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Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 1.Â
Posted by Nickiow (U13798335) on Tuesday, 7th April 2009
Germany went to war in the Eas
t without any chance of success, because of its logistical inability to supply such a plan.
Instead of wondering *if* Germany could have won in the East, its better to undertsnad how they did so well given the pratcial problems they undertook.
Head of the German Logiostical Dept Wagner, expressed the view that the plan called for compared to what existed in reality, when he told AH, there existed only 10% of the MTV`s the plan called for.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 2
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Tuesday, 7th April 2009
I'll drink to that. Was it megalomania on the part of Hitler? All we can safely deduce is that the Wehrmacht was unprepared for the invasion and a sustained campaign. The initial success was as a result of Russian unpreparedness.
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Message 3
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Tuesday, 7th April 2009
Nickiow
Germany went to war in the Eas
t without any chance of success, because of its logistical inability to supply such a plan Quite so. But Hitler did not have a choice. By mid 1940 his OKW figured that all their strategic supplies are under threat from Stalin.
Instead of wondering *if* Germany could have won in the East, its better to undertsnad how they did so well given the pratcial problems they undertook Red Army's massive deployment in East Europe in the spring and early summer of 1941 was executed in complete disregard of a possible Wehrmacht attack. Red Army's losses of both equipment and personnel in the first weeks following the strike of June 22 were enormous - the highest in the entire Second World War on any front. The initial success was as a result of Russian unpreparedness ...for the enemy attack.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 4
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Tuesday, 7th April 2009
They had gathered there 2,5 million soldiers (60-65% German and 35-40% allies) let alone local collaborating forces armed and equiped with the best of German material(in the west, apart the V-rockets they had the "crap" plus a lot of older French stuff found on place). I am sorry but how many more they needed? Napoleon had invaded with 1 million (predominantly French), the best army of the times, and had a parallel fate (at least he returned home without the Russians chasing him at Paris). Apparently it takes something more than good preparation to enter Russia, that is the 1/4th of the worlds' surface. Winter or no winter.
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Message 5
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Tuesday, 7th April 2009
Nik Napoleon had invaded with 1 million (predominantly French), the best army of the times, and had a parallel fate (at least he returned home without the Russians chasing him at Paris)Â I believe that seemingly obvious parallels between Hitler's and Napoleon's Russian campaigns are false. The Grande Armee (about 600K troops actually) was almost four times larger than the Russian army. Wehrmacht was about 5 times smaller than the Red Army. Had Napoleon destroyed the Russian army at Borodino, which was a pretty close call actually, he would have achieved his objective of dethroning Alexander. Hitler never had a chance.
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Message 6
Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Tuesday, 7th April 2009
i really dont agree that it was a lost cause
once again it was the poison dwarf who made it unwinnable
his entire ethos was a hatred of the ussr and he despised them and had no respect for their martial qualities
he actually laid down divisions used in france such was his arrogance
he won against the allies and poland using the awesome tool of blitzkrieg - but against the ussr he used convential tactics - invasion on a broad front - which nazi germany could not supply
he also wasted time helping out the jackal in greece and yugolavia - 6 weeks wasted - just enough to enter the russian winter !!
i would suggest that if he had used Blitzkrieg tactics against russia - ie huge armoured spearheads striking towards moscow - bypassing centres of resistance - leaving infantry to deal with these - using the hatred of normal russians of stalin to his advantage - probably a 100,000 willing volunteers - taking moscow - he would have won
stalingrad and leningrad could have "withered on the vine"
moscow was the centre of communications. transport, and government - not to forget morale
it could easily been done!!
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Message 7
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Tuesday, 7th April 2009
stalteriisok i would suggest that if he had used Blitzkrieg tactics against russia - ie huge armoured spearheads striking towards moscow - bypassing centres of resistance - leaving infantry to deal with these - using the hatred of normal russians of stalin to his advantage - probably a 100,000 willing volunteers - taking moscow - he would have won Russian campaign started out exceptionally well for Wehrmacht: only in the first three weeks Red Army lost 6 thousand tanks (almost twice the amount of all Wehrmacht tanks) and 3,468 aircraft (about as many as all Luftwaffe aircraft on the eastern front). The decision point you are talking about was when in August 1941 Hitler and his OKW had an option of bypassing Kiev and massive concentration of Soviet forces around it in favor of the direct dash to Moscow. Wehrmacht executed a brilliant tactical operation resulting in the capture of near 700K troops, 37 hundred artillery pieces and 900 tanks. Of course, the consensus is that the time and resources spent on this operation contributed to the stall of Hitler’s Blitzkrieg in the autumn of 1941. But, as Suvorov put it invoking the Russian saying, ‘shto v lob, shto po lbu’. How do you suppose Wehrmacht infantry would protect Guderian’s supply lines from this kind of force? it could easily been done!! There's a whole host of other sayings that address this statement.
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Message 8
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Wednesday, 8th April 2009
Suvorovetz, thanx for the redressing - I had mentioned the 1 million out of repeating common belief (it sounded too much for me too), still though I did not know that back then the Russian army was not much more than 150,000. I imagined that Russians could present at least 500,000 comparable to the 600,000 of the French enemy. Your info makes even more interesting that case but it is not our topic here.
On Russia though while I accept the "blietzkrieg" possibility that stalteriisok presented and that Germans could have achieved victory that way (like in France and Poland), and thus was wondering why Germans had not tried it as a first alternative... I then thought that "blitzkrieg" essentially needs a smaller more agile force in the forefront hitting the nail right on its head. But while that was possible in France I am not that sure that this was possible in huge Russia where this "spearhead" would feel quite "lonely" in the vastness of the country and could be easily ecircled and such an initial failure while not destroying German hopes, it would be certainly more than a plus to the Russian defense effort that would gain another dynamic.
Then if adding the necessary volume to be "respected" as an invader in Russia (2,5 millions according to Germans), you were losing a bit in agility and co-ordination thus full blitkrieg could not be employed on that scale - still the German attack from the very little I know was not 100% conventional but employed bits and parts of blitzkrieg, Russians were caught often by surprise in many sites of conflict.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 9
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Wednesday, 8th April 2009
Oi! as one who is of similar stature to the A.H I object to the word dwarf. Napoleon's army relied on about 40,000 horses which due the the Russian scorched earth policy could not all be fed. His retreat from Moscow might have been studied a little more closely by A.H. for the German faced exactly the same problems. Once you infiltrate such a vast distance your difficulty of supply become magnified exponentially. But let's all be grateful that he wasn't too keen on reading history.
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Message 10
Posted by Nickiow (U13798335) on Wednesday, 8th April 2009
they had the "crap" plus a lot of older French stuff found on place). I am sorry but how many more they needed?
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40% of all of German trucks were French, taken over when France fell and confiscated from the French civilian sector, it was this war bonus that allowed the partial motorization of the Whermach in 1940, when the 39 model TOE halved in MTV`S so as to provide the vast increase in DIv numbers with a minimum of motor transport.
German Industry could only provide 4000 per year of trucks to the German logistical Dept.
German manpower was also extremly squezzed while SU was not.
Raised or recieved as replacements during Oct.
Germany "Die wende vor Moskau" gives the following cumulative figures of replacement received by AG Center in 1941-early 1942
By 1.10.41 - 151 thousands
7.10 - 151
16.10 - 151
15.11 - 151
30.11 - 151
1.1.1942 - 192
31.01. - 211
28.02 - 281
31.03 - 331
so it seems that in October-November the Army Group didn't received any repalcement at all. No New formations either.
SU raised. Western Front Armies of the following 16th, 5th, 33rd, 43rd, 49th and 50th. 58 ID`s in total.(The West Front had (different sources) 546/545/558 thousands men, the Reserve - 478,5/448, the Bryansk - 225,5/244, total about 1 250,000, these are the numbers the SU was feeding by ration issued numbers. )
On 23 September AG Mitte’s command told the subordinated armies: “Mit der Inmarschsetzung der letzten 18 Marschbattalione (verwendungsbereit 9 October) ist die Zuführung von ausgebildeten Ersatzmannschaften im Wesentlichen abgeschlossen, da die Bestände des Ersatzheeres aufgebraucht sind. Anforderungen von Truppenteilen … sind daher zwecklos.“ -- "With the sending of the last 18 marching battalions (operational 9 October) the allocation of trained replacements is largely complete, as the capacities of the replacement army are spent. For that reason … requirements of additional troops … are useless."
Anlage 6 (p. 315 of the same book) provides a chart of AG Mitte's losses and replacements:
source: KTB Heeresgruppe Mitte, Anlagebände
(All figures cumulative from 22 June 1941 and rounded off to the nearest full thousand)
period -- losses –– replacements – Fehl
- 1 October 41 -- 229,000 -- 151,000 -- 78,000
- 7 October 41 – 254,000 – 151,000 – 103,000
- 1. October 41 – 277,000 – 151,000 – 126,000
- 15 November 41 – 317,000 – 151,000 – 166,000
- 31 November 41 – 358,000 – 151,000 – 207,000
- 31 December 41 – 462,000 – 192,000 – 227,000
- 31 January 42 – 607,000 – 211,000 – 396,000
- 28 February 42 – 716,000 – 281,000 – 435,000
- 31 March 42 – 796,000 – 331,000 – 465,000
Acordinmg to the Logistical officers when shown barborrosa, Wagner as head, explained only 10% of the required Lift exiosted to meet the plans consumption estimates, OKW anmd OKH heads of logistics, also pointed out that the plan as proposed was "insane" and impratcical, they were told the plan for 5 months wouold now take 6 weeks and redo their coalculations, which now showed that it was no longer a pysical imposobilty, but depended on the whole thing taking 6 weeks.
If you take x number of ID @300 tons a day and x number of AD`s at 400 a day, you soon see the proble, when you look at the RR delivery on tonnage from the Riech to the east and from the RR to the filed forces.
German drove on Moscow in Oct on 12000 tons a day logistical supply,
Germany base of supply for the drive on Moscow was smolonsk, 230 miles away and required 32 trains a day to meet normal logistcial requirements, and achived during Oct 6 a day, with a 12,000 tons/day capacity sounds a lot, but is it really?. For SU Moscow itself was the base of supply.
German fuel stocks for Typhon, start with 5 days supply, and saw them all expened with 8 days.
So how much is 12000 tons a day in Smolonsk to supply AGC?, well thats 50 ID 10 AD needing 50@200+10@300=40,000 tons required by the regs, or rather if the Germanys want to attack in Aug onto Moscow they do so from a supply base that cann supply 25% of expected consumption on a daily basis, so how long do they need to build up a depot to sustain an advance?, yes you guessed it they cant attack Moscow in August because they cant supply an attack in Aug and had to wait untill they could.
As for a comparison to Naploen, Geramny went to the east with 375k German horses and had 7k left by end of 41, and had taken 675k more european horeses east to repalce its own lost ones and MTV it never had in the first place, most wouold also be gone by next year.
German horses ate more in the East than the Allies sent in LL to Russia.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 11
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Wednesday, 8th April 2009
hmm... if a 2,5 million army with whatever supply material it had was much less than enough then I wonder, invading successfully Russia reaches the realm of impossible.
I was happy that my rough phrase convinced you Nickow to inform us of these details and reading about the analysis you present on the supply lines I very much remembered Sun Tzu setting aside battle tactics and start measure size of amry and the "lis" (li is the chinese long distance measure), and explaining how even a relatively small increase in distance multiplies the needs for supplying meaning that supplying 1 man on the front costs on the top supplie for 2 to 3 men in transportation; hence according to Sun Tzu, either you first solve this problem or you can just go in deliver a hit and go out quickly.
I suppose that Germans might had thought of doing so, however, that did not exactly abide to their vision of cocnquering and colonising Russia and Ukraine - something that required complete conquest, which needed a lot of army and for a lot of time. Perhaps Germans became too used with fighting the likes of betrayed/unprepared French, resisting but essentially weaker Polish, lukewarm Scandinavians, civil-war torn Yugoslavians and completely armyless Greeks. They had it really easy so far. Russia would be the first real challenge of a substantially large land-based army (i.e. not referring here to the battle of Britain) sworn to resist (i.e. unlike French, or the unfateful British earlier actions!). And yes, too many earlier easy victories meant that complecency was common place: they just thought that at the sight of "superior German forces" Russians would just fall.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 12
Posted by Nickiow (U13798335) on Wednesday, 8th April 2009
To put it a simple as possible the German economy was geared to supply support a blitzkrieg, it would not be untill Speer took control that volume production of scale came into being, the whole rational of a blitkrieg was to avoid doing that because Germany could not win such a contest.
ergo the matters outcome was settled before the first shot was fired, partuclry with the personalty of thye contending powers, WSC POTS and JS simply orgaionsed their resources and ploughed on to victory, the cost did matter, but the outcome was not really in question.
Btw if anyone likes logistics, i can recomend Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton by v Crevald, and Alexander teh great and the logistics of the macedonian Army by engels, both cheap on amazonLink to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 13
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 8th April 2009
Nik Suvorovetz, thanx for the redressing - I had mentioned the 1 million out of repeating common belief (it sounded too much for me too), still though I did not know that back then the Russian army was not much more than 150,000. I imagined that Russians could present at least 500,000 comparable to the 600,000 of the French enemy. Your info makes even more interesting that case but it is not our topic here The size ratio is important to consider for a simple reason: any military strategist would tell you that the basic rule of thumb is that you need at least three to one advantage to plan an offensive operation. But, even apart from that, the major difference between Napoleon and Hitler is that the former faced perfectly executed by Barclay de Tolly defensive strategy. By contrast, in May-June of 1941 Red Army was deployed for offensive operation exclusively. The possibility of Wehrmacht attack was dismissed, and absolutely no defensive preparations were even considered.
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Message 14
Posted by Nickiow (U13798335) on Wednesday, 8th April 2009
"any military strategist would tell you that the basic rule of thumb is that you need at least three to one advantage to plan an offensive operation".
Picking up on this, anda bit of a side bar but intresting non tghe less, it comes from the age when you marched up and shot each other down in lines, at its simplist you lose one each in doing so leaving the attacker with 2 to hold requiring 6 to come do the same back or yield the ground.
Now Clauswitz, who wrote in this period always adcocted attacking strength so as to destroy the largest filed force possible, which is what a lot of Germanys problems were based on, they kept hitting massive newly braised SU armies of considerable numerical strength, but little combat power.
Is there a difference between stregth of numbers a combat power you might be thinking.
Actually there is consdirable difference, combat power is all the other things that are force multipliers, so 3 men v one, when each attacker has 1 round of munitions, and the defender has 3 rounds are force multipliers that can be computed, this is of course a simplistic example to show tyhe principle, so consider the Munition requirements of an ID in 41, and the nlogistical ability to mainatin it at that level, if the supply is only 25% of comnsumption, then clearly ober extended periods the Unit combat power will start from a its normal valuie and decline due to lack of munitions while incuring zero losses of manpower, yet its combat power declines.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 15
Posted by OUNUPA (U2078829) on Wednesday, 8th April 2009
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Message 16
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 8th April 2009
Nickiow Actually there is consdirable difference, combat power is all the other things that are force multipliers, so 3 men v one, when each attacker has 1 round of munitions, and the defender has 3 rounds are force multipliers that can be computed, this is of course a simplistic example to show tyhe principle, so consider the Munition requirements of an ID in 41, and the nlogistical ability to mainatin it at that level, if the supply is only 25% of comnsumption, then clearly ober extended periods the Unit combat power will start from a its normal valuie and decline due to lack of munitions while incuring zero losses of manpower, yet its combat power declines I am glad that you mentioned that. Perhaps, you can now compare Wehrmacht and Red Army in terms of munitions, fire power, etc, etc, to show that Wehrmach was a much more potent force. I have the numbers to show that it was not even close. In fact, none other than German Minister of Munitions himself, Dr. Fritz Todt was on record telling Hitler as early as in the autumn of 1941 that all had been lost already. Perhaps, you know something that Dr. Todt missed at the wheel?
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Message 17
Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Wednesday, 8th April 2009
hi suvorovetz
my take on the whole thing is this
germany could not sustain a long convential war against russias resources in manpowr and materiel
the broad front strategy was a bad decision - dissipating the german resources
a bltzkrieg against moscow - if successful - would have destroyed transport comunication and stalin links
he would have been driven over the urals and his fear factor diluted - which was the catalyst for russian resistance
centers of resistance would have given up earler - even many russians who welcomed the wehrmacht may have changed sides
if the dwarf had thought this through who knows
srLink to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 18
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 8th April 2009
stalteriisok
a bltzkrieg against moscow - if successful - would have destroyed transport comunication and stalin links That's a pretty obvious calculation. The counter point is that the direct dash to Moscow was impossible given Wehrmacht tanks' maintenance, fuel and munitions requirements, etc, etc, whereas Wehrmacht supply routes would be exposed to active armies with several million troops equipped with thousands of artillery pieces and tanks.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 19
Posted by Nickiow (U13798335) on Thursday, 9th April 2009
"Perhaps, you can now compare Wehrmacht and Red Army in terms of munitions, fire power, etc, etc, to show that Wehrmach was a much more potent force."
Can do, and the individual Ger ID did have a tbheoritical combat power higher than the Red Army for most of the war.
"I have the numbers to show that it was not even close."
You do?, id like to see these numbers for comparions if you woud be so kind as to post them, as i suspect you may not be comparing like to like.
" In fact, none other than German Minister of Munitions himself, Dr. Fritz Todt was on record telling Hitler as early as in the autumn of 1941 that all had been lost already"
From Todt pov, the battle for production supremacy was lost by 41, AH conceptual problem was that material disadvanatge could be overcome by superior tactical application of inferior numbers by use of supperior motivation/willpower and superior doctin.
"Perhaps, you know something that Dr. Todt missed at the wheel?"
Since i already pointed out that Germany lacked the infrasture to outproduce the Allies, i decline to defend a posistion i have not taken, nor posted anything close to.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 20
Posted by Nickiow (U13798335) on Thursday, 9th April 2009
Im away over Easter but will post a SU/GR comparison when i return.
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Message 21
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Thursday, 9th April 2009
I think one of the major factors was the type of government - France made peace when 'defeated' in 1940, and Britain, without Churchill, might have negotiated as well.
Russia just kept on going, after a far more catastrophic defeat in 1941, partly because of it's vast size, but mainly, I think, because of Stalin. He would not consider defeat, and did not care what level of suffering he imposed on his own people to avoid that defeat. This, with his appeal to 'fight for the Motherland', rather than 'for the Communist Ideals' was the main reason for the SU staying in the war when all looked lost, and counterattacking in that Winter when any normal nation would have been sueing for the best peace they could salvage.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 22
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Thursday, 9th April 2009
Hello again,
I think comparisons betrween industrial output needs to be considered.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 23
Posted by Spruggles (U13892773) on Thursday, 9th April 2009
Sorry, it went off in my hand before I could complete. A direct comparison between armour for example. Both the SU and Germany produced fine tanks (Germany of course with the aid of the Skoda works) but the German tanks when they faced the T34 had already covered enough ground to make deterioration a serious issue. Allied bombing of Germany also had an effect on war production which meant that the SU could produce many more tanks than their opponents. The SU also had a genius for producing cheap and relatively easy to maintain weapons. Then please consider the role of the civilian population when they poured out of Moscow to build defences. A similar effort was shown by the Germans but by that time their fight had already been lost. And who could say what would have happened if this country had decided on Lord Halifax (a known appeaser)in place of Churchill. Cor! it's enough to make your brain hurt.
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Message 24
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 9th April 2009
Nickiow
Can do, and the individual Ger ID did have a tbheoritical combat power higher than the Red Army for most of the war Is this an opinion, a result of some unnamed research or just a guess? Not clear from your post here.
You do?, id like to see these numbers for comparions if you woud be so kind as to post them, as i suspect you may not be comparing like to like According to Muller-Hillebrand (Das Heer, 1933-1945), in 1939 through the atumn of 1941 Wehrmacht received from high 50% (howitzer shells) to 30% (bullets) to 15% (artillery shells) to 12% (light mortars) to 10% (heavy mortars) to 5% (20-mm shells for T-II, the 'majority' of Wehrmacht tanks at the time) to low 3% (75-mm shells) of munitions from the 4-month baseline calculated and requested by OKW. Spot check: in October 1941, Wehrmacht expended 561K 75-mm shells only to receive 76K; 2 months later it expended 494K only to receive 18K back. Red Army on average expended over a million artillery shells a month, even though in the first weeks of the war it lost 500 metric tonns of artillery shells and by the end of the autumn of 1941 it lost 85% of its baseline munition production capacity.
material disadvanatge could be overcome by superior tactical application of inferior numbers by use of supperior motivation/willpower and superior doctin So what exactly was superior about Wehrmacht? Is it the fire power, or tactical application, or doctrine? Of these three, tactical application I definitely agree on. That was about the only thing that worked. Everything else did not - hence the result.
i decline to defend a posistion i have not taken That's easy to do when you change it.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 25
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Thursday, 9th April 2009
Suv you speak very reasonably. But being based on the numbers youo present (and I believe they are accurate - you know better that part of history than me!), how can we explain the blatant initial failure of the Red Army? Could we see it as natural blow of a mechanised army of nearly 3 million falling on a big flat country that could not just be stopped like that and that had to be dealt accordingly in the course of time by a logistically/numerically superior, technologically close army fighting fot its motherland? Or should we attribute the initial shock as the result of disorganisation that communist purges brought along? I usually chose many options together in such cases.
Very precise remark on the Finnish war of 1939: I had always this notion of Red Army being ridiculed there but I have seen a documentary and it was not at all any shameful performance of industrialised Italy vs. poor Greece at a 5 to 1 ratio, compared to 4 to 1 in the Finnish War, where Greeks not only stopped but counter-attacked chasing the army to the north (and would possibly achieve total victory had it not been for the following extremely complex events).
The Russian army had indeed proceeded into Finnish territory and to an extend achieved some of the objectives, albeit at a very slow pace (not that they could move any faster with all that snow - anyway how many "powerful nations" had tried such a campaign before them?) and at a high cost of life provoked both by the harsh resistance of Finnish patriots as well as the lack of organisation and expected lack of enthusiasm of soldiers (and this of officers also) who did not feel that that war was a matter of life and death for them. I think it was mostly due to British/French attitudes that expected "armies of great nations" to enter "on will" any other country in the world and were taken by surprise when that was not the case.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 26
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 9th April 2009
Nik Could we see it as natural blow of a mechanised army of nearly 3 million falling on a big flat country that could not just be stopped like that and that had to be dealt accordingly in the course of time by a logistically/numerically superior, technologically close army fighting fot its motherland? Or should we attribute the initial shock as the result of disorganisation that communist purges brought along? I usually chose many options together in such cases I am convinced - just as Drs Felshtinsky, Raack and Pavlova, as well as Suvorov, Musial, Danilov, Zakoretsky, Beshanov and many others - that Red Army's collapse was predicated by the fact that it was hit in the midts of a massive offensive deployment. The possibility of Wehrmacht attack had been dismissed and no defensive preparations had been even considered. When one side is expecting an enemy attack, it fortifies multi-level defense positions, moves assets away from the range of enemy fire and makes preparations for denying the enemy infrastructure for speedy advance and supplies. It is well documented by now that in 1941 Red Army did the complete opposite. Not only the unexpected strike resulted in huge casualties and loss of exposed assetes and command and control capabilities for the Red Army, the latter was utterly unprepared to fight under those circumstances, including the General Staff. Just look at the incomparable Zhukov's Directives he was sending out on the day of the attack - they were ridiculous.
The Russian army had indeed proceeded into Finnish territory and to an extend achieved some of the objectives, albeit at a very slow pace (not that they could move any faster with all that snow Bingo.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 27
Posted by hambi22 (U2309395) on Friday, 10th April 2009
Hello Nickow,
I think that the German had teoretical chance to win. Just look at it from another point of wiew, look at it from the backward wiew 1941.
In the WW1 central power managed push the russia army deep into the rusia teriory, even if they had to fought paralery on the Western front.
In 1941, comparing to the WW1, they had better prospect, the The France and to some extend Great Britany was out of game. Comparing to WW1, Italy and Romania was now on Germany side.
Teoreeticly the Japan could help too.
From ther central powers bloc only the Turkey was missing.
I think the Germans were too sure over their victory, so didn not use fully their sourced, whereas the rusian did their utmost.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 28
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Friday, 10th April 2009
I think the type of Government was a major factor - France 'surrendered' in 1940, and Britain might have made peace as well, but for Churchill.
Russia kept on fighting in 1941 after a far worse defeat, partly because of her great distance and manpower, but largely because of Stalin refusing to accept defeat, and not caring how much suffering he caused to his people in the quest for victory. 'Uncle Joe' would have fought to the last man, much like Hilter did in 1945, because he would sooner see his country destroyed than admit that he had lost.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 29
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Friday, 10th April 2009
I see a funny point there. Could we deduce here that democratic governments capitulate on average more easily than dictatorships? In any case they give the opportunity for those voices wanting capitulation to be heard while that is not the case in a dictaroship that simply shoots anyone trying even to suggest theoretically that case!
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Message 30
Posted by Nickiow (U13798335) on Saturday, 11th April 2009
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Is this an opinion, a result of some unnamed research or just a guess? Not clear from your post here.
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Commonly known fact, apartnly your not familiar with ww2 combat models.
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According to Muller-Hillebrand (Das Heer, 1933-1945), in 1939 through the atumn of 1941 Wehrmacht received from high 50% (howitzer shells) to 30% (bullets) to 15% (artillery shells) to 12% (light mortars) to 10% (heavy mortars) to 5% (20-mm shells for T-II, the 'majority' of Wehrmacht tanks at the time) to low 3% (75-mm shells) of munitions from the 4-month baseline calculated and requested by OKW. Spot check: in October 1941, Wehrmacht expended 561K 75-mm shells only to receive 76K; 2 months later it expended 494K only to receive 18K back. Red Army on average expended over a million artillery shells a month, even though in the first weeks of the war it lost 500 metric tonns of artillery shells and by the end of the autumn of 1941 it lost 85% of its baseline munition production capacity.
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As i posted, my suspicion was correct, your not comparing like to like.
So lets deal with what you have posted first before getting back to actual question i asked.
That data includes the French and Polish campaigns and the initial period of the Ostfront, and shows the level or supplys as to request for resupply. Since your data does not give pre existing stocks its an incomplet et of figures as without knowing what they had before they fired a single shot kinda makes the resuply numbers less than usefull for knowing what they have at any point in time. Germans usully had 3 combat loads when on offensive posture, and had built up 21 million tons ( 2 million french munitions)of supplys for Barbarossa expected usage. And expened on average twice the SU in tonnage of munitions per month.
Now your figures are around 20% of requests filled by resupply by the Germans. Khurolev" Stanovlienie strategicheskgogo tyla v velikoi osterchestvennoi voine" ( SU rear area logistics) who commanded that area in the war, wrote that only 10% of minition production was set aside for resupply of existing units for the SU.
Production of SU Munitions
Aug 5 million.
Sept 4 million.
Oct 3 million.
July to Dec overall produced 26 million, half the required amount.
10% of these were sent to reasupply existing units, while Germany was sending 85% of its production into resupply of existing units, SU was sending the vast bulk of what it produced into newly raised formations, who had a very limited life expectency.
So who produced how much is the next question.
Ammunition
The Soviets were in the process of expanding their ammunition production facilities when the Germans attacked. The numerous incidents with neighboring states before the German invasion had revealed that ammunition production was grossly insufficient. Had the invasion been delayed until 1942 the new and expanded facilities would have been on line, alleviating the shortages that plagued the Soviets in the first year of the war as pre-war stockpiles were either overrun or consumed.
Unlike the artillery factories, Soviet ammunition plants were concentrated in the Donbass Basin and in the Ukraine which were overrun by the Germans during the fall. Some 303 factories were lost with a capacity of over 100 million artillery shells, 32 million mortar shells and 24 million aerial bombs. This produced a huge disparity between artillery gun production, which was less affected, and ammunition production. The table below shows the increases in production between the second quarter of 1941 and the third quarter of 1942. Note how gun production increased by a factor of six, but ammunition only by a factor of three.
Soviet Artillery and Ammunition Production Quarter Guns Shells
2 Q, 1941 100 100
3 Q 228 227
4 Q 279 209
1 Q, 1942 396 158
2 Q 490 265
3 Q 633 328
The situation was partially alleviated by the reduction of aerial bomb production and the diversion of the excess explosives to artillery ammunition. Bomb production peaked in 1941 at 16 million.
Powder production in early 1943 was still 9 percent below the 1941 level, while production of shell casings had tripled, but increased enough by the end of the year to meet demand.
Soviet and German Ammunition Production, 20mm and Larger,
in thousands of rounds Year Nation Artillery % Mortar % Rocket % Totals
1940 Soviet 17,168 48.4 18,286 51.5 0 0 35,454
German 106,352 82.4 22,587 17.5 179 0.1 129,118
1941 Soviet 42,234 59.0 24,869 34.8 4397 6.1 71,500
German 104,688 96.4 3312 3.1 557 0.5 108,557
1942 Soviet 73,480 56 53,944 41.1 3876 2.9 131,300
German 193,631 94.6 9672 4.7 1387 0.7 204,690
1943 Soviet 85,800 51.8 75,704 45.7 4120 2.5 165,624
German 217,725 87.4 30,011 12 1389 0.6 249,125
1944 Soviet 94,768 53.2 78,630 44.1 4902 2.7 178,300
German 281,060 86.9 39,495 12.2 2846 0.9 323,401
Note: Excludes ammunition for aircraft guns.
Tonnage figures would be far more useful, but the above figures provide a rough guide.
So its clear the SU in 41 was outrproduced before achieving superiority of munitions production in 42, and its worth pointing out that Ger usage was for all Germans commitments while SU went only to fight Germany.
Anyways thats enough of that diversion.
Now the actual question, which is the firepower comparison between principle formations.
SU ID
9/39=4.9 Tonns of munitions in a basic load.
5/41=4.3
7/41=1.3
12/41=2.4
3/42=2.7
7/42=3
12/42=4
Guards=4.3
6/44=4.1
Tank Corps=9.3
Mech Corps=12.3
Cav Corps=9.7
GER ID
39=6.2
44=7
LW=4.8
VG=5.9
FJ 8.7
Tank 41=9.6
Tank 44=10
Tank SS=14.2
Mech=9.1.
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So what exactly was superior about Wehrmacht? Is it the fire power, or tactical application, or doctrine? Of these three, tactical application I definitely agree on. That was about the only thing that worked. Everything else did not - hence the result.
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Regardless of posture, the Germans achived a superior kill to loss ratio to all allied Armys till 45. The 3 variables i mentioned created an Army that compared ( USA Dupoy Institute HERO and QJM models) to the SU in the following, 43-44 Germans were 264% more effiecnet at killing, ie 100 Germans takes 264 SU troops to achieve the same result, for the whole of 43 the German over SU advanatge was 148%, in 1940 over the French and UK it was 135% before falling to 112-8% in 44 agaisnt UK and US.
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i decline to defend a posistion i have not taken
That's easy to do when you change it.
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Im afriad ill have to ask you to cite in which post i do as you suggest, if you cant, please stop makeing claims that have no basis in fact, as i detest a liar more than anything else that crosses my path.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 31
Posted by Nickiow (U13798335) on Saturday, 11th April 2009
am convinced - just as Drs Felshtinsky, Raack and Pavlova, as well as Suvorov, Musial, Danilov, Zakoretsky, Beshanov and many others - that Red Army's collapse was predicated by the fact that it was hit in the midts of a massive offensive deployment.
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Only in USSR is this unusual intpretation expressed, its been rejected everywhere else, denial is not only a river in Egypt.
The Soviet offensive plans theoryLink to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 32
Posted by Nickiow (U13798335) on Saturday, 11th April 2009
German Ammunition Consumption during the Polish Campaign
CHAPTER VI
Supply, Evacuation, and Movements
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section I. HIGHER ORGANIZATION OF SUPPLY
Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 33
Posted by Steelers708 (U1831340) on Saturday, 11th April 2009
"Now the actual question, which is the firepower comparison between principle formations.
SU ID
9/39=4.9 Tonns of munitions in a basic load.
5/41=4.3
7/41=1.3
12/41=2.4
3/42=2.7
7/42=3
12/42=4
Guards=4.3
6/44=4.1
Tank Corps=9.3
Mech Corps=12.3
Cav Corps=9.7
GER ID
39=6.2
44=7
LW=4.8
VG=5.9
FJ 8.7
Tank 41=9.6
Tank 44=10
Tank SS=14.2
Mech=9.1.
Nickiow,
I'm sorry but just because unit A has X tonnage of munitions compared to unit B having Y tonnage does not mean that unit A has more firepower than unit B.
Your table gives no comparison between manpower levels, type of weapons, number of each type of weapon, not to mention combat effectiveness.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 34
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Saturday, 11th April 2009
Since you got into details of numbers, I have to add also an older thread about WWII USSR: the issue was the extend of British and American aid to USSR and whether it was critical to USSR victory. Among the various opinions ranging from being the deciding factor up to being a minor detail, there was deduced that western aid to Russia had been not critical on the battlefield: while a lot British and US materials found its way to USSR where they were added the Red Star (and soldiers were puzzled as to why their "communist material" had english letters on it!) it was not that crucial. Where western aid was very crucial was in the provision of logistics materials and above all, in cars and trucks for the transfer of provisions. It seems that the totally inexperienced USSR officers had neglected the importance of healthy supply lines and the difference that 10 trucks more do in supply times.
So it was deduced that where Russians were considerbaly behind was the supply lines. Once their front had fallen along with its material, their inner lines - due to the vastness of the country - were still far from production, wharehousing centers and thus were not easily supplied. There British and American aid was critical. Without that aid, either the war would last more with even more (!!!) USSR losses or there could be even a hope of Germans prevailing (albeit in a totally messy situation, nothing like western and central Europe).Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 35
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 11th April 2009
Nickiow
Only in USSR is this unusual intpretation expressed, its been rejected everywhere else, denial is not only a river in Egypt This is cute. But these people would not see the light of day in the USSR, if they tried to publish their research. Truth be told, Western academia is just as rigged by politics; it's practically a racket. If one goes against the grain, one loses a job, gets denied grants, etc, etc.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 36
Posted by OUNUPA (U2078829) on Sunday, 12th April 2009
'because he would sooner see his country destroyed than admit that he had lost.'-yes,.....his OWN Power, Giraffe ...thus ' a nam ( Stalinu) nuzna odna pobeda, my ( we-Stalin ) za tsenoj ne postoim'......'All we ( i.e. Stalin ) need is the victory and there's no amount of money ( i.e. human lives ) we ( i.e.Stalin ) will pay to get it !'...the words taken from the famous soviet song.
Stalin sincere thought and spoke in 1941 and later on ( and most of his 'fans' truly believed ????!!!!! ) that after his death all those 'citizens' of the 'ussr' simply were doomed to die.
In order to re-capture the areas of the 'ussr' , which Hitler occupied during 3 months , Stalin was forced to fight THREE YEARS being aided by Allies during this process !!!!
Hitler lost his OWN WAR because Stalin DID manage to label it like so-called a Great PATRIOTIC???? !!!! War .
Hitler failed to gain a support of the non-Russian population. Why the non-Russian you may ask ?
Because his armies were based mainly in those territories ( the Ukraine, the Belorussia and the Baltic ) where that population lived...opposite to repeatedly sounded claims that it was the war of Russians .
These people favoured at the very least more autonomy and perhaps complete independence from Russia. Hitler was a child of Stalin and he spat on these national aspirations which could be essential to build a broad base of support among the non-Russian peoples. Instead of making the nationalists their allies, Hitler turned them into enemies.
But instead to leave on his own the Stalin ....the West chose to leave on their own the nationalists ...and helped Stalin to claim about the Patriotic War being backed by the western aid in shape of munitions and food....all in which he really needed....The rest of problems were these details....
As Mao once noticed in 1957 if we lost even 300,000,000 of Chinese people during the WWIII ...the rest of them should live happily and very long !!!! ....including Mao...who apriory listed himself to these rest....
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'were concentrated in the Donbass Basin and in the Ukraine '- I would like to know -what does that 'AND' to mean within the context of the post, Nikiow. ? It is the well known fact that Donbass Basin was ( and is ) itself the south-eastern part of the Ukraine.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 37
Posted by Nickiow (U13798335) on Tuesday, 14th April 2009
I'm sorry but just because unit A has X tonnage of munitions compared to unit B having Y tonnage does not mean that unit A has more firepower than unit B.
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Actually it does, thats how you measure firpower.
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Your table gives no comparison between manpower levels, type of weapons, number of each type of weapon, not to mention combat effectiveness.
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For the suffiecent reason that manpower/number of weapons and type etc all result in those numbers in the table.
I went on to show relative combat effiecency in a selection of time periods, which use those numbers in those time periods.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 38
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Tuesday, 14th April 2009
Hitler could never exploit for the benefit of war against USSR the national aspirations of peripheral slavic nations between Russians and Germans for the very simple reason that the basis of his plans was the full displacement at best, total annihilation at worst of all slavs Russians or not between eastern Germanic lands and the Urals. That was quickly understood by most of the anti-Russian group of Ukrainians for example who on the one hand found the chance to fight off the Russians but on the other remained offensive against Germans too. In other parts of Eastern Europe like Bulgaria or Croatia that was not the case and thus those Slavs collaborated directly without further obstacles.
Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 39
Posted by Nickiow (U13798335) on Tuesday, 14th April 2009
This is cute.
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Its also the factual truth of the matter.
Just because V Suvorov came up with a political and historical fabrication and others no longer constrained by the SU with the coming of glasnost etc, lept at this fairy tale that swept aside the traditionaly acepted SU version of the GWFTM and advoc ted this new insight, does not mean its correct.
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But these people would not see the light of day in the USSR, if they tried to publish their research. Truth be told, Western academia is just as rigged by politics; it's practically a racket. If one goes against the grain, one loses a job, gets denied grants, etc, etc.
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Completly false, as you would be aware if you worked in academia.
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Im afriad ill have to ask you to cite in which post i do as you suggest, since you have not done so i suggest you refrain from posting in reply to myself as i will not waste my time on a liar.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 40
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Tuesday, 14th April 2009
I am not part of any Academia but from the few things I have noticed, while there is considerable more freedom in western academia the end result is not less rigged by politics as there are pre-paid people to go out and say this or that, or people that simply want too distunguish themselves by proposing this new theory or that. And down to the basics academic positions are given also on "marketing grounds" thus one has to always put some water in his wine, something that does not necessarily serves the truth whatever that weird thingie maybe. I know my country has some unbelievable academics that would make even those illiterate ones of our ancestors turn in their graves.
Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 41
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Tuesday, 14th April 2009
Completly false, as you would be aware if you worked in academia This is a disingenius statement, and I doubt that a lot of people who do work in academia here will take it seriously. Dmitry Khmelnitsky who facilitated several publications on this subject interviewed quite a few historians in Germany where he resides, and that was exactly the reason he was given for their refusal to participate. He wrote that he was amazed to even have a few to agree - Musial was one of them, actually. By the way, R. Raack is an American professor.
Just because V Suvorov came up with a political and historical fabrication and others no longer constrained by the SU with the coming of glasnost etc, lept at this fairy tale that swept aside the traditionaly acepted SU version of the GWFTM and advoc ted this new insight, does not mean its correct It's noteworthy that you changed the subject from the merits of the matter to constraints. Constraints you do need indeed to prop up the failing theory.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 42
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 15th April 2009
Nickiow
Since your data does not give pre existing stocks its an incomplet et of figures as without knowing what they had before they fired a single shot kinda makes the resuply numbers less than usefull for knowing what they have at any point in time. Germans usully had 3 combat loads when on offensive posture, and had built up 21 million tons ( 2 million french munitions)of supplys for Barbarossa expected usage. And expened on average twice the SU in tonnage of munitions per month You are accusing me of providing incomplete figures, yet - in the proverbial same breath - you are providing the link, in which (re The Forging of Red Star, or something, part by someone named Jason Long) the Soviet tank pre-war production figures are careully avoided altogether in favor of an incoherent, incomplete and irrelevant details about selected armor factories. I'm not even going to addres the rest of this lengthy spam: it shows that Red Army had less artillery pieces than it lost in the first few months of the war according to the official Soviet figures (VIZh publications, for example). It has been already proven and published by VERY RESPECTED armament experts that Red Army had at least 24000; possibly over 25000 tanks, of which 1400 were T-34 and KV, the best in the world at the time (re Liddell Hart, Steven Zaloga and Igor Shmelev). And, by the way, many T-34 may "have been lost" (what a lame conjecture) not due to mechanical defects, but due to the fact that they were loaded on rail cars and weren't even fueled at the time of the attack.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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Message 43
Posted by Grand Falcon Railroad (U3267675) on Thursday, 16th April 2009
I think the German Army Group Centre could have made it all the way to Moscow but whether or not they'd have been able to hold it is another quetion - in effect thet'd be in a 200km salient and exceedingly vunerable to being cut off my Russian forces on the North/South flanks.
However if this operation could have been combined with a large armoured thrust by Army Group North eastward (and in effect passing by Lenningrad) then the Northen arm of this pincer could have been caught itself in a "kessel" albiet one on many, many square kilometres.
However if resources were jsut about no object (and if the Afrika Korps) were blundering about in the desert ultimately wasting fuel - then I'd have driven a force across European Turkey as well as seized the Bosphorus (as a Nazi-planner in 1941 I don't think I'd have cared too much for neutrality), then embarked a large force on ships and got across the Black Sea (using admittedly 95% of Luftwaffe strength as a airborne umbrella) and invaded the Soviet Eastern Black Sea coast whilst Army Group Centre are pumelling Moscow and diverting Stalin's attention.
I also still can't understand why the Army Group South didn't try and cross the Volga away from Stalingrad to get to the Soviet supply depots on the Eastern bank.Link to this forum: Germans lost the Ostfront before they started it.
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