Wars and ConflictsÌý permalink
70th aniversary of Munchen agreement
This discussion has been closed.
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Message 1.Ìý
Posted by hambi22 (U2309395) on Monday, 29th September 2008
Hello
today is the 70th aniversary of Munchen agreement.
What is your (international) wiew on the, in our country so offen discused question, if our Czechoslovak army should fight or not.
Was there any chance for succes, or was there any chance that the France and Britain would have changed their mind and would have enter the war.
best regards -
Message 2
Posted by Backtothedarkplace (U2955180) on Monday, 29th September 2008
When in doubt, fight. Even if you think your going to lose, you fight.
I can see why the czech government made the descision they did. Even understand it. But they should have fought. There is always the chance that the germans could cock it up. -
Message 3
Posted by Colquhoun (U3935535) on Monday, 29th September 2008
According to the book I am reading, 'The Wages of destruction' The German army was terrified of war in 1938 and effectively forced Hitler to back down. Germany was much better prepared in September 1939 than they were in September 1938.
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Message 4
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Monday, 29th September 2008
Hambi,
look at the thread on the History Hub about Munich. I just added a few messages overthere.
Warm regards and welcome back to the boards,
Paul.
PS. Don't be afraid. As a Belgian I started overhere some 6 years ago and I hope that the contributors don't wish for the moment I was better never started overhere
And again as a Belgian I have a soft place in my heart for the Czechs. i thought you were from Austria but if you understand Czech or French I have some links for you. -
Message 5
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Tuesday, 30th September 2008
When in doubt, fight. Even if you think your going to lose, you fight.
I can see why the czech government made the descision they did. Even understand it. But they should have fought. There is always the chance that the germans could cock it up. Ìý
They didn't cock it up against Poland the following year. And the Poles paid a horrendous price for putting up a fight. Iirc they lost about 6.5 million dead at Nazi hands, compared to less than 100,000 Czechs. Prague came out of WW2 undamaged, whereas Warsaw was totally destroyed.
Also, what exactly would the Czechs have been fighting for? If Germany looks like losing, the Russians are likely to move into both Poland and Czechoslovakia, and maybe other parts of Eastern Europe. So the Czechs would have undergone terrible suffering merely for the doubtful gain of being occupied by Stalin instead of Hitler. That of course is what they ended up getting anyway, but at a much lower cost.
Depending on whom you talk to, going to war might or might not have made sense for Britain and France: but for them it was a different calculation. For them an Eastern Europe occupied by Stalin would be undesirable, but not the end of the world. It would be another story for the peoples actually living there. One recalls the old joke about bacon and eggs representing a contribution for the hen, but a total committment for the pig.
Benes was entirely sensible to bow before the wind and hope for better times. Resistance would have been a defiant gesture, but at a hideous cost and for no particular gain other than to national pride. -
Message 6
Posted by Backtothedarkplace (U2955180) on Tuesday, 30th September 2008
Hi Mikestone8
The German army in 1939 is a different creature from 1938. Its had another year of training to perfect its tactics.
Before a battle starts no one really knows exactly what is going to happen. The czechs could have been steam rollered, or the german army could have fallen apart, bear in mind that a lot of the 1939 armoured units are equipped with czech tanks as they were superior to the equivalent German models.
The end result is probably going to be a german win. but its also possible that the superiority of equipment and the morale factors of defending your home land may have given a completely different result and we cant really know what the result would have been. -
Message 7
Posted by Grand Falcon Railroad (U3267675) on Tuesday, 30th September 2008
It could have been a Kosov/Bosnia type affair though - start a war you've got no hope of winning and hope the French and Brits get involved on your side - Could Germany in 1938 fought in Czechoslovakia and still fought us on the Rhine?
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Message 8
Posted by Colquhoun (U3935535) on Tuesday, 30th September 2008
The Germans could have only deployed five divisions to defend the Rhine in 1938 while they crushed Czech as opposed to the 11 they deployed in 1939 when they crushed Poland. Plus the West Wall was built by autumn 1939 making a rapid Anglo French offensive difficult whereas it was just a building site in 1938. In short the Germans would have been much more vulnerable to an attack in the west while they dealt with the Czechs in 1938 than they were in 1939 while they dealt with the Poles.
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Message 9
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Tuesday, 30th September 2008
It could have been a Kosov/Bosnia type affair though - start a war you've got no hope of winning and hope the French and Brits get involved on your sideÌý
Did that tactic ever work in the 1930s?
Abyssinia and Finland both fought alone for several months, the Spanish Republic for three years. In none of these cases did any foreign intervention result.
Even should it happen, once war has broken out, there is no way to prevent Stalin from intervening whenever he wants. So all that the war achieves (from Benes' POV) is to deliver Czechoslovakia, and no doubt Poland as well, into Russian occupation instead of German - hardly a difference justifying serious loss of life.
Czechoslovakia's only hope was that Hitler could be "stared down", and forced to back off without actual war. Once shooting started, she was doomed to generations of enslavement whichever side won, the only uncertainty being whether her new Master would reside in Berlin or Moscow.
Could Germany in 1938 fought in Czechoslovakia and still fought us on the Rhine?Ìý
How much fighting would there have been on the Rhine?
French strategic planning had for years been entirely defensive. As far back as the Stresa Front, when French and Italian generals discussed possible cooperation against Germany, they had talked only about the defence of Alsace and South Tyrol, not offensive action.
This, of course, is one reason for the lack of reaction when Hitler remilitarised the Rhineland. As the plan was to take up defensive positions on their border, that implied abandonment of the DMZ in any case, so it didn't greatly matter whether it was abandoned at the outbreak of war or earlier. -
Message 10
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Tuesday, 30th September 2008
For them an Eastern Europe occupied by Stalin would be undesirable, but not the end of the world Ìý
Eastern Europe occupied by Stalin was an unlikely - an extremely fortunate for the Western world - outcome of this whole affair. Had Zhukov not fallen asleep at the wheel in June of 1941, Stalin was about to realize his immediate at the time goal of subduing the entire continent. -
Message 11
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Tuesday, 30th September 2008
Re: Message 3.
Colquhoun,
have you any data about the strenght of the German army on the Czech border and on the French border?
I have on the Czech border 12 divisions in September.
And on the French border:
10 August: General von Wietersheim commander of the West under general Wilhelm Adam says to Hitler that with the most of the force being near Czechoslovakia the West was undefendable. He said also that the unfinished Siegfriedline couldn't hold but for at least three weeks.
Hitler (it was in one general's diary) shouted: in that case the whole army isn't worth anything. I say you it shouldn't be held not only for three weeks but for three years. Adam said secretly to his co-generals that he had only in the West 5 divisions and that they wouldn't be a match for the French.
On a tour on the fortifications Adam said that he couldn't hold the West Wall with the troops available to him. Hitler according to Jodl and Adam became hysterical and said that the man who couldn't held the wall was a worthless one.
General Beck resigned on 18 August He had asked for a general strike among the generals but no general followed him.
If I remember it well the Germans (I can seek it back) had in the West 7 divisions from which 3 untrained and under-equipped on Black Wednesday.
Warm regards,
Paul. -
Message 12
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Tuesday, 30th September 2008
Re: Message 5.
Mikestone,
"the Russians are likely to move both into Poland and Czechoslovakia"
you sounds exactly like a Bonnet (Minister of foreign affairs France) and like the French right, even like the far-right French as the "Croix-de-Feux" of François La Rocque.
Bonnet went even that far to let publish instead of the truth of a one day bellicose ammendement from the British, the completely opposite in French papers like "Le Matin" as if it was an hoax.
"Benes (cann't do the reverse ^ on the s
) was entirely sensible..."
No he wasn't entirely... no were the Czechs and they wanted to fight...only by the misrepresenting of the words of Milan Hodja, Czech Prime Minister, the French under the lead of Bonnet were able to disturb the Czech resolveness and even that. It was more an escape for the French to do as if it came from the Czechs.
Warm regards,
Paul. -
Message 13
Posted by Backtothedarkplace (U2955180) on Wednesday, 1st October 2008
Hi Suvorovetz,
Are you refering to the theory that Stalin was planning a pre emptive strike against Germany in 1941 but got beaten to the punch?
I've come across it in a book by Constatine Pleshakov, "Stalins Folly". But he admits himself that there is very little to go on to confirm it. No actual order or plan in the Russian archives to confirm it, or at least no ones admitting to finding it yet. -
Message 14
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Wednesday, 1st October 2008
"the Russians are likely to move both into Poland and Czechoslovakia"
you sounds exactly like a Bonnet (Minister of foreign affairs France) Ìý
Sorry Paul, I don't see your point.
What does that prove except that M Bonnet could read a map? Perhaps I betray my naivete, but I should be rather disturbed at the thought of a Foreign Minister who couldn't.
Anyway, how does this have any bearing on whether it would have been a good idea for Benes to fight Germany alone, in the hope that the foreigners would change their minds and come to his aid before he went under? He decided that it wasn't worth the gamble, and as far as I can see was perfectly right. If M Bonnet's attitude, as stated by you, was typical of French government circles, that surely only makes it all the more unlikely that such a tactic would have worked. -
Message 15
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 1st October 2008
I've come across it in a book by Constatine Pleshakov, "Stalins Folly". But he admits himself that there is very little to go on to confirm it. No actual order or plan in the Russian archives to confirm it, or at least no ones admitting to finding it yet.
Ìý
Hi, backtothedarkplace (dan)Free Sean. I have a hard time believing that gospodin Pleshakov is so ignorant of volumes of evidence uncovered by now on this, having written a book about Stalin and conceivably done at least some research. So, I have to guess that he is simply disingenuous. I suggest for you to read a few posts from this lively debate we've had a few weeks ago:
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Message 16
Posted by Vizzer aka U_numbers (U2011621) on Wednesday, 1st October 2008
General BeckÌý
Josef Beck had dreamed of a Polish/Baltic/Scandinavian defensive bloc but it never materialised. One of the reasons was the very high-handed approach he took towards Lithuania in trying to get the idea off the ground. It was a sort of "Join me in a defensive alliance or else I'll bash you!". Needless to say that this was not the most subtle form of diplomacy, was counter-productive and Becks' plan for a Polish/Baltic/Scandinavian defensive bloc fell at the first hurdle.
I've often wondered if (rather than going for a Polish/Baltic/Scandinavian defensive bloc) a more focussed but fully-fledged Polish/Czechoslovakian alliance at this time might have dissuaded Hitler. The Polish attitude was towards Czechoslovakia seemed to be ambiguous and one thing is for sure Poland certainly did join in with Germany and Hungary in dismembering Czechoslovakia in 1938. -
Message 17
Posted by hambi22 (U2309395) on Wednesday, 1st October 2008
Hello Mikestone,
in the Backward wiew the Benes decision was realy right. Czech escaped the war with lighter casaulties the Poland (there was 300 000 deads)
But nobody could know in 1938, how would hade the war finished. In case of German history could be quite possible that not only the jews but other "untermenschen" as the slavs, would hade been "eliminated". -
Message 18
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Wednesday, 1st October 2008
Re: message 9.
Mikestone,
don't know what happened with the Â鶹ԼÅÄ. Wasn't able to reach the pages even my startpage of the Â鶹ԼÅÄ homepage I couldn't reach and it was only the Â鶹ԼÅÄ.
"Remilitarisation of the Rhineland" "lack of reaction when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland" This lack of reaction although on the end it cmae to it was a bit more compicated than one would think on the first sight:
Read the URL in message 9. The URL in message 10 don't work anymore.
Warm regards,
Paul. -
Message 19
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Wednesday, 1st October 2008
It is again the same with the slow reaction of the Â鶹ԼÅÄ messageboard.
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Message 20
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Wednesday, 1st October 2008
Re: Message 14.
Mikestone,
will answer tomorrow. The messageboard seems not to work properly this evening.
Warm regards,
Paul. -
Message 21
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Wednesday, 1st October 2008
Hello Mikestone,
in the Backward wiew the Benes decision was realy right. Czech escaped the war with lighter casaulties the Poland (there was 300 000 deads)
But nobody could know in 1938, how would hade the war finished. In case of German history could be quite possible that not only the jews but other "untermenschen" as the slavs, would hade been "eliminated".Ìý
In September 1938 nobody (except maybe Hitler himself and those, if any, whom he had confided in at this point) knew that anybody was going to be "eliminated" at all. Even Kristallnacht was still in the future.
As far as Benes knew, they were faced with heavy handed foreign rule, a bit like having the Austrian Empire back, only harsher. They could expect discrimination of various kinds (all education to be in German, and that sort of thing), and maybe plundering of their property, but he had no reason to suppose that their physical survival was at risk.
As indeed it probably wasn't. Apart from the special case of the Jews, racial theories didn't, in practice, have much bearing on how conquered nations got treated [1]. Those that yielded without too much of a fight - Danes, Channel Islanders, Czechs and even French - got off relatively light. Those that resisted hard - Poles, Yugoslavs, Russians in the occupied areas - copped it good and proper, often to a near-genocidal degree. Makes me very glad they never got across the Channel.
[1] If Wiki is to be believed, the thoroughly Aryan Dutch lost more of their population (2.65% as against 2.25%) than the "non-Aryan" Czechoslovaks. -
Message 22
Posted by Backtothedarkplace (U2955180) on Thursday, 2nd October 2008
Hi,Suvorovetz.
Just finished "Stalins Folly" and reading that combined with "Absolute War" by Chris Bellamy, which also touches on the same area. Merging the two I get a feeling that something was going on but i cant, or havent found enough to persuede me that Stalin was intending to invade all of Euorpe.
Both books say that the Soviet army doctrine at the time was to fight on someone elses soil if they could. Both say that there were several plans in place with that in mind but the most they say imply is that in the event of a german attack or build up to an attack they, the soviets would be invading poland. Of course in the event of a major victory over the germans they might well carry on going to see how much they could get away with. But the plans released only seem to cover the intial phase.
Constantine Pleshakov's theory is that the last of these plans the 14th of may one? was put into efect on the night of the 21 /22 june simply because there was no other plan.
It does give me the impression that there is some very strong circumstantsial evidence that an actual, as opposed to a theorectical plan was underway but possibly for later on than 1941, maybe for spring of 1942?
The one thing I would say is that all armies have plans for wars even ones they know are unlikley to take place. its what they are paid for and means that if the unlikley happens they at least have a bare bones plane for how to deal with it. Having a plan is to be expected. Putting it into play is another. For that I would have expected their to be minutes of meetings at least if not outright written orders. Which their dont seem to be, or at least they havent been found. Its still interesting though. If you look at the battle of moscow it rolled the germans back something like 200 miles if you transpose that to the situation in 1941 then theres a chance that all of poland and parts of prussia are captured. keeping it might be a difficult and different matter though.
Without that sort of smoking gun, all I can say is that it's an interesting theory. -
Message 23
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 2nd October 2008
Without that sort of smoking gun, all I can say is that it's an interesting theory. Ìý
Obviously, you haven't really read the thread I had put the link to for you yesterday. It's not easy to recreate the entire debate in one post.
I'll start with the quote by historian/journalist D. Khmelnitsky, who put together an anthology of historical material about it: "By and large, from the scientific stand point, this debate is over. The fact that Stalin prepared to attack Germany in the summer of 1941 is definitively proven by [historians] M. Meltyukhov, V. Nevezhin, I. Pavlova and many other researchers. They proved it independently from one another, using different sources. Nobody found any evidence that in 1941 Stalin prepared the country not for the aggression against the West, but for the defense." -
Message 24
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 2nd October 2008
Constantine Pleshakov's theory is that the last of these plans the 14th of may one? was put into efect on the night of the 21 /22 june simply because there was no other plan.Ìý
These are excerpts from the actual copy of the plan dated as of May 15, 1941 (try the link below). V. Suvorov proved that this plan was being executed - meaning that deployment and all kinds of other activities were in progress - with the target date of launching on July 6, 1941. That is true that Zhukov attempted to execute parts of this plan on June 22, when he realized that he was under attack by Wehrmacht. That only proves one thing - there was no contingency plan for defense. Defensive war was never even considered:
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Message 25
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Thursday, 2nd October 2008
Re: Message 21.
Mikestone,
the whole evening occupied with visits and no time to answer.
In the meantime not yet completely studied:
I came to it via an URL of a French messageboard, but about the French part of Radio Praha.
Now saw that the English version was completely otherwise than the French version. Not yet checked the German, the Spanish and the Russian version. If you understand French: Click in the balk above in the URL on "français" and you come to the French page and you will see what I mean.
Warm regards,
Paul. -
Message 26
Posted by OUNUPA (U2078829) on Thursday, 2nd October 2008
'I've com
e across it in a book by Constatine Pleshakov, "Stalin's Folly". But he admits himself that there is very little to go on to confirm it.'
-there is the confirmation of another sort. I mean the meeting of the Central Committee of VKP(b) on the 19th of January 1925 during which Stalin openly claimed about his own intentions of how commies should act in case if the West would 'unleash' the WWII.
' We should be involved into the next war.....that's the fact....but we have to come over the battlefield among the last ones if even not the last ...in order we can throw on the 'scales' the 'weight' which really be able to bring us the decisive victory.'
'Czech escaped the war with lighter casaulties the Poland '- but Hitler gained the powerful defensive Czech system , mate, which was built with the help of France onto the Czech-German border. The 40 Czech Divisions were among the best ones in Europe.
The capitulation of Czechoslovakia meant the end of French system of friendly unions towards France within the Central and East Europe and led to the moral disruption of the Hungary , Poland , Romania and Bulgaria . The destiny of Czechoslovakia had been driven them to the situation when they were just forced to seek an alliance with the Nazis to survive. In 1938 it seemed that Germany without a shot totally recreated the magnificence of the German Empire. -
Message 27
Posted by Backtothedarkplace (U2955180) on Friday, 3rd October 2008
Hi Suvorovetz.
From what I can gather the Soviet approach to war at the time was that it was something best done in some one elses territory. A sort of defensive offence? Given what happened to them later its a good plan.
But, plans are as far as I can see is what they are. I have are open to the idea that there may be a cabinet memo or meeting stating the intent to make war with germany once it, and the allies were sufficiently weakened. But there is nothing that says its due in 1941 everything I can find relating to the speed of the call up and forming and equipping of the divisions seems to imply that 1942 was intended to be the crucial year.
what is interesting me is what the end result would have been if Hitler had decided to finsh the business with Britan first, which he should have done really. Then the Soviet armies he is attacked by are going to be equipped with a lot more of the T34's and KV1@s that gave them so much trouble. In addition the Russians are going to have had the extra time to establish the Communications and train troops and officers. It is a very interesting what if.
Thank you for the links you have provided. is anything you can think of that would help shed a bit more light on this period? -
Message 28
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Friday, 3rd October 2008
Re: Message 21.
Mikestone,
the whole evening occupied with visits and no time to answer.
In the meantime not yet completely studied:
www.radio.cz/en/issu...
I came to it via an URL of a French messageboard, but about the French part of Radio Praha.
Now saw that the English version was completely otherwise than the French version. Not yet checked the German, the Spanish and the Russian version. If you understand French: Click in the balk above in the URL on "français" and you come to the French page and you will see what I mean.
Warm regards,
Paul.Ìý
Thanks Paul,
Like you say, notably different. So far as I can follow it - my schoolboy French is very rusty these days - the French version seems to focus more than the English on the men involved and what they had to say.
For me, the moral of it all is a sort of "First Law of Life for Small Nations" - keep out of the Great Powers' wars if you possibly can, and if they seem disposed to get involved in your troubles, treat all offers of help with the liveliest suspicion. When elephants quarrel, the mouse is liable to get stomped, and even if you finish up in the winning camp, your powerful "friends" are likely to short-change you.
Incidentally, though not around in 1938 (I was still a decade in the future) I did witness 1968, when the situation recurred with another enemy. I recall somewhat similar arguments then, with some armchair warriors getting annoyed with the Czechs for not offering armed resistance. Some clot in the "Spectator", whose name, perhaps mercifully, now escapes me, grumbled that "instead of acting like Hus and Zizka, they chose to act like the Good Soldier Svejk". Personally, though, I'm inclined to feel that the "Good Soldier Dubcek" was probably also right to refrain from playing the hero. -
Message 29
Posted by Hasse (U1882612) on Friday, 3rd October 2008
Mike
The cituation of 38 differ a lot to 68.
1938 had the modern Check army at least a 50/50 chanse to win over Wermacht on their own.
1968 would it just be a brave gesture since they had the a chanse of the snowball in hell,against the Soviets.
Hasse -
Message 30
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 3rd October 2008
Hi, backtothedarkplace (dan)Free Sean!
From what I can gather the Soviet approach to war at the time was that it was something best done in some one elses territory. A sort of defensive offence? Given what happened to them later its a good plan Ìý
This was not a plan, but rather a spin invented by Zhukov and Khrushchev to explain away their regime’s aggressive nature and their own personal failure to "eliminate capitalist surrounding."
there is nothing that says its due in 1941 everything I can find relating to the speed of the call up and forming and equipping of the divisions seems to imply that 1942 was intended to be the crucial year Ìý
V. Suvorov effectively demonstrated in his books 'Icebreaker' and 'Day M' that it was July 6, 1941. Just one snippet for starters:
"At the cost of tremendous efforts in 1939 and 1940, the Red Army 1st Strategic Echelon was deployed and lodged. But in February 1941 - slowly at first but faster as the time went by - the 2nd Strategic Echelon began its deployment in the same areas [at the new border in East Poland]. At this moment the change unnoticed by historians occurred: RED ARMY STOPPED CARING ABOUT ACCOMMODATIONS FOT THE NEXT WINTER. The troops of the 1st Strategic Echelon abandoned their tents and unfinished barracks and went into the borderline zone. We're talking about ALL troops and AT THE VERY BORDER (Marshal of the Soviet Union Bagramyan - VIZh, 1976, #1, page 62). The troops from the 2nd Strategic Echelon closing in from within the country did not use abandoned tents and unfinished barracks either. These arriving troops had no intentions to settle down for the next winter in these areas... Where were they going to spend the next winter, if not in the Central and Western Europe?"
the Soviet armies he is attacked by are going to be equipped with a lot more of the T34's and KV1@s that gave them so much troubleÌý
By June Stalin amassed 25K tanks, of which roughly 2K were T-34 and KV tanks vastly superior to any of Wehrmacht tanks. The total of all Wehrmacht tanks was a meager less than 4K. -
Message 31
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Friday, 3rd October 2008
Re: Message 9.
Mikestone,
"The lack of reaction when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland"
Read once the "learning curve" link from message 9. The Lima Peru link from the Americans in message 10 is disappeared. Are the Americans no longer in Peru?
Remind the names of Prime minister Sarraut, Georges Mandel and Joseph-Paul Boncour as proponents for a reoccupation of the Rhineland. If I have time I will come back again on this thread.
Warm regards,
Paul. -
Message 32
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Friday, 3rd October 2008
Re: Message 14.
Mikestone,
reading on the internet for the whole evening on the Franco-Soviet-Czechoslovak relationship 1935-1938
2 May 1935.
Pierre Laval...ha,ha...
16 May 1935 Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance. I found the whole text but it isn't relevant for our discussion here.
the Hungarian point of view?
Found a link to "The Soviet Role in the Munich Crisis: An historiographical debate by Marcia Lynn Toepfer but I find no further links on the first sight.
I am interested in the role of the Soviet Union in the crisis; Read a book of a far-left Belgian Lieven Soete on the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939. It also says a lot about the Munich crisis as from the Russian Maiski (perhaps on orders of Stalin, as was Litvinov). Although biased for the left wing, it contains a lot of interesting first hand material. Sadly it is in reparation at the library, but I have found two books on the same suject that I will try to borrow tomorrow. I will study them especially in the light of Suvorovetz's thread with the same suject. And I hope both books will contain also a lot about the relationship of the Soviet Union on the eve of Munich. And there was also the French ambassador at Moscow, Robert Coulondre, who wanted strong ties with the Soviet-Union and miltary talks, but I come back on that...Bonnet 12 may 1938: What would the soviet-Union do if Germany attacked? Litvinov said: Honour their commitments if France did.But France had to convince Poland and Romania to cross their slices of country to reach Czechoslovakia...
Yes the Bonnet's as Laval and many others on the right side were against a support of the French to their treaty commitment? But not the de Gaulle's or the Churchill's (de Gaulle had no influence on that time because he was only a colonel if I recall it well): Mandel, Reynaud and another (have to seek for his name stepped down from the French cabinet out of protest for the betrayal of the Czechoslovakia in the treaty of mutual assistance. Wanted to prolong the list of the French resistants but it is nearing closing time...Including in his heart Daladier, even being a Socialist. On the acclamations from the French population at Le Borget he siad "les cons" (the stupids°
Also Churchill had to stop in the parliament against the Munich agreement by the boooing
sent it not corrected -
Message 33
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Saturday, 4th October 2008
Wanted to prolong the list of the French resistants but it is nearing closing time...Including in his heart Daladier, even being a Socialist. On the acclamations from the French population at Le Borget he siad "les cons" (the stupids° Ìý
As previously stated, my command of Frogspeak isn't all that great, but isn't that translation a somewhat "cleaned up" version of what the original words actually meant? -
Message 34
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Saturday, 4th October 2008
Mike
The cituation of 38 differ a lot to 68.
1938 had the modern Check army at least a 50/50 chanse to win over Wermacht on their own.
1968 would it just be a brave gesture since they had the a chanse of the snowball in hell,against the Soviets.
HasseÌý
I've heard this claim before but can it really be taken seriously?
Czechoslovakia was enveloped on three sides by a country with about five times her population - a population large chunks of which weren't particularly loyal. She also had the Slovak frontier to guard against the Hungarians. That was not a recipe for victory.
I can certainly imagine them giving the Germans a bloody nose or two, as the Finns did to the Russians, but the bottom line is that Czechoslovakia can't conquer Germany - it's just too big - so if the war goes on, sooner or later Germany conquers Czechoslovakia. It may take longer than Hitler or the Wehrmacht assumed, but they'll still do it in the end.
After all, keep in mind what the decision to capitulate meant for Benes. There'll be no place for him in a German-dominated country, so he's looking at an indefinite period of exile, quite possibly lifelong (In the event it wasn't quite - he lived until 1946 - but it might as well have been). If his position had really been as promising as you suggest, he wouldn't have given in. He knew better, though. -
Message 35
Posted by Vizzer aka U_numbers (U2011621) on Saturday, 4th October 2008
She also had the Slovak frontier to guard against the Hungarians.Ìý
And there was also the Moravian-Silesian border to guard against the Poles. Czech Teschen was, of course,occupied by the Polish army on 2 October 1938. This annexation followed an ultimatum which had been issued by Poland to Czechoslovakia 3 days earlier.
I can certainly imagine them giving the Germans a bloody nose or two, as the Finns did to the Russians, but the bottom line is that Czechoslovakia can't conquer Germany - it's just too big - so if the war goes on, sooner or later Germany conquers Czechoslovakia. It may take longer than Hitler or the Wehrmacht assumed, but they'll still do it in the end.Ìý
The Finnish analogy here doesn’t really work. The reason is that although the Finns may have lost both the Winter War and the subsequent 'Continuation War' and although Finland had to cede territory, nevertheless, the country was not conquered by the Soviet Union.
Another analogy would be the case of Ireland. It's a bit like saying that the independence of southern Ireland is only temporary but 'in the end' the UK will conquer Ireland. This is obviously not the case. Similarly there is also no reason to suggest that Czechoslovakia (as with Finland and Ireland) could not have militarily forced a much larger neighbour to the negotiation table. -
Message 36
Posted by Hasse (U1882612) on Saturday, 4th October 2008
Mikestone
If Checkoslovakia and Germany was the only countries on earth would your prediction be more or less correct.
In an earlier thread by Paul,did I show that the forces the German general staff said that they could muster for an attack against Checkoslovakia was more or less the same strenght that the Checks could muster.
Since the advantage lays with the defender so had the Check a real chanse of stopping the Weermacht.
To win a deffensive war isnt it necessary to ocupy the attackers land as you imply.
Hitler couldnt afford to risk weermacht 1938,that would leave his budding empire open for attack from say the French or Poles.Not to mention a failed attack against Checkoslovakia would have sent him from power PDQ.
You does yourself compare Checkoslovakia with Finnland.
The Finns did fight againt much higher odds than the check had,it did cost them dearly in manpower.
Altough they did lose some land did they keep their freedom and wasnt incorporated in the Sovietunion like the baltic states.
The Checks had a better position than the Finns,but they gave in for the pressure not at least from GB.
If the Checks had stod firm would Hitler IMO back down since he had more to lose than win on a real war 1938.
About Hungary backstabbing the Checks that risk was slim about the same as the Swedes would accept Stalins sugesstion 39 that they would split Finland between them.
The Poles altough was a real threat.
If you dont stand up against the bullies will you always be opressed,that stands both for persons and nations.
Hasse -
Message 37
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 4th October 2008
The Finns did fight againt much higher odds Ìý
This is debatable. The Mannerheim Line was considered impenetrable in frontal attack. Red Army had no flanking option, as, for example, Wehrmacht had to bypass the Maginot Line. Now consider the approach to the Line: dense woods; narrow passes; deep snow; brutal - virtually unbearable at nights - cold; Finnish mines going off at the head and at the end of advancing columns; Finnish snipers picking off officers from everywhere. Pretty tough environment for an offensive operation, don't you think? -
Message 38
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Saturday, 4th October 2008
The Finnish analogy here doesn’t really work. The reason is that although the Finns may have lost both the Winter War and the subsequent 'Continuation War' and although Finland had to cede territory, nevertheless, the country was not conquered by the Soviet Union.Ìý
But is such a "middle way" possible between Germany and Czechoslovakia?
The territories Stalin wanted (and got) were in one corner of the country. Their loss was a heavy blow, but Finland could (and still does) exist without them.
OTOH, the territories Hitler wanted from Czechoslovakia were far more crucial. Without them, the country was indefensible and Hitler could and did help himself to the rest of it whenver he wanted.
So I don't see how a "Finnish" outcome was possible in the Czech case. For them, it would either be total victory or total defeat.
Another analogy would be the case of Ireland. It's a bit like saying that the independence of southern Ireland is only temporary but 'in the end' the UK will conquer Ireland. This is obviously not the case.MÌý
Difference is, the UK doesn't want to reconquer Southern Ireland.
Eire's position is exactly what Czechoslovakia's would have been if Hitler had been "genuine" and only interested in annexing those bits of it whose inhabitants wanted to be annexed - as Britain has retained the corner of Ireland which wanted to be retained.
Had we been determined to keep all Ireland (and prepared to use the sort of methods Hitler used in occupied Poland) we would be there to this day. -
Message 39
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Saturday, 4th October 2008
The Checks had a better position than the Finns,but they gave in for the pressure not at least from GB.Ìý
But if they were strong enough to handle Germany alone, why yield to the pressure?
FTM why would GB or France have applied any? After all, if the Czechs were really so strong, that was an ideal situation for us. No need to fight, and no need to surrender either. Just sit contentedly on our bums and let them wear each other out, then broker a ceasefire once everybody was exhausted. No need at all for Mr Chamberlain to go rushing across Europe like a blue-***ed fly when he could have been at home looking after the British economy.
In such a case, what on earth were all the alarums and excursions about? If the Czechs were strong enough to fight alone, then none of the events make any sense. -
Message 40
Posted by hambi22 (U2309395) on Saturday, 4th October 2008
Hello Hasse,
regarding only the number of the divizion on the eve of Munchen agremet, The German had no clear supremacy. The Hungarian had only few brigades.
But the germans had supremacy in the tanks and planes.
May be the bigist trouble is for Czechoslovak was the leng of the the border. The divizion were to much stretched. One divizion has in average cover about 50 km. So it was for German no problem to create local supremancy.
Hambi 22 -
Message 41
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 4th October 2008
Hi again, backtothedarkplace (dan)Free Sean!
But there is nothing that says its due in 1941 everything I can find relating to the speed of the call up and forming and equipping of the divisions seems to imply that 1942 was intended to be the crucial year. Ìý
This is another issue commonly overlooked when talking about 1942 as alleged Stalin's target for readiness to launch: prior to 1939 military draft in the Soviet Union was selective, and the draft age was 21. On September 1, 1939 this was changed to reduce the draft age to 18 and to make the draft mandatory for all. So, anybody of eligible age not drafted by then – whether 18, 21 or even 30 years old – was drafted in the autumn of 1939. This manipulation of military conscription allowed Stalin to quietly increase the size of Red Army from 2M in the summer of 1939 to 5.5M in June of 1941. But here’s the kicker: most of them were due for dismissal from the Army in the autumn of 1941, because by law they had to serve 2 years. If Stalin was planning to engage in 1942 as you claim, he would have surely postponed this draft until 1940. -
Message 42
Posted by Hasse (U1882612) on Saturday, 4th October 2008
Suvoretz
The so strong Mannerheim line was a myth,most of it was constructed in haste a couple of month before,it lacked dept.The fortifications on 95km long line where 66 pillboxes with machineguns,no one could withstand heavy artillery.
The Soviet attack was not only by the Karelian ichtmus.
The Soviet 8th army did attack east of lake Ladoga,the 9th did attack further north trying to cut Finland in half and the 14th attacking from Murmamsk.
So the Soviet put the pressure on the whole frontier.
Soviet had vastly more men,guns,tanks and planes.
You are altough right about the terrain and weather the Fins made masterly use of that and won some spectacular victories like Soumasalmi.
On the other hand the time for the attack was chosen by Stalin not Paasikivi.
Hasse -
Message 43
Posted by Hasse (U1882612) on Saturday, 4th October 2008
Mikestone
Yes that is a good question why did the britts diplomatic speaking more or less break the Checks arm for get them to yield.
My comment is that Hitler was a very good conn man the world belived Germany to be stronger than it was. You can look at when the Germans marched in Reinland was the world astouned over the good equipment and dicipline the Germans had they where also talking about the German airforce.
Those couple of thousand soldiers where about the only one with equipment at that time,the airforce consisted of twelve bf-109 whos machinguns where unable to fire since the syncronisation with the propeller didnt work,everytime they landed where they repainted with new markers to look as they was more.
Hitler did make a bluff over Checkoslovakia and the world fell for it not daring to call his cards.
Its a bit the same with later on the battle of France.Most people are still today convinced that the Germans had superority both in men,armour,artillry and planes.Wich is false,even the belief that the German tanks and planes was of better quality is an illusion.
Hasse -
Message 44
Posted by Hasse (U1882612) on Saturday, 4th October 2008
Hambi
You are quite right there wouldnt be any problem for the Germans to create a local supremacy.
Their problem would be to utilize it.
They had 7 armoured divisions(four just light armed),3 gebirge and 5 motorised (lorries) that had more speed than to walk to put against the Checks.
The Cheks could move their men on interior lines by rail and lorries and they had 4 fast armoured divisions two with LTvz35 tanks(P35t).
The Checks had a real overweight in artillery not at least heavy.
The Germans had an on paper chrushing advantage in tanks. This is more or less a mirage since their force consited more or less only of PI and PII mostly PI,PIII and the first workable PIVE didnt go into production until later.
Neither PI or PII was designed to go into war they where basicly build for training.
PI was armed with twin machine guns and had between 7-13 mm armour wich you could pentrate with a heavy calibre machine gun,PII was armed with a machine gun and a 20 mm gun the armour was somewhat better than PI.
The Check had LTvz35(P35t)the LTvz38(P38t)was ordered but not deliverd at this time.
Ltvz35 was armed with two machine guns and a 37,5mm cannon the armour was up to 35 mm.
Neither the PI or PII stod a chanse against the LTvz35,PI couldnt harm it and PII would have go into point blank range for to have a chanse of success.
Well into 1940 was the Check built P35t and P38t the best the Germans had in numbers.
Acording to airforce have to agree on the German advantage.Not so much in numbers since the Checks had a large airforce it was a bit old and the German spanking new.One thing was altough to German disadvantage the best of Luftwaffe was at this time in Spain fighting for Franco.
So the Checks would have a real good chanse to give the German a real run for their money and keeping their independence.
IMHO would the Germans step down if the Checks had stod firm.
Hitler did as you know plan an anschluss taking Austria as early as 1936 but did back down when Mussolini did put troops at the Austrain border declaring that they would defend Austria from Gemany.
Hasse -
Message 45
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 4th October 2008
On the other hand the time for the attack was chosen by Stalin not Paasikivi.
Ìý
Stalin was on his tight strategic schedule - as you can see from my previous post. Finnish campaign was just a tactical milestone - hence the seemingly unexplainable timing -
Message 46
Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Saturday, 4th October 2008
Re: Message 45.
Suvorovetz, I just borrowed today a book from the library from the Dutch historian Marius Broekmeyer: "Bedrogen bedriegers. Stalin contra Hitler" (deceived deceivers)(2006). It is the follow up from his book from 1999:
Stalin, the Russians, and Their War: 1949-1945
In his foreword of the latest book he says: that he in his first book made the question if the Soviet-Union in or araound 1941 planned an attack on Hitler-Germany? In his first book he balanced to the "no", but now he balances to the "yes", although there is no "sound argument" or "not yet" and there will perhaps never be a "sound argument"
You have first the "official" Soviet-Russian opinion, that is also backed by the Western historici, although with other nuances. That is also the version that I mentioned overhere and that I read in the book I mentioned yesterday from the far-left Belgian Lieven Soete (in the library they have called in for me that book (in reparation) from another belgian library and I will have it next week). Than you have the second version from the Germans that they had acted in a preventive war, while the Russians were concentrating their troops at the new West border of the German Reich, there was also the agression on the Fins.
A third opinion for the first time uttered by the to Britain defected Soviet-Russian officer from the secret service Victor Suvorov... He says that WWII intentionally is sparked by Stalin by the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-agression pact of 19 August 1939. And once Europe exhausted by the struggle between Hitler and the democracies, Stalin would enter the war to bring the whole Europe under his rule. Hitler would then be the ice-breaker for Stalin. Suvorov explained his thesis in his two books "Ledokol" (the Ice-breaker) and "Denj M" (Day M).
Suvorovetz, when I read further in the book I will let you know a synopsis of the book on your "19 August 1939" thread.
Warm regards,
Paul. -
Message 47
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 5th October 2008
Hi, Paul
In his foreword of the latest book he says: that he in his first book made the question if the Soviet-Union in or araound 1941 planned an attack on Hitler-Germany? In his first book he balanced to the "no", but now he balances to the "yes", although there is no "sound argument" or "not yet" and there will perhaps never be a "sound argument" Ìý
This reminds me of an old - admittedly pretty racist - Soviet joke about Eskimo, or, as they call them in Russia, Tchuktcha representative at the All-Soviet Writers Congress. When asked if he ever read Pushkin, Tchuktcha said that he is a writer, not a reader.
Perhaps, if many of the so-called established historians read even their original sources - like Zhukov's memoirs, for example - with a fine tooth comb, so to speak, they would find that illusive "sound argument." But I can only commend your compatriot for coming around, however slowly and painful this process is. -
Message 48
Posted by Hasse (U1882612) on Sunday, 5th October 2008
Suvoretz
You are of course correct about the time table.
Furthermore did Stalin exept Finland to give in at the first shot considering the Soviet advantage in forces.
A big misscalculation.A funny tidbit was the the Soviet troops of the 9th and 14th army in the north had severe orders not to blunder in on Swedish lands acording to the fast advance that was exepted.
IMHO was the lesson the Soviets did learn in Finland,what saved them 1941 in the first German onslaught.
The Red army was reorginised after as Stalin secretly tought defeat against the Fins. Hitler took the debacle as a proof that the Red army was usseles.He should have asked the Finns who had a real respect for the courage and the deffensive if not the offensive power of the Russians.
Hasse -
Message 49
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Sunday, 5th October 2008
This reminds me of an old - admittedly pretty racist - Soviet joke about Eskimo, or, as they call them in Russia, Tchuktcha representative at the All-Soviet Writers Congress. When asked if he ever read Pushkin, Tchuktcha said that he is a writer, not a reader. Ìý
Sounds a bit like the one about the Albanian police back in Communist days.
Q. Why do policemen always go around in threes?
A. Because the first can write but not read, the second can read but not write, and the third is a reliable Party man sent to keep an eye on the intellectuals. -
Message 50
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Sunday, 5th October 2008
Hasse
IMHO was the lesson the Soviets did learn in Finland,what saved them 1941 in the first German onslaught Ìý
IMHO this had little if nothing to do with the first German onslaught, simply because nether Stalin, nor his General Staff with Zhukov at the head, expected any German onslaught. They were busy preparing one of their own instead.
The Red army was reorginised after as Stalin secretly tought defeat against the Fins. Hitler took the debacle as a proof that the Red army was usseles.He should have asked the Finns who had a real respect for the courage and the deffensive if not the offensive power of the RussiansÌý
Same here. Hitler never really planned to be trapped in multiple front war. In fact, he had explicitly warned that Germany cannot afford one in his infamous Mein Kampf. No 'perceived debacle' - which it absolutely was not, as you pointed out - could lure him into it. But in the summer of 1940 he was informed that Stalin had begun amassing enormous striking force, particularly in just annexed Bessarabia. His only source of oil - apart from oil shipments from Stalin himself - was Ploesti oil fields, which now were a tank column's dash away from being cut off. The jig was up. Hitler ordered his General Staff to put together Barbarossa in desperation. By the way, both Keitel and Jodl testified as much in Nuremberg. Of course, established historians dismissed all that in favor of Zhukov's memoirs. After all, Marshal Zhukov did not hang in Nuremberg, for some reason or another.
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