Wars and ConflictsΜύ permalink
Atlantic Conveyor sunk - bit of luck ??
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Message 1.Μύ
Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Friday, 12th June 2009
Revisited the Falklands conflict recently and was left with the theory that the sinking of the AC - although a terrible blow at the time - was maybe the final bit of luck - in a conflict that we now know we needed lots of it - that turned the balance of the whole thing
firstly and obviously - it was probably the fact that it looked like a carrier on radar that made the argies waste 2 exocets on it (waste??)
the loss of the 3 heavy lift chinooks + 5 wessex helicopters that slowed the advance on stanley were almost a blessing in disguise
this meant that more time was taken to consolidate the bridgehead meaning more time acclimatising the troops
this also meant that the argies who had already shivered in their foxholes for 6 weeks had another 21 days to wait - knowing that a determined enemy was actually walking 60 miles to kill them
the lost of the heavy lift meant that Goose Green HAD to happen -
a fast move out of san carlos meant that the slow build up of stores in a safe bridgehead wasnt needed - the front line would have been flexible with stores following fast moving troops - no need for GG
to me - Goose Green was the catalyst of the eventual victory
lightly armed elite british troops , heavily outnumbered, outfought a dug in enemy (NOT conscripts) and won a resounding victory
it boosted public opinion, troop morale and determined argentine tactics for the rest of the war
there was no way they dared to commit their troops to offensive operations or counter attacks - which would have been the obvious response
they sat and waited - they must have heard on the news or by the gradually nearing sounds of battle - they knew it was a matter of time
if we had the chinooks we probably would have been straight at their throats - just at a time when they were still up for it - they have landed - here they come !!
bit harder to know that all the BS you have been fed is being proved false day by day
just a thought
st -
Message 2
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Friday, 12th June 2009
The old Atlantic Convayor sat in a dock in North Liverpool for years. Her loss, more so the nice shiny new replacement paid for by the Tax Payer must have seemed like pennies from heaven to Cunard. Among other things that went down on her though, was the interlocking steel plates used for runways, which would have allowed the Harriers (And Jaguars that could have been tankered down) to operate from land.
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Message 3
Posted by JB on a slippery slope to the thin end ofdabiscuit (U13805036) on Saturday, 13th June 2009
The Atalntic Conveyor was unlucky. The Arg Etendard squadron never pressed their attacks home close enough and let fly at the first blip that appeared on their screens.
Many people in Argentina continue to beleive that their last Exocet hit and badly damaged the Invincible, which was scretely taken to Surinam for repairs and replaced by the Illustrious which then switched names much like the Titanic-Britannic conspiracy theory. -
Message 4
Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Saturday, 13th June 2009
hey - didnt realise that Jaguars could have been flown from the carpets!! pity it wasnt phantoms - mind u never mattered anyway !!
my post came because i watched a recorded "Falklands" documentary
it obviously showed Goose Green and the fierce battle there
the mixture of regulars and conscripts there put up a good resistance and very nearly did it
they had no choice - they saw the landings and heard the air attacks - they knew they were next - wallop - they had to fight or die (or both) and it came quickly whilst they were still up for it
if they had to listen to the war slowly coming towards them and realise that their compatriots had been smashed elsewhere - how good would they have felt - morale would have been ebbing away day by day
the documentary pointed out that the mountain battles were expected to be fearsome - but although costly werent as bad as we dreaded
can you imagine 2 para esconsced in the rocks of Tumbledown ?? they would still be prising the buggers off the hill now lol
as with Goose Green - these mountain battles - without the delay caused by the loss of AC would have been against troops still hyped up by the invasion - a much tougher task
st -
Message 5
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Saturday, 13th June 2009
a great fuss was made about the Jaguar being able to opperate from rough strips. Before the M 55 was opened, the R A F landed and flew off one from a length of the road. One of my posts seems to have gone adrift, so I will try again. The Lightening didn't have the legs and the Tornado was only just coming into service, and if I remember rightly, the I A radar was still dodgy. Maggie could have asked Ron for the loan of a carrier to allow us to fly off Phantoms and Bucaneers closer to the Falklands.
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Message 6
Posted by delrick53 (U13797078) on Sunday, 14th June 2009
stalteriisok,
Speaking to some of my former comrades about the loss of Atlantic Conveyor implies that the troops on the ground would disagree with you.
They were twitching. Most were experienced M&AW troops, and were unaffected by the conditions. None were happy having to sit around doing nothing.
The attack on Goose Green was a political decision, and not one made by the commander on the ground.
Indeed, Goose Green could have been kept for later, and it may be unpalatable, but Goose Green could have gone either way.
To be honest, the attack was poorly planned, and was rushed.
It didn't help that the Argentinians probably knew the Paras were coming, due to Whitehall 'loose lips' and the Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ.
It's interesting to see how the different mountain battles were planned and executed, with the Paras straining at the leash and the Marines taking a more cautious approach. The casualty rates say a lot.
The extra choppers would have simply moved the inevitable forward. The Argentinians had no idea who they were up against. Their officers had been trained by the USA, who believed that a 60 mile yomp/tab across the Falklands was impossible. They didn't find out until later that the Marines had actually been watching them from inside the Argentinian positions for days.
I don't know why the Paras would be on Tumbledown, as the Scots Guards were responsible for that one. And it was my old boss, Mike Norman, who made the quip about a 'company of Marines dying from old age had they been defending Mount Harriet'.
The best overview of the conflict, in my opinion, was written by Julian Thomson himself in '3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands - No Picnic', with 'The Battle For The Falklands' by Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins a close second.
Of course, had heavy lift been available, the Gunners (all Commando or Para trained) could have pounded the mountains into submission, and the actual battles could have become a cleaning-up operation. But I don't think the Marines or Paras would have liked that somehow. -
Message 7
Posted by Andrew Host (U1683626) on Monday, 15th June 2009
Hi all,
You may find these interesting;
a precis of the conflict by Julian Thompson:
interviews with veterans:
Cheers
Andrew -
Message 8
Posted by delrick53 (U13797078) on Thursday, 18th June 2009
stalteriisok,
I've had a quick look and have a few interesting titbits for you.
As well as the Chinooks, when the Atlantic Conveyor went down, she took the entire tentage for all the land forces.
One Chinook could lift the same as 5 Sea Kings. This would have meant that almost an entire Commando or Battalion could have been moved in one lift.
Of the 21 1000lb bombs dropped (by Vulcan) on Stanley airport, only one hit the runway.
The British air blockade of the airport failed, and between the 1st May and 14th June, 435 tons of cargo was flown into Stanley, and almost 270 casualties were flown out.
It was considered that the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor was a bigger blow to the campaign than the loss of the Galahad. The former slowed things down considerably and Thomson was ordered to attack Goose Green (I've confirmed that this was never in his plans, or those of Moore). The latter had no effect on the campaign. Two companies from 40 Commando replaced the dead and injured/shocked Guardsmen and the Battalion was soon up to strength and operational again.
There is no doubt that the attack on Goose Green was a government PR operation, and a complete waste of lives and resources. -
Message 9
Posted by englishvote (U5473482) on Thursday, 18th June 2009
Delrick53
One Chinook could lift the same as 5 Sea Kings. This would have meant that almost an entire Commando or Battalion could have been moved in one lift.
Μύ
a Chinook can lift about 45 troops, so if there had been four Chinooks available it would have taken at least three round trips to have moved a cut down battalion or Commando. That is without supplies and ammunition and places for supporting troops.
But four Chinooks would certainly have speeded up the advance and saved in trench foot casualties.
Of the 21 1000lb bombs dropped (by Vulcan) on Stanley airport, only one hit the runway.
Μύ
Of the 21 bombs dropped in the first Vulcan raid only ONE was supposed to hit the runway, this was because of the attack plan and direction of flight. In fact to get one bomb on target was pushing the ability of the RAF and the Vulcan to its limits.
The British air blockade of the airport failed,
Μύ
There was never a British air blockade, there simply was not enough aircraft to maintain one. What the Vulcan raids did achieve was to deny the Argentines the ability to use the runway at Stanley for fast jets.
There is no doubt that the attack on Goose Green was a government PR operation, and a complete waste of lives and resources.
Μύ
Sorry but you are completely wrong on all these points. The neutralisation of the Argentine forces at Goose Green was a sensible military decision and fundamentally changed the Argentine attitude to the conflict.
The battle removed 1,000 Argentine troops from the campaign at one go and instilled a sense of superiority in the British soldiers and a sense of foreboding in the Argentine troops. Rather than taking on the British forces the Argentines chose to defend static positions around Stanley, which ensured they would be overrun piecemeal, all of this stems from the Battle of Goose Green and its outcome. -
Message 10
Posted by Sabre-Wulf (U2142937) on Thursday, 18th June 2009
Sorry but you are completely wrong on all these points. The neutralisation of the Argentine forces at Goose Green was a sensible military decision and fundamentally changed the Argentine attitude to the conflict.
The battle removed 1,000 Argentine troops from the campaign at one go and instilled a sense of superiority in the British soldiers and a sense of foreboding in the Argentine troops. Rather than taking on the British forces the Argentines chose to defend static positions around Stanley, which ensured they would be overrun piecemeal, all of this stems from the Battle of Goose Green and its outcome. Μύ
Nope, sorry can't agree with you on this one. Every single account I've come across makes it clear that the Commanders on the ground were forced into attacking Darwin and Goose Green in order to appease the folks back home, to show that something was happening.
I've also yet to come across any evidence that the Argentinians ever intended to do anything other than defend static positions. What do you mean by "take on the British forces"? Leave their minefields and prepared positions and march out and meet the Paras and Marines away from their lines of communication, supply, artillery support etc? -
Message 11
Posted by lindavid (U10745308) on Thursday, 18th June 2009
The loss of the AC could or could not have been a good thing, I was one of many who had to walk from san carlos to stanley NO PICNIC.
We did at one time shift some of our unit in a Chinnock, there were so many of use plus our kit that the bloody thing could only fly feet off the ground.
One experince on this trip, got the job of unhooking a netted load from underneath the Chinnok, after lighting up like a Christmas tree staffy said "allow the hook to ground first" -
Message 12
Posted by delrick53 (U13797078) on Thursday, 18th June 2009
englishvote,
45 in peacetime, 80 during war, and a few more if you're Paras looking for a fight.
So one lift would have taken 3 rifle companies. That's three-quarters of the fighting end of a Commando (I did say 'almost').
42 Commandos move to Mount Kent was going to be done in two lifts, but that would have included their Gunners.
If you don't know, a Commando leaves it's luxuries (like sleeping-bags and food) behind, and just takes what it needs to fight a battle, with everything else following on.
Someone (we've got two similar threads going) claimed that Argentinian Mountain troops and regulars couldn't have been flown into Stanley if the British decided to spend the winter at the beach-head. They could have.
If what you say is correct with regard to the Vulcan, and I believe you are, why did we bother at all ? Unless someone suspected that there was a possibility of fighter/bombers using Stanley, it seems a wasted effort.
Thomsons plan (I checked last night) was to put a small blocking force between Goose Green and the beach head and ignore it. He and his commanders knew that the terrain between the two locations favoured defence.
The orders came from Northwood/Whitehall, and my references come from the people that were there at the time, including Thomson himself. It was PR, nothing more, nothing less, and it nearly cost the whole campaign. No leader, if he had a choice, would choose to attack Goose Green. He didn't have the artillery, the sea bombardment, or sufficient air cover. We were lucky, even with the Paras. Even the intelligence was poor, with defensive troop numbers turning out to be more than double what was expected.
Had the Argentinians fought on, the whole eastern move would have had to turn south.
Don't forget, Thomson had to threaten to flatten the place to get the surrender. -
Message 13
Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Thursday, 18th June 2009
to all
if u read sharkey ward you come up with tha fact that the Vulcan raids were a waste of effort and could have ben carried out by harriers - yes indeed -
but that would have been accompanied by the scream of harriers - how good was it that the argies were sat in their foxholes and with no noise at all there were huge explosions from the sky
i can remember how good it made me feel - so how bad did the argies feel
militarily GG was a bad deal - politically and for morale it was superb - all due to the loss of AC
st -
Message 14
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Thursday, 18th June 2009
Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't the Vulcan raids make the enemy hold back fighters to defend the main land just in case. Dictators don't mind their men being shot at, but the thought of a bloody great delta wing jet flying down main st and dropping a bomb on your breakfast plate makes you think of your safety.
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Message 15
Posted by delrick53 (U13797078) on Thursday, 18th June 2009
GrumpyF,
I don't know about the Generals, but it's claimed that some air force commanders were effectively 'hiding' their resources because of the high casualty rates.
By the end of the conflict Argentina had lost over 40% of it's strike force. -
Message 16
Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Monday, 22nd June 2009
hi GF
i think you are correct there - the argies suddenly found that their mainland bases could be hit - although they never were an option in reality
the one vulcan bomb that hit hit the runway was filled in by lunch time - but suddenly there was the syndrome of we can hit u when we want - superb
how good was that
st
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