Wars and ConflictsΒ permalink
Peace in 1916
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Message 1.Β
Posted by Lee (U8097024) on Friday, 2nd January 2009
A few words that were in a book I was reading recently," German peace overtures were rejected in 1916".Any one have any info about what was offered etc?
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Message 2
Posted by -frederik- (U13721647) on Friday, 2nd January 2009
I have no knowledge of this precise event, but I would like to say this: In 1916, Germany still had a good chance of winning the war. The peace they offered did (most likely) not include a retreat of German forces. In fact I would be surprised if they would have proposed a status quo. I think what they must have proposed was a surrender of allied(1) troops.
-f-
(1) I dont know if "allied troops" is the right term to use in British WWI literature, but I guess you know who I mean. -
Message 3
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Friday, 2nd January 2009
nomore
President Wilson launched an initiative in 1916 to get the combattant powers to put forward their terms for a peace settlement. While the Entente Powers (Britain, France, Italy, etc)did put forward terms, the Germans did not. What they did do was make an offer simply to talk. This was rejected by the Entente powers as empty rhetoric.
As the Germans did not formally express terms, their exact position cannot be stated. However, it is clear that they included retention of occupied Belgian territory (three weeks after the German "offer", the Kaiser informed his advisors that Germany must emerge from the war with possession of the Belgian coastline) and probably retention of their gains in Northern France.
They had made specific overtures, beginning in 1915, to the Russians for a separate peace, based on German and Austrian retention of their conquests. This deal was rejected by the Czar, but later accepted by Lenin.
In effect, the German "peace overtures" were merely an attempt to cash in their chips while they were ahead, and an attempt to influence US opinion, not a genuine offer of peace.
Martin Gilbert's "First World War" has details on this.
What was the book your saw this in, by the way? -
Message 4
Posted by Lee (U8097024) on Saturday, 3rd January 2009
Thankyou for the reply L/W,I knew someone would ask that question,I am one of those readers who has lots of books on the go at one time.I am quickly re reading Mud,blood and poppycock, by Gordon Corrigan,I think the quote is in it somewhere.I have also been re reading my collection of Battlefield guides of the First world War at the moment,so it may be on one of them,leave it with me and I will track it down.
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Message 5
Posted by Mike Alexander (U1706714) on Saturday, 3rd January 2009
I recall reading that one of the reasons Siegfried Sassoon objected to the continuation of the war was because he believed a German peace offer of 1916 had been ignored.
I don't know many of the details, but there was certainly an approach in December 1916, initially the idea of the Hungarian King, but endorsed by Germany and the other central powers, and intended to be mediated by US President Woodrow Wilson. The deal proposed was to end the war with an agreement to restore the status quo of 1914 ("status quo pro bellum" was the phrase used).
However, the wording of the document, from what I've seen, is oddly aggressive - the tone is very much "we've shown you can't break us down", and, perhaps more provocatively, "we are fighting a war of defence" - almost as if it was designed to be an unacceptable offer to the Entente. This may have been a result of the conflict between the more liberal backers like Bethmann-Hollweg who sought peace after the failure of Verdun, and the militarist right-wingers, who were looking for an excuse to extend the naval war to unrestricted submarine warfare.
In the event, the deal was unacceptable to the Entente, who raised objections over the fate of the slavic nations under the terms. This gave the German right-wingers the advantage they required to unleash unrestricted submarine warfare in March 1917 - the great irony being that this was a major factor in drawing the US into the war against the central powers.
This link may be of interest:
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Message 6
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Saturday, 3rd January 2009
Re: Message 5.
Mike,
thank you for this message and the link. However 518 pages are a lot to read.... But an interested one can read what is important to him/her I agree.
Thanks again and warm regards,
Paul. -
Message 7
Posted by Frank Parker (U7843825) on Sunday, 4th January 2009
the tone is very much "we've shown you can't break us down", and, perhaps more provocatively, "we are fighting a war of defence" - almost as if it was designed to be an unacceptable offerΒ
Now where have I heard that recently? -
Message 8
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 4th January 2009
Mike
Agree with you about the language being unusually bellicose. I wonder if it perhaps something in the translation, and what was supposed to be a firm declaration of principle (We were in the right, and we're winning) became unduly aggressive? The same tone is reflected in the note to the Vatican (Gott mit uns?).
I don't think Germany was offering the status quo ante bellum, although Austro-Hungary might have settled for that. Neither the note to Wilson, or the Vatican contain the suggestion. Three weeks after the note, the German Chancellor spelt out to the US Ambassador that, although Germany was prepared to allow Belgium sovereignity, it involved Belgian disarmament, the surrender of the Leige and Namur fortresses to Germany and the right for Germany to keep a garrison in Belgium (which was effectively, to be able to control the Belgian coast). Hardly a return to the status quo.
The Entente did not just reject the offer because of the Slavic countries, but also because of Belgium.
Renewal of unrestricted U-Boat warfare was a calculated gamble. The German leadership thought Wilson would still try to stay out of the war (as indeed he did), and even if the USA came in, it would take at least a year for any sizeable US army to arrive in France. That gave Germany a year to starve Britain into submission (they calculated it would take five months), and finish off Russia.
As it was, although Wilson broke off diplomatic relations after the sinking of the Housatonic in Feb 1917, he didn't go to Congress for a Declaration of War until April. And Britain did have a grave crisis over shipping losses, and Russia was knocked out of the war. The USA had not mobilised before declaring war, and did not get a major army into the field until the last few months of the War. It was a closer run thing than post-facto rationalisation allows. -
Message 9
Posted by LairigGhru (U5452625) on Sunday, 4th January 2009
On 19 Dec 1916 Prime Minister Lloyd George made his first speech. In this he rejected recent peace proposals and stated "We shall put our trust rather in an unbroken army than in broken faith."
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Message 10
Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Monday, 5th January 2009
Very true, LW, but the gamble consisted of two parts - the use of submarines to break the flow of munitions and supplies from North America to the Western Allies (which had been in place since 1914 thus US entry into the war, as in 1941, hardly seemed to change the situation from the German point of view) and, secondly, a sufficient transfer of troops from the Eastern Front to launch a large-scale offensive in the West which would break the deadlock.
The first part of the gamble failed with the introduction of the convoy system and the practical problems that surrounded the inability of WWI submarines to stay submerged for long periods (they normally surfaced to fire cannon which made them vulnerable to attack themselves rather than launch torpedoes whilst submerged).
The second part of the gamble failed because of the length of time it took to remove Russia from the war. Their principal strategy seems to have been to inject "the plague bacillus" (in Churchill's words) into the Russian body politic by returning Lenin to Russia from his exile in Switzerland, presumably in return for a promise to take Russia out of the war, in April 1917.
However it took ubtil November 1917 before Lenin seized power and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was not signed until March 1918. The Kaiserschlacht was not launched until 25 March 1918 and although it seemed to achieve a dramatic breakthrough initially the erosion in discipline and morale caused by three-and-a-half years fighting and the poor rations caused by the Allied blockade (resulting in the Germans falling upon the well-stocked larders of the captured Allied trenches with abandon, considerably slowing the advance). Not only were the Allied forces in a much better position to absorb and repel the attack but enough US troops had arrived on the front lines, despite the submarine menace, to tip the balance in the Allies' favour. -
Message 11
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Monday, 5th January 2009
The first part of the gamble failed with the introduction of the convoy system and the practical problems that surrounded the inability of WWI submarines to stay submerged for long periods (they normally surfaced to fire cannon which made them vulnerable to attack themselves rather than launch torpedoes whilst submerged).Β
Also you have by that time the RN actually have a means of destroying (or at least damaging) a submerged submarine with the depth charge.The reponses they had previous verged on the riduculous(my favourite ones being the training of seagulls to sit on periscopes or the issueing of bags a and a hammer to smash periscope lenses)
VF -
Message 12
Posted by Mike Alexander (U1706714) on Tuesday, 6th January 2009
The point I was making about unrestricted submarine warfare was that, in order to get backing from the 'hawks', Bethmann Hollweg had to agree to the condition that, if the peace approach failed, unrestricted warfare would be resumed. Presumably the hawks also had some input into the content of the document, in which case it was in their distinct interest to make it as aggressive and unpalatable as possible.
PS apologies for misquoting earlier - the phrase is indeed 'status quo ante bellum', not 'pro bellum' as I put. As has been pointed out, the German proposals probably fell well short of this initial ideal, at least from an Entente point of view. -
Message 13
Posted by Mike Alexander (U1706714) on Tuesday, 6th January 2009
The reponses they had previous verged on the riduculous(my favourite ones being the training of seagulls to sit on periscopesΒ
Interesting, I'd not heard of that one! I do recall something about seals or sea-lions being trained to listen for U-boat engines, and thus provide 'early warning'. -
Message 14
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Tuesday, 6th January 2009
I hope this of interest to you Mike !
VF -
Message 15
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Tuesday, 6th January 2009
Renewal of unrestricted U-Boat warfare was a calculated gamble. The German leadership thought Wilson would still try to stay out of the war (as indeed he did), and even if the USA came in, it would take at least a year for any sizeable US army to arrive in France. That gave Germany a year to starve Britain into submission (they calculated it would take five months), and finish off Russia.Β
Incidentally, the German and British navies weren't all that far apart in their calculations.
The German submariners insisted that they could starve Britain into surrender by 1st August 1917. When Admiral Sims arrived in London in April, he was told by Jellicoe that on present trends, Britain would be forced to surrender by 1st November.
In the event, of course, both were wrong, partly because of the success of the convoy system, but also because the U-boats simply couldn't keep up the success they achieved in April 1917. That month they sank around 900,000 tons of shipping, but in May less than 600,000, rising to nearly 700,000 in June, but falling back to 550,000 in July - ie even before the convoy system had made much impact. The fall was mainly due to mechanical failures and loss of personnel. Those early subs were deadly, but weren't - quite - up to what was required of them.
Of course, the benefit to Germany from these sinkings was more than offset by the resulting intervention of the United States, which gave the Allies the use of much extra neutral shipping (since neutrals now had nobody but the Allies with whom they could trade) and many German ships trapped in hitherto neutral ports both in America itself and in other countries like Brazil which declared war with her. -
Message 16
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Wednesday, 7th January 2009
The second part of the gamble failed because of the length of time it took to remove Russia from the war. Their principal strategy seems to have been to inject "the plague bacillus" (in Churchill's words) into the Russian body politic by returning Lenin to Russia from his exile in Switzerland, presumably in return for a promise to take Russia out of the war, in April 1917.Β
Whichh may have been a very close call.
In late October 1916, there had been a very scary incident in Petrograd, when soldiers called in to suppress a a strike had opened fire on the Police instead of on the strikers. They had been suppressed by Cossacks, and later the French Ambassador, Maurice Paleologue, heard rumours of 150 executions.
Had the Cossacks been slower to arrive, or the soldiers been a larger force, able to defeat them, the mutiny might well have spread. Oct 28 might have found Petrograd in the hands of rebels, which could have triggered revolution five months "ahead of schedule". Lenin and Trotsky return to Russia sometime in November, and get to work subverting whatever government has replaced the Tsar. So we might well have the Bolsheviks in power, and Russia leaving the war, in the Spring of 1917 instead of at the end of it.
This gives Bethmann a far stronger argument, since if there is a chance of Russia quitting the war, Germany's prospects are far better and the submarine war less necessary. So May 1917 finds Russia out of the war, America not in it, and the French army half paralysed by mutiny. Verray interressting! -
Message 17
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Thursday, 8th January 2009
Mikestone8,
This gives Bethmann a far stronger argument, since if there is a chance of Russia quitting the war, Germany's prospects are far better and the submarine war less necessary. So May 1917 finds Russia out of the war, America not in it, and the French army half paralysed by mutiny. Verray interressting!Β
FWIW, the US declared war in April 1917. -
Message 18
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Thursday, 8th January 2009
FWIW, the US declared war in April 1917.Β
Indeed it did, as a result of the unrestricted u-boat campaign. Delay that, and you delay (or eliminate altogether) US participation in the war.
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