't really have the option of doing anything other than launching attacks in his campaigns. If he'd just gone on the defence the Union army would've won by sheer numbers and materiel. If Lee had sat in the earthworks at Richmond it would've been only a matter of time before he lost the siege. A series of defeats in battle was the only way that he could hope to crush Union morale (at home as much as in the army) and force a ceasefire.
It seems a bit unfair to compare Lee to Napoleon or Marlborough, both of whom had far greater resources available to them and far, far more control over how best to use them.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 16
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Tuesday, 28th July 2009
It seems a bit unfair to compare Lee to Napoleon or Marlborough, both of whom had far greater resources available to them and far, far more control over how best to use them.Ìý
In retrospect, comparing him to those two seems quite a good idea. I'll explain...
I'd say that Napoleon's Italian Campaigns of 1796-1797 were among his finest. He certainly wasn't in the position to dictate resources (despite being a favourite of the Directorate). He willingly ignored instructions and as a general with limited powers and troops dictated the course of the war at his own pace and against the strategic instructions from Paris. By doing so he was able to out-manouvre superior numbers and force the Austrians out of Italy and out of the war.
Marlborough, similarly, in his Blenheim campaign also ignored political instructions and absconded with the army from the Low Countries, despite very clear instructions from London and the Hague not to do so.
As for Lee's lack of resources: that in the end was always going to tell unless he could pull off some masterful campaign like Napoleon's first Italian campaign and batter the army of the Ptomac continuously all the way back to Washington. In one sense his only real hope was to fight a Napoleonic style of war. Sitting on the defensive would only ever play to the north's grand strategy.
Grant, on the other hand used all the modern technology and industrial might of the north to his advantage. Certainly he was in the lucky position to fight a modern war and he did so with great skill. He saw numerical superiority for what it was and made sure he made it count by constatly moving to engage the south. He made them defend everywhere knowing that they couldn't and that eventually something would break.
In Lee's defence I would point out that decisive defeats in the American civil war were few and far between - the nature of defensive warfare being such that eliminating an opponent's army was much harder than in Napoleon's day.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 17
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Wednesday, 29th July 2009
Grant once displayed a flare for the Napoleonic at Vicksburg in 1863, when he cut his own supply & communication lines. Even though he enjoyed all the Northern material advantages as he would throughout the war, he nonetheless found he had to try something unusual against "the Gibraltar of the Confederacy."
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Message 18
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Thursday, 30th July 2009
Grant once displayed a flare for the Napoleonic at Vicksburg in 1863, when he cut his own supply & communication lines.Ìý
In what sense does it display "flare" to sever ones own supply and communication lines?
What is the 'Napoleonic' parallel you have in mind?Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 19
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Friday, 31st July 2009
U3280211
In what sense does it display "flare" to sever ones own supply and communication lines?Ìý
Rare is the general who'll willingly cut his own supply and communication even once in his life. Certainly, few ACW generals thought of it; Sherman expressed doubts when Grant first told him.
What is the 'Napoleonic' parallel you have in mind?Ìý
The Piedmont Campaign in 1796.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 20
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Saturday, 1st August 2009
WC.
Rare is the general who'll willingly cut his own supply and communication even once in his life.Ìý
Indeed, there are very good reasons why an army on the move needs to be re-supplied.
But I confess I cannot see any obvious parallel between Napoleon's brief, dynamic and cleverly strategic campaign, in the Piedmont, in 1796, and the brutal grinding 'triumph' of huge Union forces over much smaller Confederate ones at the siege of Vicksburg, with its caves and trenches, which anticipated the gruelling slog of the First World War.
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cf
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Grant's attempt at a dynamic battle was a failure (on several attempts).
Imho Grant lacked much military vision and to describe him as a man of flair (or 'flare', your term) on a par with Napoleon, is stretching the English language beyond breaking point.
Grant was a cool, calculating, alcoholic depressive. If he looked good to the Union that could only be in comparison with the utterly appalling generals who preceded him on the Union side, such as Mc Clellan, a man so indecisive as to be called the "Virginia Creeper".
Lincoln became so angry with McClellan's caution that he said if McClellan could not use his massive army, he (Lincoln) would borrow it and have a go himself.
Grant's contribution to modern warfare was his awareness of the importance of the body-count and the need for vastly superior numbers on the attacking side; in a modern war in which accurate rifled guns gave the advantage to the defender.
If there was a second 'Napoleon' in the American Civil War, I agree with Prof. David Reynolds' analysis, in "America, Empire of Liberty" (2009) pub. Allen Lane, p196, that it was Lee, not Grant or McClellan.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 21
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Monday, 3rd August 2009
U3280211,
Grant's sieges did indeed portend the Western Front in WW1 but I was referring to how he got to Vickburg in the first place.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 22
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Wednesday, 5th August 2009
Steelers and others
I was following Fuller to specifically contrast Grant and Lee, not Lee and all his Union oponents. Unfortunately, I can't lay hands on my copy of Fuller at the moment. However, even on your figures, it is clear that Lee was most profligate at the most crucial battles, which was rather my point.
I would agree that battlefield tactics of the time had not moved much beyond the Napoleonic period, whichever General was in command (indeed, I siad as much in an earlier post). And on the field itself, Lee was much more the heir of Napoleon, although Grant had his moments.
But it was Grant who showed the modern grasp (the subject of the OP).
Posters have mentioned the cutting loose from supply lines and compared the practice with Napoleon. I think the comparison is valid, but more for the differences than the similarities.
Napoleon had a policy of living off the land because he was unable to maintain the size of army he wanted with his existing logistic organisation. In this Confederate Armies were his sucessors, for much the same reason (requisitioning goods and "compensating" with worthless Confederate scrip does not constitute payment).
Grant's move round Vicksburg may have required Napoleonic moral courage, but the manoeuvre - relying on reduce your opponent before a relieving force can in turn beseige you, is one that goes back much further. Indeed, Marlborough did it on several occasions. Although a masterpiece and of great strategic importance (which is why Grant was prepared to take the cold-blooded risk), it was not new.
Sherman's March, on the other hand was. The operational advantage - that the Confederacy would not be able to attack his lines of communication (something they had proved adept at) - was an immediate advantage. The calulation that there were enough supplies on the line of march to keep his forces fed was a matter of proper and analysis (Napoleon, on the other hand, simply worked on the assumption there would be enough, with dire consequences for the peasant farmers along any of his campaign routes). The plan was also based on Sherman not facing an Army equal to his own.
The modern part was the use of the economic and logistic havoc that Sherman would wreak as a deliberate weapon of war. It had been recognised as a consequence of such actions in previous wars (one reason why C18th armies moved to proper supply), and seen as a useful side effect or, on occasion, as a deliberate weapon against morale. But the scale of sherman's operation and the intention that it would have a strategic effect on the stability whole Confederacy, was a major development in modern war.
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Message 23
Posted by Dutchbrfc (U10655737) on Saturday, 8th August 2009
The American Civil War in its entirety can be regarded as the 18th meets the 20th century. The Southern leaders still relied on terms such as valour and honour as being the decisive factor whereas, certainly after 1863, Northern leaders were more focussed on industrial might and making the South understand war is a dirty business.
Also the use by Lincoln of the slavery issue as a propaganda tool cannot be overstated, it took away in an instant the notion of the South that their cause was noble.
To say that Grant alone should be regarded as being the first modern military general is too much honour.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 24
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Saturday, 8th August 2009
The Southern leaders still relied on terms such as valour and honourÌý
Valour and honour were in rather short supply for Union prisoners of the Confederates at the Andersonville concentration camp:-
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Message 25
Posted by Dutchbrfc (U10655737) on Monday, 10th August 2009
Yes, I know, but that wasn't the point I was trying to make,besides harsh treatment of POW's wasn't a Southern thing only.
I was referring to the mindset of most Southern leaders. A good point of where the notion opf honour and valour failed would be the Battle of Franklin where John Bell Hood wasted his army in a vainglorious attempt to make a name for himself.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 26
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Monday, 10th August 2009
Valour and honour were in rather short supply for Union prisoners of the Confederates at the Andersonville concentration camp:-Ìý
To be fair, the north's record on prisoners of war wasn't much better (Camp Douglas had a death rate of almost one in four). I suppose the south had the excuse that supplies were often bad for the general population too.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 27
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Monday, 10th August 2009
Dutchbrfc (25) and Cloudyj (26)
I accept that the Confederacy was not uniquely cruel to prisoners. Both sides acted badly. I'm always surprised when American friends say the British 'invented' the concentration camp in the Boer war. I would have thought that the Civil War in the US had several.
As for the concepts of honour and valour then Lee could be said to possess much of both, but the problem for the South remained the brute fact of slavery. Not honourable, and more sadistic than brave or 'valourous'.
In fairness to him, Grant acted with some decency and honour at Appomattox when he allowed Lee's men to keep their swords and horses after the surrender.
On page 211 of 'Empire of Liberty' (2009), Prof. David Reynolds makes it clear that by early 1865, Lee had completely changed his attitude and had (in abject desperation) agreed to employ slaves as soldiers, acknowledging that their efforts would be repaid with their freedom.
Needless to say, many in the Confederate army regarded this as tantamount to suicide.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 28
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Tuesday, 11th August 2009
<quote>I'm always surprised when American friends say the British 'invented' the concentration camp in the Boer war. </quote.
Do they mean civilian concentration camps? (Though the Spanish used them in Cuba and the Phillipines.)
<quote>As for the concepts of honour and valour then Lee could be said to possess much of both, but the problem for the South remained the brute fact of slavery. Not honourable, and more sadistic than brave or 'valourous'.</quote>
Absolutely. The southern concept of honour was just as hollow as the medieval concept of chivalry. Both being based on a complete subjugation of an underclass - serfs in medieval Europe and slavery in (most of) the American South. Bruce Catton's "The Coming Fury" points out that New Mexico had two slaves in the entire state.
<quote>On page 211 of 'Empire of Liberty' (2009), Prof. David Reynolds makes it clear that by early 1865, Lee had completely changed his attitude and had (in abject desperation) agreed to employ slaves as soldiers, acknowledging that their efforts would be repaid with their freedom.</quote>
Not just Lee. Many in the Confederate government came to similar conclusions. David Eicher's "Dixie Betrayed" quotes the responses from some state politicians after suggestions that slaves could be armed and freed. The comments leave no-one in any doubt that for many the sole driving force behind secession was retention of slavery.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 29
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 11th August 2009
At the risk of straying yet further from the original topic, I find the loose use of the term "concentration camp" on this thread cause for concern. Yes, the prisoner camps - for captured uniformed soldiers - in the ACW were obscenely cruel but they weren't "concentration camps" as such.
The original intent of concentration camps was to corral a hitherto certain disparate people - all civilians - within a small area; thus, the Native American reservations imposed by the US Gov't come under that denotation. Ditto the nicely euphemistic "Relocation" camps into which Nisei Americans were briefly entrained in the 1940s.
That concentration camps eventually became synonymous with mass cruelty is history. But, though they should never have been built, they they were built for civilians. Prisoner-of-war camps were and are built for soldiers; they're standard warfare.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 30
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Tuesday, 11th August 2009
Cloudyj. (28)
Good analysis.
I agree with all that.Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 31
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Tuesday, 11th August 2009
WC (29)
The word 'concentration' means literally:-
"the spatial property of being crowded together" .
Why should this term not apply to the prison camps of the US Civil War in which many men were crowded together for the purposes of humiliation, starvation and neglect?
In what sense, and why, should the term "concentration" apply, as you would wish, only to civilian populations?
Are you arguing that there never were any rules of conduct in war, applicable to the US conflict between April 12th 1861 and April 9th 1865?Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 32
Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Wednesday, 12th August 2009
In what sense, and why, should the term "concentration" apply, as you would wish, only to civilian populations?
Ìý
Convention?
Prisoner of war camps were known as such and the British Authorities in South Africa needed another name for the equivalent of those camps, but for civilians (who clearly weren't soldiers captureed during war).
I think there's a moral argument for maintaining the difference. It's hard to justify the wholesale concentration of civilians in prisons simply because they are of the enemy's country. Whereas holding soldiers (under conditions of the Geneva convention) is entirely justified. The extend the word to cover both civilian and military camps could lend false justification to civilian camps by associating them with a legitimate purpose.
But this is getting even further from the topic!Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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Message 33
Posted by cthulhu1 (U13911150) on Thursday, 13th August 2009
Going back to topic, Grant does deserve credit for recognising the strategic need for the North to effectively pummel the South into submission by accepting that even an equal amount of casulties would always favour the North. The key was never let your opponent have time to recover.
Again, it is slightly unfair to generals like Sherman and Sheridan to say Grant was architect of victory. Perhaps that accolade should go to Lincoln(or Scott)who had the vision to realise this was a strategic war, that would be won by politics as well as force of arms.
As for comparisons with Lee, these are spurious. By 1864 the ANV was a spent force offensively (as it had been sice Antietam - Gettysburg was the last gamble for European support but almost certainly doomed to failure. Also by 1864 the South had only Lee. Jackson and Stuart were dead, Dick Ewell and Jim Longstreet were in above their heads. the only hope was a Lincoln defeat and to Grant's credit he gave the North just enough to avoid that.
The best commander in the civil war, IMO the controversial Nathan Bedford Forrest.
Ah well history is all about debate,Link to this forum: Grant - First Great Modern Military Commander?
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