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Russia takes Constantinople
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Message 1.聽
Posted by Colquhoun (U3935535) on Friday, 20th March 2009
Much of Britains foreign policy in the c19th was to prop up the Ottoman empire and prevent the Russians taking Constantinople.
But how bad would it have really been for British interests if the Russians had? Constantinople was a long way from Suez and the route to India. -
Message 2
Posted by Vizzer aka U_numbers (U2011621) on Saturday, 21st March 2009
Very good question Colquhoun.
The UK's policy throughout the 19th century of propping up the Ottoman Empire - 'the sick man of Europe' - seems to have been based more on some sort of pseudo-religious mantra rather than on any real practical considerations. The Ottoman Empire could have (and probably should have) been dismembered on several different occasions during the 19th century by either Russia, the Habsburg Empire, France or even by Britain itself.
The Ottoman Empire of 1805, 1825, 1855 and 1875 (i.e. the times when the UK intervened to protect it) was not the Ottoman Empire of 1915 when ironically the British did indeed need themselves (and the Russians!) to have access to the Straits.
By siding with the Central Powers during the First World War and by inflicting the subsequent Gallipoli disaster on the British etc, the Ottoman Empire showed its gratitude for all the support it had received from the British over the previous hundred years. -
Message 3
Posted by delrick53 (U13797078) on Saturday, 21st March 2009
Your evidence for this is what ?
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Message 4
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Saturday, 21st March 2009
Ghhhmmm ... it was not only the Russians that the English wanted to keep at bay but also the Greeks.
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Message 5
Posted by Colquhoun (U3935535) on Saturday, 21st March 2009
"Ghhhmmm ... it was not only the Russians that the English wanted to keep at bay but also the Greeks."
Not being unkind but I don't think the Greeks on there own were that much of a threat to British interests in the c19th. They were a small newly independent country, which Britain helped set up at Navarno, with minimal military or economic resources. -
Message 6
Posted by cmedog47 (U3614178) on Saturday, 21st March 2009
". . . keep at bay the Greeks." That is quite a stretch.
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Message 7
Posted by JB on a slippery slope to the thin end ofdabiscuit (U13805036) on Sunday, 22nd March 2009
Reminds me of a gag in a 'comedy atlas of the world' showing an Evzone in frilly shirt, knickerbockers, fez, tights and funny slippers doing slow-motion drill, with he caption: The Greek Army is justifiably feared throughout the Medeterranean.
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Message 8
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Monday, 23rd March 2009
No problem with the comic above - even Greeks find the dress funny but at the same time are very proud of it. On their military capacity however these Evzones were taking in half a day Bulgarian-German fortresses that combined British-French forces of double the size and technological advance could not take for a week in WWI.
Now, on my above comment, yes it might sound strange but ou judge with 2009 retrospective knowledge, not with the conditions back in the beggining of 19th century where things had a completely different dynamic.
You have to take notice that for the British, the sleeping Ottoman Empire was the best thing that ever happened. Why would they wish the situation to change and Greeks (in the west) and Armenians (in the east) take control of the situation for example? Don't you know anything about pre-emptive politics?
Note here, that in such pre-emptive politics there are always parallel scenaria. In such one, in case Russians conquered Konstantinople and erased from history the Ottoman Empire (no talk about any turkish nation cos back then it was all about muslim religion) which was anytime possible since the 18th century, the British were prepared to launch plan B: give ample help to the Greeks and in parallel revive the age-old Greek-Slavic (mainly Bulgarian) hatred. Russians were expected to side with Slavs and British with Greeks. However that plan included also the considerable empowerment of Greeks in the area which risked create a new medium power in the area that would not be contained easily in future, hence that plan was a last-solution. It has to be said that the Great Idea was a notion born out of that plan and not out of any Greek mind. For Greeks it resembled natural the step-by-step liberation of all Greek territories either through revolution or - above all - complete failure and inner collapse of the Ottoman Empire which was simply emminent had it not been for the western support. Greeks did not even need to formulate any special theory about it!!! It was rather the British and French that formulated it and made talk about the "Great Idea"... funny thing that same for the "New Turkish Great Idea", it was not any muslims or rreal Turkish people that started all that.
Given the fact that Russians seemed to prefer minimal friction with Britain (even the Krimean war was singlehandedly due to British belligerence - in a pre-emptive effort to contain Russia and protect once again the long-before failed Ottomans), the British did not support the continuation of the "Megali Idea" but kept it there and revived it in 1920 only to press for Greek troops to be sent in the depths of Minor Asia to be slaughtered only to give them the chance to establish full control in the Middle East.
Sometimes you really think very little of Britain's diplomatic capacities! It is quite a shame! Britain those times did not rule half the world by having half the standing army of other countries for no reason! -
Message 9
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Monday, 23rd March 2009
The Ottoman Empire of 1805, 1825, 1855 and 1875 (i.e. the times when the UK intervened to protect it) was not the Ottoman Empire of 1915 when ironically the British did indeed need themselves (and the Russians!) to have access to the Straits. 聽
Nor, unfortunately, was it the powerful state it had been in the 16/17Cs, or even the 18th Century Turkey which had pretty much held its own until the 1770s.
By one of those ironies, Turkey only became a major problem when it stopped being a military threat to any of the European powers. Despite the occasional seige of Vienna or Malta, the stong Ottoman Empire had never been more than a nuisance. Once the Turks became the menaced instead of the menace, the would-be predators found themselves continually at risk of war over how to split the loot. The weak Ottoman Empire of the 19/20C became a bigger threat to peace than the strong one had ever been. -
Message 10
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Monday, 23rd March 2009
Far from the great super power that muslims and of course the Turkish like to present them, Ottomans and their Seljuks were far from really very powerfull.
First it took them a really long, agonising and painstaking 500 hundred years to establish any recognised control over the long before completely sacked and destroyed by catholics and then divide by civil wars ex-Eastern Roman Empire. By the time Ottomans enterred in E.Roman cities, they were finding them full of ruins and with depleted populations, not particularly rich (not what they imagined based on their past glories) and were trying to make any money by selling people as slaves and breaking... house stones (something that Mohamed had tried in vain to stop in Konstantinople out of... shame... he had to stop the "3 days looting" because of so few things found in a city that was by then mostly agricultural fields).
And still when we talk about 1500 and the Ottoman power in full scale, Ottomans completely lacked the basics, hacing absolutely no control over the Aegean sea in the middle of their territories, whole islands were controlled by minor insignificant knight orders or small (no matter if rich and with many ships, still small and note this, inter-fighting) Italian cities with total standing armies of 10-20,000 people! Italian cities virtually roamed around and did anything on will!! At the same time in numerous places in the mainland, especially in mountainous regions there was simply no control, "local-law" was above any Ottoman law (by 1800 the areas that claimed "no Turk ever placed his foot" were quite many to count.
I am sorry but we talk history, we have to be exact. Ottomans went as far as it was easy for them. Anywhere they faced some moderate resistance they stopped and became uninterested. The fact that small inter-fighting Italian cities always controlled the Ionian islands (just go see the map) next to this immense Empire and from there on will attacked and controlled whole parts in Epirus or Peloponesus for whole decades all that in the heyday of Ottoman Empire, really shows the reality:
And the reality was that Ottomans had an over-inflated army, relatively ineffective, that was oriented in controlling what was easy, i.e. uncontrolled areas and semi-defenseless people. From there on, it was not anything more than the local militias that terrorised people as long as people did not have weapons and run off at the first sight of trouble (you have to read stories about "kleftes" to see how whole parts of the Ottoman armies in late 17th and early 18th century were rooted by a handful of "kleftes" - something understandable since the Ottoman soldiers were the first to be present for looting without resistance and ther last for fighting (what could they gain from the "kleftes" other than bullets in the head?).
The mere fact that successively the Portuguese, the Spanish, the Dutch and the British navigated half the globe to reach India, Indonesia and later Australia and Ottoman Empire that had ports in the Middle East and was a breath's distance from... fanatically muslim Indonesia never managed to stage a single expendition (!o!o!o!o) says it all! -
Message 11
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Tuesday, 24th March 2009
Far from the great super power that muslims and of course the Turkish like to present them, Ottomans and their Seljuks were far from really very powerfull.聽
In fact, from the West's point of view, they were almost the perfect "happy medium". They weren't strong enough to really pose much threat to the West (despite the occasional scare at the time of Lepanto or the Vienna sieges) but they were strong enough to make the vast bulk of their territories reasonably secure against western conquest - or at least render such conquest liable to be more expensive than it was worth.
This balance started to break down around the 1770s. From then on the Turks became increasingly vulnerable, and European powers increasingly tempted to move in. The Napoleonic Wars delayed the process by giving Europe a more urgent problem, but once these ended it was only a matter of time before European encroachment led to a falling out over how to split the loot. -
Message 12
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Tuesday, 24th March 2009
Or said in other words - the complete destruction and social chaos that followed Crusader's conquest of Eastern Roman Empire and the following Ottoman Empire that down to the basics did not solve any of that but remained as long as it could exploit the basic work of christian populations meant one basic thing:
that for the following 500 years Ottomans simply retained the till 1400 A.D. one of the (if not the) most progressive nations in the world, Greeks. Can you imagine any Western European wishing to see them again in control? Absolute nightmare!
Same remark for Greeks goes of course for Arabs the other civilisational powerhouse that under Ottomans simply went on for a deep sleep (and still not really waken up). Can you imagine these two active? Asian-European trading would continue mostly through them (since it would be faster and cheaper than making the round of Africa). Thus much fewer Europeans would take to the seas while the Pacific, including Australia would had been colonised by Arabs.
An even more worse (though very imaginary one) for Europeans scenario would be Greeks (in the sense of Eastern Romans) somehow gaining control of parts of Mesopotamia down to the Persian Gulf and monopolising the European-Asian trade.
In that scenario western Europeans would be still left with the Americas, they would indeed develop, they would indeed progress and become rich but then they would not be neither the most rich nor the most developed.
These things were very well known to Europeans. And their particular affection for Ottomans was singlehandedly for this very special reason. They kept down half the world cutting the road from East to West so as to give space to Europeans doing their tricks by circumnavigating Africa - something that would be out of the question for commercial reasons otherwise. -
Message 13
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Tuesday, 24th March 2009
In anyway, the above lie moostly in the region of alternative histories - however note down that long-term politics use such points and not short term details.
Back in 1827-28 the case was much more straitforward and in-your-face, frightengly short term with nightmarishly long-term negative effects (all that from the British point of view):
Russians having been repeatedly threatened in the past for its expansionist policies in the Mediterranean was once again in war with the Ottomans, it crossed in an epic campaign (where Ottomans also fought very harsh) via modern-day Roumania and Bulgaria and managed to arrive with some 50,000 troops a mere 50km outside a completely defenseless capital of the Ottoman Empire inside which all the muslim population was mobilised, not to defend any "mother country or nation" (what mother country and what nation?) but to flee!
It goes without saying that had Russians conquered Konstantinople (Konstantiniya for Ottomans) Ottomans could never fight back for the simple reason that Russians would add double as 50,000 to protect their access to the Mediterranean and would easily count on the help of non-muslim populations (part f their success up to then). At the same time Ottoman armies fighting Greeks in Europe (this was the time of the Greek revolution - something the Russians wanted to take advantage), would feel isolated and without central support and would find refuge to some final looting before going out (or if staying getting slaughtered). The whole of Balkans would pass to immediate or at least very close influence of Russia - and that for a very long time to come. Russians would establish some short of Russian controlled governement in Konstantinople (you can imagine ...even a relative of the Czar reviving the Byzantine Throne!... you know 3rd Rome liberating 2nd Rome and other such).
We are talking about an extremely nightmarish situation for Britain and France that had to intervene and protect the Ottoman Empire. They simply theatened Russia with total war that culd be arranged to be conducted from Sweden to central Europe and from Ottomans to Iranians, Indians and Chinese... simply they would throw in all the nations of Eurasia on them - there having an incredible possibility of a first real World War we just missed!!! Russians were an Empire in the making, they were not ready to take up the world, thus they backed up and not only they backed up but they accepted piece with terms really derogatory for them as they did not even secure the presence of Russian troops to ensure the free passage on the Channels (normally being 50km out, they should be in position to ask them anything on earth!) - therefore a mere 20 years later Ottomans (under British influence re-closed the passage) and so Russians had to re-do war with them and of course British to attack them in Ukraine (that was the idea of that war anyway), ableit without success. The backing of Russians also meant that the Greek revolution (that had drifted apart due to inner frictions further inflammed by too much "noise" and intervention) had to be finally contained. British convinced the Ottomans that by giving the absolutely useless for them Peloponesus and "the bits above the isthme"), they would cease at least for the moment the revolutionary movement of Greeks elsewhere. It goes without saying that for Greeks that was not a good option since it would be much more preferable to try that by late 19th century where they could have independence all over the greek-habitated lands both in Europea and Asia at once just like other Balkan nations did in their own lands (Greeks were the first to make a state but that included only a small part of their nation contrasted with Bulgarians for example whose first independent state included lands at times even well above their traditional national territories.
At goes without saying that having beaten for good the French, the whole 19th British policies were governement by "what did Russia", a country that was so close to them in the North Sea and just above them in their Chinese colonies (when that happened it was a shock for British!)! Even the unification of Germany, something that Britain did not seem to mind that much can be seen as a thing seen positively by British that hoped that a new player could aid in the containment of Russia.
Something which contrasts with the fact that Germany went to fight on Britain and Russia since that made Britain and Russia somehow allies but which finally should not be any strange thing if one takes into account that WWI in Russia meant "communist preparation", paid by western funds) and that the "white armies" that came there as as-if allies were there only to ensure final victory of communists (last comment only for those that can comprehend). -
Message 14
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Wednesday, 25th March 2009
Colquhoun,
Much of Britains foreign policy in the c19th was to prop up the Ottoman empire and prevent the Russians taking Constantinople.
But how bad would it have really been for British interests if the Russians had? Constantinople was a long way from Suez and the route to India.聽
A Russian navy with access to the eastern Mediterranean could have threatened Suez. -
Message 15
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Wednesday, 25th March 2009
Russians had already access to the eastern Mediterranean. You forget that by late 18th early 19th century all Greek commercial ships were under Russian flag (as a result of the Russo-Turkish war so called Orloff-war of 1780s) and that had been a tremendous boost for the Greek shipping industry. If one thinks that Russians would have to undertake any special high-cost projects for developing their bases in the Mediterranean is mistaken - they need not do oa lot - had they taken Konstantinople, the ships even those carrying a Greek flag would be the official Russian fleet in the Mediterranean.
Therefore one of the reasons for the change of British and French attitudes towards Greek revolution (from negative to positive) was the effort to take Greeks - and their commercial fleet - away from Russian influence. -
Message 16
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Wednesday, 25th March 2009
Not to mention that from there on the possibilities for Russians were endless. The Middle East was not far and thus access to the Indian ocean would be the next step with all expected consequencies for the British (and French and Dutch) interests.
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Message 17
Posted by MattJ18 (U13798409) on Wednesday, 25th March 2009
Would the threat really have just been from the Russians? Even with access to the Mediterranean I cannot imagine the Russians really pursuing a naval/commercial programme that would threaten British interest as much as two other scenarios:
1) The collapse of the Ottoman Empire leads to a series of smaller states growing, some of them very nationalistic/islamic. Egypt in particular becomes massively rebellious and threatens the Suez Canal.
2) France takes advantage of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to seize control over the Middle East and directly threaten the route to British India.
Both of these could easily have precipitated war and the ensuing outpouring of resources. Propping up the Ottoman Empire was clearly the best idea and as Russia was its main threat opposing Russia became the policy. -
Message 18
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Wednesday, 25th March 2009
Interesting comments:
However you seem to judge (like most here):
1) No it would not necessarily:
The main nations of Balkans (i.e. above 500,000 souls) apart the nation-less Ottoman muslims that were later identified as of Turkish ethnicity and Minor Asia were the following:
Balkans: Serbians, Serbocroatian muslims (currently identified as Bosnians), Roumanians, Bulgarians, Albanians (mainly muslims but also many christians too) and of Greeks that you could find in all Balkan regions.
Minor Asia: Greeks, Armenians, Assyrochaldeans
By far the most numerous and by far most prominent nation had been the Greeks the only nation present in both Balkans and Minor Asia followed by Armenians that were largely in Minor Asian (with a few financial immigrants in Balkans).
Bulgarians were a dormant nation, back then they would just celebrate any change of status implying getting rid of Ottomans like Serbians (less dormant as nation in comparison to Bulgarians). Albanians, mostly muslim (but with volatile religious beliefs) would be suffering the loss of Ottoman support would become silent, note that back then they were less numerous (today they are 4 millions having enjoyed 100 years of explosive birth rates in conjunction with good health care).
Given the fact Greeks did not revolt for the establishment of a nation-state (which anyway would had to includ both European and Minor Asian lands populated by Greeks) but for tearing down Ottoman control and establishing a new state - something less of a nation-state and more of a successor to the East Roman state. They had revoted as Romans. And the "Roman" identity was not ethnic but of state-citizenship. Practically all christian people of Balkans.
Had Russians conquered Konstantinopolis they would rather not see the region being fragmented into a war zone among orthodox nations: they would play the "3rd Rome liberating the 2nd Rome" card. They would push for the creation of a large inclusive state, probably sending one of their Czars to rule as a "Roman Emperor" and make the state allied to Russia for really a long time to come.
It goes without saying that Greeks would be much interested in that since Russians would need their ships for establishing control over the Eastern Mediterranean and once that achieved,
British in that sense would have to resort to allying with muslims be it Turkish and Arabs pushing for "holy war" against orthodox christians - the last chance of Britain to remain active in the region. However, with a Black Sea already closed, with infinite resources from the Russian north and with the belief of the new age of the liberated christians things would be very hard for British and French because then they would not be in position to hit with one short campaign (unless they did it right the very same month Russians enterred Konstantinople). If they would do it 10 years after it would be too late.
If British and French took aside Turks and Arabs to teach them fight a holy war against "the orthodox" that would need quite some time especially for Arabs who needed a lot of time to wake up from their sleep, then if waking them up what that could imply for the British in India or elsewhere (Arabs re-building armies and navies, hmmm)? It goes without saying that Russians having dissolved the Ottoman Empire meant that Ottoman administration in the absence of central support would collapse in a matter of months and the horrible muslim militia would be outsted at best or slaughtered (getting a taste of their own recipe) at worst. That not only in Europe but also in Minor Asia. The whatever remaining muslim populations would simply accept fate and remain becoming passige populations (given the fact that they had developed so many centuries no special capacities nor any particular education or culture to given them any objective).
It goes without saying that things would look pretty bleak for British and French interests. That is why they were there to intervene both for saving the Ottoman Empire and for the creation of a small, harmless neo-greek state with a history that started in 750 B.C. (麻豆约拍r) continued up to 400 B.C. (end of Peloponesian war) did a 2 millenia break and restarted on 1821... unfortunately a tremendously perverse viewing that still persists well even among well-wishers of the Greek nation (including so many Greeks).
2) France could not take control of the Middle East and threaten any British interests. It was alredy beaten. It had some army but it had no navy for the task. -
Message 19
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Wednesday, 25th March 2009
However, with a Black Sea already closed, with infinite resources from the Russian north and with the belief of the new age of the liberated christians things would be very hard for British and French because then they would not be in position to hit with one short campaign聽
Why does it have to be one short campaign?
It took a couple of years to capture Sebastopol, but we managed it, despite all those "infinite resources from the north" and without even having leadership worth a hoot. In a siege of Constantinople, the logisitcs would if anything be easier. -
Message 20
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Thursday, 26th March 2009
You are right. And obviously the British back then had by far the best navy and army in the world and could eventually find the numbers necessary from their Empire. Joined with French that should be enough to create so much trouble for Russians to end their expansionist dreams.
But what I added above is that had the Russians done the "thingie", the British and French should would have to react instantly, in a month, maximum a year!!! Had they waited for more the game would had been lost. Of course, wise as always British diplomats arranged so as to terrorise the Czar so much (who knows what threats he had heard to back up at such a last minute point? Perhaps attack from all nations of Eurasia including Germans, Arabs, Indians and Chinese?).
Had the British/French waited for more, Russians would find the time to establish their presence in both sides of the Aegean, effectively controlling the Eastern Mediterranean. Imagine, the case of British and French being slow and organising a campaign 10 years later. Their only hope would be 1) to re-assemble the bits and parts of the muslim militia from the depths of "uncntrolled" Minor Asia and (2) by dividing christian nations (say provoke a clash between Slavs and Greeks) - however given the fact that Russians would already had placed a philo-russian Patriarch (and back then the orthodox church was one) it would be increasingly difficult. Not to mention that the bulk of local aristocracies would had more to lose by going against their liberators Russians some 10 years after the event. Diffucult but given the British excellent performance in divide and conquer tactics possible - probably they would tell tales of fear to Greeks about "panslavism" and would promise them an extensive Greek state and whoever would believe them (probably entrusting contracts to shipowners could do the job better). However getting the Greeks fight a civil war (as was done in the revolution) would not aid anymore british/french plans and all that manipulation would be a bit more difficult if British would bring in again the Turks (though we had seen civil war during the revolution, however this would be another case).
In the case that English and French sent troops to fight Russians off both sides of the Aegean they would get into a very eventful adventure. By all means British navy would rule in the Aegean occupying many islands (including coastal Crete but in that case they would trap extraordinarily large numbers too fight off the Cretans and thus their presence would concentrate in 2-3 main cities/ports. However 10 years would suffice for Greeks to construct a valid navy and thus even that "obvious" task would not be really so obvious (it had been shown that smaller Greek ships were much more relevant in the Aegean sea than large ones).
From there on, waging war in this mountainous region (bot sides of the Aegean) with British/French armies still more close to Napoleonian standards than any WWI could easily end up as a disaster - especially if one judges from British/French performances in the Balkans where they had Greeks as a major ally in the area (thus friendly the most difficult part of the area!!). And back then there was no mass-bombing. Let alone the fact that Russian weaponry though a bit behind than that of the British was more than enough in the hands of local armies. Not to mention that if all that provoked an orthodox-attacked-by-crusader-barbarians attitude, British/French would be in for heavy trouble (one could not guarantee even Italian states' case!!). And in case of a very probable final defeat of British/French, who would exclude a huge power vacuum in the middle east and north Africa?
Therefore you understand that things were extrememly critical with Russians 1 day march outside an unarmed Konstantiya (as Ottomans called it) ready to cancel 400 years of history (or lack of it) and send Ottomans to the dusty selves of time. Pre-emptive politics prevailed and triumphed but due to their nature today we are not in position to realise the importance of such political decisions. -
Message 21
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Saturday, 28th March 2009
Which at the end means that Russians back then did perhaps their most grave geopolitical error.... ever!
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Message 22
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Tuesday, 31st March 2009
Which at the end means that Russians back then did perhaps their most grave geopolitical error.... ever!聽
Surely the only error was in bothering to march on Constantinople at all - ever.
Russian victories (at least over any country bigger than Finland or Afghanistan) were mostly won by exploiting the sheer size of their country - encouraging the enemy to traipse into the interior until his lines of communication were stretched to breaking point.
By contrast, the "secret" of defeating the Russians was to tempt them into emerging from their wide-open spaces and fighting on or beyond their borders, somewhere where the logistics would favour the other side. Going by the past history, any war fought in the neighbourhood of Constantinople looks like the classic recipe for a Russian defeat - an earlier Sebastopol or Port Arthur. -
Message 23
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Thursday, 2nd April 2009
Hmmm why would you think that it was an error of Russians? The decision of going to war against a beligerent Ottoman Empire repeatedly refusing Russian accesss to the Mediterranean was correct.
And while seen as a modern army, Russians had not yet reached the forefront of military advances, and in that campaign they had employed if I remember some 50,000 soldiers which was not any large army for the task (Ottomans had 10 times that army and endless reserves of militia). Yet they fared exceptionally well and came down to Konstantinople despite the Ottoman (arguably fierce) resistance. Need not remind you the pathetic loss of British in Iraq in WWI where the surrendered an army of 300,000 to Ottomans arguably considerably weaker than those times.
And they were there, in front of a defenseless capital city placed in one of the most strategic points in the world - others had done "le resalto finale" in the past for less gains and now you do not even remember the cities and those states. Had they done it today we would not even spend a lot of time on the Ottoman Empire - it would be seen just as 300-400 years step-bad for the region, and most certainly a minimum of 4 million christians (from late 19th to the end of the 20th century) would had avoided dying in inhuman conditions.
In what sense could this campaign be an error? The possible gains would had been enormous for Russians who in the end stepped back in not 100% clear situations, obviously more afraid of a World War I against them - do not forget, the example of Napoleon and his final fate were quite recent!
Now, I am not sure if the examples you give are very compatible. The case of Finland was the first war waged by Communist USSR that was still under a purge (20 million Russians died in the purges of that period). Most communist leaders had practically no idea about war and were early on their learning curve. About half of the officers were purged (most of them sent in gulagks or directly killed) while Russian soldiers' moral was in a very low point (who could ever go to fight for "workers' paradise"?). Russians went on to fight only after 1941 when Stalin changed his song to the "Russian nationalism, orthodox against barbarian teutonic crusaders" etc.). Given the situation, anyone could win over such a sad army.
In the example of the Crimean war, what you had was Britain and France (the two most powerfull countries in Europe) siding with Ottomans (whatever forces they could give, and they had endless numbers) and even pre-unification Italians all against Russians. Most of their offensive acts included raids against unarmed towns and even small villages and industrial facilities - and that was seen as a shame by British that thought of their army as the best and did not particularly like to see it waging a war of attrition against an objectively inferior technologically and organisationaly army. Even their success in Sevastopol came after unjustified losses while in many other fronts (less known in the west for obvious reasons), British, French and the rest received hard bashing even by the likes of militia troops like Kozaks.
Of course all that huge mobilisation of the world against Russia made Russia weary over a war that threatened to be long and arduous and that is why they accepted the bad for them treaty (though easily amendable by them later) rather than any amazing success of the technically superior British and French forces against them.
Now imagine that if all that at best unimpressive campaign is all what Britain and France along with Ottomans could do against Russia while having full access to the Black sea, imagine how much they could do if having no access to the Black sea and if fighting ... from Egypt to gain access to Crete and to south Aegean Sea while Russians having sided completely with the side of Greeks and the rest of Christians in Europe and Minor Asia!
Tough!!! I tell you very tough. That is why British diplomats threatened Russians perhaps with devil himself coming down against them if they ever dissolved the Ottoman Empire.
Still I believe it was an enormous error from the side of Russians to listen to all that (too bad for them for having tzars related to western royal houses - that brought too much noise around them). Even if British and French attacked the same year, judging from their mediocre performances 30 years later despite having 3 times better armies in terms of weapons and means while Russians marginally 1,5 times better than before (kind of saying that 5 and 1,5 it is just to show the evolutions) one cannot but think of an emminent failure back in 1827. Now that I am thinking I would not give much hope to a British-French army (naked of Ottomans who would had been dispersed random militia too occupied in regional conflicts, thus more nuissance than aid) against Russians plus Greeks, Armenians and Slavs. British had nothing to attack on either side of the Aegean, they had 3000 islands to control, 1 Crete where they would simply get massacred, and any attempt to pass through the straits of Dardanelia would mean defeat. A 10 times better army in WWII failed terribly in Dardanelia fighting a much inferior to Russians (given time transfer) Ottoman army, so really there is nothing there to convince anyone that a British-French force would be decisevely victorious over Russians had they dissolved the Ottoman Empire.
Hence, again I stress my opinion that this was Russias greatest geopolitical error, arguably ever. -
Message 24
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Thursday, 2nd April 2009
Now imagine that if all that at best unimpressive campaign is all what Britain and France along with Ottomans could do against Russia while having full access to the Black sea, 聽
Unimpressive or not, it still sufficed to win the war, despite the Russians having a much more favourable logistical situation than they would have had in Constantinople. Going to the Bosporus would just be sticking their chin out so that the Allies could thump it more easily.
imagine how much they could do if having no access to the Black sea 聽
They don't need access to the Black Sea if the Russians have obligingly come down to the Bosporus to meet them. It's the Crimea, but with Allied lines of communication a good deal shorter, and the Russians fighting hundreds of miles from home instead of on their own ground. And once Constantinople falls, as Sebastopol fell, then the Allies do have access to the Black Sea. -
Message 25
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Friday, 3rd April 2009
When I am saying "unimpressive" I am meaning it on the tactical side. It is obvious that the strategic aim was to contain anyhow Russia "back to its Ural cage". And that aim was relatively achieved, mainly due to the fact that Russians got war-weary and did not want to end up in a long total war where they had to face the worlds' leading armies (British and French) and their allies (Ottomans, Italians) who were fighting mostly a war of attrition that would cripple Russian economy. However, beyond that, British and French would hope to have shown the capabilities to srike Russia with more direct hits, they tried it but they found it very difficult.
You mentioned an important disavantage in logistics for British, French favouring Russians. If you talked for French ok, but for British that ruled half the world with their navies, that should not be a justification: Russians had themselves burnt the bulk of their navy to avoid being captured and used by British and thus British had gained control of most of the Black Sea based on their friends, Ottomans - thus even provisions were just in the neighbourhood, they did not bring them from... England! It was Russians in the most difficult position as they had to send armies in Roumania, in Caucasus, in the Baltics and in Ukraine were the bulk of the war was waged. And Ukraine is a flat-land, perfect for those British and French armies, good also for Russian armies but not so excellent for local Russian Kozak militia in the case they wanted to fight invaders guerilla-style. Thus I do not see any such important disadvantage for the Allied force. The main disadvantage being the weather as they had no experience of what was needed to fight through Russian winters. -
Message 26
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Friday, 3rd April 2009
When I am saying "unimpressive" I am meaning it on the tactical side. It is obvious that the strategic aim was to contain anyhow Russia "back to its Ural cage". And that aim was relatively achieved, mainly due to the fact that Russians got war-weary and did not want to end up in a long total war where they had to face the worlds' leading armies (British and French) and their allies (Ottomans, Italians) who were fighting mostly a war of attrition that would cripple Russian economy. However, beyond that, British and French would hope to have shown the capabilities to srike Russia with more direct hits, they tried it but they found it very difficult.聽
I don't know what you mean by "behind its Ural cage". Behind the Danube would have satisfied Britain. France would have liked the Russians out of Poland as well, but didn't regard that as vital - and couldn't achieve it anyway without fresh allies.
That aside, while I wouldn't argue with the claim that Allied tactical performance was bad, wasn't that just as well? A decisive tactical victory might have forced the Russians to evacuate the Crimea, and since the Allies couldn't remain there forever, they would sooner or later have had to either go away, leaving Russia no worse off than when the war started, or else push on, deeper into the Russian interior - a course which, to judge from the precedents, might well have led to disaster.
The Allies did indeed end up fighting a war of attrition, but they hadn't planned it that way. Rather, it happened accidentally, as a result of their failure to grab Sebastopol right at the outset. This tactical failure opened the way to strategic success. Sebastopol was of little value to the Allies in itself. Its value lay in the Russians' insistence on holding it to the bitter end, thus pinning them down in a long siege which left them broke and exhausted. In one of history's little jokes, the Allies' military incomptence had won the war for them. -
Message 27
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Friday, 3rd April 2009
I find very correct your view on how "tactical error opened the way for strategic success" in regards to the Sevastopol siege. The reference to Ural cage is a failed image I tried to pass... Russia was like a beast going out of its cage (i.e. those inner lands east and west of Urals) trying to lay its feet on Mediterranean and Middle East while British and French and the rest of allies tried to close the door back on its face.... ok... sorry... kind of saying, not everything I say is "great success" (borat accent).
-
Message 28
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Saturday, 4th April 2009
Now on the second part of your questioning - about the difficulty of Russians fighting 100s of miles away from their northern base, I really think that this would not be any problem when they would had secured the full and monopolised control of all the Black Sea and the co-operation of all orthodox christian nations in both S.E. Europe and Minor Asia (inlcuding Serbians, Roumanians, Bulgarians, Armenians, Assyrochaldeans and above all the everywhere-present Greeks with their not so little navy). So at the end would really Russians operate "far from their bases"?
The whole question would be this: 1) Whether British and French would be able to attack within 1 month after conquest and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire or 2) if not, whether they would be possible to divide orthodox especially by a Slavs-against-Greeks division - and it is known that there was a plan for such in 1827 that included even the possibility of full liberation for all Greeks everywhere and the creation of a British-friendly anti-Russian mini-Byzantine Empire which was finally discarted as soon as Russians took back their army. Yet, that gave birth to the talk about "Great Idea" (which was not formulated by Greeks but by foreigners - for Greeks the initial idea was "Liberation" and "Liberation" would be the "Natural flow of history" not any "Great Idea").
Since we fall to alternative history I will commend first the case where Russians enter Constantinople and the nearby British/French navies remaining hesitant as to if they had to attack instantly (something not obvious as these navies did not have much of land troops, while Russians were only land troops).
So Russians dissolve the Ottoman Empire becoming in the eyes of all christians (all orthodox like Russians) the liberators - all that inbetween an ongoing Greek revolution taking place in nowadays modern Greece (from Macedonia down to Peloponese and the islands). That would mean that the already ongoing revolution would take a different turn, Ottomans being disorganised and thinking how to flee, people taking to the arms with newly found courage and kicking them out from all places with Russians aiding only in the regions around the Bosphore (thus cutting completely the movements of muslims who would be mostly fleeing with whatever means to inner Minor Asia, either slaighered, either completely disarming and asking for mercy accepting their fate to becoming the working class (almost all of them, previously having as a profession being militia and looting, completly uncultured and illiterate to have any hopes to do anything else) of the newly fond states. The above means that in a very small time framework the muslim militia would be neutralised and it would be not easy for British/French to ressurect them and re-use them apart those from inner Minor Asia.
It is natural that Russians would remain quite popular in the sense that they would not need to establish quickly tight control over these lands. They would most probably go for creation of autonomous self-governed regions part of a federation with head of state the Tzar in Moscow, or some philo-Russian Greek polititian like Kapodistrias but always promoting the Patriarch (by then voting a philo-russian Greek Patriarch or directly a Greek speaking Russian Patriarch) as a universal leader uniting ex-Ottoman subjects orthodox with Russian orthodox.
Having achieved that, it goes without saying that Russians would remain quite popular and the voices against them would be merely some local disgrunted families that would lose local priviliges - that dealt easily (anyway we know there existed local families that had it better by collaorating with the Ottomans... and these had either shifted ideas either dealt easily by being "eliminated"... all that within the very weak funny little Greek state - guess how much in this alternative case). You have to take into account also that the whole Greek shipping industry was already working extensively with Russians and that the Russian conquest of Constantinople would even more cement the common insterests and thus the financial leadership of Greeks would stick to Russians, that being one of the most important details.
So 4-5 years later British and French gather their forces to attack. What could they do in such a situation? And how would be seen by local people? They would see that orthodox Russians came and liberated them and that despicable western catholic crusader barbarians enter to attack again and destroy and collaborate with the muslims and repeat past crimes and such. That would simply seal the fate of any British/French effort.
With the patriarch and the bulk of the local financial leaders against them they would not find easily local collaborators and if yes these would be of secondary importance (usually some local families caring about their localised interests). They could not expect muslims to be able to stand back to their feet in Europe and would mostly do that in central Minor Asia - not much of a help as these would mostly end up fighting Pontians, Kappadocians, Armenians and Assyrochaldeans. Not to mention that muslims could as well fragment to their sub-groups (eg. many of the less fanatic Alevites would simply not be interested to follow the more fanatic sounnites and would possibly even co-operate with christians if the latter did not show very belligerent against them).
So British and French would logically go for a direct hit, like capturing Constantinople. Would it be easy? Well, they could zig-zag the Aegean largely intimidating the smaller Greek ships, capturing 1-2 islands to use as basis but from there on to enter the Dardanelia narrow it would be a different story - they could not pass the narrows with Russian-Greek army controlling the lands bombing the ships 1 by 1: they had to do an amphibious assault on both sides of the land.
So lets go forward to WWI: A large but relatively badly trained, badly organised, badly equiped Turkish army stopped British and allied army that was technological leaps ahead them, trained to do amphibious assaults and such. It was actually a catastrophe. So back then while Russians were not as advanced as British and French, were still at relatively comparable levels while Greeks,fresh veterans from the revolution could do a lot with little. Note that Russian-Greek defenses would had been on the limit of reach of British/French ships' canons while British/French unloading canons from ships to the land would fragilise their navy. British and French would have just to run like crazy against the Russian canons only to be annihilated by the waiting Russian-Greek troops, arguably one of the least diserable enemeis you wanted to face in battle.
If you really disagree with the above you have again to remember that back then wer talk about the 1830s (not the 1850s, Crimean war etc....if British/French waited till then they had lost it anyway) when the British/French armies were more close to Napoleonic style of warfare than any WWI (where still they failed largely).
Thus any direct attack to Constantinople would be highly risky and would most probably show to the world a complete failure of the worlds 2 main armies against the "orthodox alliance" with all what follows after that, and the chain of events could lead to Russian Bases in Iraq, Russians opening the Suez canal and all that thus international investors by mid-late 18th century rushing to invest more to Russia than USA and so on. The possibilities really become very extended.
It goes without saying that British and French would do everything to kill such crazy scenarios in the beginning (and they did it in 1828 by convincing the Russians to step back). War against Russia would happen elsewhere, by China and Mongolia, by Finland, by Poland, it would obviously be the WWI. But in the Eastern Mediterranean British/French would be the least possible to do something directly as explained above. Now employing a large army for a longer campaign (i.e. landing at some point in Minor Asia and marching up to Constantinople) was more valid. But. They would simply need more than 1 million soldiers and the necessary oganisation. Say 200,000 British, 300,000 French and 500,000 muslims recruited by all Middle east and India. Still very difficult as by the time russians would had given some 200,000, Bulgarians and Serbians and Romanians some 100,000 Greeks all their 300,000, ending up in comparable numbers. And when mule riding 120,000 Greeks stopped 550,000 car-riving Italians
I am not referring to Greeks as best fighters in the world or something... no it is not that; its simple: Greece and Minor Asia are highly mountainous areas and that aids defenders: you can defend even when 1 to 5 and that had happened repeatedly in Greek history (do you think that Ottomans yielded control everywhere? there were areas practically free for all the 400 years of occupation). From there on, it is also true that Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbians are all fearsome fighters - British and French would have to face such a terrible opposition they would never had faced before... especially if they were there attacking by dragging behind them a horde of muslims - that fact could be the last drop, and from there on any British/French total loss (probable) could eventually have Greek ships taking a revengeful offensive and attacking Italy, Corsica and Marseilles initially pirate-like attacks then if with success more organised ones paralysing control of British and French even in their own western Mediterranean. 1 million army defeated - just remember Napoleon in Russia? What happened next? - would be such a psychological shock that "defeatism" would pass directly to their own societies back home with all relative repercussions.
Thus the only hope for British and French would be to drag at least the Greeks along with them before any attempt to attack. And that is what they were doing during the Greek revolution a bit before the Russians declaring war and reaching outside the Constantinople. Facing any united orthodox front created by Russian conquest of Constantinople would be nearly impossible. -
Message 29
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Saturday, 4th April 2009
Now on the second part of your questioning - about the difficulty of Russians fighting 100s of miles away from their northern base, I really think that this would not be any problem when they would had secured the full and monopolised control of all the Black Sea and the co-operation of all orthodox christian nations in both S.E. Europe and Minor Asia (inlcuding Serbians, Roumanians, Bulgarians, Armenians, Assyrochaldeans and above all the everywhere-present Greeks with their not so little navy). So at the end would really Russians operate "far from their bases"?聽
How exactly do thye get the co-operation of these "Orthodox Christian nations"?
On your scenario, the Turks have been swept entirely out of Europe, so the Balkan peoples have no further need for Russian help, unless against their fellow "Christians". As soon as the last Turk has departed, they'll be fighting each other hammer and tongs over how to split the loot.
Then enter a British agent with a sack of gold coins. I don't think we'd have much trouble buying the loyalty of local warlords. Our treasury was a good deal bigger than the Tsar's.
Nor is being Orthodox any guarantee of a country being (or remaining) pro-Russian. Bulgaria was defying the Tsar in the 1880s, despite owing its existence to Russian arms. No such thing as gratitude in international affairs.
Also, remember, we still have Asia Minor as a base. Whoever now rules there, It is still overwhelmingly Moslem, so any Armenians or Greeks dopey enough to take the Russian side will soon become either refugees or corpses. So the Russians can be held easily enough at the Straits until we are good and ready to move against Constantinople. Then, as in the 1850s, we just slog it out until Russia goes broke. -
Message 30
Posted by Vizzer aka U_numbers (U2011621) on Saturday, 4th April 2009
Russian victories (at least over any country bigger than Finland or Afghanistan) were mostly won by exploiting the sheer size of their country - encouraging the enemy to traipse into the interior until his lines of communication were stretched to breaking point.
By contrast, the "secret" of defeating the Russians was to tempt them into emerging from their wide-open spaces and fighting on or beyond their borders, somewhere where the logistics would favour the other side. Going by the past history, any war fought in the neighbourhood of Constantinople looks like the classic recipe for a Russian defeat - an earlier Sebastopol or Port Arthur.聽
An interesting and thought-provoking analysis Mikestone8.
It's worth also remembering that the the term 鈥楥rimean War鈥 is something of a misnoma. During the war itself (and throughout much of the rest of the 19th Century) the British press referred to it as the 鈥楻ussian War鈥. This was understandable as there were several theatres of operation - not just the Crimea. There was also action in Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia as well as in the White Sea and even in the Pacific where French and UK launched an attack on Petropavlovsk on the remote Kamchatka peninsula.
The Kamchatka episode pretty much sums up the whole war as it just seemed to be the waging of war for war鈥檚 sake but with no realistic strategic objective. Forces were just spread thinly all over the place and just seemed to be playing at war.
Quite apart from anything else the UK forces in the Baltic served only to earn themselves a reputation for burning defenceless Finnish villages to the ground for no good reason. The poor Finns must have wondered what destroying their livelihoods and leaving them destitute in the face of the coming Northern winter had to do with 鈥榮afeguarding the holy places in the Levant鈥. -
Message 31
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Saturday, 4th April 2009
Of course your thoughts are in the correct direction: Britain and France would throw in a lot of money to attract the attention of local warlords who were always so close to fighting each other. And yes there is nothing like "gratitude" in international affairs thus it is understandable that local vendettas and micro-civil clashes could be exploited to insurrect armies against what would be propagandised as Russian ocupation.
There is a problem though: as I mentioned above, it would be the position of the major finance forces and that was the Greek ship owners. Do not forget that already that force, in the days prior to the Greek revolution was recognised and it was that that led largely the revolution. So what would they prefer these ship owners? Russia that would utilise them for its presence in the Mediterranean - thus Greek owners getting the monopoly of trade between Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean? Or British who would fragment completely their touch with the Black Sea and they would render them local playes of small magnitude? The possibilities with Russians seemed much more promising than any alliance with British and French. British could hope to get 1-2 families with them but it did not suffice, that had to be the majority to work.
It is true that during the revolution and despite they had been helping also the Ottomans, British and French had worked well their propaganda, much better than Russia with all that phillelenic movement and the whatever aid they had offered (well after having divided the rebels into camps, French, English as opposing to the older, Russian camp). However the conquest of Constantinople would be certainly THE No1. argument. Who had got ridden of Ottomans? Who really fought off the Ottomans? Who "cleared the land off that long-due pest?" Was it British? Was it French? No, it was Russians. So what would British and French want then? Would it be liberators? Or barbaric crusaders? You see that Russians would have a lot of space to propagandise there!
And Russians would never present themselves as any foreign force but as "orthodox" liberators. And Russians had the advantage of having hosted the birth of the Greek revolution (in Odessa) as well as having Greeks occupying high posts in the Russian Empire - like Ioannis Kapodistrias, one of the most prominent polititians of those times. What British and French had to bring? Half-retarded impottent King Otto? And among the Greeks who were the most influential and more rich and most powerful if not for those who habitated Constantinople and Minor Asia - the ones that had no chance to rebel till then but only suffered the "easy reprisals" of muslims? Why would these Greeks ally with the British and French who would be most willing to bring back the muslims? A bit difficult. And why would mainland Greeks be so willing to help the westerners even if 2-3 families here and there agreed to help? With Constantinople in hands, Russians would just accuse any collaborator with British and French as a traitor-working-with-crusaders. In anyway, with conquest of Constantinople the Russians would take the white pieces and the British the black on the chessboard (i.e. it would all depend how Russians performed in relation to locals, not the British/French who would rather be fighting for a draw).
Also my comment for the muslims has to be understood well: naturally you do the mistake by counting modern populations (a mistake that all people do!). Back in 1900 - 100 years later, and despite already falling christian demographics, christians in Minor Asia (where the mass of Ottoman muslims lived) where 7 million and muslims 10 milion. Does that sonds any difficult analogy for chrisians to cope had they been fighting with weapons against disorganised muslims? I do not think so.
Muslims were mostly local militia that thrived attacking armless populations, looting and raping and the rest. Muslim populatins largely lived out of that, most of them working "for the army", i.e. official army and militia. The taxes christians payed went largely there (where would they go? Did you see them building roads and bridges?). When the central organisation would had fallen, in a chain reaction and quite very fast, muslims would lose control since christians would be armed and with newly found courage due to the certainty of giving the final blow - usually christians were reserved due to the usual initial success followed by a hord of 10 times more muslim militia arriving from other regions and attacking not the army but revenging on ; well that time there would be no other hord arriving from elsewhre, thus muslims were doomed. We had seen how in the collapse of central authority muslims were not even resisting but packing and leaving before even they were asked to do so, guess how much pressed - this fact explained by the fact that muslims would never accept living "under" christiand even at equal basis, they had to leave in a society where they were the rulers over those infidels. And that can't be more clear than this.
Hence, conquest of Constantinople would imply total collapse for muslims. Take into note also that back then there was no false turkish propaganda and that muslims never considered to have any imaginary right to rule over Europe or Minor Asia or whatever. They were always aware that they had been conquerors, ruling over foreign lands in the name of islam. They had never any special attachment to their places, perhaps apart the recently converted local ones. Thus, many of them would be just happy to get out (as it had happed in real historic events) and go back to the middle east to live "above and not under the infidels", others, the Alevites and other muslim sects (less fanatic) and above all the recently converted ones would stay behind and become the "low-class" in peace (as it had happed in real historic events). The few who would wish to remain but in violent relationship with their neighbours, they would perish. In anyway muslims would very quickly cease to be a threat (as it had happed in real historic events).
As for the wars between orthodox nations you have to keep in mind that back in 1830 the slavic element was completely dormant. Completely means completely. And they were considering Greeks as some kind of superior authority since the Patriarch was Greek. Had the slavic brothers Russians collaborated with Greeks, Slavic people of Balkans simply would follow. For them, the mere fact that they would had got rid of Ottomans would be enough. Do not forget that to a large part, the Bulgarian beligerent nationalism and expansionism was the work of France and Germany who first gave them ideas about expanding even to Greek southern lands like the coastal zones of Macedonia and Thrace. In the absence of that inlfuence Bulgarians would not search for more than their newly found liberty. Why would they need "access to the Aegean" when they would have it in the form of that short of (even loose) federation? And when all their Black Sea coast was habitated by Greeks that would do the connections with the south by sea? Bulgaria in that sense would not be locked even if it did not have any authority over any Aegean coast. Do not forget how much Slavic populations looked upon Greeks - even in the heart of Slavic awakening, Bulgarians on the one hand were jealous of Greeks, on the other were sending their kids to Greek speaking schools and not to slavic speaking ones. Back then, that trend would be much more strong and without the slavic nationalism awakened
Do not forget that the Greek revolution NEVER aimed to create a small Greek state in Peloponese. They had rebelled as Romans - making reference not to ethnic origin but to being inheritors of the Eastern Roman Empire that of course included not only Greeks but practically all christian populations. Who remembers that Greek revolution had started in Roumania where 1 million Greeks lived and ruled under loose control of Ottomans and was prepared by Greeks living in Russian controlled Greek city of Odessa. Greeks were present all over the Balkans, Black Sea, Minor Asia and Cyprus. And in overall numbers more than the heart of the Ottoman administration (if taken out the Albanians, Kurds, Alevites and other sects with strong tedencies for independence).
Therefore you understand why British and French run so many times to save at the last moment the Ottomans which resulted at the expense of at least 4 million christians killed and other 4 expulsed from their homes - and there I do not include the inter-christian wars that came along with British-French-German influence and which (possibly - not certainly of course) could be largelyavoided had Russia been ruling there.
In any way you take it, the scenario of would be much more advantageous for Russia and all the christian nations as well as for the global development of the greater area - in both financial as well as civilisational terms. Hence my belief that this was the worst geostrategic error that Russia ever did. -
Message 32
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Saturday, 4th April 2009
(correction above; bulgarian nationalism was fed initially by Russians in order to break them out o the Ottoman Empire: however Russians, selling pan-slavism, would not want them to go fight with Serbians; Bulgarian nationalism was quickly taken up by French and Germans who were pushing them to expand to the Greek south in the expense of Greek populations there - it normal reading German texts accusing Greeks of being degenerate mix of Turkish and Albanians and thus Bulgarians should take it all but it is really very funny reading French texts about the imaginary Greek crimes against Bulgarians during the struggle of Greeks to free Macedonia of Ottoman occupants and Bulgarian invaders)...especially when half Greek priests and teachers had their tongues cut and the other half their eyes torn out (oh yes, things like that happened on a regular basis).
It goes without saying that a Russian conquest of Constantinople would mean that such events would not happen - at least not that way. -
Message 33
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Saturday, 4th April 2009
It's worth also remembering that the the term 鈥楥rimean War鈥 is something of a misnoma. During the war itself (and throughout much of the rest of the 19th Century) the British press referred to it as the 鈥楻ussian War鈥. This was understandable as there were several theatres of operation - not just the Crimea.聽
Indeed, but imho the traditional name is still valid.
It was the Russians who turned it into a specifically "Crimean" war, because it was in the Crimea, before Sebastopol, that they chose to take their stand, and so it was in that theatre that they lost the war. Had they abandoned it, we might have transferred our main atack to Sveaborg or somewhere (see below) in which case it might now be remembered as the "Baltic War" or summat.
There was also action in Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia as well as in the White Sea and even in the Pacific where French and UK launched an attack on Petropavlovsk on the remote Kamchatka peninsula.
The Kamchatka episode pretty much sums up the whole war as it just seemed to be the waging of war for war鈥檚 sake but with no realistic strategic objective. Forces were just spread thinly all over the place and just seemed to be playing at war. 聽
Just to put the tin lid on it, Alaska, which could have been turned into the western end of Canada with the slightest of efforts, was never attacked at all. Iirc its governor was allowed to declare it neutral or something. Brilliant!
Quite apart from anything else the UK forces in the Baltic served only to earn themselves a reputation for burning defenceless Finnish villages to the ground for no good reason. The poor Finns must have wondered what destroying their livelihoods and leaving them destitute in the face of the coming Northern winter had to do with 鈥榮afeguarding the holy places in the Levant鈥.聽
Catherine Gavin did a good historical novel "The Fortress" about that side of the war. The fortress in question is Sveaborg, in Finland. -
Message 34
Posted by Hasse (U1882612) on Sunday, 5th April 2009
Mike
To my knowledge was Bomarsund on 脜land the only mayor fortess that was attacked in force in the Baltic,under the Crimean war.Sveaborg(just outside Helsinki) was heavily shelled but non whatsover attemp to take it was made.
Your friend
Hasse -
Message 35
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Sunday, 5th April 2009
Mike
To my knowledge was Bomarsund on 脜land the only mayor fortess that was attacked in force in the Baltic,under the Crimean war.Sveaborg(just outside Helsinki) was heavily shelled but non whatsover attemp to take it was made.
Your friend
Hasse 聽
Indeed - but that was because the Crimea (and in particular the neighbourhood of Sebastopol) soon emerged as the main theatre of war.
Had the Russians retreated from it, the Allies might have looked for another point of attack - perhaps in the Baltic if they can't achieve a decisive result in the Black Sea. Sveaborg was merely one possibility, mentioned because I happened to have heard of it. There may well be others. -
Message 36
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Sunday, 5th April 2009
And Russians would never present themselves as any foreign force but as "orthodox" liberators聽
How does it matter in the slightest how they present themselves?
Once the Ottomans are evicted from Europe with no prospect of coming back (as you claim would be the case) the Balkan peoples do not need the Russians any more. The Tsar has served his purpose and there is no further reason to take his side. Indeed, better for them if the British and French win, since the latter's interest is confined to the Straits (and maybe the Levant) and they have no particular interest in dominating the largely valueless Balkan Peninsula.
We may safely assume that they won't be influenced in any major way by gobbledegook about Orthodox brotherhood."Brotherhood", like "gratitude" is one of those nonsense words which may be pressed into service when one country wants something from another which it ain't in the latter's interest to give. If the Tsar wants Balkan Christians to call him "brother", the way to do this is not to destroy the Ottoman Empire, but to carefully avoid doing so. As long as they are afraid of Turkish reconquest, they will want to keep Russia in play as a counterweight to Turkey. Once Turkey is gone for good, they can tell the Tsar "Thank you and goodbye". They sinmply won't need him any more. -
Message 37
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Monday, 6th April 2009
Mike, it mattered how they presented themselves as much as it mattered how British & French presented themselves and as we have seen no-one intervened coldly but prepared well his speech. And you are 100% right in saying that there would be no 鈥渙rthodox鈥 alliance (you used the word brotherhood which I would avoid even in the case of a strong alliance!). But I did not mention it in that sense 鈥 all I mentioned is that Russian propaganda would move along that line.
It goes without saying that as soon as Christian nations would feel that the muslim threat was neutralised they would want to have the maximum degree of liberty. But back then that would hold true mainly for Greeks and no-one else. Bulgarians were a completely dormant nation. Serbs never minded Greeks, Romanians were already governed by Greeks (placed by Ottomans 鈥 and they were much preferable than Ottomans despite their also authoritarian rule, they were much more progressive) while Albanians were a small nation empowered only by the Ottomans, they would have simply not much of a choice. So if we speak in 1830 about autonomy tendencies that would be mostly on a very local scale, mostly about local vendettas. It goes without saying that this would exist.
But Russians having eaten taken the cake I am not so sure that they would be willing to give it present to anyone else. For me the whole question would be the relationship between Russians and Greeks. With millions of Greeks all over the Eastern Mediterranean, freshly empowered by the Russian intervention and positively positioned against them (something that had been shaken in the Orloff鈥檚 campaign in 1780s when Russians had let down the then Greek revolution), I do not think that Russians would give any emphasis on doing anything (like giving importance to Slavs etc.) to disappoint Greeks 鈥 unless the bulk of Greeks were really convinced by British & French to fly away from them.
Hence the whole question is the position of the Greek ruling classes, what position they would take. It goes without saying that the financially most active part of Greek nation lived in Constantinople, Black Sea coast (a lot in modern day Romania, coastal Bulgaria and north Turkey, some in Ukraine) and in Minor Asia, then the islands of the Aegean. Greeks elsewhere (Thrace, Macedonia, Epirus, Thessaly, Sterea & Peloponnese where of more localised importance). So, with Russians having liberated Constantinople and with a philo-Russian Patriarch and local leaders, I find it hard for philo-French and philo-British to be able to do something even if amply funded. Russians had a long tradition of simply crushing such opposition at birth (Borat style 鈥淚 will crush you鈥) 鈥 they had retained the 1/3 of the earth that way, they would not find it hard to do it in a Russian-friendly Constantinople. Minor Asians had similar to identical interests with Constantinopolitans 鈥 they would follow. Greek Pontians would suicide if wanting to go against Russians since that would isolate them again, let alone be 鈥渃rushed鈥 by the first random Russian fleet arriving there, they simply would not even think about it. So that let us with Greeks of European side. Thrace? Same, as Constantinople 鈥搕heir interests were bound. They would be so close to the Russian army there afterall. Macedoniia? What for? Being previously the center of the Ottoman army, they would be of the last to fight to get rid of them (and so needing Russian aid) so actually of the last to go against them anyway).
So that really leaves practically the Greeks of Peloponnese and Aegean islands (put the Italian occupied Ionian ones who would be in agitation 鈥 Italians were never positively seen, just as a better thing than Ottomans), i.e. the regions that would be first liberated.
So could British and French throw money there and do propaganda? Yes of course (in reality that is what they did anyway 鈥 they wanted a small powerless rough-summary of a state for a Greek state). But there would be a difference : the position of shipping owners, coming from the islands :
In reality these saw positive British and French since they saw Russians had let Greeks down in the Orloff鈥檚 war 鈥 but then had largely profited by using a Russian flag and passing for free the Dardanelles (due to the Ottoman-Russian Kioutchuk Kainartzee agreement following Orloff鈥檚 war). However in the case of Russia shuttering to pieces the Ottoman Empire and presenting a unified sea-space from Black sea to Eastern Mediterranean providing not only with guaranteed free access but also with the demand from them to become the main Russian commercial fleet 鈥 most of them that already had kept a Russian flag on their ships would not even bother to change it.
Hence, British and French would really have to find refuge to 1-2 disgruntled shipping families that were losing to competition and then buying as many Peloponnesian chieftains they could to fight a civil war of the likes of Peloponnesian Greeks against all the rest of Greeks. It is funny but that is what had happened anyway during Greek revolution at the 2nd year 1823 when foreigners started getting implicated (though here I am not implying directly that foreign intervention was the root-cause) with Peloponnesians fighting against Roumeliots (Greeks of the other side of the channel). Still with the Russian army present in growing numbers, with 3/4 of Greek navy on the Russian side, with 8/10 of Greek financially ruling classes with Russians and with 9/10 of Greek population more close to Russians than British and French I find things difficult for British and French. While I do not doubt their capacity to throw the seeds of division and civil war, I think that would be more of a nuisance for Russians (and Greeks, since that would be an attack against Greeks) than any real threat.
Hence, the choice would be to attack at the very first moment of Russian conquest 鈥 but while having the navy present there, they did not have the means to fight 50,000 Russians inside Constantinople, while Russians could easily throw down some 100,000 more in a matter of 1 month (British and French not) that could fight off any British/French supported counter attack (which would bring Greeks anyway to the side of Russians for good!). Or the other choice would had to be a long political war of attrition with British and French attacking all muslim areas of southern and eastern Mediterranean and luring Greeks with commercial contracts there (throwing in a lot of money), then working with other Balkan people (like Albanians, Serbians and Bulgarians) to provoke turbulence etc. That is something that would need time and money but that also supposes that Russians would sit down doing nothing to protect their biggest geostrategic achievement!
My opinion is more that British and French would simply prepare for the first WWI that would take place from Baltics to north eastern China (i.e. the threat that they had posed on Russia to let Ottomans survive). -
Message 38
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Monday, 6th April 2009
It goes without saying that as soon as Christian nations would feel that the muslim threat was neutralised they would want to have the maximum degree of liberty. But back then that would hold true mainly for Greeks and no-one else. Bulgarians were a completely dormant nation. Serbs never minded Greeks聽
Theey may not have "minded" Greeks but they showed no disposition to be ruled by them. The Principality of Serbia had existed for nearly a generation before the Greek War of Independence. Nor do "Karageorgevic" and "Obrenovic" sound like Greek names to me.
Looks to me as if the Bulgars etc, once Turkish rule was gone, would have shucked off Greek rule just as fast. My impression is that it was diffcult enough to get Serbs and Bulgars to take orders from other Serbs and Bulgars (or Greeks from other Greeks) never mind from anyone else. -
Message 39
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Monday, 6th April 2009
Mike, yes indeed. But when money would start to flow in people would talk less. And money would come from commerce and commerce moved by no-one else than Greeks. Bulgarians and Serbians would never have any aspirations in Eastern Mediterranean and hardly any (for Bulgarians) in Black Sea since they would simply be based on Greeks of the Black Sea coast.
The above is something that never occured in the course of 19th century due to the course that things took. Also note that with Russians in Constantinople we do not talk about Greeks "ruling" over Balkans. It would be more of a de-facto financial control by means of the numerous and prosperous coastal Greek communities, Bulgarians and Serbians would be masters of themselves in anyway. Greeks never expressed any will to rule over them. -
Message 40
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Monday, 6th April 2009
Mike, yes indeed. But when money would start to flow in people would talk less. And money would come from commerce and commerce moved by no-one else than Greeks. Bulgarians and Serbians would never have any aspirations in Eastern Mediterranean and hardly any (for Bulgarians) in Black Sea since they would simply be based on Greeks of the Black Sea coast.聽
But if these are the Greek shipowners you were talking about earlier, can they afford to oppose Britain? She is, after all, the 800lb gorilla of the high seas, and to side with her enemy means having their ships either seized as prizes or bottled up in port until the owners are ruined. How long does their financial influence last then?
Finally even in the very unlikely event of the Allies being successfully excluded from the Black Sea, as previously noted there's still the Baltic. If we can't get to the Crimea, or even to Costantinople we could send an expedition to Finland or Estonia, and pin down the Russian army at a point where defeat would threaten St Petersburg. The Tsar might like to have Constantinople, but not at that price. In addition, there's Austria, who can't allow Russia to take over the Balkans, as this would expose Austria's entire southeastern flank. If she comes into the war, that brings it to Russia's most sensitive spot - Poland. One way or another, The Tsar would be forced to pull back. -
Message 41
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Monday, 6th April 2009
Also, as you noted, there was a high possibility that the area would become very decentralised as the idea of people about governance would be not necessarily "nation-states" but local states serving local interests. And there, as I also said above, British and French had some space to play. However the big game was who would take aside the big influencers and there when start talking about commerce and ships, business men had more to gain from the unifying approach of Russians than the fragmentation that British and French were trying to enforce. British especially would have to promise (but to an extend also give) really a lot in exchange for co-operation. Just to give you an example, in 1920, British had done it. They were on the talks with London based Greek magnates for taking contracts in the middle east so as to convince them betray the Greeks (industrialists and high-profile merchants) of Minor Asia. At the end they gave them much of what promised ending in the Greek fleet becoming at times the largest commercial fleet coming out of a given country in the world albeit all under foreign flags (I do not think it is anymore but still it retains large numbers).
But back in 1830 neither the British nor the French had anything of value to provide to Greek magnates that were about to operate already in a very promising environment presented by Russians. British would have to talk to them about opening the Suez and letting them trade with India but such talks would be still in the sphere of fantasy. For Greeks trade with Russia would be much more attractive than any trade with British based Egypt and Saoudi Arabia. For with Russians they could have both north and south, with British they would lose the north.
A valid argument from the side of British (especially) would be that "co-operate or we throw in pirates". But Greeks with their small agile ships operated already like semi-pirates (even against each other), thus it would not be something like Spanish-galleys against pirates of the Carribean. Thus British would have to use their own navy to chase down and burn the Greek-Russian fleet... up to northern Aegean, not more than that. It goes without saying that after the first such attack, the Greek fleet would pass the Bosphore letting British roam around like pirates in the Aegean then wait till Russians (obviusly already building a fleet for roaming all Mediterranean and not only controlling the east) come down and crush the British (mostly based on a numerical superiority - British would still have the best fleet in the world).
Again with such an event we fall to the WWI happening in the 1840s since British would have to gather immense allied forces to face that danger of being completely outsted from perhaps the most sensitive part of the world (yes, plans for Suez existed from Napoleon's times - why do you think French were there?). -
Message 42
Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Monday, 6th April 2009
correction: talks about opening Suez were of course not in the sphere of fantasy (some 3 decades later it was already done!), but any talks between British and Greeks with British promising them to open their businesses to places like India would indeed be fantasy for the Greeks, thus would leave them uninterested.
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