Wars and Conflicts聽 permalink
Who was Hitler's Top General?
This discussion has been closed.
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Message 1.聽
Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Saturday, 6th June 2009
I guess we seldom discuss this item. The candidates that come readily to mind are: For the Brits, Erwin Rommel. For the Russians, Guderian. For many Von Manstein.
Why were the German Generals so good that they almost overwhelmed the Allied Generals? Was there some thing in the German General Staff Course that the Allies were lacking? Perhaps they had mislaid the book by the British Captain Lidell Hart.
Tas -
Message 2
Posted by -frederik- (U13721647) on Saturday, 6th June 2009
Not just German generals, but (whether or not you Britons like it) Germans 'in general' are good at what they do, what they make, what they build.
I would say Rommel was the most gifted general... while it lasted. The least gifted with military(!) insight would have to be Adolf himself I think.
(No, I am not German! :D) -
Message 3
Posted by Shaz519 (U2827975) on Saturday, 6th June 2009
He only made it to corporal the lowest NCO and next step up from private. Was he only good as a basic rifleman or 'hod carrier' in the field? Was he totally lacking in other qualities? Surely the generals would not have his respect when he became fuhrer, and when he personally took over orders? Didnt Von Manstein (as seen in the Longest Day film) refer to him contemptuously as: 'that little bohemian corporal'
Was hitler the only case of a private soldier becoming general or field marshal? -
Message 4
Posted by vesturiiis (U13688567) on Saturday, 6th June 2009
To Fred
I think it is an illusion to assume the German whatever was superior to others. Obviously this was bought into with all the racial disaster their system created. Why not see them for whate they really were monsters being created. The free world hopefully is striving to see all mankind warts and all as contributing to our harmony.
Sounds a bit hokey but the German High command didn't look too mighty at Nuremburg trials end.
The Allies won----and never forget it -
Message 5
Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Saturday, 6th June 2009
Kammhuber.
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Message 6
Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Sunday, 7th June 2009
Yes, these guys were fighting for the wrong side, and they may have overthrow Hitler; it was only possible early in the game. Hitler was not only the worst of his Generals, but essentially destroyed his army and his people.
I think the real strength of the Wehrmacht was shown in the Polish and the French Campaigns. is it not strange that our generals had no idea of tank warfare and blitzkrieg, when the Briton Lidell-Hart had written so well about it. Did our General Staff not read anything that was contrary to their ideas. Why were they trying to fight WW1 all over again?
They had forgotten all about the war of massed tanks and breakthroughs and manoeuvre. Guderian and Rommel, and Von Manstein reminded them about it.
Thank God the Allies had the massive production capacity of the US and Hitler saw fit to declare war on the US, else things could have gone very badly for the Allies.
Tas -
Message 7
Posted by -frederik- (U13721647) on Sunday, 7th June 2009
@ Shaz & vesturiiis
Shaz:
<>
Hitler grew popular and powerful through charisma and feel for politics. His military service had little influence on that. Moreover, Hitler did not climb up in the army, he created an army. After WW-I the German army was disbanded. It was Hitler who (after becoming powerful) decided that Germany no longed played by the treaty-of-versailles rules and reinstalled a German army. (shoot if this information is incorrect)
Vesturiiis:
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Of course that is an illusion. But you cannot deny that Germany equals some degree of quality at various things. Superiority is a diffrent thing.
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I think it is an illusion to assume that the cruelties of WW-II are a collective responsibility. Yes, Adolf and various others were twisted evil monsters no doubt, but what little did the simple man in the streets of Berlin know?
As for the popularity of Hitler. If your country was the victim of an unfair and unrealistic versailles-treaty, and in your country the economy and unemployment would be so dramatic with no hope of better times... If that was you in that situation, would you not like the man who makes sure everyone has a job, who builds roads and cars, who says "enough!" and tells the treaty to "go do naughty manners with itself", and tells you that he will go teach these unfair "illegitimate children" a lesson? I think you would.
The dramatic outcome could not be foreseen at that time. By the way: The right-wing was growing popular in nearly all european countries. Would you say europe was turning into a monster?
I believe the main reason why Germany went the furthest in this matter, was the malcontent due to the Versailles treaty. And also becouse Britain and France did not stop Hitler when they could. Why did they not intervene when Hitler took power and disbonded what was after all their treaty? Three reasons: they realised they had gone too far with their treaty in the first place, they underestimated the possible consequences (as did the german people), they feared communism and liked the idea of a right-wing Germany better than a red one. The responsibility of Britain and France in this matter is AT LEAST equal to the responsibility of German everyday people.
<>
You are confusing Generals with war criminals. The German generals and soldiers at the front were just (patriotic) soldiers like any British soldier. No more or less honerable. The ones who were active behind the front, they were the ones who ended up in Nuremberg: Gestapo, SS, mass murderers, war criminals. These are not the generals this topic is about.
<> (1)
And I am most grateful for that. But in my personal opinion (as I meant with my previous post) the main reason why the allies won, was not the superiority of allied generals, but the lack of military insight (and some ridiculous commands as a consequence) of mister A.H. himself. He wanted to have total control over the entire army. The professional generals were often unable to make (speaking in military terms) the "right moves".
But then again without Hitler there might never have been a second world war at all...
<> (2)
You are getting carried away on a wave of patriotism or some other sort of emotional feeling. That kind of talk might work in a pub, but in this discussion it is completely useless. (this is my humble oppinion)
However i thank you for your critical review of my post
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Message 8
Posted by oldbess (U13929099) on Sunday, 7th June 2009
My Father and many of his family fought in this war,and, like a lot of his Army Mates,had more than a little respect for the 'Old German army'
(Not Hitlers Henchmen.) He always claimed they were great soldiers,and wether we liked it or not,were for the most part far better organised
and better prepared for war than we were.
If Hitler had not been in the equation, and pulled the 'real' army down, the old guard would have probably have won hands down.
And touching on Hitlers poulariity,wasn't it the case in the early thirties,even our country admired him for the way he was pulling Germany out of the mess they were in? If only we knew. -
Message 9
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 7th June 2009
The good performance of the German general staff during WWII had its basis in the efforts made during the Weimar period to retain a cadre of qualified general officers and the core of a functional general staff -- in direct violation of the terms of the treaty of Versailles. General Hans von Seeckt made a determined effort to learn from the defeat in WWI, and new tactical and strategic options were energetically investigated. In this, they built on the "stormtroop" tactics that had been so effective in the last German offensives. The Weimar republic also signed the treaty of Rapallo with the USSR, which allowed secret German units and arms factories to be created on Soviet territory.
They also built on the Prussian military reforms of the early 19th century, which had been inspired by the defeat inflicted on the traditional army by Napoleon. An important product of the reforms was the concept of "Auftragstaktik", the notion that a subordinate commander should be given a mission and the means to execute it, but then left to make his own decisions in the implementation. This delegation of responsibility to the commander on the spot, even junior officers, was a perfect match for the fluid tactics of manoeuvre that were advocated by the military reformers of the 1930s. It did of course demand a very high level of performance and training from junior officers, but for much of the war German officer cadres were excellent. (Late in the war too many officers had been killed or disabled, and SS units often had poorly trained cadres.) German officers on the Eastern front were amused when they heard Red Army units radio back to headquarters "What shall we do now?" German officers did not need to wait for orders --- the goal of their training was to ensure that they would automatically do the right thing. This mindset extended down to lowest ranks and accounted for much of efficiency of the German army.
The successes of a von Manstein, Guderian or Rommel could not have been achieved without the confidence that it was enough to give a relatively short, simple order, and the entire structure of the army down to the lowest ranking soldier would be able to move and take the initiative. This style of command did, of course, also rely on excellent staff officers to maintain order in what could easily have decayed into chaos. Thus German military organization featured a kind of dual leadership in which the chief of staff was almost as important (and sometimes more important) than the commander.
Hitler's role in all this was mostly destructive. He had never held a military command of any kind -- his WWI rank of 'Gefreiter' was not a real NCO position -- and in practice behaved as the archetypical armchair general. He eagerly studied the maps and knew everything there was to know about military equipment, and occasionally made good or even brilliant decisions. But he completely ignored logistics and chose to remain ignorant of the suffering of his soldiers. He would carelessly sacrifice large units to retain positions on the map. He is ignorance of the weakened condition of units also resulted in orders that were impossible to execute. His dictatorial insistence on orders being obeyed to the letter conflicted with the leadership style in which his generals had been trained, and his unwillingness to grant authority to a single person wrought havoc with the command structures.
That is not to say, however, that German generals could have won WWII without the interference of Hitler. Most of them would have been smart enough to avoid starting a world war in the first place, because they knew that their country did not have the resources to win it. -
Message 10
Posted by petaluma (U10056951) on Sunday, 7th June 2009
-frederik-, 100% correct as far as I'm concerned, Hitler destroyed Germany and the Army, had he left his generals fight the War as their skills enabled them the World would be in a much different state today. Only in recent years I saw part of a speech given by Hitler where it was captioned in English, I realized that had never been done before as many in Britain would have agreed to his aims and wished them for themselves. I was born in Britain in 1926 so understood conditions at the time and from my perspective able to pop many balloons. As many American soldiers said it was the American civilian industrial output that won the War for the Allies. Not to forget Britain was fighting to keep its Colonies won by modern arms and industrial strength against primitive people. What cost Freedom? The seeds of WW2 were sown by France and Britain, what else did they expect?
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Message 11
Posted by -frederik- (U13721647) on Sunday, 7th June 2009
Petaluma, it means a lot to me that you (having been there where I can only go in my immagination) agree with a humble 21year old history student. Especially while you of all people on this board could so easily (and who could blame you?) have a biased opinion.
Cheers! -
Message 12
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 7th June 2009
That is not to say, however, that German generals could have won WWII without the interference of Hitler. Most of them would have been smart enough to avoid starting a world war in the first place, because they knew that their country did not have the resources to win it.聽 I think, this paragraph is a sufficient resume. Hitler lost the war the moment Ribbentrop signed the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in Moscow on Hitler's behalf. The first bell rang on September 3 1939, when - apparently to Hitler's utmost surprise - the French and the British declared war. The second shocker came in the summer of 1940 when Stalin invaded Bessarabia and Bukovina and threatened Hitler's only remaining oil supply route that had not been controlled by Stalin already. At this point it must have become clear to many in the Wehrmacht High Command that no amount of tactical brilliance could compensate the strategic abyss Hitler was trapped in.
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Message 13
Posted by ambi (U13776277) on Sunday, 7th June 2009
Just to play devil's advocate, Alan Clarke in his book 'Barbarossa', takes the contrarian view (not for the first time) that Hitler was in fact the intuitive military master whose genius was largely obstructed by his generals.
Personally I was struck by General Wenck in Beevor's 'Berlin - the Downfall'. He seemed to be one of the few individuals at that point to combine pragmatism with humanitarianism. -
Message 14
Posted by LairigGhru (U5452625) on Sunday, 7th June 2009
As a youngster, much of what I read about WW2 left me wrestling with the question "How the hell did we, with our technology typified by the Matilda tank, manage to overcome and defeat such a juggernaut as the Nazi forces?"
I received my answer in 1974 when Fred Winterbotham blew the gaff about the Ultra Secret. -
Message 15
Posted by TrailApe (U1701496) on Monday, 8th June 2009
Why were the German Generals so good that they almost overwhelmed the Allied Generals聽
I suppose this question is based on a view - and it would seem that the Germans shared this view 鈥 that war is simply a matter of manoeuvre and skill at arms. Unfortunately for the Wermacht (and for those who built models of German uber-kampfenwagens and wonder how could these magnificent beasts, in their sexy camouflage schemes ever could be defeated by olive-drab Sherman鈥檚 and Churchill鈥檚) war 鈥 at least since Napoleonic times 鈥 is more than that. Modern war is not about how good your army is, it鈥檚 about the total ability of the nation. A mechanised war (and it might surprise a lot of people that the 鈥榖ackward鈥 British had embraced mechanization whilst the wermacht still had millions of horses) is all about supply.
Amateurs talk tactics, professionals study logistics. Supply is king and the Allies realised that.
A Panther or Tiger with an elite crew whose heads are full of Bewegungskrieg and schwerpunkt is of no use if it鈥檚 out of fuel and has no ammunition. Rommel, the 鈥榖rilliant鈥 General, often ignored the supply issue and as a consequence his Panzer鈥檚 ran out of fuel and were stranded in the middle of no where (eg Alem el Hafa). No use bemoaning this and complaining bitterly 鈥 next time try listening to the supply officer. The pursuit of Rommel by Montgomery after El Alamain was not nearly as dashing as Rommels previous advance 鈥 was this due to Montgomery being staid and cautious? 鈥 No - it was all because that the Commonwealth forces planned operations around logistics.
Additionally the Allies put more effort into the whole arena of supply 鈥 they had too, if you look at the situation the Western Allies were in, they were prosecuting a war against a centrally based power whilst they were isolated behind sea. Possibly the British and Americans did not have to consciously think about supply 鈥 to them it was ingrained 鈥 it had to be. Look at the effort they expended at Normandy, floating harbours and undersea pipelines and a host of other measures designed to keep the troops supplied and able to continue on with operations.
Mutatis-Mutandis earlier wrote an interesting piece about the structure of the Wermacht and how its policy of Auftragstaktik (youv've just got to love the german language at times!)enabled it to be much more flexible at unit level than the early allied units. However whilst this may be so, look at the role of the supply officer in their set up 鈥 no where as nearly influential as the similar position in the Allied organisation - and this showed.
The German generals certainly looked good in the early part of the war, British, French and Russian commanders looked distinctly pedestrian and their tactics reeked of hidebound dogma. This seemed to continue into North Africa, but as incompetents were sacked (obviously in those days the attributes that got you noticed as a peace time general didn鈥檛 translate well into those skills required as a combat general) and new commanders came to the for the Wermacht didn鈥檛 look so all conquering. Mid war and late war, apart from local counterattacks and that waste of men and material that was the Battle of the Bulge, the Germans were fighting a defensive campaign and certainly did not look like overwhelming the Allies.
As many American soldiers said it was the American civilian industrial output that won the War for the Allies.聽
Oh, and the Soviets had nothing to do with the eventual victory? Remind me which army entered Berlin first鈥︹.
Not to forget Britain was fighting to keep its Colonies won by modern arms and industrial strength against primitive people,聽
Very similair to the current US strategy around oil resources isn鈥檛 it?
The ones who were active behind the front, they were the ones who ended up in Nuremberg: Gestapo, SS, mass murderers, war criminals. These are not the generals this topic is about聽
Whilst there is some truth in that, these Generals owed their appointment to the Nazi Party and must have some complicity in the actions of the 鈥榝anatics鈥 鈥 turning a blind eye is not the same as innocence.
s a youngster, much of what I read about WW2 left me wrestling with the question "How the hell did we, with our technology typified by the Matilda tank, manage to overcome and defeat such a juggernaut as the Nazi forces?"
I received my answer in 1974 when Fred Winterbotham blew the gaff about the Ultra Secret.聽
LairigGhru which Matilda are you talking about here and what are you comparing it against?
Matilda I was an improbable looking beast armed with only a machine gun and was the product of a MOD request to build a cheap tank. No doubt about it, it wasn鈥檛 particularly effective (and looked rubbish). None of them survived Dunkirk. On the other hand Matilda II, at the time of its introduction was a very well armoured and armed AFV that caused the Wermacht no end of problems. In 1940-41 it was nicknamed the Queen of the Desert. I agree it became quickly outclassed by the further up-gunning and up-armouring of the Pz MkIII and MkIV鈥檚, but this was recognised by the allies and by the time of Alamien the Matilda鈥檚 were no longer gun tanks but used as mine clearance tanks.
If you are thinking of early war German tanks - PzI, II and early III鈥檚 and IV鈥檚 鈥 the Matilda II compares well if not better. Mid War tanks, upgraded III鈥檚 and IV鈥檚, Panthers and Tigers, it鈥檚 decidedly second best 鈥 but then it did not come up against these as it had been withdrawn as a fighting tank and replaced by other products.
If you are looking at the end of war German tanks and technology it would be better to use the Comet and the Centurion (it didn鈥檛 get to see combat but was available in May鈥45) as a yardstick of British technology. -
Message 16
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Monday, 8th June 2009
I entirely agree that in the end, the better logistics and greater supply available to the Allied forces was decisive. German neglect of logistics and transport in all forms went to baffling lengths.
That being said, before criticizing the Germans for their neglect of logistics, one needs to consider their situation. Even before the war, the German rearmament programme was consuming resources and money at a greater rate than the country could produce them, and the conquests of 1939-1941 added disappointingly little to the German war economy. German commanders focused on manoeuvre more than on logistics because they were aware that they would certainly lose a war of attrition, especially after the USSR and USA joined the conflict. They had to bet on a short war, and for this they had to move forward rapidly.
Of course, betting on a short war is almost the definition of strategic stupidity. If your opponents only need to be patient to exhaust you and win final victory, you can count on it that they will. It was a measure of Hitler's arrogance that he began the war in 1939 essentially BECAUSE Germany's long-term prospects were not good. As he wrote to Mussolini, "a significant shift in the balance of forces in our favour was barely conceivable."
This forced the commanders on the front to indulge in "va banque" warfare, if they did not gamble on capturing war-winning objectives they could be almost certain to be defeated. In France such a gamble was won, but over Britain, in front of Moscow, in the Middle East, and finally in the Battle of the Bulge they lost.
Rommel has been criticised because his advances in the desert were logistically unsupported, but it is not obvious that he had a workable alternative. If he had chosen to take a defensive posture and wait, the forces building up in front of him would quickly have become overpowering. Destroying the Allied forces piecemeal in a series of desert offensives, while costly, at least exploited the strong points of the forces he had available. In the long term, the capture of Egypt, chimera that it was, was the only way to stabilize the Axis position in the Middle East. -
Message 17
Posted by TrailApe (U1701496) on Monday, 8th June 2009
Mutatis_Mutandis,
totally agree with you, and I think anyone who has done a certain amount of basic reading around this subject understands this. The Wermacht relied on the shock value of getting into their opponents deciscion cycle to unbalance and defeat superior forces. A quick victory was what they required, and luckily for them they achieved this in their early campaigns
With reference to Rommel and DAK, I recently read a document that suggested the allied involvment in denying him his supplies was overstated, he was getting enough, but the bottleneck was of their own making - the DAK didn't spend enough resources on improving port/road/rail facilities and so their supplies moldered way back in Tripoli (try 'Logistics and the Desert Fox by Major Jay Hatton, USMC'). There's no doubting Rommel's panache and you just wonder what he might have done if he had paid more attention to his 'tail'.
And one factor that might not have been considered as the desert war grinds on - the number of 'keen subalterns' and 'cavalry officers' in the British army are winnowed out and as the army is filled with fresh minds, there are less chances of cavalry charges onto dug in A/T gun positions, British armour becomes more street wise and many of the old rules are thrown out of the window.
The British learned their lessons (as did the US a little later) through bitter experience and the armies that liberated Europe in 44/45 were grrounded in the experiences of the desert defeats in 41/42.
(in my opinion anyway
) -
Message 18
Posted by curiousdigger (U13776378) on Monday, 8th June 2009
Hitler grew popular and powerful through charisma and feel for politics. His military service had little influence on that. (quoted from msg 7)
Frederik-
I think that Hitler's military service did have some influence at least on his decision to enter politics. According to Ian Kershaw's biography, he became more aware of his abilities as a public speaker from having participated in "re-education" classes for returning POWs, who had been influenced by Bolshevik thinking. It was through this experience (and contacts he made who had heard him speak) that he gained some support for the NSDAP when it was still only a small party of interest in Bavaria.
Also, Kershaw argues that it was not specifically his military service which shaped his entry into politics, more what he saw and heard on the streets of Munich and Berlin while on leave during the war. With Army High Command still churning out the message that the war could be won, Hitler was dismayed (to say the least!) to hear the defeatism of the German public; so convinced was he that Germany was historically superior.
Hi popularity in later years almost certainly came from circumstance as much as Hitler himself. I think it is fair to say that his service (as a dispatch runner I think)during WWI definately didn't make him a particularly good military tactian!
CD -
Message 19
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 8th June 2009
Mutatis_Mutandis Even before the war, the German rearmament programme was consuming resources and money at a greater rate than the country could produce them, and the conquests of 1939-1941 added disappointingly little to the German war economy.聽 This is not entirely accurate. In 1938-39 fiscal year Germany spent 15% of its GNP on the military - about the same percent as the UK. By contrast, the USSR spent 26.4% on same in 1937-39; 32.6% in 1940; and planned to spend 43.4% on same in 1941.
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Message 20
Posted by LairigGhru (U5452625) on Monday, 8th June 2009
TrailApe,
I was indeed referring to the Matilda used at Dunkirk and I bow to your superior knowledge of developments that came later in the war. I seem to have failed to give proper credence for technological development by the British over the course of the war, so thanks for the lesson! -
Message 21
Posted by Steelers708 (U1831340) on Monday, 8th June 2009
How can you give proper credence to something that throughtout the war was totally dismal?
Yes by the end of the war we had the Comet, of which relatively few saw any real action at all, and the Centurion which didn't see any action.
What's the point of having something decent when it's too late to really matter, meanwhile in the proceeding years the Germans upgraded the PzKpfw IV to keep it at least the equal of the main Allied tank, the Sherman, and had the superior Panther from July 1943. Then there's the impact that just 1,347 Tiger I's made. -
Message 22
Posted by petaluma (U10056951) on Monday, 8th June 2009
TrailApe, who mentioned the Soviets did or did not help in the defeat of Germany? Advice, stop putting up Straw Men they ignite easily. America helped the Russians with War supplies that the Russians sorely needed and asked for, many Americans, British and other nationalities died on convoying War supplies to Russia, and the crews Officers and Men were treated very poorly by the Russians after a horrendous journey, certainly not by people receiving much needed supplies fighting in their own land for survival.
As regards America's concern re. dependable oil supplies for all countries I fail to see where it keeps whole nations under bondage. I was not aware it at the time it happened ,but during the Vietnam war learned that three weeks after V-Jay Day the British rearmed the Japanese POWs to prevent the original people from reclaiming their country for themselves after the Defeat of their Task Masters. Dutch, French and British. So much for the cry, "Fighting for Freedom from the Oppressor"
If you must ask for someone to remind you of who first entered Berlin, probably the best answer would be a specialist engaged in Memory Training, One does not bring a Knife to a Gun Fight.
The British found a way to defeat a Tiger Tank but it took 4 Sherman Tanks 3 destroyed as Decoys. (What a way to fight a Tank War). American Civilians up to their 'Tricks Again', Supplies and More Supplies. I rest my case. -
Message 23
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Monday, 8th June 2009
This is not entirely accurate. In 1938-39 fiscal year Germany spent 15% of its GNP on the military - about the same percent as the UK.聽
The financial figures are misleading, because by then the budget, the prices and the value of the Reichsmark were completely artificial constructs.
A more significant measure is that in the pre-war years, the military was consuming 40% to 50% of German steel production, and an even larger share of some other resources. While this still failed to provide for the grandiose rearmament plans, the impact on other sectors of the economy was huge -- to continue the point about logistics, the railways complained that their allocations were not even sufficient to maintain the existing rail network, and carrying capacity was reduced.
However, 1939 did see stagnation in the military expansion, because the Reich was facing bankruptcy. In 1938 there had been an about 30% gap between the income of the Reich and its spending, and in 1939 it became clear that the regime could not continue to bankroll itself by printing money. (It did resort to paying 40% of its bills in IOUs.) As a result the military expansion plans were scaled back, and part of the economy redirect to export products to bring in foreign currency. -
Message 24
Posted by Steelers708 (U1831340) on Monday, 8th June 2009
"The British found a way to defeat a Tiger Tank but it took 4 Sherman Tanks 3 destroyed as Decoys"
The 'It takes 4/5 Shermans to knockout 1 Tiger' is a complete 'myth' that seems to have it's origins in North Africa when the two tanks first met and has become the accepted truth through repeated usage, rather like the 'death ride of the panzers' Kursk myth. -
Message 25
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 8th June 2009
The financial figures are misleading, because by then the budget, the prices and the value of the Reichsmark were completely artificial constructs.聽 Regardless of how Reichsmark was set, the portion of the military spending was still 15% of the GNP - hardly the breaking point for the economy. Even in March of 1945 - at its last breath - German industry produced more armament than in June 1941. Contrary to the popular belief, Wehrmacht actually grew in size over the course of the war - up to 9.4 M troops at the end of 1944. On top of that - as anybody knows - Wehrmacht conducted incredibly successful tactical operations in Europe in 1939 - 1941. None of that turned out to be enough to overcome the strategically impossible position Hitler got himself into in 1939.
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Message 26
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Monday, 8th June 2009
Steelers
Agreed. It did not take three Shermans destroyed to get each Tiger.
The handful of Tigers in North Africa do not seem to have made too much impression, although the 17lbr was rushed out to Tunisia in January 1943 to meet the threat (which it did). They were more of a problem in Italy, apparently.
But the myth may have its origin in the doctrinal tactic for dealing with a Tiger laid down before D-Day. In that case, where a tank troop consisted of two or three 75mm Shermans and one Firefly, the 75mm tanks were supposed to engage the Tiger with HE, to make the crew button down and disrupt their view (and maybe blow a track off, if lucky), while the Firefly manoeuvred to knock it out. This tactic obviously required three or four Shermans to one Tiger, but did not mean that two or three of them had to be knocked out. It did rather depend on Tigers being encountered on their own, or in small numbers, but that was the usual occurence.
Attacking tanks tended to lose more than they knocked out, whether they were Shermans or Pz IVs, Vs or VIs.
Tank losses overall in Normandy seem to have been about the same on both sides, although the Germans lost proportionately more to air bombardment, artillery and fighter bombers.
LW
LW -
Message 27
Posted by TrailApe (U1701496) on Monday, 8th June 2009
Petaluma,
Please spare me you鈥檙e offended sensibilities. If you bring remarks like 鈥淣ot to forget Britain was fighting to keep its Colonies won by modern arms and industrial strength against primitive people. What cost Freedom?鈥 聽
don鈥檛 be surprised if someone holds up a mirror to your face and you don鈥檛 like what you see. Are you honestly telling me that the British troops that went ashore on beaches in France just 65 years ago were doing it to keep 鈥楾he Empire鈥? I find that quite insulting to the memories of those men that gave their all during that war against fascism that you dismiss their sacrifice in such a glib fashion... You may not be aware of this but one of the terms offered for Britain鈥檚 cessation of hostilities in 1940 was freedom to keep the Empire. Wonder why the British people rejected this if Empire was all they cared about?
What price freedom indeed 鈥 can you tell me what the US was doing in the Philippines until 1946 鈥 or does it not count as oppression if it鈥檚 done by the Good Old USA?
It鈥檚 ironic that you learn of these dastardly deeds of the British in SE Asia during one of the US鈥檚 forays into interfering with the policies of another country in the same area.
And as for the American civilians and their industrial output, well yes, the US contributed a huge amount to the eventual defeat of the Nazi鈥檚, but while working hard for a good wage is an admirable think, lets face it, nobody in the continental US had to worry about their factories, houses, rail network, road network, wives and children getting blown to pieces did they 鈥 so whilst it鈥檚 three cheers for the hard working folk of the US, please keep it in context.
And lets get to 鈥淚f you must ask for someone to remind you of who first entered Berlin, probably the best answer would be a specialist engaged in Memory Training, One does not bring a Knife to a Gun Fight.鈥 聽
My goodness, how dramatic, knives and guns 鈥 I don鈥檛 think the 麻豆约拍 approves of such shenanigans. My point, which you seem not to want to answer, is that despite your claims to the effect that the US Civilians won the 39-45 war, it was in fact mainly the efforts of the Soviet Army that defeated the Wermarcht on the field of battle. Now Hollywood might not like that, but it is a fact.
As for
The British found a way to defeat a Tiger Tank but it took 4 Sherman Tanks 3 destroyed as Decoys. (What a way to fight a Tank War). American Civilians up to their 'Tricks Again', Supplies and More Supplies. I rest my case 聽
Well here鈥檚 a snippet of information for you, the first Tiger knocked out by the Western Allies (those pesky Soviets were bagging them by the bucketful) not by a Sherman but by a Churchill 鈥 no need to get Shermans brewed up if you鈥檝e got something with more armour and a decent anti-tank gun. -
Message 28
Posted by TrailApe (U1701496) on Tuesday, 9th June 2009
Steelers,
There鈥檚 no way I'm going to even try and defend the British tank development in the early and mid part of the war. When you compare the hodgepodge procurement effort we used to produce tanks and look at the success story we had in producing aircraft it does make you wonder. I suppose in one way the air ministry knew what they wanted, whilst the tank lot were still stuck in the infantry/cruiser tank debate. Running alongside this was the debate concerning the gun used on these tanks, should it be a good anti-armour weapon with a modest HE ability (6lber) or should it have the ability to through out a good HE shell for grunt killing and have a modest A/T capability (M3 75mm). Also when you look at the aircraft industry there are a few standout names, Sidney Camm, RJ Mitchell and Barnes Wallis who all became prominent 鈥 where were the tank designers 鈥 did we have any?
Back to the Comet - one of the reasons that the Comet didn't see much tank vs tank action is that the Germans were running out of serviceable panzers, so it's not the Comets fault it turned up to the dance and nobody wanted to take part. You are right that they were not there in huge numbers but the 11th Armoured Division was outfitted with these tanks, so they were definitely there on the ground
Lostweekend makes a valid point about the merits of defending/attacking. Usually in advance you would expect to have a force three times greater than the opposition 鈥 mainly because you are getting out of cover and advancing over ground which has probably been worked into a coherent defence plan using direct fire and indirect fire assets. From 43 onwards it was the allied tanks that had to expose themselves and they paid the subsequent price.
One question - if the British used the 75mm Shermans to set up the Tiger for the Firefly, what did the Americans do 鈥 or where they equipped with 76mm Shermans by that time? -
Message 29
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Tuesday, 9th June 2009
Re: Message 9,
Mutatis Mutandis,
thank you for this as ever excellent message. The Swedish Hasse, said it several times to me on these boards. That was one of the main reasons the breaktrough through the Ardennes succeeded as the later defeat of the French and British in France May, June 1940. And he is well positioned to say this while he had the background in the Swedish army by his studies overthere.
I will use it also as one of the mean reasons in my reply to the "extension of the Maginot line" thread whenever I will have time. Next week again holidays to France.
It is a pleasure to read your logical and well-constructed messages. Not that many...but when one appears...
Warm regards,
Paul. -
Message 30
Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Tuesday, 9th June 2009
I just read about Captain Liddell-Hart, the so-called "Captain who taught the Generals."
It seems that Liddell Hart had grossly exaggerated his role in developing Blitzkrieg. It seems that in Guderian's book, "Achtung - Panzer!", written in 1936, the one written before the war about tanks, he has different version for Germany and Britian. In the British version there is a paragraph of commendation for Liddell-Hart.
It turns out Liddell-Hart wrote to Guderain asking for him to endorse him . Since his book had already been published in Germany, he could only give Liddell-Hart an endorsement in the British version of his book.
It seems Blitzkreig came about as a result of the orders given by Guderian and Rommel during the war and was developed gradually. The use of massed tanks in effecting a breakthrough, the use of close support aircraft and the use of manoeuvre subsequent to the breakthrough. It was not a fixed theory and did not have the name Blitzkrieg, either.
I had believed that Liddell-Hart and developed the theory and the younger German Generals had learnt it from the books of Liddell-Hart. You live and learn.
Tas -
Message 31
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Tuesday, 9th June 2009
TrailApe
Under US doctrine, heavy panzers were supposed to be left to the tank destroyers, for which an aggressive set of tactics had been worked out. Indeed, in the right conditions, the tank destroyers could achieve spectacular success.
However, Italy had shown the tank destroyers could not always be in the right place. The 76.2mm Sherman was the designed response, and the US forces in UK also asked about the possibility of acquiring Fireflies. Unfortunately, there were barely enough of these for the British armoured divisions. As it was, tank regiments before D-Day only got 12 instead of the planned 15, and armoured recce regiments did not get any (which was why 2nd Northants Yeomanry suffered so cruelly outside Vire during BLUECOAT).
For all the gloomy tales of Fireflies being deliberately targeted by the Germans, Firefly losses were proportionately less than ordinary "gun" Shermans. By the end of August '44, armoured regiments were operating with troops increassingly having two Fireflies. The armoured recce regiments were also belatedly issued the 17lbr-equipped Challenger, which had not been ready for D-Day.
Spoiled by this, the British did not want the 76.2mm Sherman, as the HE performance was inferior to the 75mm. They resisted taking any, and when the supply of Lend-Lease 75mm Shermans dried up, the new tanks were issued first to the Poles.
The Comet's entry into operational service, incidentally, was delayed by the Ardennes offensive. 29 Armd Bde (11 Armd Div)had withdrawn to re-equip with Comets near Brussels (Bruxelles), but as the only uncommitted armoured brigade, had to hurriedly remount their old Shermans and go off to cover the Meuse bridges. Their delayed re-equipment had a knock-on - 22nd Bde (7 Armd Div) could not start their own until they were back in the line, and were still re-equipping at the war's end.
LW -
Message 32
Posted by stevep (U14025984) on Tuesday, 9th June 2009
suvorovetz
How sure are you about this? Most sources I've come across give much higher spending on the military and Germany was running out of resources, despite forced loans from the population, late payment for imports and looting Austrian gold stocks and what they seized from the Czechs. It was only their early victories and their massive looting of assets from them that enabled things to keep ticking over.
Steve -
Message 33
Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Tuesday, 9th June 2009
Many British Army programmes were disrupted by the loss of materiel used by the BEF. This lead to equipment being manufactured to replace the losses, although it was already obsolescent at best.
-
Message 34
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Tuesday, 9th June 2009
stevepnew
How sure are you about this? Most sources I've come across give much higher spending on the military聽 I got this from Y. Felshtinsky, Phd in history: Germany spent 17% of its GNP on military needs in 1938-39 fiscal year. I'll try to track his sources down further. What are your figures and where did you get your figures from? -
Message 35
Posted by aussiebrit (U13851320) on Tuesday, 16th June 2009
To all members
May I offer (2) two candidates as to the best German generals in WW2.
Firstly : Generaloberst Erhard Raus.
He was one of the German Army's finest panzer generals and a leading exponent of blitzkrieg in the east.
He commanded the 6th Panzer division in the the invasion of Russia in 1941 during the drive to Moscow which took the division almost to the suburbs of the Russian capital.
He was the man who led the spearhead of the relief force that drove for the trapped 6th Army in Stalingrad, the man who led three panzer armies with distinction, the man who commanded the brilliant defense in the fourth battle of Kharkov.
Raus was such a master of the art of war and leadership that his men coined a phrase for the saving effects of those qualities -(Raus pulls you through).
Secondly: General Herman Balck
He was one of the German army's most brilliant leaders of armor . To take a quote from the book Panzer Battles by Major Gen F W von Mellenthin, if Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during WW2, then Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander, he had a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership, as the commander of a rifle regiment in the 1st Panzer division in France, the commander of the 11th Panzer division in Russia in 1942-43 to an army and later an army group commander in Poland, France and Hungary.
I have obtained much of my information from the following books, which are excellent reading
Panzers on the Eastern Front, edited by Peter G. Tsouras
Panzer Battles by Maj Gen F W von Mellenthin
Panzer Leader by GeneralOberst Heinz Guderian.
In conclusion these two generals were considered by many soldiers and myself after much reading to be the finest exponents of armored tactics and leadership.
I hope my comments will lead to further discussions as to whom is the best -
Message 36
Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Tuesday, 16th June 2009
Thank you Aussiebrit.
You live and learn. I myself never knew about these generals, but I am sure you are far better informed than myself.
Thank you once again.
Tas -
Message 37
Posted by Tim of Acleah (U1736633) on Tuesday, 30th June 2009
Manstein would be the best for me. He was the mastermind behind the 1940 Ardennes attack and he pulled the eastern front togther after Stalingrad inflicting the last major defeat against the red army of WW2. the only question mark over him must be the extent to which he was responsible for the Kursk offensive of 1943 which Germany should have never undertaken.
regards
Tim -
Message 38
Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Tuesday, 30th June 2009
Hi Tim,
I am inclined to agree with you about Von Manstein. However, his attempted rescue of the Germans troops caught in the pocket at Stalingrad were unsuccessful.
Hitler had become so high-handed in treating his Generals after the Victory in France, that one never knew how much of Hitler's hand was there in each subsequent debacle.
I think after the defeat at Stalingrad, Hitler was determined on a Spring offensive, and the arm chair general that he was, he thought he could effect it with his Panzers.
That man was an asinine idiot and the German Generals rued the day he made himself Fuhrer.
Tas -
Message 39
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 30th June 2009
Tas,
That man was an asinine idiot and the German Generals rued the day he made himself Fuhrer.聽
Many people did. -
Message 40
Posted by curiousdigger (U13776378) on Thursday, 2nd July 2009
Hmmm... Yes he was a pain in the proverbial for the German High Command, but I don't think they are entirely blameless for having Hitler as Fuhrer! Up until 1938 when Blomberg and Fritsch were unceremoniously removed from their posts, the army was pretty much the only body in Germany with the capacity to oppose Hitler, and rein him in as it were. Unfortunately they didn't act as decisively as they perhaps could have, resulting in Hitler pronouncement of himself as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Blomberg's other post). However much generals may have later detested Hitler meddling in military affairs, they were in some ways responsible for his ability to do so in the first place!
-
Message 41
Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Thursday, 2nd July 2009
Hi Curious,
I suspect they did not know that Hitler would turnout to be such a meddlesome person. Right up to the Conquest of France, he seemed to be behaving himself. It was that Victory over one of the then Great Powers of Europe, that he seems to have come to regard himself as a great commander and a great strategist. I guess there must have been many sycophants in he entourage, convincing him that the victory was from his strategy rather than some of those old fuddy-duddies in the High Command.
He even interfered in the production of the first fighter jet planes, wanting a huge cannon put on them to shoot down the Liberators and the Lancaster's.
Tas -
Message 42
Posted by curiousdigger (U13776378) on Thursday, 2nd July 2009
Very true, Hitler was surrounded by sycophants, for which Bormann must surely be partly responsible as he controlled almost all access to Hitler in the later stages of the war. The "Fuhrer myth" had however, been building since the late 1920s and had only really taken hold of the man himself after the triumphs of 1933 onwards. He was always very distrustful of military commanders, particularly those who diagreed with him. This could have been due to his sel-image and enormous ego, which couldn't handle the truth- he was actually a mediocre soldier who was not adept at military strategy!
"He even interfered in the production of the first fighter jet planes, wanting a huge cannon put on them to shoot down the Liberators and the Lancaster's."
Hitler insisted that the Me 262 be designed as a bomber, and when he was eventually persuaded otherwise, it was of little effect as a fighter for the Luftwaffe. His "input" must have been infuriating for anyone with expertise!
CD -
Message 43
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Friday, 3rd July 2009
Hitler's involvement with the Me 262 was a bit more complex than is reflected by the popular account.
It is true that he insisted that the Me 262 would be produced as a fighter-bomber. The idea, by no means that foolish, was that a fast fighter-bomber would be a very useful weapon when the Allied invasion came. Because of crushing air superiority of the Allies, only such a high-performance aircraft stood any chance of hitting the invasion beaches. Earlier experience with the Fw 190 had illustrated the usefulness of a fast fighter-bomber.
Because the initial versions of the Me 262 were being produced as pure fighters, the order to equip the aircraft with bomb racks did result in some delay. However, this was hardly significant compared to the delays inflicted by the Jumo 004 engine. Because Germany lacked the necessary materials to make high-strength, high-temperature alloys, the development of the jet engine was protracted, and the early engines were unreliable and had very short useful lives.
The 50-mm cannon experiment had a different origin: It was the result of attempt to find a weapon that could destroy a B-17 or B-24 with a single hit. Calculations indicated that this would take about a pound of high explosive, and to deliver that charge a 55-mm cannon would be required. As a suitable weapon would take time to develop, this resulted in experiments with the BK5 and MK214, high-velocity weapons derived from tank guns. In theory these also enabled the fighter to open fire outside the range of the .50 defensive guns of the bombers. In practice these guns were too heavy, had a too small ammunition capacity and were too unreliable. -
Message 44
Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Friday, 3rd July 2009
Interesting. How does the failure of that gun compare to the success / failure of the Hurricane with 40mm cannon (c. 2pdr shell), and the Molins 6-pdr fitted to the Tsetse mosquito for shipbusting?
-
Message 45
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Saturday, 4th July 2009
Both aircraft were developed for the anti-tank role, the Mosquito Mk.XVIII 'Tsetse' was only diverted to a naval strike role when the RAF began to doubts its viability as an anti-tank aircraft.
In the anti-tank role, equipping aircraft with powerful cannon was generally successful: The Hurricane Mk IID with the Vicker S had its German counterparts in the Ju 87G with its two BK3,7 cannon, and the Soviet Il-2 Type 3M with two NS-37 cannon. The requirements for the gun where different than for air combat: It needed to be powerful and accurate, but a small ammunition capacity was acceptable -- for the given examples, 15, 12 and 25 rounds per gun, respectively. And, up to a limit, considerable weight was acceptable as well, because these aircraft were not intended to enter air combat. They were best operated with a strong escort or in condition of air superiority.
However, even in the anti-tank role cannon were gradually being displaced by rockets. Rockets rarely hit a tank, because they were far less accurate than a gun, but they provided heavy firepower for relatively little weight. -
Message 46
Posted by ambi (U13776277) on Sunday, 5th July 2009
Wasn't there a variant of the Henschel 129 with a 50mm a/t cannon? I've seen pics of it but never read how it performed.
-
Message 47
Posted by curiousdigger (U13776378) on Monday, 6th July 2009
Thanks for the extra info Mutatis_Mutandis, I haven't read far enough into my book yet to get all the details!
-
Message 48
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Monday, 6th July 2009
50-mm was one calibre the Hs 129 did not operationally use, although it seems to have been tested. Models entered service with the 30-mm MK101 or MK103, the 37-mm BK3,7 and the massive 75-mm BK7,5. The gun most frequently used was the MK103. The MK101 and MK103 fired similar (but not identical) 30-mm ammunition, with good armour penetration performance if rounds with tungsten cores were used. The MK101 had a magazine with 30 rounds, the MK103 had a belt feed for 100 rounds.
The BK7,5 armed version (Hs 129B-3) was fairly rare, as just 25 were completed and saw use on the Eastern front. The weapon was derived from the PaK40 anti-tank gun. A magazine provided 12 rounds, and the 40 rpm rate of fire permitted four rounds to be fired during a single attack run. The BK7,5 could destroy any Soviet tank. But on the downside, the gun weighed 705 kg, rather a lot for an aircraft that weighed 3810 kg empty and was notoriously underpowered and handicapped by unreliable (French Gnome-Rhone 14M) engines.
In an emergency, the pilot could drop the gun, but nevertheless the BK7,5 degraded the flight performance of the Hs 129 to unpleasant depths. Eric 'Winkle' Brown who flew the MK103 armed version in 1945, rated even this version "rather abysmal" and "a terrible aeroplane". Nevertheless the Hs 129 made an effective anti-tank aircraft because it was well-armoured and carried effective armament. -
Message 49
Posted by Tim of Acleah (U1736633) on Tuesday, 7th July 2009
Hi Tas
I do not think that you can blame Manstein for the failure to get through to Stalingrad, it was a hopeless task and Manstein did his best with the forces he had available.
regards
Tim -
Message 50
Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Wednesday, 8th July 2009
Tim,
I agree with you. Hitler always demanded no retreat, when it would have been a lot better to withdraw and regroup. He set impossible tasks for his General Staff.
It is amazing that despite the constant interference of Hitler, the German Wehrmacht were able to capture such a great power as France and go all the way to Moscow and Leningrad and Stalingrad, probably because Stalin had wiped out many of his best generals in the purges of the late 1930s.
This what I believe: Strong men appear to be getting things moving, but sooner rather than later, they run out of steam, however, great institutions always survive, even when it appears they are muddling through.
This is how you won out WW2 in the end.
Tas
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