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Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 1.
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 7th July 2008
It appears that the following events took place in Moscow on Saturday, August 19, 1939:
1. Stalin either offers himself or accepts Hitler’s offer for the “Non-aggression” Pact (the Pact is signed the next week on Wednesday)
2. Stalin gives General Zhukov the go-ahead order to attack the 6th Japanese Army at Khalkin Gol
3. Stalin orders secret but massive Red Army mobilization
4. Stalin makes a speech in an urgent joint session with Politburo members and Comintern leadership. The speech contains the following excerpts:
“The question of war and peace enters the critical for us phase. If we make an agreement of mutual cooperation with France and Great Britain, Germany will give up on Poland and will seek “modus vivendi” with the western powers. War will be avoided, but future events could become dangerous for the USSR. If we accept Germany’s offer for a non-aggression pact, she, of course, will attack Poland, and the involvement of France and Great Britain in this war will become inevitable. Western Europe will be subjected to serious angst and unrest. In this situation, we will have good chances to stay away from the conflict, and we can hope for advantageous involvement in the war.
The experience of the last 20 years shows that it is impossible to generate Communist movement strong enough for the Bolshevik Party to take power in Europe in peace-time. The dictatorship of this Party becomes possible only as a result of a big war. We will make our choice, and it is clear. We must accept the German offer and politely send English and French missions back. “
(cited from the copy kept in the Centre for the Preservation of Collections of Historical Documents, former Soviet Special Archives; fund 7, list 1, file 1223)Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 2
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Monday, 7th July 2008
That was a busy day indeed...
But it pales into insignificance to the manic activity of the evening of 20th and the morning of 21st June 1941.
The 'Little Corner' had beeen busy for days, with everyone in a flurry about German shipping movements and 'provocative' reconnaissance flights.
Poskreychev told Chadaev that "The Boss" had been in conference with Timoshenko. German deserters had told of the invasion plan. Still Stalin refused to believe the brute fact that Russia was about to be attacked.
In the next few hours..
"Stalin swung between the force of reality and the self-delusion of his infallibility" (from S. Montefiore, 2003. "Stalin, The Court of the Red Tsar")
Within 24 hours he had to accept that he had held Soviet forces back from responding to the German invasion. Probably the worst moment of his life.
With the Germans now 200 miles inside the SU he had to wake up and smell the coffee.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 3
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 7th July 2008
"The 'Little Corner' had beeen busy for days, with everyone in a flurry about German shipping movements and 'provocative' reconnaissance flights."
Of course, we all know that Hitler launched the attack of June 22, 1941, and that he spent considerable time preparing for it. Nobody ever disputed that, and I am not either. However, it appears that Stalin was doing the same on much larger scale. That includes the flurry of Russian shipping movements and reconnaissance flights, by the way. Stalin had all sorts of contradictory intelligence coming in. As I pointed out in the other thread, his GRU chief Golikov and Stalin himself quite reasonably concluded that Wehrmacht was unfit to attack Red Army, which turned out to be the right conclusion, by the way. That's why Hitler's attack came as a very nasty surprise to Stalin and his Chief of General Staff Zhukov.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 4
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 9th July 2008
"That was a busy day indeed...
But it pales into insignificance to the manic activity of the evening of 20th and the morning of 21st June 1941"
This in particular I would have to strongly disagree with. Granted, June 22, 1941 is the most significant WWII milestone. But, in my opinion, nothing can eclipse August 19, 1939, carefully considering the gravity of the moves made on that day in Moscow. Essentially, on this day WWII became inevitability.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 5
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Wednesday, 9th July 2008
I would agree that August 19th 1939 was an absolutely critical date, but allow me to develop my case for 21st and 22nd of June 1941.
On that June day Stalin was close to madness. He had convinced himself and his retinue of the impossibility of an imminent German invasion. When he was so abruptly proved wrong, what did he do?
1) He denied the validity of good intelligence from his spies in the German Air Force.
2) He said that if Germany was going to invade, they had "Missed the best moment".
3) He refused to take calls from his chief of staff, Zhukov. (He had told his secretary in Kuntsevo to say he wasn't even there.)
4) Admiral Kuznetsov, who knew that German aircraft were even then bombing Sebastopol, was not allowed to speak to Stalin.
5) The next morning, despite all the evidence that war was now happening, he remained in denial, still talking about cunning German provocation to get him to fight.
6) Voronov described Stalin that day as "depressed and nervy with his voice breaking"
Whereas, on August 19th two years before, Stalin had been the omnipotent Generalissimo, by 22nd June 1941 he was a psychiatric case. It seems to have taken him 4-6 weeks to recover sound judgment. So I still reckon Stalin went into busy over-load on that day. (And your thread is about 'busy days'. So, from Stalin's viewpoint, I would guess there was none busier.)
On another matter...you seem to have a grip on this Russian stuff; have you by any chance read Arkady Babcheko's "One Soldier's War in Chechnya"?
I found it a gripping tale.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 6
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 9th July 2008
Let me ask you about the source of these details first. Taking it part by part,
"1) He denied the validity of good intelligence from his spies in the German Air Force."
As I said before, he had every reason to dismiss intelligence reports about the imminent attack. Wehrmacht was utterly unprepared for Russian campaign. That is a fact.
"2) He said that if Germany was going to invade, they had "Missed the best moment"."
This statement does not make any sense. You explain this by the fact that Stalin went mad. I suspect the source, however.
"3) He refused to take calls from his chief of staff, Zhukov. (He had told his secretary in Kuntsevo to say he wasn't even there.)"
This one I can tell you is absolute rubbish. According to V. Suvorov, who studied Stalin's Visitors' Book, Zhukov spent all night long in Stalin's office on the might of June 21 - 22.
"4) Admiral Kuznetsov, who knew that German aircraft were even then bombing Sebastopol, was not allowed to speak to Stalin."
Same as above.
"5) The next morning, despite all the evidence that war was now happening, he remained in denial, still talking about cunning German provocation to get him to fight."
The following several days Stalin and his General Staff apparently were still trying to launch the offensive operation they had been planning all along. It failed because of the horrendous and instant losses of equipment and personnel, as well as momentum, of course. No defensive effort was attempted, because it had not even been considered, let alone prepared.
"6) Voronov described Stalin that day as "depressed and nervy with his voice breaking"
I don't know if this is even relevant.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 7
Posted by OUNUPA (U2078829) on Wednesday, 9th July 2008
'It failed because of the horrendous and instant losses of equipment and personnel,'- during the first day of the German invasion Stalin lost 1,200 of fighters and bombers only on land. Such was the first strike of 'unprepared' Germans.
'According to V. Suvorov, who studied Stalin's Visitors' Book, Zhukov spent all night long in Stalin's office on the might of June 21 - 22.'-but according to Zhukov himself Stalin didn't refuse to take call from him ...because Stalin was in Kuntzevo ( which stands seven miles from Kremlin )and where Stalin preferred to stay in June , 1941.
The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov ( London , 1971, p.268 )
And I don't know if this is even relevant , so to speak
Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 8
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 9th July 2008
"The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov ( London , 1971, p.268 )
And I don't know if this is even relevant , so to speak"
Very much relevant. But,
V. Suvorov's books "The Victory Shadow" ('Ten' Pobedy', which is a Russian pun over "The Victory Day", or 'Den' Pobedy') and "I Take Back My Words" are entirely devoted to Marshal Zhukov and his Memoirs. Long story short, Suvorov makes a complete mockery of Zhukov's memoirs, which were re-edited and re-published as many times as the Soviet and consequent Russian administrations changed hands, mostly after the Marshal's death. Suvorov also caught him (and his shadow, so to speak) flat-out and clumsily lying many times over - just like in the case with his whereabouts on the night of 21-22 June, 1941.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 9
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 9th July 2008
"during the first day of the German invasion Stalin lost 1,200 of fighters and bombers only on land. Such was the first strike of 'unprepared' Germans."
You are confusing tactical and strategic outcomes. The reason for Red Army’s tremendous losses was that it was in the final stages of offensive deployment. Here's how it looked:
barb wires, mine fields and other defensive installations dismantled
ammunition, parachutes, maps (of Central and West Europe, by the way) and even uniform dumped on open ground next to the demarcation line and stored in rail cars ready for the 'Deep Offensive Operation', as prescribed by the SOP of the time
airfields moved to within few kilometers from the demarcation line
armies deployed in offensively advantageous, but defensively exposed positions, such as 26 Army in Carpathian Mountains
The list goes on and on. All this and Zhukov's own order to maintain complete radio and otherwise silence resulted in the devastation of Wehrmacht's early morning strike. Of course, Zhukov never mentioned any of that. He even forgot to mention how many tanks he deployed against Wehrmacht.
Why was Wehrmacht unprepared? Suffice it to say that its troops did not have adequate clothing for Russian climate. Wehrmacht equipment was not winterized. Hitler, according to his own generals, was running out of ammunition as early as in August - that is having captured over 75K rail cars filled with Red Army ammunition. Lastly, Wehrmacht lost the war, even though it wiped out the entire first echelon of Red Army within a few weeks. You watch football, do you? The winner is determined at the final whistle, not at the half time, right?Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 10
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Wednesday, 9th July 2008
Let me ask you about the source of these details first
The following have been helpful:-
Beevor, A. (1998) Stalingrad (pp3-21 only)
Berezhlov, V. (1967) History in the Making.
Bullock, A. (1991) Hitler and Stalin, Parallel Lives.
Clark, A (1996) Barbarossa.
Conquest, R. Stalin, Breaker of Nations
Schmidt, p. (1951) Hitler's Interpreter, Secret History of German Diplomacy 1935-45.
Seabag-Montefiore, S. (2003) Stalin, The Court of the Red Tsar.
Shukman, H.(1993) Stalin's Generals
Tolstoy, N. (1981) Stalin's Secret War.
Wettlin, M (1945) Russian Road.
Zhukov, G.K. (1969) Zhukov's Greatest Battles.
There, I've shown you mine, can I have a peep at yours?
he had every reason to dismiss intelligence reports about the imminent attack.
He did much more than that. Yes, his paranoia did make him mistrust his own spies. But he also refused to accept that he was actually under attack when the attack came.
Wehrmacht was utterly unprepared for Russian campaign. That is a fact.
Which would account for the Germans gaining 900 miles in a few months, of course.
This one I can tell you is absolute rubbish.
Your rubbish seems to have been rubbished by others. Is it your position that all sources are invalid apart from the one you cite?
The following several days Stalin and his General Staff apparently were still trying to launch the offensive operation they had been planning all along. It failed because of the horrendous and instant losses of equipment and personnel, as well as momentum, of course. No defensive effort was attempted, because it had not even been considered, let alone prepared.
What a wonderfully Baroque argument!
So, are you saying that Stalin was 'so prepared for attack that he couldn't defend himself'!?
That's silly. The early massive losses were due to the fact that he thought he was in charge of the timing of events, but discoverd that he was not. His arrogance, coupled with the justified terror of his temper, within his immediate circle, meant that few had the courage to tell him that he was wrong. (see Montefiore (above), Chps 31, 32, 33)Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 11
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 9th July 2008
"The following have been helpful:-"
actually, not. What helps is when you cite a source for a particular line item that you provided. You did in only one case: Zhukov's claim that Stalin kept him incommunicado.
"There, I've shown you mine, can I have a peep at yours?"
I did this repeatedly.
"But he also refused to accept that he was actually under attack when the attack came."
I'm not sure what you mean and who you cite here. If it is Zhukov, that would be as a wolf crying wolf. Zhukov issued blanked silence orders as late as midnight on June 21, just like he had done it at Khalkin Gol. It worked then, because the Japanese had not preempted him.
"Your rubbish seems to have been rubbished by others. Is it your position that all sources are invalid apart from the one you cite?"
I cite - although indirectly - the official record of Stalin's meetings with his staff, including General Staff, including the Chief of General Staff. Are you saying that Zhukov's Memoirs written forty years before these records were unearthed supersede them?
"So, are you saying that Stalin was 'so prepared for attack that he couldn't defend himself'!?"
Exactly. You have another explanation of how he lost more tanks, airplanes and troops than Hitler even had at his disposal?Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 12
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 10th July 2008
A few more corrections, if I may.
You said, "But he also refused to accept that he was actually under attack when the attack came." - about Stalin according to Zhukov & Co, I assume.
So that you know, 3 pertinent Directives by Red Army general Staff have been uncovered by now. Directive #1 issued at 0:25 AM, June 22, 1941, stating, "It is the duty of our forces not to retaliate to any provocative actions… No activities are to be conducted until further notice." Signed by non other than Zhukov and Timoshenko.
Directive #2 written and signed by Zhukov at 7:15 AM:
" In connection with the unheard of by its impudence attack of the Soviet Union by Germany, I order for the armies to crash the enemy forces with all forces and means and destroy them in every area, where they crossed the Soviet border...", etc, etc.
And Directive #3 written and signed by Zhukov later on the same day:
"surround and destroy the enemy concentration at Suvalki and take over the area of Suvalki by June 24… surround and destroy the enemy concentration advancing toward Vladimir-Volynsky and Brody… take over the area of Lublin by June 24."
So that you also know, Suvalki, Brody and Lublin were located in Poland west of the demarcation line. So, for Zhukov and his devoted followers to blame everything on Stalin going mad all of a sudden is a bit disingenuous. And this bit is a great sample of what a fraud Zhukov's memoires were:
He writes in his original 1969 edition of "Memories and Thoughts" that Wehrmacht had 3,712 tanks (slightly exaggerated) and 4,950 airplanes (about twice as the actual amount) on page 263 of the Russian edition. Fine. Close enough. On page 411 he repeats the same figures and adds that "the qualitative advantage by the enemy was huge – about 5-6 times over, especially in terms of tanks, artillery and aircraft." Yet, in the same book (almost in the same breath, eh?) he writes, "From January 1939 through June 22, 1941, Red Army received over seven thousand tanks." (page 205). And, "According to validated archive data, from January 1 1939 through June 22, 1941, Industry provided Red Army with 17,745 fighter planes." (page 209). Go figure.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 13
Posted by OUNUPA (U2078829) on Thursday, 10th July 2008
'Why was Wehrmacht unprepared? Suffice it to say that its troops did not have adequate clothing for Russian climate. Wehrmacht equipment was not winterized. '- a silly question , man.
Germans didn't see a need in June 1941 to have clothing for Russian winter just because Hitler was not going to fight against Stalin in December 1941.
'Lastly, Wehrmacht lost the war, even though it wiped out the entire first echelon of Red Army within a few weeks.'- Hitler lost the war because his intentions included in itself the plan to leave the Ukrainians , Belorussians , Lithuanians , Latvians and Estonians without hope of creating their own independent states..he just wanted to make from them slaves as the events in L'viv on 30 of June 1941 showed and proved that.The commitment to such intentions was a fundamental Hitler's weakness , because his armies were based mainly in those territories ( the Ukraine and the Belorussia ) where the non-Russian population favoured at the very least more autonomy and in case with the Ukraine complete indepence from Russia ( i.e. from Stalin , kolkhozs and GULAG and Russians themselves ). If Hitler would not have been failed to see that a compromise with these national aspirations was essential if Hitler was to build a broad base of support among NON-Russian peoples !!!
And ...instead of making the nationalists his allies , Hitler turned them into enemies....with all of outcomes for his Great armies.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 14
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 10th July 2008
"Germans didn't see a need in June 1941 to have clothing for Russian winter just because Hitler was not going to fight against Stalin in December 1941."
But he did fight - a losing battle, mind you - in December of 1941.
"If Hitler would not have been failed to see that a compromise with these national aspirations was essential if Hitler was to build a broad base of support among NON-Russian peoples !!!"
But he did fail to see all that. This does not even begin to describe things Hitler failed to see.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 15
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 10th July 2008
"That's silly. The early massive losses were due to the fact that he thought he was in charge of the timing of events, but discoverd that he was not."
I forgot to address this. Essentially, this statement is in agreement with my premise that Stalin planned offensive operation, because this is the only way he could be in charge of the timing. If he was trying to defend himself, he would be busy digging in, mining everything, and moving his assets away from the would-be front-line. In other words, he would be doing the complete opposite of what he was actually doing.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 16
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Thursday, 10th July 2008
What helps is when you cite a source for a particular line item that you provided. You did in only one case: Zhukov's claim that Stalin kept him incommunicado. (M11 Suvorovetz)
What arrogance! Thanks so much for sparing the time to tell me how to 'do' history. You asked for my sources, I gave you 13.
Here are two more:-
On Stalin's personality pathology see:
Fromm, Erich (1973) "Anatomy of Human Destructiveness" Penguin pp380-384.
Medvedev, R.A. (1971)Let History Judge. Intro and Chps 1-3.
So that's 15 sources in support of my argument, and what do you offer in response?
One text by 'Suvorov'! And what is your ID here?
Suvorovetz! Are you by any chance related?
"There, I've shown you mine, can I have a peep at yours?"(me)
I did this repeatedly.(You)
No you didn't, you are a one 'trick' (reference) pony who has read a short critique of Zhukov and flogged it to death
I cite - although indirectly (Suvorovetz, M11)
Self praise is no recommendation!
A few more corrections, if I may. (Suvorovetz 12)
No, you may not; unless you can demonstrate the breadth of scholarship necessary to hold an informed debate. A redacted list of weapons available to Zhukov hardly clinches any argument from this era, since we both accept that any military notes or histories written in the Soviet Union during Stalin's lifetime are likely to have been re-worked many times by the 'Vozhd' and his editors.
Do you have a proper range of sources beyond Suvorov and his glimpses at Zhukov's records, or don't you?
You bang on about the readiness of the Russian attack before Barbarossa. Yet most sources (esp. Beevor and Montefiore) describe the mood in the Kremlin as "hysterical". Hardly an army in charge of events.
You say the Germans were "unprepared", this is laughable. Why would they take 'winter whites' for fighting in June?
If they were so unprepared how come each German soldier was issued with several condoms (Beevor) before attacking? That strikes me as 'thinking ahead' if ever there was.
Your magnificent 20/20 hindsight allows you to 'back-project' the outcome, but in October 1941 most Europeans were far from confident that Germany would be 'done for'.
As ONUPA has argued, Hitler threw away any possible victory by refusing to schmooz the Ukrainians, Slavs and citizens of the Baltic states, who hated Stalin and all things Russian.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 17
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 10th July 2008
"What arrogance! Thanks so much for sparing the time to tell me how to 'do' history. You asked for my sources, I gave you 13."
I'll give you 2 pages worth of references by days end tomorrow when I get to my desk just to make you happy, dear U3280211.
"No, you may not; unless you can demonstrate the breadth of scholarship necessary to hold an informed debate. "
I hope 2 pages of references will demonstrate enough breadth for you, because it will beat your 13 sorces hands down.
"A redacted list of weapons available to Zhukov hardly clinches any argument from this era, since we both accept that any military notes or histories written in the Soviet Union during Stalin's lifetime are likely to have been re-worked many times by the 'Vozhd' and his editors."
You don't even understand the meaning of what you read. Zhukov's memoires is a proven lie and nothing more than a propaganda buklet.
"Self praise is no recommendation!"
Again, you don't even understand what you're reading.
"You say the Germans were "unprepared", this is laughable. Why would they take 'winter whites' for fighting in June?
If they were so unprepared how come each German soldier was issued with several condoms (Beevor) before attacking? That strikes me as 'thinking ahead' if ever there was."
Talk about laughable. Wehrmacht does not have enough ammunitions to fight the war, but it has enough condoms Beevor. How on earth did they lose the war?
"Hitler threw away any possible victory by refusing to schmooz the Ukrainians, Slavs and citizens of the Baltic states, who hated Stalin and all things Russian."
For your information, Russians are Slavs. Hitler was doomed as soon as Ribbentrop signed the Pact with Molotov on August 23, 1939 in Moscow.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 18
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 10th July 2008
"Your magnificent 20/20 hindsight allows you to 'back-project' the outcome, but in October 1941 most Europeans were far from confident that Germany would be 'done for'."
This is a good one too. How many Europians even today know the number of tanks Stalin produced before the war? Do you know this?Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 19
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 11th July 2008
"No, you may not; unless you can demonstrate the breadth of scholarship necessary"
ok, then.This pretty tedious post is meant to pacify U3280211, who demanded that I demonstrate "the breadth of scholarship" to qualify for the debate, although I haven't found anything of sorts in the 鶹Լ house rules. So, I apologize to everybody else for taking up all this precious cyber space. This is good stuff, though:
V. Suvorov, Icebreaker, AST, 2001; Day 'M', AST, 2001; The Last Republic, AST, 1997; Suicide, AST, 2000; The Victory Shadow, Stalker, 2002; and I Take Back My Words, Stalker, 2005
John Traylor, Combat Aircraft of the World, Ed & Co, 1969
Goralski R. WWII Almanac, 1931-1945, Hamish Hamilton, 1981
Gregory Batchelor, Airborne Warfare 1918-1941, Petty & Sons, 1978
Hearing on American Aspects of the Richard Sorge Spy Case. House of Representatives. 82nd Congress. 1st Session. August 9, 22 and 23, 1951
Hitler, Mein Kampf, Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1940
Kesselring, Gedanken zum Zweiten Weltkrieg, 1955
Le Bon Psychologies des foules, 1895
Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, PAN, 1978
Mallory and Ottar, Architecture of Agression, Wallop G.B., 1973
Muller-Hillebrand, Das Heer 1933-1945, 1954-1956
Nemecek V., The History of Soviet Airctraft from 1918, Willow Books, 1986
Price A., WWII Fighter Conflict, Macdonald and Jane's, 1975
Sutton A., National Suicide; Military Aid to the Soviet Ujion, Arlington House, 1973
Avtorhanov A., The Mystory of Stalin's Death, Posev, 1976
Avtorhanov A., The Origin of Partocracy, Posev, 1973
Azarov I.I., Besieged Odessa, Voyenizdat, 1962
Antipenko N.A., In the Main Direction, Memories of the Front Commander, Nauka, 1967
Antonov-Ovseyenko, The Tiran's Portrait, Chronika, 1980
Anfilov V.A., The Failure of Blitzkrieg, Nauka, 1974
Bagramyan I. H., This Is How the War Began, Voyenizdat, 1971
Bagramyan I.H., This is How We Came to the Victory, Voyenizdat, 1977
Bazhanov V. Memoires of the Former Stalin's Secretary, 3rd Wave, 1980
Basov A.V., Fleet in the Great Patriotic War, Nauka, 1980
Biryuzov S.S., When Guns Roared, Voyenizdat, 1962
Platonov S.P., Battle of Leningrad. 1941-1944, Voyenizdat, 1964
Boldin I.V., Life Pages, Voyenizdat, 1961
Struggle for the Soviet Baltic, Eesti Raamat, 1980
Brezhnev, L. I., Malaya Zemlya, Politizdat, 1978
Vasilevsky A.M., The Mission of My Life, Politizdat, 1973
Vaupshasov S.A., At Alarming Crossroads: Notes of a Chekist, Politizdat, 1971
The Great Patriotic War (1941-1945): Brief Popular Scientific Review, Politizdat, 1973
Sokolovsky V.D., Military Strategy, Voyenizdat, 1962
Voznesensky N.A., Military Economy of the USSR During the Great Patriotic War, Gospolitizdat, 1947
Issues of Operative Art Strategy in the Soviet Military Literature 1937-1940, Voyenizdat, 1965
Voronov N.N., In Military Service, Voyenizdat, 1963
18th in Battles for Motherland: Fighting Road of the 18th Army, Voyenizdat, 1982
Galitsky K.N., Years of Tough Trials, Nauka, 1973
Gallay M.L., 3rd Dimension, Soviet writer, 1979
Galder F., Military Diary. Daily Notes by the Chief of the Ground Forces of the General Staff. 1939-1942, Translation by Voyenizdat, 1968-1971
Gorbatov A.V., Years and Wars, Voyenizdat, 1965
Grigorenko P.V., In the Underground One Only Can Meet Rats, Detinets, 1981
Eremenko A.I. At the Beginning of the War, Nauka, 1964
Zhukov G.K., Memories and Thoughts, APN, 1969
Marx's, Lenin's and Stalin's Complete Work Collections
Shaposhnikov B.M., The Brain of the Army, Gosizdat, 1927-1929
Sandalov L.M, In the Direction of Moscow, Nauka, 1970 and Survivied, Voyenizdat, 1966
Sikorsky V., Future War, Voyenizdat, 1936
Triandafillov V.K., The Scope of the Modern Armies' Operations, Voyenizdat, 1932, and The Character of the Modern Armies' operations, Gosizdat, 1929
Tuchachavsky M.N., Selected Works, Voyenizdat, 1964Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 20
Posted by OUNUPA (U2078829) on Friday, 11th July 2008
'For your information, Russians are Slavs. '- really ? Very valuable bit of info...But they count themselves by the special ones.
Suvorovetz , as I had typed already into my previous post the Hitler's armies were based mainly in those territories ( the Ukraine and the Belorussia ) where the NON -RUSSIAN population favoured at the very least more autonomy and in case with the Ukraine complete independence from Russia ( i.e. from Stalin , kolkhozs and GULAG and Russians themselves ).
But I deeply suspect that Russians who are the special Slavs didn't and don't want to create their own 'independent state'....from the Ukrainian reach soil ( the bread&butter ).... as later Eltzin did it in 1991. Now Russians blame him that he was a traitor.....Yes , from their view , he is a REAL traitor. He deprived Russians from many things ....which they had a habit to take for free. Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 21
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 11th July 2008
OUNUPA,
First of all, Eltsin has nothing to do with this thread. It has already been overloaded with irrelevant information. You probably know very well what it means to 'navodit' ten' na pleten'.
Now, you and U3280211 are trying so hard to prove that Hitler was a degenerate. The irony is that I am not trying to disprove that. Just because Hitler was a cretin does not mean that he was prepared for war, you know.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 22
Posted by OUNUPA (U2078829) on Friday, 11th July 2008
'This is a good one too. How many Europians even today know the number of tanks Stalin produced before the war? Do you know this?
'- they know the total Cost ( in number of human lives ) of those tanks which were wasted within minutes by 'Brezhnev, L. I., Malaya Zemlya, Politizdat, 1978'.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 23
Posted by OUNUPA (U2078829) on Friday, 11th July 2008
'Now, you and U3280211 are trying so hard to prove that Hitler was a degenerate.'- no , we say that he was just a Commie-National Socialist with his own formula 'the war of races' which fought against Stalin's one- 'the war of classes'.
'Just because Hitler was a cretin does not mean that he was prepared for war, you know.'- hell knows what really ....these your own speculations.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 24
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 11th July 2008
"'Just because Hitler was a cretin does not mean that he was prepared for war, you know.'- hell knows what really ....these your own speculations."
According to Yury Felshtinsky, PHD in History: "…in 1938-39 financial year, Germany spent 15% of its GNP on military needs, on par with Great Britain… The Soviet Union spent 26.4% of all its budget appropriations on military needs on average from 1938 through 1940, with 32.6% spent in 1940 and 43.3% budgeted for 1941."Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 25
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 12th July 2008
"these your own speculations"
According to Muller-Hillebrand (Das Heer, 1933-1945, Volume 1, Page 161), in 1939, only 30% of hand-gun bullets, 15% cannon shells, 12% mortar shells, and only 5% tank shells were produced, assuming four-month engagement as 100% base requested by the Wehrmacht High Command. In October of 1941 Wehrmacht expended 561K of 75-mm shells, while German industry replenished only 76K of those. In December Wehrmacht expended 494K shells, replenished 18K. Wehrmacht was in luck only because it had captured huge stockpiles of Red Army munitions during the first few weeks of the invasion, while Red Army was suffocating from huge loss of personnel, equipment, munitions and industrial capacity. On November 29, 1941 - more than a week prior to Stalin's grand winter counter-offensive that is - Reich Minister of Weapons and Munitions Fritz Todt told Hitler that the war was lost in military and economic terms. Yet, German industry was not mobilized to function under war-time regime until January, 1942.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 26
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Sunday, 13th July 2008
in 1939, only 30% of hand-gun bullets, 15% cannon shells, 12% mortar shells, and only 5% tank shells were produced, assuming four-month engagement as 100% base requested by the Wehrmacht High Command. In October of 1941 Wehrmacht expended 561K of 75-mm shells, while German industry replenished only 76K of those. In December Wehrmacht expended 494K shells, replenished 18K. Wehrmacht was in luck only because it had captured huge stockpiles of Red Army munitions during the first few weeks of the invasion, while Red Army was suffocating from huge loss of personnel, equipment, munitions and industrial capacity. On November 29, 1941 - more than a week prior to Stalin's grand winter counter-offensive that is - Reich Minister of Weapons and Munitions
Please, slap me, I'm falling asleep from the sheer tedium of your absurd anally-retentive posts.
In an earlier post I asked if you "Suvorovetz" and Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun Suvorov, the Russian 'defector' were related?
You did not reply, did you? But you are the same person, right?
The person who wrote himself up in Wikipedia as the 'multiply-published Russian defector', who amazingly has no books in print that Amazon has ever heard of.
Suvorov's most provocative idea was that Stalin had planned to use Nazi Germany as a proxy (the “Icebreaker”) against the West. For this reason Stalin had provided significant material and political support to Adolf Hitler, (from Wikipedia)
That was written by you, right? A bit of silly ego-massage from a rather bored Russian traitor?
Suvorov has written several books about his Soviet Army experiences
None that anyone in the UK has ever read.
German industry was not mobilized to function under war-time regime until January, 1942. Suvorovetz 25
Utter tosh. Data, please.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 27
Posted by Andrew Host (U1683626) on Monday, 14th July 2008
Hello guys,
Can I ask they you try to keep this friendly please.
Cheers
AndrewLink to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 28
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 14th July 2008
Sorry, Andrew. I'll try to be friendly as much as I find it possible, while responding to the above. I myself hope to see something more of a debate on merits and less of the name calling.
"Please, slap me, I'm falling asleep from the sheer tedium of your absurd anally-retentive posts"
May be it's just me, but the "sheer tedium" beats pseudo-scientific drivel that carefully avoids facts and tries to fit the party story-line by making up some really weird mental disorders - like the one Stalin allegedly got stricken with for a day or so in June of 1941.
" In an earlier post I asked if you "Suvorovetz" and Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun Suvorov, the Russian 'defector' were related? You did not reply, did you? But you are the same person, right?"
The answer happens to be no. If it was yes, this answer would be irrelevant still, by the way. These personal inquiries look pretty strange, when coming for someone identifying self as U3280211.
"The person who wrote himself up in Wikipedia as the 'multiply-published Russian defector', who amazingly has no books in print that Amazon has ever heard of."
Wrong again, even though for the purpose of historical debate it is irrelevant, whether Amazon chose to stock the material or not. Yet, amazingly, they do (see the link just a notch below). What happened to the breadth of scholarship?
"That was written by you, right? A bit of silly ego-massage from a rather bored Russian traitor?"
Here's what's really boring. I've been looking for anything out there that seriously challenges Mr. Suvorov's work, and all I found was volumes of Suvorov-Rezun-traitor-calling. That's powerful argument - for people like you, possessing "the breadth of scholarship", or whatever on earth you mean by that. I'm more impressed by the "sheer tedium" and Suvorov's ability to connect the dots, though, which GRU trained him to do too well for its own good, obviously.
"None that anyone in the UK has ever read"
That explains a lot of what goes on in UK, and I don't mean this as a compliment, sorry.
"Utter tosh. Data, please."
That IS data. You must be asking for the source, and it IS there as well. I really wish you had any capacity for arguing the merits, but, for all this "breadth of scholarship," the best you can muster is petty personal name calling, quite apparently.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 29
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Monday, 14th July 2008
'Vladimir', my dear old friend.
I shall try to keep this polite, as Andrew has requested.
Can I ask just a few questions, please?
1) Would you accept that there seems to be an uncanny congruence between your approach to Soviet history (1936-1946) and that of V.Suvorov (born 1947)?
2) Would you accept. that while Suvorov's "Icebreaker" theory is undoubtedly fascinating, it has been characterised as eccentric and untested?
3) On what basis do you suggest that German industry was not put on a war footing until 1941?
Some people who fought through (and beneath) the Battle of Britain (summer 1940) might be surprised to learn that their enemy was not yet geared-up for war.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 30
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Monday, 14th July 2008
1) Would you accept that there seems to be an uncanny congruence between your approach to Soviet history (1936-1946) and that of V.Suvorov (born 1947)?
Suvorov's main point is that WWII is the key to understanding of the entire Soviet history, so your time span is too narrow for the subject to begin with. Perhaps the link to this message I posted on the other thread will put an end to your conspiracy theory:
2) Would you accept. that while Suvorov's "Icebreaker" theory is undoubtedly fascinating, it has been characterised as eccentric and untested?
In my opinion, Suvorov's entire body of work uncovers and elegantly explains facts that the so-called "accepted" history conveniently ignores at best, and distorts or fabricates at worst. But let me quote a Russian publisher D. Khmelnitsky: "By and large, from the scientific stand point, this debate is over. The fact that Stalin prepared to attack Germany in the summer of 1941 is definitively proven by [historians] M. Meltyukhov, V. Nevezhin, I. Pavlova and many other researchers. They proved it independently from one another, using different sources. Nobody found any evidence that in 1941 Stalin prepared the country not for the aggression against the West, but for the defense."
3) On what basis do you suggest that German industry was not put on a war footing until 1941?
On the basis of the quoted comparative industrial production outputs, as well as governmental decrees, or the lack thereof.
Some people who fought through (and beneath) the Battle of Britain (summer 1940) might be surprised to learn that their enemy was not yet geared-up for war.
Guilt trip is not a good approach for studying history. By June of 1941 Stalin amassed the park of 24+ K tanks, while Wehrmacht had less than 4 K. What does it tell you?Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 31
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Monday, 14th July 2008
Many thanks for your response.
You place great credence on Vladimir Suvorov. I go for Anthony Beevor, Alan Bullock and (for insights into Stalin's thoughts and actions) Simon Sebag Montefiore. I doubt that we will agree about their relative merits.
I suspect that the causes behind our 'little tiff' have to do with the weight one should give to 'negative evidence', or more simply "the absence of evidence against a particular interpretation of events"
Let me give an example from your last post here:-
Nobody found any evidence that in 1941 Stalin prepared the country not for the aggression against the West, but for the defense." (from Suvorovetz)
That sentence contains a double negative, and as any philosopher will tell you, cannot be disproved.
That 'nobody' found that Stalin was NOT doing something does not actually prove what Stalin was doing. As it happens I think we both agree that Stalin was getting ready for war. Can we also agree that he was taken by surprise on 22-6-1941?
Another example of a double-negative cul de sac comes when we talked of German readiness for war:-
3) On what basis do you suggest that German industry was not put on a war footing until 1941? (Me)
"On the basis of the quoted comparative industrial production outputs, as well as governmental decrees, or the lack thereof." (You)
So once again, the lack of a 'decree' telling German industry to get busy for war means that it was not ready for war? Is that your position?
If so, I humbly submit that such an argument, based on the absence of a bit of paper (which might still exist, but is yet to be found) does not constitute a robust argument.
On this sub-topic, I think the following is more pertinent:-
In a speech on January 17th, 1936, Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels stated: "We can do without butter, but, despite all our love of peace, not without arms. One cannot shoot with butter, but with guns." Sometime in the summer of the same year, Hermann Goering announced in a speech, "Guns will make us powerful; butter will only make us fat." From Wikipedia)
I would have thought that those two speeches clearly signaled Germany’s intention to prepare for war.
Winston Churchill certainly read them that way.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 32
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Tuesday, 15th July 2008
You place great credence on Vladimir Suvorov.
Suvorov is not a lone warrior out there. Particularly in Russia, where the subject is extremely sensitive, and where the intensity of the opposition to his thesis is at times violent - quite literally. It is remarkable that I. Pavlova successfully defended her PHD thesis "Mechanism of Power and Erection of Stalin's Socialism" having overcome brutal resistance and intimidating political protest, for example.
That 'nobody' found that Stalin was NOT doing something does not actually prove what Stalin was doing. As it happens I think we both agree that Stalin was getting ready for war. Can we also agree that he was taken by surprise on 22-6-1941?
As you said yourself, Stalin WAS getting ready for war. There is a lot of evidence that he was getting ready for a MASSIVE OFFENSIVE. I can oblige with another tedium cataloguing all this evidence, if you so desire. It's simple if you accept Suvorov's point of view, and it is pretty difficult if you don't. Stalin did prepare for war. He did not prepare for a defensive war. He prepared for an offensive war. If he expected Hitler to strike first, he would have prepared defense. If you reverse any of these premises, you will have to make up a story about some very peculiar break-down Stalin was having on the week of the invasion. Stalin KNEW that Hitler was unprepared. Stalin DID NOT KNOW that Hitler would launch his suicidal attack anyway. Why did not Stalin foresee this eventuality? Obviously, he did not consider it probable. In his latest books, Suvorov hints that Stalin made a mistake of over-relying on Zhukov, who planned and executed all of his operations the same way. As I said, it worked at Khalkin Gol, where Zhukov launched first. It did not work in Europe, where Wehrmacht launched first. So, as you can imagine, Zhukov had a special motivation to muddy the water years later. There is no doubt at all that had he launched first, it would have been absolutely devastating for Wehrmacht.
the lack of a 'decree' telling German industry to get busy for war means that it was not ready for war? Is that your position?
Suvorov & Co's position (I just happen to tag along taking notes) is that Reich was not prepared for war WITH STALIN, not just any hypothetical war. That was the essence of Stalin's plan. Stalin himself helped Hitler to prepare for war - with Poland, France and Great Britain in particular (...see his speech of August 19, 1939). Hitler had not even thought of fighting Stalin until after mid-June of 1940, when he ordered his General Staff to draft Barbarossa. By that time he already could not possibly catch up with Stalin's war machine. Not only Stalin had put his industry on the war footing as early as in 1939 - having signed the "non-aggression" Pact in quite a Machiavellian fashion - this had been THE reason for genocidal programs of Collectivization and Industrialization he had subjected his people to.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 33
Posted by OUNUPA (U2078829) on Wednesday, 16th July 2008
'He did not prepare for a defensive war. He prepared for an offensive war. '- it was the bottom line for commies since the Lenin's times and Warsaw's offensive in 1920.....I have no see any special connection with Hitler.
'Stalin KNEW that Hitler was unprepared. Stalin DID NOT KNOW that Hitler would launch his suicidal attack anyway.'- Stalin never been in army to know was Hitler prepared to war or was not .
All Stalin's Kliment Voroshilovs Mark II Russian Heavies were useless against German VAST SUPERIORITY over the Stalin's armies IN TACTICS AND TRAINS.
The German Mark 3 Panzers made a hazardous crossing of the river Bug using three and a half metre air tubes welded into the turret hatch and a secondary air system to feed the sealed motor , without loss. By the time Reds had realized what was happening , the Brest Litovsk strongpoint had been by-passed .
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P.S. 'Suvorovetz' also meant a kid who was shipped into the Soviet military school .Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 34
Posted by Backtothedarkplace (U2955180) on Wednesday, 16th July 2008
Hi U3280211
No one in the UK has read Victor Suvorov.
I read the Liberators and Inside the read army in the 80's.
They were quite popular at the time although personally as they didnt fit the then image of the Red army as the unstoppable, efficient war machine I wrote them of as propoganda. it was only the collapse of the USSR that finally showed me I was doing the man a disservice.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 35
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Wednesday, 16th July 2008
No one in the UK has read Victor Suvorov.
Well, who can blame us. We would have to pay £80 (Amazon) for a copy of 'Icebreaker' (his publication relevant to this thread).
Given that most historians of merit rate it as a wild stab in the dark, it's an investment I'll probably not be making.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 36
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 16th July 2008
I have no see any special connection with Hitler
I did not either, until I read "Icebreaker". There's first time for everything, my friend.
All Stalin's Kliment Voroshilovs Mark II Russian Heavies were useless against German VAST SUPERIORITY over the Stalin's armies IN TACTICS AND TRAINS.
Had Red Army launched first, it would be a mirror picture of what actually happened, only worse (worse for Wehrmacht that is). All Stalin's KVs, T-34s and other toys were stacked on fields (many unloaded, not fueled and disassembled under pre-action maintenance) and even rail cars - being deployed and unloaded away from fuel storages, ammunition dumps and crews. The meaning of this is very simple: there was no expectation of imminent enemy attack whatsoever. It is quite obvious that unloaded and not fueled tanks are useless.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 37
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Wednesday, 16th July 2008
Suvorovitch (or son of Suvorov, since I can see no difference between your position and that of Vladimir Suvorov)
Just a couple of points about your (or is it Suvorov’s) twin theses that
a) Stalin was so ready to attack the German Army on 21-06-1941 that he could not defend himself when the German attack came.
And
b) the assertion that Germany industry:
was not mobilized to function under war-time regime until January, 1942.(Suv M25)
Taking ‘a’, first…
1) If attack was his only thought, why had Stalin made detailed plans for the wholesale removal of factories and 20 million people, back to the east?(Source: Montefiore (2003). “Stalin”)
2) Why is it that an army ‘readied for attack’ cannot defend itself?
3) Why was Stalin asking for confirmation that anti-aircraft defences around Moscow were at “75% readiness” two days before Barbarossa? (Montefiore)
In an earlier post you show the overwhelming numerical superiority of Soviet weaponry. No one disputes this. But as others have noted, what matters is the quality of the hardware. Stalin had 14,000 tanks but as Beevor points out, only 2,000 were any good. His best aircraft were rubbish by comparison with their German equivalents. Even if they had been allowed to get airborne on the morning of 22-06-1941 they would have been ripped apart. As it was, about 1,000 were destroyed on the ground that day (Montefiore).
What happened in the air that day was very similar to the first day of the Arab-Israeli six day war. One air force blew another apart with its aircraft on the ground.
Stalin: “Surely the German air force did not reach every single airfield?”
Timoshenko: “Unfortunately it did”
Stalin: (In typical ranting mood) “This is a monstrous crime. Those responsible must lose their heads” (Montefiore p 326, line 21)
Thesis ‘b’. German industry was unprepared for war until Jan 1942. Tell this to the British, French, the Dutch (esp those in Rotterdam) and the Poles.
In order to pursue that argument you have to treat all conflicts in WW, before Pearl Harbour (Dec 1941), as a sort of ‘side-show’ (That is actually quite rude, as several readers of these boards will have lost relatives fighting the Germans during the previous two years).
Of course the German –Soviet conflict ( a brief forerunner of the longer US-Soviet conflict) was always going to be the ‘big one’. Russia and Germany both gained time to tool-up by signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact but I doubt that many (non-communist) Germans thought of Russians as ‘our friends in the east’.
From 1920 to 1933 Russia and Germany had two things in common, they were both weak and humiliated (Germany by Versailles, Russia by Brest-Litovsk and a very nasty civil war). But their pact was a hollow sham from the start. Russia certainly wanted a strong Germany but not because it wished to see an ‘old pal regain confidence’, rather it wanted a buffer to stop British and western European meddling in Soviet affairs. Even a week before Barbarossa, Beria reminded Stalin of their belief that rumours of a German build-up were ‘British disinformation’ (Montefiore).Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 38
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 16th July 2008
1) If attack was his only thought, why had Stalin made detailed plans for the wholesale removal of factories and 20 million people, back to the east?(Source: Montefiore (2003). “Stalin”)
Interesting. He made all those plans, yet he was doing the opposite, i.e., developing production facilities in the European part of the country, like Kharkov, Leningrad, etc. I personally knew someone who was employed at the plant making aircraft engines in Leningrad. This person did not know of any such plans. He said that they barely made it out of the city on Wehrmacht approach.
Why is it that an army ‘readied for attack’ cannot defend itself?
You obviously have a hard time accepting the bits and pieces I used here to describe the situation on June 22, 1941. When I have time - within a few hours, hopefully - I'll give you the snippets of Stalin's war doctrine developed by Shaposhnikov and quote Red Army Commanders about what was going on there.
Why was Stalin asking for confirmation that anti-aircraft defences around Moscow were at “75% readiness” two days before Barbarossa? (Montefiore)
How is it relevant? British found the way to bomb Berlin, even though they were not "the aggressors".
Stalin had 14,000 tanks but as Beevor points out, only 2,000 were any good. His best aircraft were rubbish by comparison with their German equivalents)
Beevor is wrong on all counts. Stalin had over 24,000 tanks (he cites Shmelev's impeccable research of tank production in the pre-war Soviet Union), of which over 3,000 were KV, T-34, T-40 and BT-7M tanks - the best in their class throughout the 40s. Wehrmacht had less than 4,000 tanks that were inferior to Stalin's. Suvorov - a former tank commander himself - took a lot of time and space to talk about it and I take him over Beevor any day of the week, thank you very much.
His best aircraft were rubbish by comparison with their German equivalents. Even if they had been allowed to get airborne on the morning of 22-06-1941 they would have been ripped apart. As it was, about 1,000 were destroyed on the ground that day (Montefiore).
What happened in the air that day was very similar to the first day of the Arab-Israeli six day war. One air force blew another apart with its aircraft on the ground.
This is an interesting point. You almost have it, but no cigar. Stalin's aircraft were not rubbish. Most of them were what Suvorov calls "the clear sky aircraft" designed to bomb and strife ground targets with no interference from enemy fighters. Remember, the idea was to attack enemy airfields and wipe out enemy air force first. Luftwaffe was not dissimilar in its composition, only Stalin's air force outnumbered Luftwaffe by a huge margin.
German industry was unprepared for war until Jan 1942. Tell this to the British, French, the Dutch (esp those in Rotterdam) and the Poles.
In order to pursue that argument you have to treat all conflicts in WW, before Pearl Harbour (Dec 1941), as a sort of ‘side-show’ (That is actually quite rude, as several readers of these boards will have lost relatives fighting the Germans during the previous two years).
Of course the German –Soviet conflict ( a brief forerunner of the longer US-Soviet conflict) was always going to be the ‘big one’. Russia and Germany both gained time to tool-up by signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact but I doubt that many (non-communist) Germans thought of Russians as ‘our friends in the east’.
Full circle. Just read excerpts from Stalin's speech of August 19, 1939: it's right on top of the thread. If you want more of it, I will oblige. About being rude, well, as they say, truth can be hurtful, there's no doubt about that.
Russia certainly wanted a strong Germany but not because it wished to see an ‘old pal regain confidence’, rather it wanted a buffer to stop British and western European meddling in Soviet affairs. Even a week before Barbarossa, Beria reminded Stalin of their belief that rumours of a German build-up were ‘British disinformation’ (Montefiore).
It looks like your source got it exactly backwards by using official Soviet press releases as a guide. As you may or may not know, Stalin created his "Anti-Hitler Coalition" even before June 22, 1941, while he and Hitler were still partners in their "non-aggression" Pact.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 39
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Wednesday, 16th July 2008
. I personally knew someone who was employed at the plant making aircraft engines in Leningrad. This person did not know of any such plans.
Oh dear! It’s that old negative inference problem again. This is not how history works.
So, you met a Russian who did not know about the contents of Stalin’s mind in 1941.
And what, exactly, can we deduce from that? If Stalin's own General Pavlov did not understand Stalin's plans, why would a factory worker in Leningrad be trusted with such knowledge?
Alexandr Solzhenitsyn was not privy to Stalin’s thoughts at that time either, and he was a tank commander, the sort of person you hold in high esteem.
In fact Solzhenitsyn was sentenced to 10 years in the Gulag for daring to speculate about the probity of Stalin’s plans in a letter to a friend.
Are you denying that Stalin made plans to retreat to the east, taking industry and workers with him? This is a well-enough known historical fact. Many of the workers of St. Petersburg stayed on, as did those in Moscow. But check-out what happened further south…where the Germans went...
You obviously have a hard time accepting the bits and pieces I used here to describe the situation on June 22, 1941. When I have time - within a few hours, hopefully - I'll give you the snippets of Stalin's war doctrine developed by Shaposhnikov and quote Red Army Commanders about what was going on there.
This is really weird. Why is Shaposhnikov an unreliable source when Montefiore cites him (many times), but suddenly reliable when you do?
Why was Stalin asking for confirmation that anti-aircraft defences around Moscow were at “75% readiness” two days before Barbarossa? (Montefiore) (me)
How is it relevant?(you)
It shows a capacity to think about defence. Something you claim Stalin was unable to do in 1941.
Beevor is wrong on all counts.
That is arrogant, errant, nonsense. Beevor has gone down badly in Moscow because he highlighted the use of rape by the Russians as a tool of war. He has received the following awards for non-fiction in the west:
"Crete: The Battle and the Resistance"
Runciman Prize
"Stalingrad"
Samuel Johnson Prize for Non-Fiction
Wolfson History Prize
Hawthornden Prize for Literature
"Berlin:The Downfall 1945"
Longman-History Today Trustees' Award
"The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936-39 (Spanish Edition)"
La Vanguardia Prize for Non-Fiction
And he has been supported by many respected historians, including Richard Overy, whom we both know well, I’m sure.
Stalin's aircraft were not rubbish. Most of them were what Suvorov calls "the clear sky aircraft" designed to bomb and strife ground targets with no interference from enemy fighters
Err, that means they were great unless anyone else came along to oppose them? Such things happen in war.
They were rubbish. I’m a pilot, I know about pilots and aircraft. If they were so good how come the worst USA imports were a huge step forward for the Soviet air force?
The German/Soviet air-war in 1941 was a “turkey shoot” for the German aces, just look at the numbers..
Just read excerpts from Stalin's speech of August 19, 1939: it's right on top of the thread.
I note that you treat Stalin as if he was an independently reliable historical source. That is absurd. He was a manipulative cowardly psychopath who blamed his generals for his own inertia. And had them tortured when things got rough. Read the Erich Fromm book I suggested. (Or Beevor, or Solzhenitsyn, or Medvedev or Montefiore, for details)
It looks like your source got it exactly backwards by using official Soviet press releases as a guide.
That is complete drivel. My sources (Beevor, Bullock and Montefiore , Overy and Solzhenitsyn wouldn’t be so naïve as to trust anything coming from Stalin’s Russia (or Putin’s Russia, for that matter) at face value.
As you may or may not know, Stalin created his "Anti-Hitler Coalition" even before June 22, 1941, while he and Hitler were still partners in their "non-aggression" Pact
Yes, I did know that, because I referred to exactly that sort of duplicity in the post before, Try to keep up….
So, we’ve got three army officers each personally familiar with tank warfare tactics. (Beevor, Solzhenitsyn and Suvorov)
Two are also world-class historians. One isn’t.
And, err, your money is on the one who isn’t.
You dismiss a Russian-speaking Cambridge-educated historian (Montefiore) as if he was a parvenu. What exactly are you getting from this single-minded attack on the best historians?Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 40
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Wednesday, 16th July 2008
If Stalin's own General Pavlov did not understand Stalin's plans, why would a factory worker in Leningrad be trusted with such knowledge?
These both assumptions are wrong. Pavlov was implementing the General Staff orders to the letter (I will quote the orders itself in a lttle while, by the way. I know, you will get a kick out of that read.) The person you're calling a factory worker was the chief engineer, and he would certainly be in the know of any contingency planning of sorts.
Alexandr Solzhenitsyn was not privy to Stalin’s thoughts at that time either, and he was a tank commander, the sort of person you hold in high esteem.
Solzhenitsyn was an artillery leutenant drafted late in the war and he would have absolutely no insight on the General Staff plans of 1941. His expertise lies in the history of GULAG.
Are you denying that Stalin made plans to retreat to the east, taking industry and workers with him? This is a well-enough known historical fact. Many of the workers of St. Petersburg stayed on, as did those in Moscow.
It's been also a well known fact that Stalin never spoke to anyone on August 19, 1939, and dozens of Soviet and Western historians "of merit" were adamant about, until - oops - Volkogonov had his slip of the tongue and - oops again - the copy of the speech was uncovered in the archives. Why is it that those poor workers got stuck if there were plans to move them? Is not it the proof of the opposite? It's a strange logic when you keep denying the existance of plans that WERE BEING implemented actually and insisting on those that WERE NOT.
Why is Shaposhnikov an unreliable source when Montefiore cites him (many times), but suddenly reliable when you do?.
It does not matter what Montefiore or I think of Shaposhnikov. Suffice it to say that Stalin regarded him with utmost respect (the only person Stalin ever to address in full name was Shaposhnikov) and used his book "The Brain of the Army" as the basis fo his military doctrine.
It shows a capacity to think about defence. Something you claim Stalin was unable to do in 1941.?
I never said that Stalin was unable to think about defense. He paid a lot of attention to defensive aspects of the military prior to 1939. It's when he made his final decision to launch the big war - yes, in August 19, 1939, - when he began dismantling all his defensive installations and focus on pure offensive capabilities.
Beevor has gone down badly in Moscow because he highlighted the use of rape by the Russians as a tool of war.
I don't care about that. He's wrong on the facts that you cite, and I showed you why.
He has received the following awards for non-fiction in the west.
Arafat received Nobel Peace Prize in the west too, not that it has any relevance to this debate. Neither are Beevor's awards, as far as I am concerned.
They were rubbish. I’m a pilot, I know about pilots and aircraft. If they were so good how come the worst USA imports were a huge step forward for the Soviet air force?
The German/Soviet air-war in 1941 was a “turkey shoot” for the German aces, just look at the numbers.
Did you try them? Stalin had all kinds of aircraft. He had an option of mass producing TB-7, for example, which was the best strategic bomber of the time. He decided he did not need those mass produced, though, because they did not fit the doctrine. He mass produced the Su-2s equipped with "Katyusha" rockets. Those would be devastating for what they were meant to do and useless in the defensive warfare. I look at the numbers and they support Sovorov's theory completely.
I note that you treat Stalin as if he was an independently reliable historical source. That is absurd.
This is borderline amusing. We're talking about Stalin's secret program speech to his henchmen. It's as saying that Stalin's orders cannot be treated as independently reliable historical source. Talk about absurd.
My sources (Beevor, Bullock and Montefiore , Overy and Solzhenitsyn wouldn’t be so naïve as to trust anything coming from Stalin’s Russia (or Putin’s Russia, for that matter) at face value.
Good for you.
So, we’ve got three army officers each personally familiar with tank warfare tactics. (Beevor, Solzhenitsyn and Suvorov)
Two are also world-class historians. One isn’t.
You can safely drop Solzhenitsyn from the list. He is many things, but certainly not familiar with tank warfare. Nor he ever wrote about tank warfare either.
What exactly are you getting from this single-minded attack on the best historians?.
I am getting a kick out of it. You?Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 41
Posted by OUNUPA (U2078829) on Thursday, 17th July 2008
'Had Red Army launched first, it would be a mirror picture of what actually happened, only worse (worse for Wehrmacht that is). '
- it would have been ended up catastrophically for Stalin himself I bet.
Do you know why ? Because ....... there was the German VAST SUPERIORITY over the Stalin's armies in tactics and trains ( the so-called 'luck' as you say ) . In comparison with these things all Stalin's 'dinosaurs'- tanks nothing to worth . And who was that 'Marshal' Voroshilov - a cavalry man - a 'son of proletariat' I mean a son of a casual labourer on the railways and had had no more than a ' basic education' who spent only two years (!!!!) at school . Those Stalin's 'Marshals' - Timoshenko , Budenny , and ....Zukov belonged to the same caste of 'cavalry-men' with the 'basic education' behind their backs. Germans really were not THE Cossacks of Krasnov near Tzaritsyn to think that Red 'warriors' were able to defeat German armies..
Steeped in the military doctrines of the Civil War , they believed that a bold attack with plenty of CAVALRY charges and liberal use of the bayonet would best reflect the 'bravery of the Red warrior'. They failed to consider the HUGE LOSS OF LIFE that such 'tactics' was likely to entail once it was met with advanced tactics of the best REAL German Generals. In order to re-capture the territories which were occupied by Hitler during four months...... Stalin needed to fight in terms of FOUR YEARS .
+ The Western Powers backed Stalin in that his 'desperate effort'....with unknown to anyone human losses during this process.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 42
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 17th July 2008
Why is it that an army ‘readied for attack’ cannot defend itself?
As promised, this is what Colonel-General L. Sandalov wrote in his memoires "In the Direction of Moscow" and "First Days of the War":
"In the Autumn of 1940, [visiting the 4th Army at the fortress of Brest on the west bank of the river Bug, right at the demarcation line] People's Commissar of defense Marshal Timoshenko emphasized, 'It is necessary to teach the troops to act only as it is required at war'... All pre-war war-games were planned and executed with the focus on taking reinforced positions... Command and Control games and field exercises of the entire Winter and Spring of 1941 were exclusively offensive...At the end of May, there was a field exercise ending with the map games of an offensive operation...On June 21, 1941, the Army Staff completed two-way war-games on how to cross a river by an infantry corps...On the artillery range of the army located south of Brest, Army Staff planned to conduct games on how to overtake the second line of reinforced defensive position in the morning of June 22 in the presence of representatives of the District Command."
Colonel-General Popov wrote on March 10, 1953, "As the Commander of the 28th Infantry Corps of the 4th Army, I was NOT made aware of any plan to defend our state border" (VIZh, 1989, #3, Page 65)Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 43
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 17th July 2008
If Stalin's own General Pavlov did not understand Stalin's plans
And this is the kicker, The Red Army General Staff Plan as of May 15, 1941, written by Major-General Vasilevsky and signed by the Chief of General Staff General Zhukov and Peoples Commissar of Defense Marshal Timoshenko (just snippets, because it's too long for the 鶹Լ House Rules):
"The 1st strategic goal of the Red Army is to crush the Wehrmacht main forces deployed south of Demblin and by the 30th day of operation reach the front of Ostrolenk, river Narev, Lovich, Lodz, Kreitsburg, Opeln, Olomoutz. The next strategic goal is, by advancing from the area of Katowitse north- and northwest-bound, to crush the concentrations of Wehrmacht Armies Center and North; and to take the territories of former Poland and East Prussia. The immediate objective is to crush German army east of river Visla and ...take Katowitse... Thus, Red Army will launch an offensive from Tschizhov and Motovisko front with 152 divisions against 100 Wehrmacht divisions...Western Front - 4 armies...to the total of 45 divisions and 21 airborne regiments...goals: strike with the left wing toward Warsaw, Sedlets, Radom, crush Warsaw army group and take Warsaw... reach Visla bank and take Radom... Southwest Front - 8 armies...to the total of 122 divisions and 91 airborne regiments, with the immediate goals of ...surrounding and destroying the main enemy group east of river Visla at Lublin... take Krakov , Katowitse and Keltze areas...be ready to strike Romania from Tchernovtsy and Kishinev areas in order to...crush northern flank of Romanian army and reach river Moldova and Yassy. In order to implement the mentioned plan...it is necessary to...;
1. Conduct secret mobilization under cover of reservist training
2. ...conduct secret deployment next to the Western border, beginning with all the armies of the General Staff reserves
3. Secretly redeploy air force to airfields from the rear districts...
4. Steadily layout resupply and medical grids under cover of reservist training
Allocate 5 armies for the General Staff reserves and deploy them as follows: 2 armies with... the total of 15 divisions in the area of Vyazma, Sytchovka, Elnya, Bryansk, Sukhinitchi; 1 army with...the total of 8 divisions in the area of Vileyka, Novogrudok, Minsk; 1 army with...the total of 12 divisions in the area of Shepetovka, Proskurov, Berditchev; and 1 army with...the total of 12 divisions in the area of Belaya Tserkov, Zvenigorodka, Tcherkassy...
Request to
1. Approve this plan of strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the plan of actions for war with Germany..."Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 44
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Thursday, 17th July 2008
Suv, my old pal, you have gone off into one of your transient ischaemic attacks, yet again.
The Red Army General Staff Plan as of May 15, 1941, written by Major-General Vasilevsky and signed by the Chief of General Staff General Zhukov and Peoples Commissar of Defense Marshal Timoshenko (just snippets, because it's too long for the 鶹Լ House Rules):
"The 1st strategic goal of the Red Army is to crush the Wehrmacht main forces deployed south of Demblin and by the 30th day of operation reach the front of Ostrolenk, river Narev, Lovich, Lodz, Kreitsburg, Opeln, Olomoutz. The next strategic goal is, by advancing from the area of Katowitse north- and northwest-bound, to crush the concentrations of Wehrmacht Armies Center and North; and to take the territories of former Poland and East Prussia. The immediate objective is to crush German army east of river Visla and ...take Katowitse... Thus, Red Army will launch an offensive from Tschizhov and Motovisko front with 152 divisions against 100 Wehrmacht divisions...Western Front - 4 armies...to the total of 45 divisions and 21 airborne regiments...goals: strike with the left wing toward Warsaw, Sedlets, Radom, crush Warsaw army group and take Warsaw... reach Visla bank and take Radom... Southwest Front - 8 armies...to the total of 122 divisions and 91 airborne regiments, with the immediate goals of ...surrounding and destroying the main enemy group east of river Visla at Lublin... take Krakov , Katowitse and Keltze areas...be ready to strike Romania from Tchernovtsy and Kishinev areas in order to...crush northern flank of Romanian army and reach river Moldova and Yassy. In order to implement the mentioned plan...it is necessary to...;
1. Conduct secret mobilization under cover of reservist training
2. ...conduct secret deployment next to the Western border, beginning with all the armies of the General Staff reserves
3. Secretly redeploy air force to airfields from the rear districts...
4. Steadily layout resupply and medical grids under cover of reservist training
Allocate 5 armies for the General Staff reserves and deploy them as follows: 2 armies with... the total of 15 divisions in the area of Vyazma, Sytchovka, Elnya, Bryansk, Sukhinitchi; 1 army with...the total of 8 divisions in the area of Vileyka, Novogrudok, Minsk; 1 army with...the total of 12 divisions in the area of Shepetovka, Proskurov, Berditchev; and 1 army with...the total of 12 divisions in the area of Belaya Tserkov, Zvenigorodka, Tcherkassy...
Request to
1. Approve this plan of strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the plan of actions for war with Germany..."
What on earth has any of that got to do with the fact that Stalin refused to accept Pavlov's warnings of an imminent German attack on the 21st June 1941. If Stalin and Pavlov were so hugger-mugger, why did Stalin have Pavlov tortured and shot?
Please answer in your on words, not with a tedious scanned-in photocopy of a document fed to you by someone in Minsk.
Now, where were we, ah yes! Your claim about the superiority of Russian aircraft in 1941/45.
Just a few facts:-
Erich Hartman (flying Me109's,usually):- 345 Russian aircraft shot down. He crashed a few times (mechanical problems, debris strikes from close kills)but was never shot down through enemy action.
If we add together the combined 'kills' (including friendly fire on two P51's) of the 5 top Soviet pilots of that era, we see that Hartman's score exceeds the sum of all kills by Kozhedub, Pokryshin, Gulayev, Rechkalov and Yevtigneyev (Russia's 5 best pilots). Disinformation, I suppose?
The huge tallies accrued by German World War II aces are partly explained by the Luftwaffe's technical and tactical superiority over the Allies during the first half of the war. Many kills were over obsolescent aircraft and against either poorly-trained or inexperienced pilots fielded by the Allies, especially the Soviets.(from Wikipedia)
You said that Soviet tanks were good in 1941 and that there were 24 thousand available to counter Barbarossa. (There were barely that many in the entire Soviet Union, certainly not on the Russian western front.
By the spring of 1941, the Red Army's reorganization was still very incomplete. Only 30% of Soviet tanks were fully operational.
Stalin had disbanded the Red Army's large-scale mechanized corps in 1939, dispersing its armor among infantry divisions. The German blitzkrieg victories in Poland and the West had proven this decision was unwise, and the mechanized units were hastily thrown back together. They were mostly equipped with the fast but lightly-armored BT-7 tank, which could be destroyed by any German anti-tank weapon. (Goebel 2008)
You said that Anthony Beevor was wrong to imply that the Soviet tank force facing Barbarossa was 14,000.
Here is independent confirmation:
The USSR had 2,900,000 men on the western frontier, as well as 15,000 tanks (close to the figure of 14,000 used by Beevor, note) and 9,000 aircraft. Reinforcements were being moved up as well. On paper, it was an impressive force. In practice, the Red Army's leadership was still in disarray from the purges, most of the equipment was antiquated if it was even in working order, and the country was not even close to full mobilization. (Goebel 2008, “The Great Patriotic War”, available on-line)
You refuse to accept that Russian industry was moved Eastwards. Here is confirmation of what I said:-
Soviet military planning, which almost entirely reflected the wishes of Stalin, did not acknowledge the possibility of a German invasion in the immediate future, but a war with the Germans was likely over the long run and some preparations were made. Stalin built up stockpiles of food, strategic metals, and oil. He also built up industrial centers east of the Urals, where they would be out of reach of Hitler in case of an invasion, and plans were drawn up for the relocation of industries in the west if that became necessary. (Goebel)
Any more queeries about the unreliability of Suvorov's fantasies, just let me know.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 45
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Thursday, 17th July 2008
What on earth has any of that got to do with the fact that Stalin refused to accept Pavlov's warnings of an imminent German attack on the 21st June 1941. If Stalin and Pavlov were so hugger-mugger, why did Stalin have Pavlov tortured and shot?
Please answer in your on words, not with a tedious scanned-in photocopy of a document fed to you by someone in Minsk.
My old pal pilot U3280211, what you call a tedious scanned-in photocopy of a document fed to me by someone in Minsk is the copy of the Red Army operational plan that non-other than the fomer member of the Soviet Writers Union Karpov disclosed, without fully understanding the implications of this document - kind of like you don't. It is filed in Moscow, not in Minsk. Funny you. Pavlov, by the way, was implementing this plan to the letter. Your don't even understand that your story is implausible. If Pavlov was arguing with Stalin about the plan, he would have been arrested right then and there. In reality, he was arrested after the disaster of June 22, 1941, together with a few of other scape-goates, or as Russians call them "strelotchniki" ('rail switch operator' in direct translation).
Your claim about the superiority of Russian aircraft in 1941/45.
Just a few facts:-Erich Hartman (flying Me109's,usually):- 345 Russian aircraft shot down. He crashed a few times (mechanical problems, debris strikes from close kills)but was never shot down through enemy action. If we add together the combined 'kills' (including friendly fire on two P51's) of the 5 top Soviet pilots of that era, we see that Hartman's score exceeds the sum of all kills by Kozhedub, Pokryshin, Gulayev, Rechkalov and Yevtigneyev (Russia's 5 best pilots).
Neither did I make this claim, nor it has anything to do with what I claim. I claim that Red Army had an enormous amount of I16 and Su2 aircraft perfectly suited for the sudden early morning strike and consequent "clear sky" campaign. They became largely useless on the morning of June 22, when Luftwaffe bombed airfields in East Poland. Thank you for your help in supporting my contention.
Only 30% of Soviet tanks were fully operational.Stalin had disbanded the Red Army's large-scale mechanized corps in 1939, dispersing its armor among infantry divisions.
This is incorrect. I can give you another tedious document to disprove this. Is that why you dislike those tedious documents that much? Perhaps, they tend to spoil the exciting fiction you're reading with dull facts.
The USSR had 2,900,000 men on the western frontier, as well as 15,000 tanks (close to the figure of 14,000 used by Beevor, note) and 9,000 aircraft.
Wrong again. By the way, even if Red Army had 15K tanks, Wehrmacht still had only less than 4K. As a pilot, you're surely should know what is the accepted asset ratio for planning offensive operations. Tell us what you know.
Soviet military planning, which almost entirely reflected the wishes of Stalin, did not acknowledge the possibility of a German invasion in the immediate future...Stalin built up stockpiles of food, strategic metals, and oil. He also built up industrial centers east of the Urals, where they would be out of reach of Hitler in case of an invasion, and plans were drawn up for the relocation of industries in the west if that became necessary
You win. You found a smoking gun somwhere in Munich. It does not make too much sense, and it does not tell us where this information is coming from, but, as long as it pleases you, I would have to accept it at face value. Yes, Sir, Colonel.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 46
Posted by OUNUPA (U2078829) on Friday, 18th July 2008
People's Commissar of defense Marshal Timoshenko emphasized, 'It is necessary to teach the troops to act only as it is required at war'... '- the pot calling the kettle black really.
But it is still being unclear enough in obtaining the details ....of how it is required at war ?
'Command and Control games and field exercises of the entire Winter and Spring of 1941 were exclusively offensive.. ' -and in what direction had gone those 'exercises&experience' during the Crimean 'Offensive' of Reds in May , 1942 ?
Several points against the theory of the writer V.Suvorov ( whose books stand in the Ukrainian book- shops together with the Stephen King's ones for the price of $3 for the one ).
1.Stalin gained from Hitler all he wanted ( except of Finland ) to June 1941.
2. Stalin ( and Lenin in his time ) afraid of German military machine to think seriously that he would ever think about to unleash the war against Germany.
3.Defeat in Poland ( 1920 ) finally made the Russians give up their fantasies to wage war against European Powers. The Polish disaster had clearly shown that Russia's army was not strong enough to sustain an offensive against even the smaller Western powers.
Stalin always had on his mind the lessons of the Red defeat in Poland which were extremely painful for the commies to learn.
The era of the 'socialism WITHIN THE ONE COUNTRY' came.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 47
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 18th July 2008
Several points against the theory of the writer V.Suvorov ( whose books stand in the Ukrainian book- shops together with the Stephen King's ones for the price of $3 for the one
Are you complaining that they are too cheap? The pilot here complained that they were too expensive. Go fugure.
1.Stalin gained from Hitler all he wanted ( except of Finland ) to June 1941.
2. Stalin ( and Lenin in his time ) afraid of German military machine to think seriously that he would ever think about to unleash the war against Germany.
3.Defeat in Poland ( 1920 ) finally made the Russians give up their fantasies to wage war against European Powers. The Polish disaster had clearly shown that Russia's army was not strong enough to sustain an offensive against even the smaller Western powers.
Stalin always had on his mind the lessons of the Red defeat in Poland which were extremely painful for the commies to learn.
The era of the 'socialism WITHIN THE ONE COUNTRY' came.
OUNUPA, it strikes me peculiar that, despite your professed "anti-Red" stance, you keep recycling spin created in Khruschev's times. The fact is that all of the Communist theorists from Marx on to Lenin and Stalin explicitly stated that for Communism to succeed, it needs to spread, and for it to spread, it needs a world war. It is preposterous to say that Lenin was afraid of German military machine, when he was on German payroll to begin was. Similarly, Stalin was the one who facilitated German rearmament illegal under Versailles Treaty. Tukhachevsky miserably failed in 1920, and that not only took away the momentum from the Bolsheviks, but also sparked anti-Bolshevik insurrections in Russia. So, Lenin ordered Tukhachevsky to make due by brutally suppressing Kronshtatd mutiny and Tambov farmers' uprising. Then, Lenin declared NAP to avoid further trouble from the population. Then Stalin took over and he took his time to:
1. gain control of the Party
2. consolidate control of the country
3. conducting Collectivization and Industrialization to build the largest military-industrial complex in the history of the world
4. build the biggest army in the history of the world.
5. start another world war using proxies like Hitler
He was almost flawless in his execution, except for a few mistakes that led to the disastrous for him Wehrmacht strike on June 22, 1941. Otherwise, he would have much more than some petty half of Europe under his control.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 48
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Friday, 18th July 2008
Please answer in your on words, not with a tedious scanned-in photocopy of a document fed to you by someone in Minsk
Just a little correction: the tedious document is located in the Central Archive of the Ministery of Defence of Russian Federation in Moscow in the fund 16, list 295, pages 1-16.
You have a pretty good game going here: when I answer in my words, you discount them because I am not a distinguished European elite awards laureate (and neither is Suvorov, of course). Then again, your laureates don't seem to be too interested in reading "tedious documents" either. These tedious suckers can ruin careers, tenures and perks, you know.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 49
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Friday, 18th July 2008
He (Stalin) was almost flawless in his execution, except for a few mistakes that led to the disastrous for him Wehrmacht strike on June 22, 1941. Otherwise, he would have much more than some petty half of Europe under his control. (Suv 47)
I suppose this is a symptom of a condition of yours which rather worries me. If I am wrong, I sincerely apologise; but this and a few other posts of yours make me think that you have a sneaking admiration for “Uncle Joe Stalin”. I do hope I’m wrong? In my book he was a five-star cruel, sadistic psychopath (I use that last term not as a metaphor, but as a clinical diagnosis)
You have a pretty good game going here (Suv 48)
Thank you. I’m flattered.
You are just as good, honestly. We both like a word-joust, it seems?
when I answer in my words, you discount them because I am not a distinguished European elite awards laureate (and neither is Suvorov, of course).
Not so, your own words are the interesting ones. It’s the hyper-long quotes which have me reaching for my revolver.
Then again, your laureates don't seem to be too interested in reading "tedious documents"
Actually, that is a fair comment on many UK academic historians with an interest in Russia during the Stalin era. I’ve probably learnt more about Russia from reading Platanov and Solzhenitsyn (in English translation) than from Bullock. I’ll give you that one.
A UK historian with an excellent knowledge of Stalin (and of long documents in Russian), who best counters your assumptions IMHO, is Simon Sebag Montefiore. But you’ve contradicted everything he says, so far!
Anyhow, the village fete is on this weekend and I’m playing a minor but time-consuming role, so I must leave these boards until Monday. Have an excellent two days without my vexacious comments, and as we pilots say, when in a bit of a spin, “stick forward and neutral, full opposite rudder”, and never turn back if the engine cuts just after take-off.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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Message 50
Posted by suvorovetz (U12273591) on Saturday, 19th July 2008
I suppose this is a symptom of a condition of yours which rather worries me. If I am wrong, I sincerely apologise; but this and a few other posts of yours make me think that you have a sneaking admiration for "Uncle Joe Stalin". I do hope I'm wrong?
Pilot, just think about it: essentially, I am arguing that Stalin is responsible for many more murders than you're giving him credit for. If you perceive this as a sneaking admiration, it's as comical as the argument between the guy with Boris Karlov's face and the middle-age twin-ladies about who murdered more strangers in "Arsenic and Old Lace" movie (I wonder if you ever saw that, it's a Cary Grant comedy released in the 40s). I will say this, though: of all the Communist gang line-up from Marx to Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev, Stalin, etc, etc, he was probably the least fanatic. If you read Marx's Manifesto closely (talk about tedious reading, pilot, eh?), you'll realize that what he envisioned was nothing less that the global GULAG. Lenin was a maniac who ordered children killed - and I'm not talking just about Romanov children. A well-known Russian writer and publicist Korolenko sent him personal letters complaining about teenage girls taken hostage, raped and killed by Lenin's thugs. Lenin's reply to Korolenko could be best summarized like, go [do you know what] yourself. And so on. Of this gang, Stalin - although being devoted Marxist himself - was probably the most pragmatic and calculating character. So, he lasted longer and murdered more people by default. I don't know if he should have been the first guy hanged in Nurnberg, but, most definitely, before Ribbentrop and company.
In my book he was a five-star cruel, sadistic psychopath (I use that last term not as a metaphor, but as a clinical diagnosis)
Pilot, are you moonlighting as a shrink?
Have an excellent two days without my vexacious comments, and as we pilots say, when in a bit of a spin, “stick forward and neutral, full opposite rudder”, and never turn back if the engine cuts just after take-off.
Will do, Colonel. Cheers.Link to this forum: Was August 19 1939 a busy day in Moscow or what?
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