Wars and ConflictsΒ permalink
Dresden and Stalin
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Message 1.Β
Posted by Ratbones (U13981844) on Wednesday, 27th May 2009
My father (now deceased) flew as a radio operator on Lancasters, completing three tours of ops. He was part of the force which caused such tragic destruction of Dresden.
He often told me that although 'Bomber Harris' ordered the operation (and thus is vilified for it), the orders actually came from the War Cabinet at the direct request of jovial Joe Stalin, who wanted Dresden obliterated both for revenge, and to facilitate the Soviet advance from the East.
Can anyone confirm this? -
Message 2
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Wednesday, 27th May 2009
Dresden was a regional transport hub for the Nazi war machine in the East. Although we think of the war as being mostly over by 1945, there was still much fight in the Germans, especially with regard to the Eastern front.
The British would not waste the lives of their bomber crews on 'revenge missions'. That does not stack up. Neither does it make sense to accuse Stalin of wanting it for revenge. It is a simplistic characature of the Soviet war machine.
However, the western allies were keen to show, right up to the end, that they would co-operate with Soviet war needs. The RAF had smashed cities before, and were not about to stop this practice until the total surrender had been achieved.
Neither the British nor the Soviet armed forces were too caring bout enemy casualties, but that is not revenge, it is determination. There was dis-quiet amongst certain groups, mostly civilians, but that was based on conflicting human emotions, not because the RAF wanted civilian casualties as such.
Think of it this way, if you were the mother of a Soviet soldier facing that quadrant of the front, would you prefer your son died than that Dresden be bombed ? That soldiers mother was more important to the Soviet generals than the citizens of Dresden. -
Message 3
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Wednesday, 27th May 2009
I've heard the same rumour, Ratbones, but also a very different speculation that Dresden was bombed intensively to show to advancing Soviet troops (who were probably close enough to see light from the fires in the night sky ahead of them), that the Allies could really 'put on a show'.
While the USAAF and RAF adopted Slessor's ruling that only 'military objectives' may be targets in German-occupied territory, a different rule was applied for targets within Germany itself. Here targets might be chosen which would be "an attack on enemy morale". I suppose area bombing of Berlin and Dresden fitted that latter definition?
There seems to have been considerable discussion about the interpretation of these rules. (See 'Air Power Review', Autumn 2003, article by R.G. Davis and US Strategic Bombing Survey) -
Message 4
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 27th May 2009
TimTrack Think of it this way, if you were the mother of a Soviet soldier facing that quadrant of the front, would you prefer your son died than that Dresden be bombed ? That soldiers mother was more important to the Soviet generals than the citizens of Dresden.Β If you think that Stalin (or Zhukov, for that matter) had soldiers' mothers factored in their considerations, I don't think you understand them too well.
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Message 5
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Wednesday, 27th May 2009
TimTrack,
Greeting. You are correct. Contrary to popular belief Dresden was not the sleepy Medieval City of no military significance. It was the crossroads where the retreating German forces would have to pass through. The SU therefore asked for assistance to harass the retreating forces by preventing easy passage. The tragic fact that it was full of refugees already fleeing the oncoming SU forces did not enter the equation. Nor do I not think that there was much sympathy shown by the contemporary Allied civilians and certainly little compassion from the many victims of Nazi aggression. However, there were murmurings of discontent at the continued Bomber Command policy of attacking civilian targets in general including members of Bomber Command.
I had a friend now sadly departed whose conscience always troubled him about civilian deaths. He completed one tour and continued on flying duties until 1946(bringing POWs home etc). He gave me a few of his precious things before dying including his log books and a copy of a letter (which makes interesting reading) by which he replied to a request to contribute to 'Bomber' Harris' memorial, or 'Butcher' Harris as he refers to him. -
Message 6
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Wednesday, 27th May 2009
Contrary to popular belief Dresden was not the sleepy Medieval City of no military significance. It was the crossroads where the retreating German forces would have to pass through.Β
Dresden was attacked by Allied bombers 8 times between 1944 and April 1945. The bulk of those raids were targeted on the industrial area and the marshaling yards. (Consistent with the 'important rail crossroads' hypothesis of Spruggles).
The raids of the night of 14th Feb 1945, which have become synonymous with the term 'Dresden Raid" were very different and consisted of carpet attacks on the civilian centres using roughly the same tonnage of incendiaries as of HE bombs (1,400 tons HE, 1,100 tons incendiaries).
Pilots flying in the later waves (I have interviewed one) say that they could see the fire from more than an 100 miles at 20,000' and they merely dumped on the edge of the burning mess and headed for home. This was not precision bombing.
The USAAF raids the next day could claim to be vaguely 'targeted' but by then the bulk of the city was under dense smoke.
The SU therefore asked for assistance to harass the retreating forces by preventing easy passage.Β
The evidence I have suggests that:-
". On 14 December 1944, the American Ambassador to Russia, Mr. Averill Harriman, personally stated to Marshal Stalin that General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), βwas very anxious to operate in concert with the Russians and to help the Russian armies whenever such support might be needed.β
Plans were refined and in Jan 1945 Tedder and the Americans offered to help stop German withdrawal to the west.
The source I'm using,
"HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 14-15 FEBRUARY 1945
BOMBINGS OF DRESDEN
Prepared by:
USAF Historical Division
Research Studies Institute
Air University"
Does not mention a specific request from Stalin to attack the civilian areas of the town.
While the attack was indeed said to be:
".. clearly a strategic decision of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians".
Given that the communication links had already been successfully attacked (hence the greater than usual number of civilians in the city at the time), I think it unlikely that the raids of 14th and 15th Feb were strategically much more important than a terrible and lethal 'punishment beating'. -
Message 7
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Thursday, 28th May 2009
"...Given that the communication links had already been successfully attacked..."
SOME of the communications links had been destroyed. However, roads run every where through a city. So to stop those roads being used, and to eliminate other capacities that a city has to support a military operation, it has to be flattened. You certainly could not do that nowadays, but the general opinion then was different. -
Message 8
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Thursday, 28th May 2009
This is true TimTrack except that the attempt was to saturate the defences as well as the roads and railways. Disruption to the railway system would for example force armoured vehicles to use the roads thus adding to the wear and tear. Neither can you bring reinforcements forward rapidly. Of course the opposite is equally true; if you lay waste to a city you provide more opportunities for the defence to secrete themselves and the passage of the attackers is made more difficult by having the roads congested by rubble(Monte Casino is a classic example). However, war is a percentage game.
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Message 9
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Thursday, 28th May 2009
Then did the fire raids work? Was Dresden rendered useless as a transportation hub?
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Message 10
Posted by TimTrack (U1730472) on Thursday, 28th May 2009
"...Was Dresden rendered useless as a transportation hub?..."
In terms of the rads themselves, then yes, fr periods, it was.
Roads can be cleared and repaired, but that is itself a distraction from other work.
However, the other capacities that a city offers were eliminated for the duration of the war. Storage, vehicles, staffing. These were eliminated permanently.
When a city is described as a transport hub, it is not simply the roads, it is the other infrastructure that goes with it. -
Message 11
Posted by peteratwar (U10629558) on Thursday, 28th May 2009
There was a report in one of the Sunday Newspapers not very long ago. It was by someone who was in Dresden at the time.
He and his fellow slave workers cheered the bombing even tho it was dangerous for them -
Message 12
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Thursday, 28th May 2009
peteratwar and WhiteCamry,
This has been reported in other publications and at various locations. In Auschwitz some of the inmates prayed that the bombers would visit them.
The appalling loss of civilian life in Dresden, Hamburg, Berlin and all the other cities, especially the fire-storms can only be viewed with impotent horror in retrospect but, dare I say, that at the time they were certainly viewed as a success, even apparently by Goebbels. I have little doubt that Harris's concept of destroying German morale was fatally flawed but the strategic bomber offensive was instrumental in winning the war and just because something succeeds even if from the wrong concept it does not alter that success. The attempt later by certain persons directly involved to distance themselves with that policy certainly disgusted many of the aircrew who did the job for them.
The American authorities, given the casualty figures in the Pacific certainly appraised those two atomic bomb detonations as a success. -
Message 13
Posted by George1507 (U2607963) on Thursday, 28th May 2009
There were some particular reasons why the raids on Dresden were so devastating.
First Dresden had not been bombed as often as other German cities, and the people that lived there didn't have the same experience of dealing with incendiaries by throwing them off houses and into the street, or putting them in buckets of water. So many incendiaries were allowed to burn.
Second, Dresden was an older city, and had a larger number of older houses with timber frames than Koln or Berlin. It also did not have the same interconnecting cellars that many northern German cities did, which provided escape routes for the polulation.
Third, the airraid warning system was fairly modern, and largely elecric powered, again unlike other German cities. One of the first wave of bombers destroyed an electric substation, which had a knock on effect and knocked out the airraid warning system. Of course, warnings for the first raid has sounded already, so it didn't have any effect until the raid ended, when the all clear couldn't be sounded. So again, many incendiaries whoch could have been extinguished were allowed to burn because many people were still sheltering.
Fourth, the weather was perfect for bombing, and winds whipped up the flames.
Fifth, the Allied bombing was more accurate that far into the war, and the daylight raids by the USAAF were extremely effective.
Although the raids on Dresden were devastating, it was the combination of all these factors that caused the unprecedented level of damage. Stalin may have wanted to flatten Dresden, or any German city for that matter, but only for the comination of factors at Dresden was it so devastating. -
Message 14
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Friday, 29th May 2009
1507 George,
I don't think Dresden had been bombed at all prior to THE attack. You are quite correct to point out the electrical control fire warning system but there were few firefighting devices anyway, and precious few air-raid shelters either. All in all a bit like Rotterdam. -
Message 15
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Friday, 29th May 2009
I don't think Dresden had been bombed at all prior to THE attack.Β
It had. See Wikipedia article on Dresden.
The Marshalling yards were attacked on 7th Oct 1944 and again on 16th Jan 1945.
THE raid, on the city centre, was 14th and 15th Feb 1945. It was designed to cause a firestorm in the civilian area (unlike earlier and later raids), hence the very high weight of incendiaries used.
There were several large raids later, again targeting the rail yards. -
Message 16
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Friday, 29th May 2009
U3280211,
Thanks for that. Glich in the grey matter again! -
Message 17
Posted by Mr Pedant (U2464726) on Friday, 5th June 2009
My impression was that on one level the raid was a message to the Germans.
By making a raid that aided the Soviets the message to German Generals and soldiers was to abandon their very real hope that the US\UK would come to an accomodation whereby they and Germany then fought the USSR together.
Also the Germans and probably allies too found the bombed out ruins of Caen a particular impediment to their freedom of movement. Perhaps that lesson was being applied. -
Message 18
Posted by Scottish Librarian (U1772828) on Friday, 5th June 2009
The raids on Dresden were no different from any other air raid other than several factors came together to make the level of killing even higher than on other air raids. i'll quote from Olaf Groehler, author of one of the most authoritative histories of the bomber war:
"With respect to the air war, the bombing of Dresden stands out from the sequence of continous, heavy air raids because of its destructive scale. Nourished by rumours and legends, it spread like a shockwave all over Germany. The destructive effect of the attack on Dresden shattered the mold of what had become customary, of all previous experience. But if one analyzes the planning documents for the city attacks undertaken in early 1945, one must recognize that in many cases these resembled the style of attack used against Dresden right down to the details. Often it was only the favourable or unfavourable weather situation, or the way the city was built (including its shelters), or how much experience the population had gained during the war years, that determined the final extent of obliteration, destruction and death."
Also, i'm sure the Soviets did suggest (not demand) that the Allies bomb Dresden, but the final decision to to so lay, of course, with the Allies.
As an aside, with regards to numbers killed in Dresden, a German Historical Commission recently published its findings
cheers,
Paul -
Message 19
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Friday, 5th June 2009
Paul.
if one analyzes the planning documents for the city attacks undertaken in early 1945, one must recognize that in many cases these resembled the style of attack used against Dresden right down to the details.Β
But that is a very strange comparison to select.
Why are you comparing the RAF bombing policy of the last four months of the war with the Dresden raid? Why not use the Dresden raid compared with all raids from 1939 to 1945?
Or are you suggesting that it was Bomber Command's desire to cause fire-strorms on all city centre targets by that time?
In the last 10 weeks of the war there were many factors in play which were not present earlier. German nightfigther response was weak or non-existent and flak ammunition was in very short supply by that period. The allies also had air superiority. One can tell much about the underlying purpose of a raid from the munitions carried by the attacking a/c. Large loads of incendiaries imply a wish to burn-out a target, and at Dresden, on the night of 14th Feb 1945, the weight ratio of HE to incendiaries dropped was close to unity. This is unusual.
Even by early 1945 standards, the Dresden bomb loads seem to indicate the wish to start a fire-storm?
Also, i'm sure the Soviets did suggest (not demand) that the Allies bomb DresdenΒ
I'm not for one moment denying that possibility. But in my message 6, I cite a source which suggests that Averill Harriman offered strategic help to the Russians before a formal request was made to bomb Dresden.
Of course this does not preclude the possibility that the Russians made such a specific request for a Dresden raid but what evidence underpins your certainty (you say that you are 'sure')?
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