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WW2 RAF Precision attacks
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Message 1.聽
Posted by Bashfulsmudger (U11287440) on Monday, 11th August 2008
We have recently had many replies to a question asked by Fascinating and the debate is not over.
But I would like to point out that there were several precision bombing raids carried out by the RAF during WW2 with complete success.
I would like to know the thoughts of some of our learned readers with regards to their personal preferences of the best RAF precision raid and why.
I look forward to reading the replies.
Regards
TCS -
Message 2
Posted by merlin (U10448262) on Tuesday, 12th August 2008
It would be all too easy to refer to one of the Mosquito raids.
But instead I will go for the Attack by Lancasters on the Renault factory, on the outskirts of Paris - March 3/4 1942. This was with 236 aircraft of which 232 claimed to have hit the target, dropping 470 tons of h/e. achieving a high concentration. Only one aircraft was lost, and the loss of life among french civilians was said to be very low.
It was an example of what could be achieved, when the will was there. -
Message 3
Posted by vera1950 (U9920163) on Tuesday, 12th August 2008
hi,
I have picked this up from your reply to one of my postings on the Harris debate.
I am not knowledgeable in individual air raids but I am learning from you all,which is good and increasng my interest.
As you will have gathered I am a supporter of Harris not a knocker of him.
If he was guilty of any incompetences I think he would have been stopped at the time.
Please continue with your posts on bombing raids I am learning so much.As yet not competent enough to contribute much. -
Message 4
Posted by 2295wynberglad (U7761102) on Tuesday, 12th August 2008
Vera & Tom,
we are all with you on that, well most of us.
the thing that bugs me is why all this hindsight thinking it just does not work.
Now Tom what about that German Battle ship the Tirpitz was it the lancs put paid to that.
Wilf. -
Message 5
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Tuesday, 12th August 2008
<quote>Now Tom what about that German Battle ship the Tirpitz was it the lancs put paid to that<quote>
I was going to use that as an example,but then Tirpitz was to be honest in a bit of a state by the time of her actual demise( being bombed by the FAA and mined by RN midget subs).Tallboys did sink her of course however.
Vf -
Message 6
Posted by Scarboro (U2806863) on Tuesday, 12th August 2008
The Mosquito raids were exceptional. The example I like is the raid on Gestapo HQ in Copenhagen. Prisoners from resistance groups were being held and interrogated on the upper floors, and messages were getting out that they would prefer to be bombed to death to being tortured to death.
The RAF raid sent Mosquitos at street level to skip their bombs to hit the lower floors of the building, hoping to give the prisoners an opportunity to break out.
I heard this was the inspiration for Lucas / Speilberg in the final battle scene of the original Star Wars movie.
Of course for precision raids by Lancasters, the Dam Busters raid fits that bill, but it too may be too obvious. -
Message 7
Posted by Bashfulsmudger (U11287440) on Tuesday, 12th August 2008
Scarboro,
Yes I also considered the Gestapo HQ mission as an example, unfortunately, very sadly and tragically in the smoke and confusion, some bombs were dropped and fell on a nearby school resulting in many child casualties.
The building was totally destroyed. -
Message 8
Posted by Bashfulsmudger (U11287440) on Tuesday, 12th August 2008
Hi Vera,
You aren't normal if you are not continually learning from others!
I am learning a lot from reading this and other message boards.
My problem is laying my hands on a book which I can use as a reference. I sometimes think, 'I know I have read this somewhere, but from which book in my collection'. It can be a little frustrating at times.
But then there is always the internet to fall back on and point me in the right direction.
A raid I think was a classic was that made by 617 squadron on 14th March 1945 on the Bielefeld viaduct in Germany, where they dropped the 22000 lb 'Grand Slam' bomb, taking out a huge chunk of the viaduct.
617 Squadron also carried out a 'Tallboy' (12000 lb) bombing raid on the night of 8/9 June 1944 on a railway tunnel near Saumar, to prevent a German Panzer unit moving up to the Normandy area.
Again with complete success.
I agree with the earlier posting that the Tirpitz was already damaged when it was bombed at Troms枚 in Norway.
But it was still considered a threat great enough to warrant a fresh attack to finish her off with 'Tallboy' 12000 lb bombs.
I believe that only one Lancaster failed to return as it was hit by Flak and made a forced landing in Sweden. -
Message 9
Posted by George1507 (U2607963) on Tuesday, 12th August 2008
It's all very well to say that these raids were complete successes - but how many raids were unsuccessful before the eventual successful one?
The area round the Bielefeld railway viaduct was like the Somme - covered in blast holes from unsuccessful raids - by the time the viaduct was demolished.
Precision bombing in the 1940s wasn't the state of the art science it is today. -
Message 10
Posted by Bashfulsmudger (U11287440) on Tuesday, 12th August 2008
George,
I take your point about the other raids on the viaduct.
As your link pointed out, it was one of the top priority targets, to be destroyed.
I started this link to show that the RAF did indeed hit essential targets and were not always employed in blanket bombing.
It took just ONE bomb to finish off the viaduct, whereas before many tons of bombs were dropped by both the RAF and the USAF, resulting in the WW1 landscape and a little damage to the structure.
Using the new bombs designed by Barnes wallis, a near miss was almost as good as a direct hit due to the deep penetration and earthquake efffect.
It is a case of giving the Armed forces the right tools at the right time.
You then get the proper results.
Tom -
Message 11
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Tuesday, 12th August 2008
Bombing accuracy in WW2 was almost non-existent, whether it was undertaken by day or night, which is why I think the concept of area bombing made sense if one is determined to use bombing in a strategic sense. The higher the a/c flew, the less accurate the bombing would be, but here's a quote from a book by a USAAF historian (I forget the author's name, unfortunately):
<quote userid=</quote>In the fall of 1944, only seven per cent of all bombs dropped by the Eighth Air Force hit within 1,000ft of their aim point; even a fighter-bomber in a 40 degree dive releasing a bomb at 7,000 ft could have a circular error (CEP) of as much as 1,000 ft. It took 108 B-17 bombers, crewed by 1,080 airmen, dropping 648 bombs to guarantee a 96 per cent chance of getting just two hits inside a 400 by 500 ft area (a German power-generation plant.)</quote>
That same author notes that despite the claims made for the Norden bombsight, bombing accuracy was roughly the same for the RAF as it was the USAAF when both bombed by daylight. At night, accuracy was non-existent.
Winds play an extremely important role in bombing accuracy, and winds are unpredictable for the most part. This was particularly true over Japan, where the Jet Stream is both powerful and erratic. That's why LeMay decided to ignore the fact that the B-29 was designed as a high altitude bomber and had them bomb from 9,000 to 12,00O feet.
As for area bombing being unnecessary, there are 3 reasons why that perspective was a fallacy in WW2. The first one is stated above. The second is that the factories and assembly plants in Germany, France, Japan --- everywhere, for that matter, even at the beginning of the bombing campaigns, were surrounded by workers' houses. Consequently, any time a raid was mounted against even a large target, bombs were bound to kill civilians. And by 1943, assembly areas and factories were not merely dispersed, they were heavily camouflaged and it was impossible for airmen to differentiate between them and surrounding homes, schools, churches, hospitals -- you name it. So if you wanted to take out the factories etc., you had to destroy just about everything.
Finally, at the time, every military and political mind in the entire world believed that strategic bombing would, if not actually win the war all by itself, at least make it easier for ground forces etc. That changed during the war, as has been noted many times on another thread, but for the first 3-4 years, no one doubted it. -
Message 12
Posted by petes (U3344676) on Wednesday, 13th August 2008
Erik - I agree, here鈥檚 a practical example of what bombing could/couldn鈥檛 achieve.
I mentioned on the 鈥榃ho started Bombing鈥 post (message 83), an entry in my Uncle鈥檚 (he was Lancaster Pathfinder Navigator) Log Book identified as 鈥極peration Luena鈥 near Leipzig 鈥 it took place on 14/1/1945.
Out of interest I just Googled Leuna 鈥 a document turned up that gives details of several synthetic oil plant (hydrogenation) operating in Germany during the war. These plants were for turning coal tar into oil. Luena was a hydrogenation plant sited near Leipzig. The document contains the following comment 鈥
鈥淭he variation in coal content of Leuna paste came about through their hydrogenation at times of some excess brown coal tar from the Leipzig area. This excess tar became available after some of the tar hydrogenating plants were partially bombed out.鈥 (my italics)
Google also found another document 鈥 a report called the 鈥榃ar on Oil鈥 from the USAAF site, which although mostly covering the USAAF raids does refer to the RAF contribution also. It states 鈥
鈥淐onsequently, the order of bombing accuracy on Leuna was not high as compared with other targets. To win the battle with Leuna a total of 6,552 bomber sorties were flown against the plant, 18,328 tons of bombs were dropped and an entire year was required.鈥
So 鈥榩recision鈥 bombing ultimately did reduce Germany鈥檚 oil output although the plant(s) continued to be repaired and returned to operation, albeit at a lower output.
But 18,328 tons of bombs dropped to destroy a single plant - so much for precision! No wonder area bombing was favoured. -
Message 13
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Wednesday, 13th August 2008
Erik,
I must disagree on nearly all points.
Even for the heavy bombers at night it is an strong overstatement that accuracy was non-existent. By 1944 a 50% error circle of about a mile was possible: Not as good as the best bombsights such as the Norden and SABS could achieve (100 yards), but vastly better than the 30% within five miles of 1941. In the summer of 1944 the efforts of No 5 Group, with low-level target marking and offset markers, resulted in 50% errors of less than 300 yards. This wasn't feasible against all targets, but over France the RAF demonstrated that it could be reasonably accurate if it wanted to.
Of course only dive-bombers were really accurate. Stuka pilots were expected to achieve an error radius of 25m during training. The best IJN dive-bomber pilots were apparently capable of putting 80% of their bombs on a moving target 182m long -- HMS Hermes. Fighter-bombers were evaluated to have a 3% direct hit rate against undefended bridges, 0.5% if the bridge was defended by AAA. Heavy bombers from high altitude were certainly not as accurate.
But that is not as defining to the concept of "area bombing" as it may seem. Because area bombing was not about performing blanket attacks on wide areas to hit military targets. Area bombing, I can't emphasize this enough, was all about _deliberately_ attacking city centres and civilian populations. This was not collateral damage, it was the primary target. As Portal pointed out in July 1940, most high-priority military targets were actually in relatively thinly populated areas, and bombs that missed the target were "wasted". Attacks on densely populated city centres ensured that fewer bombs would fail to do damage, but they did this by defining the civilian population as primary target -- euphemistically described as attack on "morale" or as a "dehousing" strategy. Any damage to military installations or factories was actually "collateral". It was desirable, but a secondary goal. An American military planner described the characteristics of the ideal city target for an area raid as "ancient, compact, historic, and of as much industrial importance as possible".
To say that the crucial targets were dispersed widely within the cities is wrong, too. It is true that that much of manufacturing was dispersed, camouflaged or moved underground; and railway stations and yards were often in populated areas. However, it is quite difficult to disperse or camouflage an oil refinery, steel mill or railway yard; or a major assembly plant. These crucial weak points in the enemy war machine were big enough and difficult to hide. I think it is under-appreciated how effective the 1944 offensive against these targets was: German fuel production, never really sufficient to meet its needs, took a 90% hit when the Allied air force finally started to deliberately and efficiently target it. And it stayed at rock bottom, with disastrous consequences for the Wehrmacht. While the area raids at best perhaps shaved 15% off the German war production.
Finally, while at least the air force officers all believed that the strategic air offensive would contribute to win the war, there was plenty of disagreement around the concept of area bombing and the expectation that it would contribute to victory. Perhaps most revealing is the reluctance of air forces and governments to admit that they indulged in it at all. -
Message 14
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Monday, 18th August 2008
Area bombing could take in industrial targets, where the target city was organised that way. The Battle of the Ruhr, which is counted at a victory for Bomber Command, was fought mainly by area bombing of the cities concerned - but the densely packed Ruhr towns lent themselves to this approach. Unfortunately, the Ruhr and Speer's organisation in general, was given a respite at just the time he was fully mobilising.
The point Portal was making was that not all cities were laid out that way, and that for some, the target, given the limitations of the bomber weapon at the time, would be the city not its industry. The idea was to make the city incapable of supporting its industry, not destroying the industry directly.
"Dehousing" was not a euphemism. British experience in the Blitz, and what intelligence there was from Germany (mostly diplomatic) indicated that many more people lost their houses than were killed and injured. Conversely, people seemd more affected by the loss of their house and possessions than by the deaths of neighbours, or even relatives. The later realisation that morale would only suffer catastrophically in the face of a hammer blow such as Hamburg was where the debate polarised.
It should also be borne in mind that the Area Bombing directive was only in place for a year - from April 42 until the Casablanca Directive replaced. Casablanca reflected the improving capabilities of Bomber Command, and the new capabilities of the USAAF. The morale target remained on the list, and it was the retention of it as a separate category that Harris was arguing for in his "Leipzig" letter in October 1943.
I agree that, in the context of the latter part of 1944 and 1945, the transportation and oil targets were crucial and effective. But many of the key elements of these target sets, particularly oil, lay in the eastern part of Germany or the eastern occupied territories. Until the defences of the Reich were pushed back to the borders of Germany itself, they could not be reached with acceptable loss by either Bomber Command or the two USAAF strategic air forces - Ploesti was proof of that.
Further, until the Wehrmacht was fully engaged on two fronts, which did not happen until at least Anzio and, more realistically, after D-Day, neither the transportation or the oil target was critical - Germany could have proceeded against the Red Army alone with surviving capacity.
It was the combination of strategic circumstance and improving bomber capabilities that combined in 1944 to allow a "precision" answer to be found. As we have agreed before, Harris was wrong to refuse to accept this, and should have been sacked. But in the circumstances on 1942-early 1944 his approach was the agreed and viable one.
One small point, in reply to Erik's post. It was not US and British daylight bombing where accuracy was comparable. In the later half of 1944, 8th AF's average accuracy by daylight was less that Bomber Command's BY NIGHT. The reason was weather - the Norden bombsight was not designed with European cloud cover in mind. In accordance with the doctrine of "round the clock" bombing, and because airspace management was difficult enough over Southern England as it was, Bomber Command's Main Force rarely operated by daylight. -
Message 15
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Message 16
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Message 17
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Saturday, 30th August 2008
I would refer you to "Precision" and "Area Bombing: Who Did Which, and When? by W Hays Parks, a US DoD lawyer specialising in bombing issues (published in
"Airpower:Theory and Practice" (Frank Cass, London 1995, ISBN 0-7146-4186-3).
Working from US sources, he shows that 76% of 8th AF attacks from 1st Sep (release from SHAEF) to 31 Dec were non-visual. Attacks on synthetic oil plants achieved a hit rate of 15.4% overall. A comparison the USAAF Strategic Bombing Survey made of USAAF and RAF attacks on three plants attacked by both forces, showed the RAF achieving a 15.6% hit rate, against a USAAF rate overall of 14.8%
He quotes Speer reporting in January 1945 that the night [RAF] attacks ...are considerably more effective than daylight [US] attacks, since heavier bombs are used and an extraordinary accuracy in attacking the target is reported.
He also notes that Spaatz's biographer concluded that "marshalling yards" was a USAAF euphemism for city areas.
For your information, I don't post utter nonsense, and I always have a reference. -
Message 18
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Message 19
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Message 20
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 31st August 2008
Matt
As the various posts make clear, we were discussing the period from the middle of 1944 to 1945, hence the parts I quoted.
The article cited in fact covers the whole of the combined bomber offensive, and comes to the same overall conclusion. The author is a senior US DOD attorney, who was responsible for legal advice for OP EL DORADO CANYON and OP DESERT STORM, and is highly decorated for his civilian service.
And, as ever, I didn't "rat you out". I hadn't even seen any of the pulled posts, until I read the nonsense one. But I reserve the right to complain about abuse, as per the House Rules. -
Message 21
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Message 22
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 31st August 2008
In good visual conditions, 8th AF's accuracy was rather better than Bomber Command's at night (for that matter, Bomber Command's accuracy by day was also better than by night). But, as pointed out in posts above, good visual conditions only occurred for 24% of 8th AF's missions. Bomber Command, using radar aids, was not so weather-dependent, and was better at using radar than the USAAF (which hadn't been expecting to have to use it).
To quote Hays Park again:
"The USAAF's daylight visual bombing was neither five nor ten times more accurate than the best of RAF Bomber Command's night-time attacks, nor as accurate as the latter under limited visibility - which was the majority of the time."
No it does not. It is counter-intuitive, until you apply the factor of weather. There is a reason that the weather is the first part of the morning brief in air forces across the planet.
He's basing this on the USAAF's own survey results, these aren't figures he or I plucked out of thin air. You really should read the article - it's only 30 pages long, and the book should be available from any decent library, especially yours side of the pond. It's also still available to buy.
In fact, I'd recommend the book to anyone interested in strategic airpower. It is a collection of essays covering a number of topics, including inter alia, the Spanish Civil War and the development of manned bombers under Eisenhower and JFK, as well as the RAF/USAAF strategic offensives. -
Message 23
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 31st August 2008
Now that is just bizarre. The sentences beginning "No, it does not." were at the start of the post when I pressed the post button, not after the Hays Park quote.
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Message 24
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Message 25
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 31st August 2008
No, the Republicans had an air force just as big. I'll leave it to the book to explain why the Luftwaffe dominated. You'd probably enjoy the book, if you gave it a chance.
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Message 26
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Message 27
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Message 28
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 31st August 2008
That non-intervention agreement was spectacularly flouted by Germany, Italy and the USSR, a problem that the members of the overseeing committee solved by looking the other way. At one time a Spanish complaint was rejected because Spain was not a signatory of the non-intervention agreement, and therefore had no right to complain! This must have been the second most obnoxious diplomatic fallacy perpetrated in the 1930s. (The first being an US complaint that the Chinese ambassador was 'anti-Japanese' -- at a time when China was being invaded by Japan. Looking the other way was not just a British practice.)
Overall this was in favour of the Nationalists, as the fascist powers were much more generous with their support than the USSR. The Republicans did get 93 Tupolev SB bombers, however. These 'Katyushkas' as the type was dubbed, were the most modern bombers of their time, too fast to be intercepted by the German and Italian biplane fighters. For a while the Republicans had at least the core of a modern, effective bomber force at their service. The SB was certainly far superior to the Ju 52s that Germany initially sent to Spain. Only when Bf 109Bs finally appeared in Spain was the SB no longer effective.
In the early 1930s, the USSR had the largest and most advanced bomber force in the world, thanks to the genius of Andrei Nikolayevich Tupolev and the Soviet obsession with the products of modern industry -- which of course included heavy bombers. They lost their lead in the late 1930s, mostly I think as a side effect of the purges of Stalin.
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