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Did Jacksons death end the US Civil War?

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Messages: 1 - 22 of 22
  • Message 1.Β 

    Posted by And God said"Let there be light,and there was Eric" (U8717965) on Saturday, 11th July 2009

    The death of Thomas Jackson , tragically shot by his own troops 2 months before Gettysburg is seen by many as the death nail in the coffin of the Confederacy.Lee knew that his one big chance to end the War , with a victory for the South was a grand defeat of the armies of Meade.At Gettysburg he had his chance, but the desperate final charge on the third day of Picketts Division ended in defeat.Could a better General than Longstreet I.E Jackson have changed Lee's mind and won at Gettysburg.

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  • Message 2

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by Parti-NG-ton Blue (U13898629) on Saturday, 11th July 2009

    I'm not convinced that whichever general was in charge the confedracy could have won the battle.

    I think that a definate lack of belief had long since settled in amongst some of the troups and this alone caused the defeat. Politicians and high ranking officers may have thought/hoped victory was possible but if the common soldier doesn't then the fight is already lost.

    I may well be wrong it is just a view that I have always thought to be at least partially true

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  • Message 3

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 11th July 2009

    Could a better General than Longstreet I.E Jackson have changed Lee's mind and won at Gettysburg.Β  That's exactly the point H.W. Crocker III made in his book "Don't Tread on Me." I wonder if this is what you're referring to. That was exactly his line of thought: at Gettysburg, the field generals under Lee were way too slow and indecisive to properly execute his plan of battle.

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  • Message 4

    , in reply to message 3.

    Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Monday, 13th July 2009

    If memory serves, at the end of the first day the Union army had been soundly whipped by Lee, and had fallen back on Cemetery Hill. The Union army had throw two corps into the battle at this point and both had suffered severe casualties. There were only about 5,000 union soldiers on Cemetery Hill and they had to hold it if the Union Army was to make a stand at Gettysburg. The only decent defensive position Meade had was Cemetery Ridge and the Hill was the northern anchor. If Lee's army got possession of that hill, Meade would have had to withdraw.

    Lee spotted this instantly and ordered Ewell to take the hill. His mistake was wording his order in a gentlemanly way. He told Ewel to take the hill ''if he deemed it possible.'' That's a wording that Jackson would have understood completely and he'd have thrown everything he had at the Union forces atop the hill. Ewell however did nothing. By the time he woke up and decided to try and obey the order, Hancock had reinforced the hill with a fresh division of Union infantry.

    Had Jackson been there, the Confederates would almost certainly have taken the hill and the Union position would have been untenable.

    No way to predict what would have happened after that. Lee had not intended his march into Pennsylvania to be an invasion. It was a raid for supplies and he intended to gather all he could and go back into Virginia. Had he beaten back Meade, he might have marched on Washington and taken up a defensive position between the Army of the Potomac and the Union capital.

    That might have won the war - so yes, IMO Jackson's death might have made the difference between victory and defeat for the Confederacy.

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  • Message 5

    , in reply to message 4.

    Posted by Backtothedarkplace (U2955180) on Tuesday, 14th July 2009

    HiErik

    Your memorys ok, although i'd argue the toss about soundly whipped. The union cavalry did some whipping of their own. They were pushed out of position and the withdrawl got savaged but had enough troops arrived to reinforce them then they may have held the ridge. In any case the battle in its first stages was to keep Lee off Cemetary Ridge rather than to keep him off Seminary ridge?

    if Lee had had Jackson, then he would have taken Cemetary Hill. no question. Jackson probably wouldnt have needed an order to take it. he would have done it any way.

    As for the gettysburg position being the only one, I am told that meade was planning on fighting along the line of Pipe Creek. Cant tell you where that is though. Although I am told by various historians that its a much stronger line than that taken at Gettysburg. Lee was also aware of the same position and was also bearing it in mind for a defensive position The AOP gets driven off Cemetary hill? Then Meade re forms on Pipe creek.

    Lee or Jackson slip round the flank? They take a defensive line on Pipe Creek.

    Both sides miss each other at Gettysburg, as nearly happened? They meet at Pipe Creek.

    IMO logistics is what killed the south in the end. Along with some truely dodgy economic descisions. I'd say that the war was lost the day that the Confederates fired on Fort Sumter.

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  • Message 6

    , in reply to message 5.

    Posted by Steelers708 (U1831340) on Tuesday, 14th July 2009

    Pipe Creek is approximately 10-12 miles SE of Gettysburg, and they would not necessarily have met there either, the immediate objective of the ANV was Harrisburg and York further North.

    Heth's Division, of Ewells Corps, was to pass through Gettysburg on it's way to York primarily because of the shoe factory at Gettysburg where they expected to find a fully stocked warehouse and Pettigrew's Bde was in dire need of shoes. The latest info they had on Gettysburg was that 3 days ago there wasn't a Union soldier in sight. Heth and Ewell were under strict orders not to bring on a 'General engagement' if they encountered any Union troops, unfortunately they ignored this. As Pettigrew encountered Buford he sent to Heth for more troops who sent to Ewell for more troops.

    This meeting engagement ended up in the general engagement that Lee sought to avoid, although he had full confidence in his troops if/when/should they meet the Union Army.

    And why shouldn't he have had confidence, the ANV under Lee had never been beaten and it was only 2 months since they had defeated the AoP at Chancellorsville.

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  • Message 7

    , in reply to message 5.

    Posted by shivfan (U2435266) on Tuesday, 14th July 2009

    I'm of the opinion that it was just a matter of time before the North would win the Civil War, regardless of the outcome of Gettysburg....

    Economically, the North was much stronger. Also, the North had a much more powerful navy than the South. These are just some of the factors that count in the long run.

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  • Message 8

    , in reply to message 2.

    Posted by Steelers708 (U1831340) on Tuesday, 14th July 2009

    Partington Blue,

    How can the troops of the ANV have lost belief?

    Since Lee took command they had never been defeated and only two months prior to Gettysburg they had defeated the numerically superior AoP at Chancellorsville.

    Mistakes were made at Gettysburg by high ranking officers, but that doesn't translate to lack of belief by the troops. Troops who lack belief don't attack like the Confederates did on the 2nd day and they certainly don't take part in attacks like Pickett's Charge. Not to mention fighting on for a further two years in battles like, the Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, Cold Harbour, and the siege of Petersburg. Even at Appomattox Court House, if Lee had chosen to fight on, the troops that were left would have followed him.

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  • Message 9

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    Posted by MattJ18 (U13798409) on Wednesday, 15th July 2009

    The loss of Jackson certainly meant that the ANV lacked oomph (for want of a better word) in its advances. I think that Longstreet is underrated as a general, his more cautious approach gets compared unfavourably with Jackson's, but together the two of them, with Lee, were a formidable team.

    Realistically the Confederacy didn't stand much of a chance of winning the war. The only thing that might have won it for them was public opinion, both in America and Europe. If the ANV had won Gettysburg decisively and marched further north, threatening Philadelphia, New York, perhaps even Boston, the Federals might have sought a ceasefire. And who knows, the British or French might have even lent them their support or recognised them.

    In that sense I guess the loss of Jackson meant that the ANV was weakened and because it was weakened it couldn't invade successfully... so they lost the war.

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  • Message 10

    , in reply to message 5.

    Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Wednesday, 15th July 2009

    Both sides miss each other at Gettysburg, as nearly happened? They meet at Pipe Creek. Β 


    I doubt that.

    At some point they are bound to learn of each other's existence. If this discovery comes a few days later, then Meade is further north - probably near Gettysburg itself - while the ANV, iirc, is divided in three parts - Lee near Cashtown, Jackson around Carlisle or Harrisburg (as Ewell actually was) and Jubal Early somewhere near York.

    When Lee realises that Meade is in among them, he will surely dash north to combine with Jackson, whilst despatching a courier to Early summoning him to join them. I don't see any other way they can unite, as they must to avoid defeat in detail, and almost certain destruction.

    Assuming Meade isn't totally blind, he must surely become aware of this, and will surely march on Harrisburg in the hope of catching the ANV before it can reunite. So "Gettysburg" is fought further north, up near the Susquehanna. Maybe Jackson's presence will make the difference, maybe not.

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  • Message 11

    , in reply to message 4.

    Posted by MattJ18 (U13798409) on Thursday, 16th July 2009

    I have to disagree with you Erik when you say that Lee's invasion was just a raid for supplies. It was a full scale invasion with the intent on taking the war to the Union and winning a decisive victory. Compare the Gettysburg ANV with the Antietam one... the Antietam one was a raid, the Gettysbury one was properly equipped and provisioned.

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  • Message 12

    , in reply to message 11.

    Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Thursday, 16th July 2009

    I think that point is debatable, MattJ18. I've read both views, but the majority that I've perused seem to feel that the original intent was a raid, both to get supplies (mainly shoes and other equipment), and to upset the Union politicians.

    As to the points made by others:

    It's certainly true that the south was not likely to win a protracted war because there is no way they could match the Union in weapon/supplies/equipment/manpower etc., but they came very close to winning on several occasions.

    The real high water point for the Confederacy occurred in the summer and autumn of 1862. The south was very near victory everywhere. They held the initiative in every theater of the war. In Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, and the west, the Federals had the advantage of numbers, but inept leadership had thrown away that advantage. From what I've read, at that point Britain and France both were on the verge of granting outright recognition and as things stood then, that would have meant southern independence.

    The tide began to ebb at Antietam (Sharpsburg). Tactically I suppose you'd have to call that battle a draw since neither side forced the other to retreat from the field, but strategically it was a smashing Union victory. Lee's invasion of the north had failed and his army was so battered that he had to go back to Virginia. The Union had regained the initiative and the opportunity for recognition was lost.

    The only other opportunity for an outright Southern victory that I can see came at Gettysburg. There is little doubt that if Lee had established a defensive position between the AoP and Washington, he had a good chance of ending the war then and there. Meade would have been forced to attack Lee, and I cannot see him beating the ANV under those conditions. Had Lee won at Gettysburg, he may well have won the war.

    Let's not forget that Lincoln's political position wasn't all that sturdy and there were a lot of northerners who were fed up with the war. Gettysburg was only one point at which the North may have given up under the right conditions. There was a possibility that had Grant lost at Chattanooga, or had Sherman failed to take Atlanta after Chattanooga, Lincoln might have lost the election and subsequent leaders of the north would have simply called off the war. The south wouldn't have won... but they'd not have lost, and that's really all they had to do - not lose.

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  • Message 13

    , in reply to message 12.

    Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Thursday, 16th July 2009

    There is little doubt that if Lee had established a defensive position between the AoP and Washington, he had a good chance of ending the war then and there. Meade would have been forced to attack Lee,Β 


    Why?

    Lee can't attack Washington. In 1863 it is about the most heavily fortified city in the world, and can be kept supplied indefinitely by water, even if the land routes are somehow cut off. If Lee tries to fight his way through the defenses, he will suffer crippling losses (on top of whatever it has already cost him to defeat Meade) and must soon expect a regrouped AoP to return to the attack. If Lee sits down near Washington and invites Meade to attack him, Meade is more likely to move somewhere west of him, across his line of retreat back to Virginia. Lee is then marooned in enemy territory, and to get home must either fight his way past Meade, or try and cross the Potomac somewhere below Washington - a very difficult task given the presence of Union gunboats.

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  • Message 14

    , in reply to message 13.

    Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Thursday, 16th July 2009

    Again, we've hit on a point that cannot really be settled. However, I seriously doubt if Meade would have moved his army anywhere except to the defense of Washington simply because the politicians would have been screaming for someone to come to their aid. I don't really see how Meade could have just walked away from the ANV while it stood astride the road to the Union capital, threatening the city. People in Washington were scared to death of Lee.

    And who was there in the city to defend against ANV if Lee chose to attack? The city may have been fortified, but it was loaded with generals, politicians, women, and many non-combatants. Relatively few active soldiers were in the city and the world's best fortifications are useless if there's no one available to man them. Washington's only real defense against an army the size of the ANV was the AoP and Lee would have been between the city and that northern army.

    I don't see any alternative to attacking the ANV. Every commander and politician would have been shrieking for him to come to their rescue, and I doubt if Meade could have knocked Lee out of a defensive position.

    But I guess we'll never know, will we?

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  • Message 15

    , in reply to message 14.

    Posted by Steelers708 (U1831340) on Thursday, 16th July 2009

    Erik,

    According to Maj. Gen,. S. P. Heintzelman, Commanding the Department of Washington, for the month of March, 1863 there were 67,267 men with 506 Heavy guns and 206 Field guns available to man the defenses of Washington. I doubt this figure would have dropped once the Confederates started to advance North.

    General Meade then headquartered at Middleburg did start to formulate a battle plan called the Pipe Creek Defense Line. The line was to cover the roads from Middleburg to Union Mills leaving Emmitsburg as the far left of General Meade's western flank. By cutting Carroll County in half, it would prevent any rebel advance toward Baltimore or Washington, D.C,

    But I find it hard to believe that Lee would have attacked a strong Union defensive position like that whislt in enemy territory. I would have thought that he would have manoeuvered Meade onto ground of his own choosing should he wish to bring on a 'general engagement'. After all the intention of the move North was to

    A) Give the war ravaged parts of Virginia a chance to recover.

    B) To gain valuable supplies for the ANV.

    C) To cause damage to the infrastructure of the North.

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  • Message 16

    , in reply to message 15.

    Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Friday, 17th July 2009

    Steelers708,

    Thanks for the stats. I'd been looking for them online but hadn't found them yet. Sounds like an assault on Washington would have made Pickett's Charge look like a Sunday school outing.

    Indeed, it almost sounds as though Washington was "overprotected". Half of those troops would probably have been more than enough to hold it - while the other half, if sent up the Potomac, might have trapped Lee on the northern bank. Still, given Northern politicians' sensitivity about Washington, I can see why it didn't happen.

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  • Message 17

    , in reply to message 16.

    Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Friday, 17th July 2009

    There no doubt in my mind that Lee could never have taken Washington and would probably have been a fool to try. Still, my readings suggest that the fortifications in Washington were undermanned at the time of Lee's foray into Pennsylvania -- apparently Halleck had sent several thousands of the troops to Hooker, and another 8 or 9 thousand to Meade. Don't know how much difference that would have made.

    But had Lee destroyed the army of the potomac at Gettysburg, or had he placed his army between the AoP and Washington instead of attacking at Gettysburg, it's hard to tell what the terrified politicians and citizens of the capital might have done or demanded. Halleck had ordered Meade to move out of Virginia as quickly as he could and place himself in a position to defend Baltimore and Washington so there must have been considerable concern -- possibly even fear -- in their minds.

    We have to remember that the people of the North weren't all anxious to continue the war at that time, and many of them -- some with great political punch -- were all for letting the south go its own way and to hell with it. It's not so much a matter of sheer military might as it is determination to use it that could have won the war for Lee under those circumstances. I can visualize in my mind's eye the terrified citizens, armchair generals, and politicians packing their bags and rushing away from the cities while the troops who were supposed to man the fortifications were running back and forth wondering where their commanders were, uncertain about what to do.

    I know Longstreet and a couple of his underlings asked Lee several times to forget attacking Meade at Gettysburg and take up a defensive position on the road to the capital. Speculating as to what would have happened had he done that is fascinating, but as you've already noted, fruitless.

    Not the kind of argument that will ever been settled here or anywhere else, is it?

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  • Message 18

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    Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Friday, 17th July 2009

    Lee had never managed to destroy the AoP even under its most incompetent commanders - which Meade wasn't. Even if he defeats it, it will still exist and be a threat to his rear if he is daft enough to assault the Washington fortifications.

    As to public opinion, whatever it may have been, the 1862 elections had already been held and the next ones were over a year away. Meantime, Congress was comfortably Republican and the Republican Party couldn't abandon the war without leaving itself a totally busted flush. So as long as there's a Republican President and Congress, the war goes on. Even if Washington becomes untenable (most unlikely) they'll just adjourn to Boston or somewhere out of Lee's reach (they can escape by water any time they choose) and sit it out there until enough reinforcements arrive to compel Lee's return to Virginia.

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  • Message 19

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    Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Saturday, 18th July 2009

    I really don't want to pursue this point forever, but I would like to conclude with the following observations.

    While Lee never did destroy the AoP there is no reason to believe that he couldn't have at Gettysburg, or failing that, scatter it so thoroughly that it might take weeks to reform into an effective fighting force.

    As for attacking Washington, Lee wouldn't have had to do that to create a kind of hysterical dread. All he had to do was station his ANV between Mead and the city and wait. As soon as he marched into Penna., handbills flew up all over the city and countryside stating that Lee was coming and their tone reflects true panic. The militia was called up to defend Washington, and these men were genuine ''Sunday Soldiers'', untrained and unfit for combat.

    If Meade had attacked Lee in a defensive position (and he may well have had no choice) it would probably have ended in a northern disaster. I have no doubt that the AVN would have won the fight handily since knowing Lee, he'd have placed his troops on favorable ground, and then just waited. He'd have had nice interior lines and a well-fortified troop placement. Considering that he very nearly won Gettysburg when Meade had all those advantages, it's not stretching credibility to assume that he'd beat the AoP under reverse conditions.

    And politicians are politicians. You have to remember that this wasn't a war of national survival to a lot of northerners. A very large number were of the opinion that if the south wanted to leave the union, let them go and to hell with them. Republican or democrat, arrogant or subservient, sooner or later politicians respond to the cries of their constituents and considering the anti-conscription riots that broke out in NYC a year later we have a good indication of how divided the attitude was toward continuation of war.

    There are a lot of historians who feel that if Lee had scored a great triumph on Northern soil, it may have been the step needed to obtain international recognition as a new country in the family of nations. As I said... the south didn't have to win; all it had to do was not lose.

    But personally, as important as Gettysburg was, IMO it was nowhere near as important to the Confederacy as was the loss of Vicksburg on the Mississippi.

    Losing at Gettysburg, the south lost a great deal, especially in international prestige. At Vickburg they lost what they could not afford to lose at all, anywhere.

    Vicksburg gave the Mississippi Valley and its transport system to the Union and broke the Confederacy in half. The wound suffered at Gettysburg might have been repairable. The wound inflicted at Vickburg was a mortal one.

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  • Message 20

    , in reply to message 19.

    Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Saturday, 18th July 2009

    But personally, as important as Gettysburg was, IMO it was nowhere near as important to the Confederacy as was the loss of Vicksburg on the Mississippi.

    Losing at Gettysburg, the south lost a great deal, especially in international prestige. At Vickburg they lost what they could not afford to lose at all, anywhere.

    Vicksburg gave the Mississippi Valley and its transport system to the Union and broke the Confederacy in half. The wound suffered at Gettysburg might have been repairable. The wound inflicted at Vickburg was a mortal one. Β 



    As was widely appreciated at the time.

    After the fall of Port Hudson (last CS foothold on the Mississippi) on July 8, General Banks told his wife. "We have taken from them the power to establish an independent government. It can never be done between the Mississippi and the Atlantic. You can tell your friends that the Confederacy is an impossibility."

    This would of course have been no less true even if Lee had been in precarious occupation of a slice of Maryland and a small corner of Pennsylvania. For the Western states in particular the success at Vicksburg would have far outweighed a defeat at Gettysburg. The Union would likely reverse that setback in time, while the CS had no way of reversing theirs.

    Incidentally, one other point which I overlooked when sending my previous message. In July 1863, Congress was not in session. The 37th Congress had ended in March, and the newly elected 38th would not meet until December. So even if its members were so demoralised as to consider giving up the war, they would have six months to wait before they could give effective voice to that opinion - ample time in which to recover their nerve, especially if Lee had had to return to Virginia in the meantime.



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  • Message 21

    , in reply to message 20.

    Posted by cmedog47 (U3614178) on Sunday, 19th July 2009

    Nothing new to add to the above except to share the reflections represented in a work of historical fiction that came with a thorough explanation of the historical analysis upon which it was based. It was "Gettysburg: a novel of the civil war" by Gingrich and Forstchen. Gingrich was a military historian before he entered politics. They wrote some sequels which I have not read.

    Their historical analysis upon which they based the novel is one which I have seen elsewhere in stories of the war:

    1. That Lee's mistake at Gettysburg was partially his lack of an smooth working understanding with Ewell, but that more than that--he shouldn't have pushed the attack once he failed to secure the good ground--and that furthemore that was uncharacteristic of Lee. In Gringrich's words "It was very un Lee like". This is now thought likely to be primarily due to his illness at the time. He was probably suffering a coronary with resulting heart failure symptoms. The characteristic emotional response is a sense of urgency which he displayed.

    2. Lee's more normal response in such situations, perhaps in response sometimes to advice from Jackson, would be to pull back and put himself in an advantageous position where the enemy would be forced to attack. He understood the politicial pressures on the enemy and used that against them.

    3. A pinning force at Gettysburg and withdrawal and shift to the right to Pipes Creek would have done that. It would have put him between them and Washington and they would have been forced to attack an entrenched Lee in a good defensive position. That never went well for the Army of the Potomac. They would have shattered themselves. For students of Lee, it would have been the expected thing to do.

    The important thing is the political outcome of such a battle. Lee couldn't defeat the Northern nation. It could always rebuild it's armies. Even were Lee able to march into Washington--which most on both sides thought he could quite easily if the Army of the Potomac was not a factor, it wouldn't constitute a military defeat of the Union forces. The defenses in Washington were visually impressive and overdone for political reasons but the troops and officers stationed there were those thought to be of little worth other than as props. Occupation of Baltimore and Washington would bring Maryland officially into the Confederacy as their legislature was about to do during the seccesion crises before federal troops shut them down.

    But Washington didn't have the importance that it's has today. Even in the north, they still thought themselves sovereign states and did not yet appreciate how they were surrendering that in prosecuting the war. That political reality was demonstrated in the fight over the 14th amendment. The congress of 1861 didn't really want the war. It was Lincoln's war then. The congress of 1865 wouldn't have given up the vast new power war had put in their hands over the loss of Washington or even Baltimore--that was the radical republican congress. I don't know about 1863. But it is indeed plausible that it don't matter what the sentiment of the congress was. Among the various states in the north some of the sentiment against the war was running strong and had it reached a point much higher, they would have forced the federals to the negotiating table. The humiliation of Washington would have encouraged the simmering rebellion in the mid-Western states. That is why the political pressure would have forced Meade to attack Lee if he got between them and Washington--the politicians understood the it's symbolic importance to the cause of federal supremacy.

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  • Message 22

    , in reply to message 21.

    Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Monday, 20th July 2009

    The congress of 1861 didn't really want the war. It was Lincoln's war then.Β 


    Could you clarify to which "1861 Congress" you are referring?

    If you mean the 36th Congress, which expired on March 4, that of course took no position on the war since it would not start until April 12. Even had it been in progress earlier, it would have had to be "Buchanan's War", not "Lincoln's", since Buck had not yet left the White House.

    If you mean the 38th Congress (first meeting July 4) it supported the war 100%, even to the point of expelling members who were considered disloyal. To the best of my knowledge, its only complaints about the war were when it thought Lincoln (or the generals he apointed) were not prosecuting it hard enough.

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