Wars and ConflictsΒ permalink
"Operation Market Garden" Again
This discussion has been closed.
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Message 1.Β
Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Monday, 1st June 2009
I was just thinking this operation was the most intricate operation devised by Field Marshall Montgomery during WW2.
What did Monty do until he was assigned to take over from Auchinleck in the Desert? Was the war in the desert his first true experience of operational command?
What was the biggest flaw in Market Garden, that lead to its failure.
Tas -
Message 2
Posted by Northern_Andy (U2943874) on Monday, 1st June 2009
The biggest flaw in Market Garden?
It was a ..."Bridge Too Far..." -
Message 3
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Monday, 1st June 2009
Here is a quick biog of the Field Marshall. The desert was not his first command, but it was a rapid promotion after his service in the French campaign. He commanded the 8th army in to Sicily, so he had experience of large scale invasion operations.
Something like Market garden usually fails because of a variety of reasons.
Poor interpretation of intelligence.
Bad luck.
Poor co-ordination.
To look for one reason is usually missing the point. -
Message 4
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Monday, 1st June 2009
TimTack,
Good list; may I also add the failure of our armour to press on to the objective.
Regards Spruggs -
Message 5
Posted by Northern_Andy (U2943874) on Monday, 1st June 2009
Also don't forget:
Airborne force being dropped several miles from objectives.
Armour advancing up a single highway (one axis of advance).
Faulty radios.
Unexpected presence of German armour that was refitting in the area.
Delay in dropping Polish forces. -
Message 6
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Monday, 1st June 2009
Tas
Montgomery had commanded a division on counter-insurgency operations in Palestine before the war, and then 3rd Infantry Division in the BEF, the best trained and probably the most effective division (1st Division possibly excepted). He briefly commanded II Corps while it was embarking at Dunkirk. Back in the UK, he reverted to command of 3 Div, then was promoted to a Corps and then South East Command. This was a key command in defence against invasion, but also intended to eventually transform into an Army in the new BEF - it had been designated 2nd Army by the time he left for the desert, having shown himself the most effective trainer in Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ Forces.
Only Alexander was better prepared for command - and he was appointed Monty's boss.
MARKET GARDEN's major planning flaw was the dependence on airlift and air support at a time of year when good weather could not be guaranteed.
The major mistake on the ground was 82nd Airborne not trying to get to the Nijmegen Bridge the moment they landed. -
Message 7
Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Monday, 1st June 2009
Hi LW,
Thanks for your well-informed comments!
Was not the 82nd Airborne a US division. Was Monty in Command of the US forces as well at the time of Market Garden?
I know he had a major difference with Ike about wanting a decisive knock-out blow in the Ruhr rather than using a broad front, as the Americans wanted. Was Market Garden an attempt by Monty to implement his Ruhr strategy? Perhaps he wanted to implement it quickly (too quickly?) because, if he let it linger, he was afraid of being over ridden by Ike.
Tas -
Message 8
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Monday, 1st June 2009
Tas
Yes, the 82nd was American. It and the 101st (US) Abn Div were assigned to 1st (British) Abn Corps for the operation - the idea was that they would revert to American command once relieved (Ridgeway, commanding their usual parent formation XVIIIth (US) Abn Corps, was recceing a possible drop on Bradley's front as MARKET GARDEN kicked off). As it was, both divisions stayed in the line, under British command, into October.
Montgomery had ceased to be Commander, Land Forces at the end of the Normandy campaign, when 12th (US) Army Group activated under Bradley, and 1st (US) Army passed to it from Monty's 21st Army Group.
The spearpoint/ broad front argument had started, but did not really develope until after MARKET GARDEN. At the time the operation was devised, the idea was get across the Rhine before winter, and Eisenhower actually backed Montgomery as the best shot at conferences in early September; Patton was too far east for a decisive crossing, and Hodge's First Army was opposite the Ruhr, where it would get snarled up even if they got across. Eisenhower agreed to the use of the airborne divisions, which were his strategic reserve, and ordered Bradley to co-operate (an order Bradley disobeyed).
After the operation failed to get across the Rhine at Arnhem, Eisenhower ordered Bradley to detach extra US divisions to Montgomery to try to exploit eastwards between the Maas and the Rhine. This part of Allied operations does not get much of an airing.
Montgomery, of course, was the master of the set piece, and there was no time for that sort of planning. In fact 21st Army Group did very little of the detailed planning. The operation was under 2nd Army, but the airborne part was, naturally, left to 1st Abn Army and 1st Abn Corps, and the ground part to XXX Corps - this was, incidentally, standard practice. It was only the last minute need to deploy VIII Corps on the right, when Bradley's supporting attack failed to materialise further east, that complicated the ground plan (the bridgehead was too small for two Corps attacks to be developed).
The decision not to go straight for Nijmegen Bridge was in fact a last minute one by Jim Gavin, which he sold to Browning on D-1 (this is Browning's big mistake in the battle).
LW -
Message 9
Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Tuesday, 2nd June 2009
LW,
Thanks from your comprehensive answer. I learnt a lot from it.
Would you say Alexander was a better General? How about Field Marshall Slim or even Lord Auchinleck?
Tas -
Message 10
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Tuesday, 2nd June 2009
What was the biggest flaw in Market Garden, that lead to its failure.Β
Market Garden had a lot of ways to fail, and only a single one to succeed -- if everything went perfectly. One can point to numerous causes of failure, and the preparation should have been better, but basically it just wasn't a good plan. In war, things often happen to go wrong, and good planners allow for some margin and flexibility. Montgomery and his staff did not.
I would argue that Market Garden is emblematic for Montgomery's style of command and one of the main reasons why he does not belong among the great generals of WWII. Most of his contemporaries understood (even if they were not always able to put it into practice) that an effective offensive should create freedom to manoeuvre. The initial assault should create a gap in the enemy line, which allows mobile units to break through into the enemy hinterland. There they would take the initiative, trying to exploit the initial success as much as possible by staying one step ahead of the enemy and taking advantage of every opportunity that offered itself. While an offensive should have an initial plan of advance, it is foolish to deny yourself the flexibility of alternatives and quick responses to circumstances.
Market Garden had the singular flaw of being a break-through operation in which the attacker denied himself any freedom to manoeuvre or respond to events. As it featured an advance concentrated on a single narrow road through boggy countryside, and the spearhead was pre-committed to relieve the paratroopers dropped ahead of it, there was no room for initiative or change of plans. Instead, the plan gave the initiative away to the Germans, who only had to figure out the purpose of the plan (not that difficult) and assemble a suitable reaction.
It was not just a plan gone awry or a case of bad luck; it was a fundamentally and deeply flawed plan.
Probably the only reason the Allied high command accepted it, was that they believed that the German forces, after their rapid retreat through France and Belgium, were done for and would not able to respond effectively. That was a serious mistake. While the Wehrmacht had been routed and driven back behind the Rhine in disorder, it was not yet entirely defeated, and the men who had driven out of France away where reorganized in a remarkably short time. -
Message 11
Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Tuesday, 2nd June 2009
Hi Mutandis,
An excellent message, as are almost all you write. I have learnt so much from them.
I guess it must have looked a brilliant plan on paper, with the use of paratroop commandos and taking bridges in the nick of time; everything working like clockwork.
That kind of thing just does not happen in a real war, only in war games.
Tas -
Message 12
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Tuesday, 2nd June 2009
MM
I have to disagree - only by crossing the Rhine before the winter set in was there any chance of "ending the war by Christmas", and much Allied planning for the Far East was based on the release of forces from Europe (including most of 8th Air Force for China; and a British Army HQ, the Airborne Corps and an Army Corps for SEAC).
The only chance to do this was the Arnhem operation and so it had to be tried - the alternative was to accept that the NW Europe campaign would continue into the middle of the following year.
It was a very narrow front, but if the 1st (US) Army had carried out the planned supporting attack to the East, the Germans would have been faced with two fronts instead of one and their reinforcements would have been split. As it was, Patton's 3rd Army (and the 1st Army operations in support of that) was too far away to be an immediate threat, and the Germans could concentrate on MARKET GARDEN.
The true measure of Montgomery is not MARKET GARDEN, but Normandy, and he does deserve to be recognised as a great general for that battle alone. No other British or US general could have managed it as well, as both Eisenhower and Bradley (who hated him) have admitted. I would agree he was not one of the great commanders, because his character traits prevented him achieving the necessary moral leadership among his wider collaborators. But he was a consummate professional soldier and military technician.
LW -
Message 13
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Tuesday, 2nd June 2009
Tas
I think it is a very difficult call.
I would characterise Alexander is the better Commander overall. He had the qualities to manage difficult subordinates and keep them on track - until McCreery took over 8th Army at the end of 194, Alexander did not get to choose his subordinate commanders. His abilities as a battlefield general are underestimated, partly because his subordinates (Montgomery, Mark Clarke and, to a lesser extent, Slim in Burma) tended to try for the credit at his expense, and (typical Guards officer) he did not try for self publicity. However, he did grip the battle in Tunisia, and orchestrated the final campaign in Italy. The political constraints on him in the first half of 1944 are also underestimated.
Monty, on the other hand, was the master of training and the set piece, which was the British Army's forte. However, he needed a firm hand to control him, which was fine when Alan Brooke was about, but a problem for anyone else, because Monty thought he always had a "get out of jail free" card.
Auchinleck has a a claim to be the finest British battlefield commander of the war. His handling of troops in the field in Norway, in CRUSADER and in the first Alamein battles demonstrate this. He was also an excellent CinC of the Indian Army. But he lacked the skills necessary for a CinC in the Middle East. It was perhaps his (and Britain's) tragedy that he was so senior that he went to be CinC India in early 1941 rather than being available to be sent out to command the desert army under Wavell.
Slim had many of the organisational and training skills of Monty (to whom he compared himself, to Leese's fury). He has a claim to be Monty's equal in Army command (he had less of a tactical problem, but a much greater logistic one), but was never tested at Army Group level. He was, of course, exactly the CIGS the Army needed in 1949, whereas Monty was a disaster in that post.
Horses for courses. And there are the great unknowns like Paget, who commanded a division in 1940, then rose to be CinC Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ Forces, CinC 21st Army Group in UK and then the Middle East, but without getting the opportunity to command in action again.
Cheers
LW -
Message 14
Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Wednesday, 3rd June 2009
Thank you LW for a wonderful and full analysis. I had a science teacher in India who had fought under FM Slim. He always opined that Slim was the best of all British Generals.
I guess it could be from personal attachment, but any commander that can produce so much attachment from his men is good indeed.
What was Slim's most important achievement? We seldom hear much of his achievements. We know much more about Monty.
Tas -
Message 15
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Wednesday, 3rd June 2009
Tas
I think I have posted before that a number of my teachers fought in North Africa and Italy, and they all preferred Alexander to Montgomery.
The cynical might say Slim's greatest achievement was defeating General Irwin in 1943, and General Leese in 1945 (they both tried to remove him, and ended up sacked themselves).
His greatest achievement was probably the creation of XIVth Army into a formation that could decisively defeat the Japanese, without which operations could not have succeeded. In terms of actual operations, his most important achievement was probably EXTENDED CAPITAL, the advance on Rangoon after the capture of Myitkyina.
The original plan only envisaged operations to open the Burma Road. The lack of sufficient landing craft to mount a full amphibious attack on Rangoon, and the weakness of the Japanese gave an opportunity for XIVth Army to become the main effort and this was exploited to the full by Slim.
It wasn't quite the masterpiece of improvisiation that Slim liked to claim. The possibility of a "return trip" down the route of the 1942 retreat had been explored ever since Burma Army emerged into India, and XIVth Army staff had probably hoped for an opportunity to exploit beyond the original limited scope of operations once they had completed their initial operations.
Nonetheless, it was a triumph of logistics (for which, incidentally, the RAF deserves more credit than it usually gets), short notice planning and remains a monument to the professionalism and training of all ranks.
If you can find a copy, I would recommend Michael Hickey's "The Unforgettable XIVth Army", an account of operations in Burma. Slim's own "Defeat into Victory" is also very good, but he leaves out some important facts (for instance, Slim needed an operation after Imphal, and his senior Corps Commander, Stopford, actually commanded the Army for a month. Stopford was quite hurt that Slim didn't mention this, but loyally said nothing in public).
Cheers
LW -
Message 16
Posted by faran3 (U14015703) on Thursday, 4th June 2009
hello people!
I think that operation "market garden" could change the war and maby end it,but it was the allies who made fatal mistakes specialy when did not warn the pararoopers about the presense of the 2 SS panzer divisions -
Message 17
Posted by aussiebrit (U13851320) on Thursday, 4th June 2009
Hi Tas
Mutandis has made many valid points, may I add some more.
The Airborne Army in the UK was Ikes only strategic reserve and the way the Allies were advancing across France and Belgium it appeared to the Allied planners that the German army was ready to collapse if we gave them one final push.
The airborne divisions were the only reserve that could be used for this push,also they were sitting around basically doing nothing.
General Boy Browning was champing at the bit for his paratroopers to be used and with Monty's adventureous plan this was the opportunity to end the war before Xmas and to use these divisions and to gain some glory.
The main problem I see with the overall plan was that the countryside near Arnhem was not suitable for large scale airborne landings and the choice of drop zones away from the town was the only feasible way, also the drop of the 1st Airborne was to be spread over 2 - 3 days because
there was not enough transport aircraft available.
The intelligence failure to know that two SS panzer divisions where refitting in the area was
inexcusable since the Dutch underground had radioed to England some days before of there existance.
I hope my comments add to your knowledge of this most important operation -
Message 18
Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Friday, 5th June 2009
Hi LW, Aussiebrit, Faran,
LW, thanks for your comments on FM Slim. I had the impression he was a very good general, but did not know much about the details.
Thank you Aussiebrit and thank you Faran for your comments. Indeed, if the operation had been successful it may have ended the war. Unfortunately, as Mutandis has opined, that was a very big if. If only Monty had conceived something a little simpler and less dependent on so many things going right.
Tas -
Message 19
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Friday, 5th June 2009
Tas
Unfortunately, it was all or nothing. Either the aim was to get across the Rhine before October, or there was no point in trying.
I think it is still not widely appreciated that because of the formidable nature of the Rhine, no major assault crossing would be possible from early in October, when the flooding began until late March. A winter campaign on the North German Plain, on the other hand was possible, and was the road to Berlin. So not to try for a Rhine crossing in September was to accept that the war would be prolonged by at least six months.
(Alexander McKee's "The Rhine Crossings" has probably the best explanation of the obstacle the Rhine represented, and the conditions of the river.)
Incidentally, it was not that complicated an operation; that was part of the problem - it was going to be obvious to the Germans very quickly what the objectives were. For all the fuss made about the operation order being found on a US staff officer's body, the German commanders have reported that they made their initial deployments, the ones that blocked key points all along the route, without knowledge of the information in it.
(English-language accounts focus on the operation from the Allied side, with the occasional elf-serving account by the odd (very odd, in some cases)German. Kershaw's "It Never Snows in September",which looks at the operation from the German side is an eye-opener for those raised on "A Bridge Too Far", "A Drop Too Many" and the memoirs of US generals)
Cheers
LW -
Message 20
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Friday, 5th June 2009
Ooops, that'll teach me to post in a hurry. Alexander McKee's book is "The Race For The Rhine Bridges", and covers the German operations to seize them in 1940 as well as the Allied operations in 44/45. Very worthwhile read.
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Message 21
Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Friday, 5th June 2009
lw
"It never snows in september" sounds good - great to see things from the other side
the main fault of market garden was the fact that the allies had 3 superb airborne divisions kicking their heels in england
any op would do and many were planned just to use them - they had to be used !!
when monty came up with MG everyone was happy because the airborne divisions could be used
in hindsight it was impossible that an entire army corps could be passed down a single highway - you get a puncture and its a 20 minute delay
it all panned out on the fact that the wehrmacht was a spent force - we now know that there was no such creature
st
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