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Clay Blair, in his two volume work

• Message 1.聽

  Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Friday, 17th October 2008

  ''Hitler's U-Boat War'' (1998) argues with considerable forcefulness, that early in WW2 Churchill and the British gov't., and especially RN officials, vastly overestimated the U-boat effect on Britain's ability to continue the war. He seems to feel that this concept - sustained by Churchill's writings and subsequent articles of other historians - has become a ''sacred cow''. In his words, <quote userid=</quote>''the U-Boat peril in WW2 was and has been vastly overblown.'' He adds that ''as a result, contemporary and subsequent impressions of the Battle of the Atlantic were wildly distorted.''</quote>
  
  He argues that when the war began Britain had more than 5,000 merchant ships and got several hundreds more from its defeated allies, and for the first 18 months of the war, the Germans had no more than 20 or so operational U-boats at any one time. They could not, he insists, have perpetrated the destruction on Britain's trans-oceanic commerce that people seem to believe they did.
  
  He continues his argument by noting that the U-Boat menace didn't reach its zenith (in terms of numbers and tactics) until 1942-43, and by then the US was turning out ships too fast for Germany's U-boats to have any significant effect on the war effort. He admits that ships were lost at an alarming rate during those years, but that the ''vast majority of allied convoys during WW2'' were never located by the U-boats and sailed unmolested to their destinations.
  
  From what I've read, the British population was forced to endure rationing of foodstuffs and many other materials - not necessarily luxuries - for many years...some things well into the 1950's. Something certainly cut deeply into Britain's raw materials and food supplies. If not the U-boats, then what?
  
  Anyone have any comments on this man's works?

  Link to this forum: Clay Blair, in his two volume work

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• Message 2

  , in reply to message 1.

  Posted by abrazier (U3915690) on Friday, 17th October 2008

  I've read both volumes and found them very interesting and seemingly well researched tracking the fate of pretty much every U-Boat lost in action, every convoy action, every strategic decision, etc.
  
  I believe that part of the problem with imports into the UK was the delay in sailings caused by the need to wait for enough vessels to form a convoy. In peacetime once you had shipped your cargo you could sail at once. In wartime a vessel might have to wait quite some time (weeks?) before it's convoy was fully assembled and escorts available thereby reducing the effective tonnage any one ship could deliver in a fixed length of time. A single ship might make one Atlantic crossing in two months, say, rather than four or five.
  
  Another element that ate into raw carrying capacity for foodstuffs and other essentials was the need to carry war materials in great quantity, something for which there was no need in peacetime.
  
  There was also the need for shipping space to keep the armies overseas supplied and once Russia entered the war the Arctic convoys required yet more shipping. The war in the Pacific also claimed vast amounts of merchantmen to sustain the American forces fighting the Japanese.
  
  Taking all this and Blair's books together I think he is probably half right. With the benefit of hindsight the U-Boat threat was probably not as great as it seemed at the time but it was great enough to make rationing necessary. The main reason that rationing persisted into the 50's was that the UK virtually bankrupted itself fighting the war and simply couldn't afford the amount of imports needed to eliminate rationing for many years after 1945.

  Link to this forum: Clay Blair, in his two volume work

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• Message 3

  , in reply to message 2.

  Posted by LairigGhru (U5452625) on Friday, 17th October 2008

  Britain stood alone in the first two years of the war so this must have concerned Churchill. Also, it isn't only lost tonnage but also the loss of skilled crews. More U-boats might have been built, increasing the losses in the future, he would have worried. I wonder whether the book's author took proper account of factors like these.

  Link to this forum: Clay Blair, in his two volume work

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• Message 4

  , in reply to message 3.

  Posted by LairigGhru (U5452625) on Friday, 17th October 2008

  An afterthought:
  Until Barnes Wallis invented his Tallboy bomb much later in the war, there was no way of destroying the U-boat pens.

  Link to this forum: Clay Blair, in his two volume work

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• Message 5

  , in reply to message 4.

  Posted by Trooper Tom Canning - WW2 Site Helper (U519668) on Monday, 20th October 2008

  Erik 鈥�
  
  
  If I may make a couple of points on this 鈥渇allacy鈥� of the U Boats effect on rationing 鈥�
  
  what many people forget is that Britain pre war depended on the Commonwealth - in much the same way as British Columbia has depended on the USA to absorb her lumber market 鈥� 98% with the odd percentage for Danish and Irish butter, bacon. hams etc. !
  
  Take that primary market away and it is chaos 鈥� shortages were doubled by having to wait for supplies coming in convoys 鈥� thefts at the docksides 鈥� and losses owing to enemy action. We then had to 鈥榙ig for victory鈥� grow our own food 鈥� no oranges 鈥� bananas 鈥� feed two pigs keep one - the Government got the other one !
  
  The thefts at docksides will be challenged but after the war it became so extensive that a new system was inaugurated 鈥� containers 鈥� you break open a massive container at your peril 鈥� as well as trying to sneak it out under much more strict security.
  
  The other point is that you asked for comments on the work of Clay Blair 鈥� can鈥檛 help on these recent works but many years ago I read 鈥� and still have his book 鈥� on Gen Douglas MacArthur and I must admit to being impressed with his standards so much that I became a long time defender of Mac Arthur as well as recognising that F.M Alanbrooke 鈥� CIGS during most of the war stated that MacArthur was the best of the US chiefs.
  
  Alanbrooke had many battles in his role in the joint chiefs of staff to know the difference between many so called leaders and a man who got things done 鈥� this made him the ONLY Chief of Staff to visit MacArthur in Japan for three days 鈥� not one American Chief visited Mac all through the war !
  
  

  Link to this forum: Clay Blair, in his two volume work

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• Message 6

  , in reply to message 5.

  Posted by LairigGhru (U5452625) on Tuesday, 21st October 2008

  Yes, MacArthur was a great man, but remember that Truman was forced to remove him smartly during the Korean War when he expressed an intention to use the atom bomb on the Chinese Army.
  
  More lightheartedly, isn't it strange that we had to do without oranges and bananas during the war but tobacco was considered essential!

  Link to this forum: Clay Blair, in his two volume work

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• Message 7

  , in reply to message 6.

  Posted by Trooper Tom Canning - WW2 Site Helper (U519668) on Wednesday, 22nd October 2008

  LairigGhru -
  While it is true that Truman fired MacArthur - he hesitated for some time until he then asked Bradley for his opinion - Bradley put the knife in when he said " I would have fired him two years ago."
  
  Tobacco was actually essential -to many- as I found to my cost - being something of an athlete at the time - I didn't smoke -until I was picked up after being wounded - a Seaforth Highlander of Canada Sergeant stuck a cigarette in my mouth - I was hooked from then on -
  
  I was handed an Orange on Geneva Station by a Swiss maid in National Costume on my way home after three years overseas - where did the Swiss get them from all during the war ?

  Link to this forum: Clay Blair, in his two volume work

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• Message 8

  , in reply to message 7.

  Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Wednesday, 22nd October 2008

  My opinion of MacArthur is mixed. There is no doubt in my mind at all that he was far and away the best person that could possibly have been chosen as military governor of Japan in 1945. He was exactly what the country needed. Someone who could assume the responsibility of government in the style of a renaissance king, and could govern as one divinely appointed. The Japanese were conditioned to respect exactly that kind of authority. His attitude in his hq was very king-like indeed, but the things he did and the changes he made in the Japanese system were better than anyone would have dreamed. His overall administration was about as perfect as it could have been. I doubt if anyone else could have done what he did, as well as he did it.
  
  Yet he made some disastrous errors as a military commander, and I believe those errors - many of them - were directly related to his megalomaniacal genius. For instance, when the Japanese began their wide-ranging blitz in the Pacific in 1941-42, he sat on his butt in Manila and hoped that by not disturbing them, they wouldn't disturb the Philippines. He ignored Marshall's instructions, tuned out his AAC commander when he begged for permission to attack the Japanese on Formosa, and ignored nearly every element written up in Plan Orange for defense of the islands. As a result, his entire air force was caught on the ground and destroyed. This was a disaster that could easily have been avoided. The a/c that attacked his bases were socked in on Formosa when his air wing commander begged to be allowed to attack them. The Japanese themselves were terrified that he would do exactly that, but he sat on his hands and let the moment pass. Instead of stockpiling foods, medicines, weapons, ammunition, and other necessities for defense of Manila and Bataan, he left all supplies where they were, in local warehouses, so when his armies retreated to Bataan, they were starved of food, medical supplies and ammunition. Had he done what he was supposed to have done, there is a slight chance that the Philippines would not have fallen.
  
  In late 1942, he was ordered to take Buka island on New Guinea and could have walked in, but he was busy moving his hq from southern Australia to Brisbane and more sumptuous dwellings, so once again, he sat on his hands. As a result, the Japanese took it, fortified it, and when he finally decided to do what he was told, he lost more than a thousand Australians and American soldiers taking it from the Japanese.
  
  His invasion of Inchon during the Korean war was a stroke of genius. If he'd done as he was told and not listened to his sycophantic advisers, he might have stopped there. The North Korean armies were a shambles after he'd taken back Seoul and when he crossed the 38th parallel they were completely disorganized. Meanwhile, the ROK armies had become a formidable force and had he let them pursue, the Chinese would never have entered the war and there's a very good chance that Korea would be one country now. His moronic G-2, Gen. Willoughby, had stated on more than one occasion that they needed to sweep the Chinese out of Manchuria as well, and MacArthur often took his advice. He even listened to that idiot Willoughby when he insisted the Chinese would never risk a war with the US.
  
  The UN mandate had made it clear that UN troops were not to go into North Korea once the agreed-upon line of demarkation had been restored, but MacArthur ignored those orders and demanded that Marshall and Truman let him go into North Korea. We know what happened.
  
  The Chinese had every reason to be afraid that MacArthur would cross the Yalu into Manchuria. When the Chinese responded to his threats by invading North Korea, MacArthur actually demanded to be given A-bombs to drop on the three offensive prongs that the Chinese had thrust into the peninsula. His comments regarding Truman and the statements he made about how he'd have won the war easily if Marshall and Truman had done what he wanted to do, left the president no choice. He had to fire him, and he should have done it sooner.

  Link to this forum: Clay Blair, in his two volume work

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