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Fall of France 1940, Why did it happen !!

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Messages: 1 - 50 of 144
  • Message 1. 

    Posted by aussiebrit (U13851320) on Monday, 9th March 2009

    I have been reading a few books on the fall of France in 1940.
    It amazes me as to how incompetent the French high command was, the Britsh high command was not that much better.
    They had ample proof of the new tactics that the Germans used in Poland and Norway, ie airpower combined with armoured thrusts = Blitzkrieg.
    They had ample time to correct their own deficency's eg use of tanks in divisions supplied with motorized artillery and infantry.
    There own secret service had warnings of an impending attack.
    They seem to have had there heads stuck in sand !!
    Has anyone read about this topic??
    Look forward to discussing it with interested parties.

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  • Message 2

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by LeamBull (U3889658) on Monday, 9th March 2009

    To reduce the fall of France to High Command failings misses some very serious issues ... like political, defence spending, military and air strategy and doctrine, training, morale ...and lots more.

    An absolutely cracking reference to this is Alistair Horne's "To lose a battle".

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  • Message 3

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by dmatt47 (U13073434) on Monday, 9th March 2009

    Although it would have not helped much, one reason was that the Maginot Line was not built right along the Belgian border in case Belgium thought that France intended invading them. Basically, France was using First World war tactics of trench warfare whereas the Spanish Civil War showed it was not going to be like that.

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  • Message 4

    , in reply to message 3.

    Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Monday, 9th March 2009

    Do not listen to anyone about any failure of the Mazinot line (what failure? did Germans enter from there?) blietzkrieg and other such bulls'waste - do not even listen about Germans fighting with tanks ad French with artillery or Germans being offensive and French defensive or the even more ridiculous that Germans had better airplanes and cars than French (in fact till then Germans had the crappest of material, those that know know that it was by copying French material and combining with their one knowledge that permitted them those better weapons that only came out in 1943, 1944 when they had already lost the war to Russians and it was WWII game over (of course well before the Normandy invasion whose only contribution was to to keep France and West Germany out of the reach of communists).

    What if Germans enterred France from Belgium? France had all the millions of soldiers and material to both fight them inside but also send 1-1,5 million men inside Germany and wreak havoc - Germany having practically no serious defense. Would Germans destroy Paris and north France? Well, French could bring Germany back to the middle Age.

    Have you ever heard though of the word "treason"?

    We have said this repeatedly: World wars that last 1 typical financial investement cycle (4 years!!!) are not any natural wars but are guided by the international interests of internationally positioned international teams... and who cared about France or England or Germany - there we talked about who is going to govern the world, and this who is not any country of those you know.

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  • Message 5

    , in reply to message 4.

    Posted by peteratwar (U10629558) on Tuesday, 10th March 2009

    This has to be a joke right ?

    Alternatively must have strayed in from some alternate time line or parallel universe

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  • Message 6

    , in reply to message 3.

    Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Tuesday, 10th March 2009

    Although it would have not helped much, one reason was that the Maginot Line was not built right along the Belgian border in case Belgium thought that France intended invading them. Basically, France was using First World war tactics of trench warfare whereas the Spanish Civil War showed it was not going to be like that. 

    The Maginot line was never intended to surround France and make her impregnable - the French army was well equipped with aircraft and tanks for offensive warfare. In fact France had more of each of these than Germany in 1940. The French tanks often being superior to the German ones.

    When the Maginot Line was conceived, France was planning for fighting alone against a numerically superior Germany. The Line was to limit the fighting frontage so that the French army could go on the offensive in Belgium and fight a mobile war. Nobody believed it would be the trenches of 1916 - largely because they'd already moved beyond that in 1918 which saw mobile warfare using tanks and aircraft.

    What did for France was:

    i) Poor morale. Troops were badly paid and there was a school of thought that defeat would be quick and relatively painless compared to the cost of winning WW1. France lost far more men than Britain in WW1 and we still have a folk memory of that lost generation.

    ii) A good German plan. The hit were they were unexpected whilst the allies followed a guessable plan.

    iii) Poor use of equipment. The Germans had moved to the Blitzkrieg tactic whilst the allies largely parcelled out their tanks. The French airforce having been savaged in the initial attack was dispersed and effectively disappeared as a useful force.

    iv) Awful command and control by the French senior command who decided not to use telephones but send and receive orders only by courier. The Allies who were on the back foot from the start just couldn't respond quickly enough to events.

    v) British withdrawal. From a French view, this was "typical Anglo-saxon treachery". But in the situation it was the only real strategic option.

    vi) French surrender. By June 1940 the French political will collapsed.

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  • Message 7

    , in reply to message 4.

    Posted by aussiebrit (U13851320) on Tuesday, 10th March 2009

    You can not be serious with your comments, Germany had many superior weapons, tactics and military leadership, especially at the air corp and army corp and divisional level.
    Please read the book by Alistair Horne, To Lose A Battle, he writes brilliantly.
    If you disagree with his comments and conclusions, it is your prerogative, we live in a democracy, but I suggest you read Alistair Horne.

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  • Message 8

    , in reply to message 2.

    Posted by aussiebrit (U13851320) on Tuesday, 10th March 2009

    Hi Leambull
    I have read this book, it is a very good read, as a matter of fact I purchased a copy when my wife and I were in Paris in 2007 from Shakespeare Book Co , the only English bookshop in Paris, right next to the river Seine.
    I totally agree with you, it was more than High Command incompetence, the French people had such a rough time in WW1, they did not have the morale and political leadership plus all the other points you made to lead them into another frightening war.
    It is frightening as to how appeasement and various other weak excuses can lead to war.
    A line has to be drawn in the sand at some point or the whole world would be dominated by evil
    dictatorships.

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  • Message 9

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by RSS_643_IKWIG (U13662597) on Tuesday, 10th March 2009

    Tuesday. 10th March, 2009. 12:47GMT
    Re. aussiebrit
    Numbered 'points of order':
    a) When was the General Election in France during 1940. Who won it and on what 'ticket' or 'manifesto'?
    b) What was the USSR 'liasion' at DUNKIRK?

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  • Message 10

    , in reply to message 5.

    Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 10th March 2009

    peteratwar,

    This has to be a joke right ?

    Alternatively must have strayed in from some alternate time line or parallel universe 


    No, Nik posts from Greece. RSS_643_IKWIG posts from a parallel universe.

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  • Message 11

    , in reply to message 10.

    Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Wednesday, 11th March 2009

    I'm not sure his universe is even parallel . . .

    Hvae you tried Len Deighton's book 'Blitzkreig'?

    Report message11

  • Message 12

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by curiousGareth (U8383504) on Wednesday, 11th March 2009

    I had read somewhere once that the French had just completed the military infrastructure for World War 1 on the eve of World War 2. Apparently from 1919 they had spent vast sums of money and effort building networks of walled garrisons and watchtowers, only to be bombed to smithereens by the Luftwaffe.

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  • Message 13

    , in reply to message 12.

    Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Wednesday, 11th March 2009

    I will show some respect to the opinion of Cloudji who present a sober and generally valid set of arguments (I am 100% ok with it), BUT, it misses the point because it misses 1 piece of information. Treason. The one who wants to fight, fights. French leaders following "internatinal orders" simply betrayed their country. People just followed into this because it was convenient (60% of population was actually pretty much ok with Germans - you even had huge gatherings of people giving salutes to hitler and it was not the Germans telling them so).

    As simple as that. Pretty much all the countries the Germans invaded apart perhaps Poland fell by treason. France fell by treason. Jugoslavia (i.e. Serbia) due to Croatian, Bosnian and Albanian venomous treason. Greece due to British-ignited treason. Britain did everything to help Nazis stay in Greece from the very beginning till the very end where it rushed in to protect the lifes of the Nazis (that had wiped out by killing and by an imposed famine 1 million Greeks in the meanwhile) from the resistance groups that would certainly kill them all in their effort to escape (very moving this effort and very humanist!!!)...

    What are you searching? Treason is treason. It starts with a T and ends with an N.

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  • Message 14

    , in reply to message 13.

    Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Wednesday, 11th March 2009

    Britain did everything to help Nazis stay in Greece from the very beginning till the very end where it rushed in to protect the lifes of the Nazis (that had wiped out by killing and by an imposed famine 1 million Greeks in the meanwhile) from the resistance groups that would certainly kill them all in their effort to escape 

    Somewhat tendentious and mostly inaccurate. I think you have forgotten that Greece was the only country of the three (the others being Poland and Rumania) with whom treaties guaranteeing their sovereignty were signed before the war to which Britain sent military support, at great disadvantage to the strategic position in North Africa, after the Germans invaded in April 1941.

    You have also overlooked the brave sacrifices made by UK and Commonwealth forces in the Battle of Crete from May-June 1941 which, though unsuccessful, proved so costly to the Germans that they were deterred from employing large-scale airborne operations for the duration.

    As for the Civil War you are gravely mistaken if you think that the Communists were the only ones who were anti-Nazi and as Churchill said in reference to Greece:

    "Democracy is not a harlot to be picked up in the streets by anyone with a tommy-gun."

    At least British forces quit after free elections had been conducted there unlike Soviet forces who remained in those nations they had liberated for 45 years to prevent free elections taking place.

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  • Message 15

    , in reply to message 13.

    Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Thursday, 12th March 2009

    I will show some respect to the opinion of Cloudji who present a sober and generally valid set of arguments (I am 100% ok with it), BUT, it misses the point because it misses 1 piece of information. Treason. The one who wants to fight, fights. French leaders following "internatinal orders" simply betrayed their country. People just followed into this because it was convenient (60% of population was actually pretty much ok with Germans - you even had huge gatherings of people giving salutes to hitler and it was not the Germans telling them so). 

    I guess it all falls to the definition of treason.

    The military policies of the inter-war French governments were eratic, inconsistant and constantly changing with the regularly changing government. But I doubt many ministers, whatever the policy, thought they were doing other than the best for France. Yes, some put their faith in international socialism and the naive belief that peace was achievable through willing it. But is that really treason, rather than plain incompetence?

    I certainly have no doubt that Petain looked on the surrender as a minor set back from which France would bounce back given time to re-arm. Remember that he was 84 and had seen the humiliation of 1871, yet France had gone on to acquire a world empire and revenge herself on Germany in 1919. This was a man who looked to the long term. Of course with hindsight we see clearly the horror of the Vichy regime and Nazi occupation, but that is with hindsight and could France realistically fight on at that point?

    At a lower level there was activity which bordered on treason - regular strikes in factories producing war supplies aimed at undermining right wing governments and the army, even into 1940. Similar action happened in Britain with Stalinist agitators promoting the peace message. But this reflected the mood of a significant proportion of the population and didn't have the goal of gifting France to the Germans.

    One effect it had on France was to downscale the original Maginot Line plan. Under some governments spending was low and the army did see sitting in the forts and waiting it out as the only option given the poor funding levels. The line was extended as part of this ploy as a necessity (which reduced spending fuirther on the mobile army). Under more militaristic governments spending on tanks and aircraft rose and the mobile war plan looked possible again.

    As it was, had the French decided to only defend France, the German invasion plan might have struggled. The slow advance in Belgium genuinely concerned German generals as it kept those troops closer to where they planned the real action would be.

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  • Message 16

    , in reply to message 13.

    Posted by peteratwar (U10629558) on Thursday, 12th March 2009

    Well he may be Greek but I certain he must be from an alternative universe.

    What are the treasonabel instructions he talks about ?

    What is this British-ignited treason etc ?

    Report message16

  • Message 17

    , in reply to message 14.

    Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Thursday, 12th March 2009

    Re: Message 14.

    Well said Allan...as always...

    Warm regards,

    Paul.

    Report message17

  • Message 18

    , in reply to message 16.

    Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Thursday, 12th March 2009

    Re 16. Peteratwar... what do y o u know about WWII? Or do you think you know more about WWII in Balcans? I did not claim I know more about Belgium or Norway in WWII.

    Of course you ignore that Nazis enterred the Balcans only to attack Greece (and that meant passing through Jugoslavia). And Nazis wanted to attack Greece not because Greece beat Italy but when British imposed by force their "help" on unwilling Greeks (while their neutral president was dead under not so clear conditions (long before he died he was "out"). And it is only when the British started landing in Greece that Nazis felt their oilfields in Romania were threatened (within reach by a WWII bombard plane taking off from Greece) so they took their army and crossed Jugoslavia (with the colaboration of Nazi-affiliates like Croatians, Bosnians and Albanians). And the British in Greece of course not only they aided by they actually helped disorganise completely the Greek defense that could still do miracles (as proved by the 1st Nazi defeat of the WWII in Macedonia-Thrace so-called "Rupel" defense lines where they failed in front of 5,000 soldiers + 2,000 civilians of the neighbouring towns despite being 20,000 Germans and 20,000 Bulgarians (the latter better army since they were even more motivated + they had the German material). And while the 100,000 strong Greek army could just descend from Albania and sent all those 40,000 barbarians to the afterlife, the British were again there to virtually abduct half the "governing class" to Crete and from there to Egypt having sold the country to the Nazis for free... no wonder those "abducted ones" have been the governing class in Greece for the last 60 years (and still are up in power)...

    So what do you know about WWII in Balcans Mr Peter? Oh now, this is not all, there is more! Actually if you go back, even the reason that Italy attacked Greece was again Britain (as proved by British files opened some years back; in effect, British had passed the idea to Mussolini that sooner or later Greeks would attack to get Rhodes (under Italian occupation), hence Mussolini attacked prememptively. I just refer you to the Italian demand that opened the war and you will understand "they asked the neutrality" - why did they ask something like this? Greece was more neutral than pH 5,5, more neutral than that you could not have (ok if you want you can just believe that Mussolini was crazy... well he was cos he took straight all info British were feeding him...)

    No it did not finish yet! Following the treason and the occupation of Serbia and Greece, the British pretended to "aid" guerilla resistance groups. But of course not the patriotic ones. These were seen as practically the enemy by British. British actually gave ample aid to the communists. How come capitalist British aiding communists in Serbia and Greece? Obvious. To create civil war. It is blatant that in 1939 communists in Serbia and Greece were struggling to gather 1-2% of votes and after 2 years of occupation they had 35% of the population under their grip... how come? Was it the Germans aiding them? (it could be the Germans but such a thing is not known by anyone, however British aid to communists is well established: in both Serbia and Greece communists started civil wars with British guns and money). Had it not been for the civil wars during Nazi ocupation, things would look very grim for Nazis who would need to pack it up and run away or really trap down there 5 to 10 times more men.

    You should realise that the actions of the British state caused directly the death of 1 million Greeks and 1 million Serbians + put the Jewish of Greece and Jugoslavia that were decimated in the concentration camps, and for all those we might say that Germans and Croatians/muslims (in the case of Serbia) are responsible but how do you measure the criminal behaviour of Britain? Wasn't equally responsible for all those crimes? Well it was. If Greece was let free by Britain, war would had never reached there, and then even if it started, if Greece and Serbia were let alone they would had fought so effectively the Germans that they would have to trap a minimum of 500,000 men there to have any hopes to achieve effective rule and that would mean they would not be able to do anything else in other parts of Europe let alone Russia where even the 2 million they sent were not enough... those 2 million dead could have been avoided if not for the criminal behaviour of Britain.

    Note that what I am saying was known even by top British military people who were not of course involved in that crime and who were wondering why did Britain react like that in the Balkans and how did they end up giving the area as a present to Nazis.

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  • Message 19

    , in reply to message 15.

    Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Thursday, 12th March 2009

    Re: Message 15.

    cloudyj,

    nice survey but it was more complex than that.

    As someone who "did" the last three months "Pétain" on a French messageboard together with three others trying to convince a "Pétainist", who has written a book to "rehabilitate" Pétain I think I already know something about him. The "Pétainist" was not convinced. You could as well argue with a wall of bricks. Someone mentioned the same in the thread here on these boards about the "Holocaust deniers". You can argue with them till you see blue without throwing them even out off balance.

    I started here on the boards a thread: "Defending the French in their defeat 1940" I will try to seek it back.

    Not sure if the myth of the "socialist strikes", who "murdered" the French war effort wasn't under Léon Blum, but I will try to find it out. I rather think, but I am not sure, that it were the right-wing pacifists, who torpedoed the "Blitzkrieg" theories from the father of the French tank and the coordinated "Blitzkrieg" tactic as later used by Guderian. Later de Gaulle considered him as his mentor, when writing his "Pour une armée de métier" (For an army of professionals) (or something like that, will seek the correct title). And in that torpedoing was Pétain the key figure.

    France had gone on to acquire a world empire and revenge herself on Germany in 1919 

    cloudyj, I am used to the "stuff" of Nikolaos, but that is not worth of you.

    "revenge". Yes ask compensations for the whole North of France devastated by four years of German bombardements. In Germany there was no devastation. And it is perhaps a bit old fashioned, but it was Germany, who declared war on France in 1914. I mentioned somewhere in the many threads about Germany's guilt on these boards the timetable of the declarations of war. Allan will I think still remember it. Yes and Wilson didn't help with the French. Instead Britain and France had to repay their loans althought they didn't receive anything anymore from Germany (I think under another American president).

    Second of last paragraph: I think the Maginot line was really the mood of the French: defending their ground and not attacking as the Hitler regime, who worked in five shifts in the arms industry obliged by the "corporatist/fascist dictatorship and continuously indoctrinating their people for attack and conquest. And it is a bit contradictory that it was just the Socialist Léon Blum, who did the most for the readyness of the army and was called a "hawk" together with Mandel. Of course the "Pétainists" say: It is easy as both are "Jews"...But I will all seek it back.

    Last paragraph: They only defended France. Of course and that together with the "Blitzkrieg" tactic, if they weren't lurred by the Germans to believe in the extended "von Schlieffen plan" instead the real "Fall Gelb" with the main offensive through the Ardennes, the story could have turned out otherwise (I emphasize "otherwise"). And believe it or not there were even then a critical "24 hours" in which the whole offensive could have collapsed.

    Even Hitler didn't trust the whole "percée" to Dunkirk: hence the "Haltbefehl", if it wasn't to please the "pacifists" in Britain to turn the negociations in their advantage. I read already a discussion of more than 400 messages about that "Haltbefehl".

    About fighting further from their empire as proposed by Reynaud, Blum and Mandel. There is an "alternative history" in a French/Belgian/American/British/Russian messageboard I mentioned already on this board too, which starts at 15 June 1940 with Pétain out of service and France fighting further from their colonies. In fact in real history Pétain and Laval torpedoed the transfer from the French "assemblée" to Algiers with the "Massilia".

    Warm regards,

    Paul.

    Report message19

  • Message 20

    , in reply to message 18.

    Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Thursday, 12th March 2009

    So you dear peteratwar I see you are worried since reality spoils the sauce they fed you as history at school. Do not worry, history is a thing, reality and truth another thing. Someday you might realise this and see things differently.

    Report message20

  • Message 21

    , in reply to message 18.

    Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Thursday, 12th March 2009

    Re: Message 18.

    Nikolaos,

    I agree you are the insider, but all these stories are very complex. In Belgium for instance you had in the beginning a right-wing resistance around Leopold III, who was at odds with the Belgian government in London. Gradually as the leaders were murdered by the Nazis, the lower "echelons" turned more to the Belgian government based in London and so received more help. But one of the more effective ones were the Communists led from Moscow, but nevertheless they recieved also help from London. The same in France where there was even a wider gap between Pétainists/Vichyists and the Free French. Jean Moulin was murdered by the Nazis when trying to coordinate the different resistance groups in France among others the Communists.

    Yes, London helped whoever tried to resist the Nazis and from 1941 they were working together with everyone who resisted to the Germans, be it Nationalists as the Polish government in exile or Communists or other groups.

    As for, if it was a good thing to attract the Germans in Greece or as you say to lurr Mussolini to attack Greece, it is up to the historians to seek for what happened. If without the English there would have been bound more Germans in Greece is also a question for the historians. But I think their strategy (the British one) at that given moment was dictated by the circumstances they saw as necessary on the larger map of Southern Europe. There was a war on for survival and if they were wrong in hindsight I think they did the logical actions as perceived by them at that very moment.

    I was nearly killed one year old by an American?/British? bomb in 1944 in an action to liberate our country from the Nazi yoke and I don't blame the Americans/ British for that.

    Warm regards,

    Paul.

    PS: And in our governments after WWII there were after a while also former "collaborators".

    Report message21

  • Message 22

    , in reply to message 6.

    Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Thursday, 12th March 2009

    Re: Message 6.

    cloudyj,

    that's better.

    Warm regards,

    Paul.

    Report message22

  • Message 23

    , in reply to message 19.

    Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Thursday, 12th March 2009

    Paul,

    Paul,

    Yes, French inter-war politics was far more complex than my brief summary. And each group had its own version of what was best for France. The atmosphere of confusion, lack of consistant leadership and constant changes in policy did as much harm as any single group trying to undermine the rival government. It's an area which deserves its own thread.

    On the subject of revenge, perhaps I used the wrong word. What I was thinking was: Alsace & Lorraine were regained, French honour and miltary primacy were re-established and the main european rival forced into a non-threatening second place. The French position at Versailles was to protect France from Germany for the future. Though I'm sure that many French (and British) soldiers were happy to see any harsh conditions placed on the Germans in revenge for what they'd had to go through.

    Report message23

  • Message 24

    , in reply to message 23.

    Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Thursday, 12th March 2009

    Re: Message 23.

    cloudyj,

    thank you very much for your reply. Yes I understand what you mean.

    I have prepared some review of all what we said about this question on the boards. If I have luck you will see it in some minutes smiley - smiley.

    Warm regards,

    Paul.

    Report message24

  • Message 25

    , in reply to message 24.

    Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Thursday, 12th March 2009

    Addendum to message 24.

    As about WWI which is also mentioned in this thread:
    Origin of First World War

    French failings in 1939/40

    Could France have been saved?

    France decides to fight further 18 June'40.

    May the 10th1940.what if?

    In my message 8 of the last thread I mentioned my thread "Defending the French in their 1940 defeat?" and the related items are in the thread: "German invasion of Poland" also in message 8.

    Warm regards to all,

    Paul.

    Report message25

  • Message 26

    , in reply to message 23.

    Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Thursday, 12th March 2009

    Paul you know I am sticking always to my "impressionist" writting style. But in the end, what I pass is the idea that it was not black and white but an endless grey situation.

    Far from the understandable example of the bomb that fell next to your house (and luckily none of you got hurt) where we cannot accuse directly, what happened in the Balkans was a pre-orchestrated crime. For us (Greeks? Serbians? whoever else that lost out of that situation), while Germans were the enemy, what can be said about British? They were as criminals as them. Same. No difference. Nazis. Worse than Nazis in the sense that they organised the crime and let the other finish it. Like the unfaithful woman (Britain) that invites her lover (Germany) to kill her husband (Greece). And us accusing only the lover, while the unfaithful wife gets away with it...

    Of course they had their games. But it was not merely strategic/military games. And that is why I never accused the military leadership of Britain. All these cannot be seen as any Montgomery's fault or machination, in fact all those British generals actually were puzzled with all what was going on behind them and with the strange orders that came from London - ex. in the case of Greece, take army from Egypt that was threatened directly by Rommel coming from Libya and send it to Greece, a country that was neutral, that never asked for help, that did not show any weakness to need any help, that had shorted out nicely the Italian invasion, and which was not threatened by Germans unless it allied with Britain letting in British troops, thus making Germans feeling threatened in their oilfields of Romania (main supplier to German army). Naturally British military leaders could not comprehend that move, however Churchill and all british diplomats and agents were crying out on this "Greece will fight on our side either it wants it or not"! And like that it happened, then 1 treason after the other, then suddenly communists jump up, then civil war and so on... 1 million dead in a country of 7 million people (it is the equivalent of this year dying 5 million French in France and next year another 6 millions), just to get the picture of the catastrophe.

    So when British (mainly ANZAC) army was sent to Greece to fight they thought they would aid there, they would not have any idea that they were sent to play another more nasty role, that of betrayal. And it is true that towards they end may of them, those last that left Crete to Germans were really ashamed and had been accusing one another for failing to defend the island (which was 100% defendable - come one, if Malta was defendable in the middle of nowhere, a huge island like Crete, so easy to defend (piece of cake), should have been defended. It is "commonly known secret" among Cretans that all that "British organisation" fell in one day during the battle of Crete for no apparent reason, leaving space for the Nazis to enter. It was not the fault of British/ANZAC troops. It was orders from above, it was well into the plan.

    So when I "accuse" (and I am not even accusing, I am stating just the bitter reality) I am not refering to the army but to diplomats and decision makers, Churdhill included (who however was not necessarily always the main decision maker on all things - in the case of Greece he certainly "followed orders from above" - as usual in this region most British governments seemed to "follow orders from above", saying 1 thing and doing the other).

    Report message26

  • Message 27

    , in reply to message 26.

    Posted by VF (U5759986) on Thursday, 12th March 2009

    if Malta was defendable in the middle of nowhere, a huge island like Crete, so easy to defend (piece of cake), should have been defended. 



    Come on E_Nikolaos_E,smiley - smiley

    Crete cost the Germans dearly.They never attempted another large scale air assault due to their losses.The British effectively were fighting on foreign soil.Malta had been a British possession for a long time,had infastructure for defence (Valetta had been a RN naval base for years) in place and had long standing defences.With Crete you have a knocked about British and Commonwealth army trying to hold off a determined German assault from an enemy which has roundly defeated them on the mainland.

    The other reason Malta would have been a difficult proposition is that the British wouldnt have given it up without one hell of a fight.When the British Army needed evacuating from Crete the RN took horrendous losses,but as Cunningham said:

    "It takes 3 years to build a ship and 300 years to build a tradition".


    For us (Greeks? Serbians? whoever else that lost out of that situation), while Germans were the enemy, what can be said about British? They were as criminals as them. Same. No difference. Nazis. Worse than Nazis in the sense that they organised the crime and let the other finish it. 

    Quite frankly that is the most bigotted,racist language Ive seen on these boards.You make Buckskins (god bless him) look like a Liberal with that statement and appears to be more a reflection of your political views than historical fact.Im British,for you to even compare my countrys actions to those of Nazi Germany is quite frankly abhorrent.This country has a lot to be ashamed of no doubt.Nazi's however we are not.


    Vf

    Report message27

  • Message 28

    , in reply to message 26.

    Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Friday, 13th March 2009

    Like the unfaithful woman (Britain) that invites her lover (Germany) to kill her husband (Greece). And us accusing only the lover, while the unfaithful wife gets away with it...  

    Nik, are you seriously suggesting that Britain, whilst at war with Germany connived with the enemy (Germany) just so that we could stitch up Greece? Not only that, a plan to put Germany in a better position and Britain in a worse position? Lost 15,000 commonwealth men just so we could hurt the Greeks? Threw away a winnning position in North Africa for no military purpose other than to gift your country to the enemy?

    Sure Britian encouraged Greece into the war and, yes, it went pear shaped and Greece suffered badly. But your idea that that was the British plan done to spite the Greeks is nationalist paranoia gone mad. I mean for one thing what on earth could Britain gain from Greece falling?

    Report message28

  • Message 29

    , in reply to message 27.

    Posted by cloudyj (U1773646) on Friday, 13th March 2009

    Crete cost the Germans dearly.They never attempted another large scale air assault due to their losses.The British effectively were fighting on foreign soil.Malta had been a British possession for a long time,had infastructure for defence (Valetta had been a RN naval base for years) in place and had long standing defences.With Crete you have a knocked about British and Commonwealth army trying to hold off a determined German assault from an enemy which has roundly defeated them on the mainland. 

    With due respect to the Commonwealth and Greek soldiers who defended Crete, the high command really screwed it up. Freyberg made very poor use of the ultra intelligence and was convinced that the airdrops were a mere diversion prior to a seabourne invasion. Slow responses to the attacks allowed the Germans the breathing space to concentrate and eventually overpower garrisons which largely failed to co-operate.

    Report message29

  • Message 30

    , in reply to message 26.

    Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Friday, 13th March 2009

    Multiple inaccuracies in Nikalaos' post. Firstly there were slightly more British troops fighting on Crete than there were Australians and New Zealanders as this shows:



    and the British garrison in Greece was reinforced by Australian and New Zealand divisons after Greece had been attacked by Germany in April 1941. The ANZAC appellation was dropped after the withdrawal from Greece (the Australians and New Zealanders only fought in integrated units in the Vietnam War):



    It was Mussolini who "lured" Greece into war not the British by invading in October 1940 without even bothering to consult his ally and partner-in-crime, Hitler. The Chamberlain Government had entered into a solemn treaty obligation to defend Greece in the event of an attack and Churchill realised that Britain was duty bound to come to Greece's aid not least because of what the deleterious effects might be of non-compliance especially in the United States from whom Churchill was still desperately seeking military and economic aid as he set out in his famous "Westward Look, the Land is Bright!" radio address of 27 pril 1941:

    "In their mortal peril the Greeks turned to us for succour. Strained as were our resources we could not say them nay. By solemn guarantee, given before the war, Great Britain had promised them her help. They declared they would fight for their native soil even if neither of their neighbours made common cause with them and even if we left them to their fate.


    But we could not do that. There are rules against that kind of thing and to break those rules would be fatal to the honour of the British Empire, without which we could neither hope nor deserve to win this hard war. Military defeat or miscalculation can be remedied. The fortunes of war are fickle and changing. But an act of shame would deprive us of the respect which we now enjoy throughout the world and thus would sap the vitals of our strength. During the last year we have gained by our bearing and conduct a potent hold upon the sentiments of the people of the United States. Never, never in our long history have we been held in such admiration and regard across the Atlantic Ocean."

    To claim Britain "lured" Greece into war is as fatuous as claiming Britain "lured" Belgium into war in either 1914 or 1940. Also Hitler ordered the attack on Greece in support of Mussolini's forces on 4 November 1940 after Britain had garrisoned Crete and Lemnos as this shows:



    Consequently the decision had been made long before the overthrow of the pro-Nazi government in Belgrade in April 1941 and did not cause Hitler to postpone the invasion of the Soviet Union for 6 weeks (nor divert any of his troops from that operation) nor was it defensive in character designed to protect his Rumanian oil supplies as Hitler apologists sometimes argue.

    It was an offensive move designed to reduce the British position in the Mediterranean. Just as Hitler ordered the invasion of Norway and Denmark in December 1939 long before the British War Cabinet had come to any definitive decision about mining Norwegian coastal waters to interrupt Hitler's Swedish iron ore supplies. Hitler was prompted if anything by Stalin's attack on Finland. As in that case events are often transposed to give a cause and effect that is quite at variance with reality that gives the appearance of Hitler as some kind of rationalist reacting to the unreasonable pressures to which he was subject rather than as the principal author of the destruction to which he himself subjected Europe for almost 6 years.


    Report message30

  • Message 31

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by Hasse (U1882612) on Friday, 13th March 2009

    Aussiebritt

    About the fall of France you can talk of treason reluctance by the French and GB goverment to came to grips with the German.Or that the Germans had more and better equipment,wich is a myth since it was quite the reverse.

    On the battlefield can you compress it to one sentence why France lost.

    The Germans had better tactics,better coordination between the service branches and higher morale.


    Hasse

    Report message31

  • Message 32

    , in reply to message 31.

    Posted by VF (U5759986) on Friday, 13th March 2009

    About the fall of France you can talk of treason reluctance by the French and GB goverment to came to grips with the German.Or that the Germans had more and better equipment,wich is a myth since it was quite the reverse. 

    I agree with you Hasse,I was always under the impression that both the British and French had some fine equipement.What differed was the doctrine that each side applied their use.The British I believe used tanks for instance in "penny packets" as infantry support whereas the Germans used them on masse.That and the Allies seemed to expect 1918 part II smiley - smiley


    Vf

    Report message32

  • Message 33

    , in reply to message 32.

    Posted by peteratwar (U10629558) on Friday, 13th March 2009

    One problem I have noted with Nik is that he has not provided one single item of evidence for any of his wild and weird allegations. All these higher intelligences etc. One of the weirdest conspiracy theories I have heard.

    Perhaps I should tell him I lived through WWII and studied it extensively since!

    Report message33

  • Message 34

    , in reply to message 15.

    Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Friday, 13th March 2009

    cloudyj,

    I certainly have no doubt that Petain looked on the surrender as a minor set back from which France would bounce back given time to re-arm. Remember that he was 84 and had seen the humiliation of 1871, yet France had gone on to acquire a world empire and revenge herself on Germany in 1919. This was a man who looked to the long term. Of course with hindsight we see clearly the horror of the Vichy regime and Nazi occupation, but that is with hindsight and could France realistically fight on at that point? 

    That the French government didn't move to Marseilles or Algiers and carry on the fight from there has always been a mystery to me.

    Report message34

  • Message 35

    , in reply to message 34.

    Posted by peteratwar (U10629558) on Friday, 13th March 2009

    There was no collective will, determination nor leadership left at that point. French resolve had hit the bottom, added to the fact that their experts gave nothing for Britain's chances of surviving much longer. It took a year or two to recover.

    Report message35

  • Message 36

    , in reply to message 27.

    Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Friday, 13th March 2009

    Re 27. VirtualF... where did you see bigotry. So all these millions that speak bad of Nazis are bigots (including yourself probably)?

    Perhaps assuming one's crimes is not so easy, it is more easy accusing the other of bigotry.... it strikes me that those Turkish reply in exactly the same way like you did (exactly the same words), when Armenians, Greeks, Assyrochaldeans talk about the millions of slaughtered in Minor Asia.

    VirtualF what I say can be easily proved. You do not have to search a lot. It is just that you (and most people) do not even want to know. Britain was as Nazi as Germany, no difference. I am sorry, but reality is this. If you do not want to face it it is your problem.

    Report message36

  • Message 37

    , in reply to message 36.

    Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Friday, 13th March 2009

    Peteratwar, what piece of evidence you need?

    Want to start from Mussolini's demand before hearing the "no" and thus declaring war? Did you know what he demanded? Once you find it come here and explain it to me... just tell me your own view on it.

    Want also to know how later British forced their help on Greeks? Read about it and come here to explain it to me how on earth British "sacrificed" their needs in Egypt to "help" a neutral country that not only did not need their help, but whose military leadership openly pleading them to stay out and whose president Metaxas ridiculed them by saying "either send 100,000 men all your ships and planes you have there or better send nothing" - next thing he does is to die from what was declared later as "medical error".... you make your own judgement out of that.

    Go read then why British gave as much aid as they could to largely marginal before the war communist parties in Greece as well as in Serbia isolating the real patriotic movements?

    Want to read how British intervened to protect the lifes of Nazis and aid them in their departure when nobody had asked them to do so? Why did they need to enter Greece after the end of the WWII? Why did they have to protect the Nazis there? Why did they care so much? And was it accidental that civil war started instantly?


    At the end...
    What do you really know? Or what is exactly what you do not want to know?

    Report message37

  • Message 38

    , in reply to message 36.

    This posting has been hidden during moderation because it broke the in some way.

  • Message 39

    , in reply to message 34.

    Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Friday, 13th March 2009

    WC

    "That the French government didn't move to Marseilles or Algiers and carry on the fight from there has always been a mystery to me."

    You've said this before. And, as has been pointed out before (on this thread as well), the French Government could see only a future of massive destruction of France, for the second time in twenty-five years and a very real chance of failure. Britain could not provide all the support necessary to stave off defeat - in June 1940 the British Army could barely reconstitute its own forces, let alone replace the French forces lost in Northern France.

    The only source of enough financial and material support was the United States, and the French Government knew that, in an election year, whatever Roosevelt's own inclinations, he would not take the USA into a war (a lesson learned in 1916). They did appeal to Roosevelt before surrendering; they asked only for a declaration of war and material support, not a US Army immediately despatched to France. They didn't get it, and surrendered.

    Report message39

  • Message 40

    , in reply to message 39.

    Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Friday, 13th March 2009

    Re: Message 39 and 34.

    Lostweekend,

    did the whole evening research to answer to White Camry about the same question.

    In esssence you are right and that was what a lot of French thought these days between 10 June and 15 June 1940. But the general trend of the Government was to retreat to North Africa and only make a "cessez-le-feu" (halt of fire). I use the French word, because we have already had pages of discussions as about the difference with "capitulation" and "armistice" and "cessez-le-feu". I will seek the discussion back for the right terminology.

    With a "cessez-feu" they could make an halt in metropolitan France and continue from AFN (North-Africa). The same as the Dutch government in exile had done in May 1940.

    But all this was torpedoed by the proposition of Camille Chautemps to ask for conditions for an armistice. So he played in the hands of the military duo Pétain/Weygand. Then came on the 16 June the proposal of the French/British Union from Monet/de Gaulle/Churchill backed by the cabinet. But it was ridiculized by Chautemps and Mandel was so uncautious to make reproches to the Pétainists as if they didn't want to fight anymore. Also the mistress of Reynaud, Madame de Portes intervened as to defend Pétain and his attitudes.

    Paul Reynaud had a strong responsibility when he resigned. Even the President Le Brun was still hesitating as the two preisidents of the Chambers and the Senate. When he had stayed strong he could have turned the tide from what I read, but he seemingly had a nervous break-down and let his friends of the continuation of the war from AFN in the cold, leaving the field free for Pétain, who had already when asked that very moment a list of his new cabinet in his pocket and read it immediately to President Le Brun.

    But yes as in Belgium when Leopold III capitulated most of the population acclaimed Pétain as the saviour that very moment.

    Read this evening an interesting study from an American about the role of the military, who had a grip on the politicians that only ended when de Gaulle stood firm against the military putsh of the military of Algeria.

    Will continue tomorrow. Had just a "videoconference" on a free skype net with the grandson in Kopenhagen (there for teaching practice) and so time was fleeing...

    Warm regards,

    Paul.

    Report message40

  • Message 41

    , in reply to message 19.

    Posted by Tas (U11050591) on Saturday, 14th March 2009

    I will try to put it in a few words:-

    Any high command has a lot vested in old ideas, in the way things have always been done. That is how they became four-star generals, because of their seniority not because of anything dynamic that they did. So were the top French and British generals.

    In Germany, Hitler was an outsider, not beholden for his power to the German high command. He experimented with his new innovative Generals, people like Guderian, Von Manstein, Rommel, who had absorbed the thinking of the brilliant British Captain Liddell Hart. They had tried these ideas in Spain and then in Poland. The French and the Brits had no answer to the rapid pace at which the Germans advanced into France.

    If they had been able to stop that advance anywhere, thy might have recuperated and brought in new talent to their high command, but perhaps even that would not have stopped the German machine at that time.

    Tas

    Report message41

  • Message 42

    , in reply to message 40.

    Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Saturday, 14th March 2009

    Paul R

    Interesting analysis, thank you.

    I think the other factor often overlooked, is the fear of the French establishment of a communist-led government seizing power. I think it gets overlooked in US studies because of the tendency that side of the Atlantic to regard socialists and communists as the same thing (this comment is not aimed at any posters here - it is a general observation about US historical approaches).

    This was a perennial concern, particularly with the military. In 1870, General Barzaine chose to remain locked up in Metz rather than risk another sortie against the Prussians in large part because he felt he needed to keep his army - the largest part of France's field forces - intact to put down the almost inevitable left-wing uprising that would follow the war. Indeed, the Army moved very fast to crush the new Commune in Paris once the Germans withdrew.

    Cheers

    LW

    Report message42

  • Message 43

    , in reply to message 42.

    Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Saturday, 14th March 2009

    The Communist Party had been marginalised since the collapse of the Blum Popular Government in 1937 in which it was both a participant and, through its policy of industrial militancy, the chief destroyer. It had been further sidelined by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939 and did nothing to make life difficult for the German occupiers until the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.

    To look at the real reasons for the defeatism both within the political and military establishment but also within the wider nexus of public opinion you must consider the widespread disenchantment with the Third Republic and with democratic constitutionalism generally in all quarters that had set in since the end of WWI and the rise of the radical right that looked to Germany and Italy as its templates and which staged the Stavisky Riots in 1934 as an abortive attempt to overthrow the gocvernment.

    Unlike the radical rightists of the past such as Napoleon III or General Boulanger the French Right of this period was essentially anti-nationalist and looked abroad for its role models - hence the expression "Better Hitler than Leon Blum" - rather than emphasising the nation-state above all other social or economic ties. June 1940 represents a belated victory for the Stavisky Rioters.

    Report message43

  • Message 44

    , in reply to message 41.

    Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Saturday, 14th March 2009

    Re: Message 41.

    Dear Tas,

    "Guderian absorbed the thinking of the brilliant British captain Liddell Hart..."
    But also the thinking of the French general Estienne, father of the French tank strategy countered by the French army, especially Pétain.

    David Lehmann is a Frenchman and an expert in tank warfare. He writes in American English. (At least I think smiley - smiley)

    You are right about the new young innovative German generals, but in Germany they seem to have listen more to them than in France.

    Dear Tas, everybody including our local expert-strategist Hasse agrees on German tactics as being the main cause of the allied defeat, but you had also the not expected breakthrough at the Ardennes, with the "fine fleur" of the German concentrated tank divisions assisted by the airforce in close air support.

    To let you understand that it wasn't so "predictable" as some historians assume some "What if"s that I posted overhere and on a French messageboard:


    Also a "What if" on a French messageboard. Nobody answered. I think there are not enough "experts" overthere.
    14 June 2007 22h00 I translate:
    "Invasion selon le plan von Schlieffen adapté" (Invasion according to the adapted von Schlieffen plan"
    What if the plans of the invasion had not fallen in the hands of the allies January the 10th 1940 at Maasmechelen and there was no delay due to the bad weather and the German attack had started as foreseen on 17 January following the original plans of the so called "adapted von Schlieffen plan?"

    No emphasis in the Ardennes as Guderian later persuaded Hitler...

    BTW: The German generals weren't that better than their allied counterparts as they tried to deplace Guderian to Poland (or was it Manstein?) to avoid contact with Hitler about his "odd" ideas.

    Warm regards from your old(old in the figurative sense smiley - smiley) friend,

    Paul.

    Report message44

  • Message 45

    , in reply to message 43.

    Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Saturday, 14th March 2009

    Re: Message 43.

    Allan,

    you are absolutely right, but it was also a general tendency I think in the Netherlands and Belgium. I know better Belgium and I think the situation during the interbellum (in between the wars) wasn't that much different from France, although it can be that the right wing was stronger in France than in Belgium.


    You have to read once "The fall of the Third Republic" by William Shirer...I plan to read it once for the third time. It can also be in another book that I read that Pétain was more concerned with the "civilian" stability of France fearing for a "communist" take-over in June 1940 than with the German invasion. Some one at a meeting "in Bordeaux?" said that Paris was taken over by Communists. Mandel had the presence of mind to call the head of the Paris police and he could say that in Paris all was quiet and that it was a false alarm (propably imagined and launched by the right wing behind Pétain). I read it already in different books. I will seek for a quote.

    Warm regards and with esteem as always,

    Paul.

    Report message45

  • Message 46

    , in reply to message 36.

    Posted by VF (U5759986) on Saturday, 14th March 2009

    VirtualF what I say can be easily proved. You do not have to search a lot. It is just that you (and most people) do not even want to know. Britain was as Nazi as Germany, no difference. I am sorry, but reality is this. If you do not want to face it it is your problem 


    Im not going to do your work E_Nikolaos_E.You made the claim.You back it up.


    where did you see bigotry 

    Well lets say I dont like my grandfathers generation being compared to Nazi's.You have (a very obvious) axe to grind.Maybe you prefer communisism with a hint of democracy.

    If you do not want to face it it is your problem 

    smiley - laugh

    Yeah ok.You are absolutely right,I stand corrected in front of your comic genius!No really,how can I stand in the way of your work smiley - laugh


    smiley - laugh
    smiley - laugh
    smiley - laugh
    Stop it,Ive been chastised enough!

    smiley - laugh
    smiley - laugh
    smiley - laugh

    VF


    Report message46

  • Message 47

    , in reply to message 40.

    Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Saturday, 14th March 2009

    Addendum to message 40 and re: message 42.

    About the story of the Massilia and the planned move of the Government and Assemblée to Algiers read the following:


    The best I found is in the online book of John M. Sherwood 1970: "Georges Mandel and the Third Republic" I don't know this book but the particular episode I will mention about the Massilia is right I think because I read the same in many French "honest" sources.
    Put in Google: "georges mandel and the third republic" and it is the first window first entry. Scroll down to page 256. From there on starts the story of the Massilia.

    It is still a controversial point among French and other historians as witnesses convicted as "collaborators" after WWII in a "commission for the events in France from 1933 till 1945" or something like that, were perhaps lying about there role in the events. There seems to be an offical catalogue about this commission and I tried to consult it but it is not that easy. I think you have to prove that you are at a university project or so. I know a French insider but he is too busy with his own affairs to help me.





    Mods all the links are in English.

    I read on a forum a full coverage of the events of 15 June and 16 June 1940 in the French government in Bordeaux nearly hour after hour. And it coincides with all what I learned and read in honest! sources but sadly it is in French and it is too long to translate on this board and BTW I have no time enough for that. I put it in my favourites if I need it further in this discussion.

    Warm regards,

    Paul.

    PS: Re: Message 42. LW I think Allan covered most of what I wanted to say. See also my message to him.

    Report message47

  • Message 48

    , in reply to message 47.

    Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Saturday, 14th March 2009

    Addendum to message 57.

    about the "Massilia controversy" I found before:
    "The Massilia Affair" by Richard J. Champoux:

    The nearest source to have access to Jstor seems to be the Europa College in Bruges or the University of Ghent and perhaps I have to be a student overthere?
    I put in Google: "r champoux massilia affair" and came conincidentally to my own message again in the French "Tribune Histoire" smiley - smiley ...
    See first window fourth entry...if you understand French...

    Warm regards,

    Paul.

    Report message48

  • Message 49

    , in reply to message 43.

    Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 15th March 2009

    Allan

    Nonetheless, there were those in the French government who worried about it. To that mindset, it seemed that having been forced out of government, the Communists were more likely to take extra-parliamentary action.

    The Army in particular was worried about communist subversion in the ranks, and these concerns had transferred themselves into the assessments the British Army made of its ally.

    Alan Brooke's observations of the French army in the Phoney War period are quite telling. He was a Francophone (it was his first language) and well acquainted with France. Spears also picked up on this, and Spears had carefully maintained his links with French figures in the inter-war period.

    I agree that the situation in 1940 was not the same as 1870, but the concerns were still there.

    The desire not to suffer more devastation and another generation of dead were more important factors, of course.

    Report message49

  • Message 50

    , in reply to message 49.

    Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 15th March 2009

    Yes, men like Weygand and Pétain seem to have been genuinely worried about the possibility of a left-wing coup. However, in the case of Petain this may have been a justification for what was, in effect, a coup staged by himself. Some historians have remarked on the irony: The politicians of the Third Republic had always been worried about the political influence of the more conservative generals, fearing that one day a victorious general, like a second Napoleon, would grab power. Instead, the Republic finally met its end at the hands of defeated generals... and rather than being driven out with fixed bajonets, the parliament itself voted to end the Republic.

    Of course Pétain was not in active service in May 1940, but his responsibility for the defeat was nevertheless great. His influence in the pre-war years had been enormous, and he at least shared the responsibility for the army's obsolete doctrine, sluggish procedures and partially obsolescent armament. In the pre-war debate on military doctrine between the reformers -- such as his former protégé and ghostwriter Charles De Gaulle -- and the conservatives, Pétain had firmly chosen the side of the conservatives. People who had argued, even in early 1940, that France had nothing to worry about.

    The attitudes of many of those who sought an armistice, were certainly influenced by their ideological sympathy for the regimes of Hitler and Mussolini. That is not to say that they were not, in their own way, French patriots; Pétain was not pro-German. But if Hitler had been a communist, Pétain and Weygand would probably have chosen to continue the war, regardless of how bad the situation was. As it was, the defeat seemed an opportunity to install a right-wing nationalist dictatorship that was more of their liking than the forever unstable Third Republic.

    But it also presented an opportunity to rewrite history and absolve the generals from the blame for the shattering defeat. The Vichy regime did its best to blame everyone else, even going as far as staging a show trial of Léon Blum --- which spectacularly backfired when Blum managed to highlight his own efforts to rebuild France's defences and the failings of the French military commanders. Nevertheless, the Vichy regime managed to a large extent to rewrite the historical record.

    It is true that the generals were not solely to blame. Although the danger across the Rhine had been recognized early, and French re-armament had started shortly after Hitler came to power, France simply did not have the economic power to rival Germany in the production of armaments. It was further handicapped by the legacy of the 1920s when, trying to reconcile small budgets with the need to keep the war industries alive, a kind of industrial welfare policy had been adopted. This resulted in small orders being parcelled out among many suppliers. The result was a fragmented and obsolete industry which failed to meet the demands of the rearmament effort when the need arose. The reorganization and partial nationalisation of the arms industry in 1936 was a case of too little, too late. It would have taken several more years to overtake Germany, and armament orders placed in the USA were also months or years away from being delivered. French leaders in 1939-1940 therefore chose to adopt the waiting attitude of the "phony war", correctly estimating that time was on their side.

    However, that time was very badly used. The French military leaders of 1940 had a case if they argued that France had not provided them with an army strong enough to win the war. Yet the nation had made an enormous effort, and the generals had an army that was in some respects superior to the opposing force, even if the Germans had the advantage in raw numbers. But instead of making the best of it, they seriously neglected it. They did not use the opportunity to learn from German successes in Poland and modify their doctrine. They did not provide their troops with the necessary activity and training, instead allowing a boredom which did nothing for morale or battle-readiness. They failed to critically review their army's vulnerable deployment and weak command structure. Most mind-boggling of all, they opted for the combination of waiting to be attacked, and pre-committing all their mobile reserves to an advance into Belgium. That made no sense whatsoever.

    In the end, the defeat of 1940 was primarily a military defeat. What turned a military defeat into a political defeat was, besides the attitudes of the political and military leadership, the structural weakness of the French empire. French North Africa was no Canada: Within easy reach of the enemy, it lacked the industry to support a war machine. The French empire had been purely exploitative, and its colonies were dependencies and not powerhouses. With the real industrial and economic centres in German hands, the means to defend the rest were lacking.

    With hindsight, it was probably an error on Hitler's part to accept the request for an armistice. The German strategic position would have been better if they had occupied France entirely, including the Mediterranean coastline and the North-African coastline. There was little to prevent it, and it would have turned the Mediterranean into an Axis-controlled sea, perhaps even pulling Spain and Turkey in the war on the Axis side.

    Report message50

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