Wars and ConflictsΒ permalink
Who really won the Battle of Jutland
This discussion has been closed.
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Message 1.Β
Posted by Amphion (U3338999) on Monday, 23rd June 2008
The Battle of Jutland seems to have come about purely by chance. From what I am currently reading, it seems that the Germans had deliberatley set out to trap the British Cruiser squadron. luring them into path of the High Sea's Fleet., whereas, the British Grand Fleet, though hoping to lull the Germans out of their hiding place, seemed to come into contact with their adversaries at a time and place when conditions favored the German retreat. Numerically Britain lost more men and ships, yet Germany gained nothing from the fact that the High Sea's fleet merely confirmed to the British Admiralty that they were not strong enough to take on the Grand Fleet in open waters, all things equal.
But what did the Germans gain? -
Message 2
Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Monday, 23rd June 2008
Ah! This takes me back to 'O'-level history.
We were taught, that just because we lost more tonnage than the Germans, that fact should not imply that we 'lost the battle'.
I think that is still the generally accepted position.
The German navy gained little, apart from showing that they had good gunnery discipline. (The sinking of the Hood, 20 odd years later rather rubbed that in).
The Germans decided against venturing out much after Jutland. So if tactical control of the sea was the goal, the Brits won. -
Message 3
Posted by Backtothedarkplace (U2955180) on Tuesday, 24th June 2008
The Germans gained nothing. Jutland pretty much finished the German fleet, it never put out to do battle again.
The British were back on patrol the following morning.
Did we loose more ships? Yes. But the ships we lost won us effective control of the North Sea. -
Message 4
Posted by Grand Falcon Railroad (U3267675) on Tuesday, 24th June 2008
Do you think then the fact that the German Highs Seas Fleet DIDNT engage (and could have been beaten) kept the war going for another 2 years?
Maybe - if the commanders had tried to "win" the battle the actual winners may have been the x-million combatants that would have been saved - would Germany surrender knowing they couldn't maintain a low level of naval efficency?
By consensus I think its agreed by all that the Allied Forces won the Battle as the objectives set out by the Germans weren't met (other than sinking a few heavier ships). -
Message 5
Posted by Backtothedarkplace (U2955180) on Tuesday, 24th June 2008
Hi GFR
"The Fleet in being?" Definetely had an effect. While the Germans have their fleet the british have to keep an outnumbering force covering it. thats men that cant be serving on the western front. Ships that cant be escorting convoys
Part of the problem with Jutland is that both admirals knew that while they couldnt win the war they could loose it, and the expense of those fleets is massive enough that both were to an extent afraid to use them in case they got broken. -
Message 6
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 24th June 2008
But what did the Germans gain? Β
Zilch. -
Message 7
Posted by Amphion (U3338999) on Tuesday, 24th June 2008
Surely, Jutland proved beyond any question of doubt that Germany would never be able to effect any alteration in the Blockade status that surrounded the Country (and would eventually strangle the life out of it). I cannot see what the Germans hoped to gain from their exploits. The Military leaders had already conceded the fact that they couldn't win an out and out victory on the Western Front, so any attempts at dictating the peace was now surely lost as a result of the Big Naval Battle. (The last of its kind!)
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Message 8
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 24th June 2008
Amphion
... the Big Naval Battle. (The last of its kind!)Β
In European waters, yes, but the Battle of Surigao Strait (at Leyte Gulf in 1944) was a classic cross-the-T battle between surface fleets. -
Message 9
Posted by Mr Pedant (U2464726) on Tuesday, 24th June 2008
Could it be said then that Jutland won the war?
I know the US were coming and they had to strike before they arrived in force if they hoped to win a complete victory in the west.
However, that offensive allowed for the counter-offensive that defeated Germany.
Having won a total victory in the east and occupying vast areas there couldn't they have just held on in the west, fortifying and holding the lands they held in France and Belgium and secured a minor victory there?
1m US soldiers might have been on their way but despite advances in technology and tactics I would imagine that the Germans would be able to hold indefinately on the defensive.
Can it be fairly argued that because of Jutland and the blockade that Germany's hand was forced and that Jutland won the war? -
Message 10
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Tuesday, 24th June 2008
It was much like the Battle of the Coral Sea in WW2. A tactical victory for one contestant, but a strategic victory for the other.
At Jutland, Germany won a tactical victory - they sank more ships than the British did. But strategically the RN won since the High Seas Fleet never again ventured forth to do battle.
The handling of the High Seas Fleet by Germany has been severely criticized by a good many observers. At least one highly respected naval historian has opined that the Germans didn't really have to defeat the RN at sea -- all they had to do was keep engaging it, eventually reducing warship numbers to such an extent that the RN's ability to blockade and maintain secure contact with the empire would be seriously affected. Had the High Seas Fleet continued to come out and fight, the feeling is that they eventually would lose just about all their ships, but the RN would lose far more than they could afford to lose. A succession of major engagements that resulted in a high loss of very expensive dreadnoughts and/or battlecruisers might have been more than Britain could tolerate economically or militarily, and may have knocked Britain out of the war.
I don't know enough about the situation that existed between the combatants to make a learned evaluation on just what effect massive naval losses to the RN might have had on the balance of power in 1916-17. I leave it up to those of you who have a better handle on it to advance erudite opinions. -
Message 11
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Tuesday, 24th June 2008
The Battle of Jutland seems to have come about purely by chance. From what I am currently reading, it seems that the Germans had deliberatley set out to trap the British Cruiser squadron. luring them into path of the High Sea's Fleet., whereas, the British Grand Fleet, though hoping to lull the Germans out of their hiding place, seemed to come into contact with their adversaries at a time and place when conditions favored the German retreat. Numerically Britain lost more men and ships, yet Germany gained nothing from the fact that the High Sea's fleet merely confirmed to the British Admiralty that they were not strong enough to take on the Grand Fleet in open waters, all things equal.
But what did the Germans gain?Β
Not a lot.The best they could say,as the Kaiser put it was "That the spell of Trafalgar has been broken" and the gunnery and seamanship skill of some of their officers and men was outstanding.
However at the end of the battle the British were still at sea,ready for battle.The German Navy had run for port and made by the skin of their teeth.Whereas the "Grand Fleet" was ready ( with exception of HMS Marlborough )for sea within a few hours,in the cases of some ships it took months to get them back to readiness.The fact that they escaped at all is blamed on Jelicoes "turn away".Personally I think that this wrong and neglects to highlight the various failings of the British system which even Beatty was forced to acknowledge.On several occassions sections of the German fleet were spotted at night and yet no fire was exchanged (because the flagship hadnt fired,or the admiral hadnt orderedit etc).Worse still they (RN) didnt report what they had seen.Jelicoe was literally left in the dark....
You then have those who claim that the Germans showed a masterclass in naval warfare.Hipper certainly did and more,at the Battle of Jutland.Out numbered from the start,he bettered Beatty,helped saved the HSF with his "death ride" and got 4 out of his 5 ships home.
Admiral Sheer,on the other hand was lucky,very lucky.One of his officers claimed that "he didnt have the foggiest idea of what he was doing".He finds himself with his "T" crossed and takes a bit of a pounding,so he turns away.So far so good,however for a reason even he apparently couldnt remember why,turns back,right into the path of of Jelicoes guns.The night escape to the Jade was risky and I mentioned before if RN signalling had been better and there hadnt been such a rigid adherence to British "protocol"(or even the "class" system")Sheer may have lost a lot more ships.
As for the ships themselves?HMS Indefatigable and Invincible were "first generation" ships whose loss the RN could absolve(ironically with the "tin clads" Renown and Repulse).The three armoured cruisers (Defence,Warrior,Black Prince)were of a different era and shouldnt have been there.The "BIG" loss was the HMS Queen Mary,a modern vessel,well equiped and a good gunnery ship.If you look at the German losses she is the equivalent of the Luitzow.The loss of over 6000 men for the RN is horrific,over 3000 on the three battlecruisers,but you have to look at how those ships met there demise and again the germans,the year earlier had an extrmely lucky and educational event
At "Dogger Bank" SMS Seydlitz suffered a double turret burnout,caused by cordite flash.She was extremely luck to not have blown up.As it was the Germans learnt that the "working chamber"(where cordite is held in preparation for firing)was exremely dangerous and tight restictions were imposed to reduce the risk of cordite flash.They learnt the lesson well as none of there ships blew up.The British however would learn the hard way.
I think that the Germans knew they had a lucky escape,despite all the bravado Adm Sheer told the Kaiser as much,that they couldnt win at sea(with the HSF).Maybe the ramification of this was a realisation that the Germans best bet (and riskiest) was the use of unresticted U-Boat warfare (Sheer was an advocate).Its often said that the HSF never sailed again,this is untrue it did sortie on several occassions and only fate stopped there being "Jutland part 2".
Possibly the greatest irony is that the fleet,which the Kaiser had husbanded so keenly thoughout the war,helped hammer one of the final nails in the coffin of his realm when it mutineed in 1918....
Just my two penneth
Vf -
Message 12
Posted by Anglo-Norman (U1965016) on Tuesday, 24th June 2008
Tue, 24 Jun 2008 18:45 GMT, in reply to VirtualF in message 11
The fact that they escaped at all is blamed on Jelicoes "turn away"Β
For the 'British Military History 1914-45' module of my History BA I wrote an essay defending Jellicoe's handling of the Fleet at Jutland. I still have it somewhere, but not to hand, and I forget much of what I wrote. However, I recall arguing that turning away was the safest option when faced with a genuine torpedo threat.
Many people expected a new Trafalgar, but that missed the point of the naval situation. Jellicoe didn't NEED to win. All he needed was to prevent the Germans winning a decisive victory, and keep the Grand Fleet more or less intact. This he achieved convincingly.
For all their losses were more severe than those of the Germans, the RN still had what in land action terms would be 'command of the field' at the end of the battle. The picture of a British defeat is as much down to a failure to destroy the High Seas Fleet as anything.
There was a poem (published in an American newspaper, IIRC) of the time which ran something along the lines of:
"The Germans cry aloud: "We've won!"
But yet it seems a curious view,
When those are conquerors who run,
And those the vanquished who pursue" -
Message 13
Posted by Amphion (U3338999) on Wednesday, 25th June 2008
So, was the Battle of Jutland a further example of the Royal Navy's complacency.
Following 'Coronel' questions had been asked about tactical awareness of Rear Admiral Cradock.
At the Battle of the Falkland Isles, quuestions were raised about the gunnery of the British Fleet.
At Dogger, a question of mis-read signals concentrated the R.N's fire on the 'Blucher' whilst the rest of the German fleet escaped to harbour.
And again at Jutland, mis-read or mis-understood signals seemed to be the order of the day amongst the Admiralty. The earliest signals sent to Beatty, seemed to suggest that the HSF were still in the pass, because Sheer's flagship was still reported to have been stationed there. The British monitors, in this instance had failed to do their job, or at least failed to use their imagination,(as Sheer had transferred Flagships)
The further mis-understandings between Beatty and Jellicoe, seem to be endemic of this. -
Message 14
Posted by Anglo-Norman (U1965016) on Wednesday, 25th June 2008
Wed, 25 Jun 2008 13:21 GMT, in reply to Amphion in message 13
As I understand it, the poor quality of British gunnery (IIRC, the battlecruisers were overshooting by a mile when they first engaged at Jutland) was not wholly the fault of the gunners. The Admiralty had skimped on money, going for inferior gunsights because they were cheaper. -
Message 15
Posted by Bashfulsmudger (U11287440) on Wednesday, 25th June 2008
Wed, 25.6.08 15;50 CET, in reply to message 14
Peter,
I have to agree with you about the inferior optics.
Germany always produced good optics for all their weaponry. When you have good optics and the technology then range finding is much easier.
There was a mention made earlier about the Hood being sunk by the Bismark. Again better gunnery was suggested.
I think the Hoods gunnery was quite up to scratch, given optical rangefinding.
Bismark and all the German capital ships had the advantage of Gun laying radar, which was a shock to the admiralty when the Graf Spee was scuttled and the radar antena was visible for all the world to see.
When photographic records were checked the same antenas were then identified on other german warships.
I think this explains the hit at pretty long range from the Bismark.
I believe the Hood straddled the Bismark on her first salvo, although I stand to be corrected. -
Message 16
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Wednesday, 25th June 2008
So, was the Battle of Jutland a further example of the Royal Navy's complacency.Β
I think it was more to do with overconfidence and a "tradition" of victory as much as anything.As for Coronel and Admiral Cradock,you have to bear in mind that a few months earlier Admiral Troubridge had been shamed and his reputation forever tarnished for not engaging a superior force in the form of the "Goeben".Cradock had no intention of suffering the same fate.Also to be brutally honest Coronel was as much a result of Churchills meddling and posturing as Cradocks zealousness.Craddock needed a modern armoured cruiser (HMS Defence),not a aged battleship (Canopus).He got the latter(though it never joined him in time),but Churchill erred about the "Defence".By the time Churchill did agree to send Defence" it was too late,Cradock was half way up the Chillean coast.As Churchill but it "we were already talking into the void".Wether Craddock lacked "moral" courage in accepting a fight he couldnt win is a question we have covered before.
At Dogger, a question of mis-read signals concentrated the R.N's fire on the 'Blucher' whilst the rest of the German fleet escaped to harbour.
And again at Jutland, mis-read or mis-understood signals seemed to be the order of the day amongst the AdmiraltyΒ
The common denominators here is Beatty and his signaller Ralph Seymour( a man who Beatty claimed lost three battles for)At Dogger Bank at least Beatty had the excuse that his ship (Lion) was extremely badly damaged with half its halyards shot way.It doesnt excuse the (very) British farce which followed,but it does explain some of the reason of why it happened.At Jutland however Beatty and Seymour deserve a grilling.Firstly Beatty doesnt inform the 5th Battle Sqaudron of his movements (and remember these ships are the most powerful vessels in the world).He then (again) manages to screw up his tactical plans by leaving one of the german ships un targetted(unforgivable as this had also happenned at Dogger Bank).During the "Run to the North" for an hour he makes no signal to tell Jelicoe just exactly where he was,making Jelicoes decisons even harder and his eventual deployment even more spectacular and a real demonstation of his skill.
A repeated problem with Beatty (despite his suppossed Nelsonic skills)was that he never met his captains or Vice Admirals to tell them exactly what he would do in a given situation and more to the point what he expected of them,something that Nelson practiced.The end result was a complete lack of initiative and a slavish following of Beatty despite the events unfolding around him.Jelicoe was also guilty on this last point but more due to the fact that he wished to "centralise"everything.Beattty was tenacous and brave but Nelson he was not.At Jutland he was in the first instance,comprehensively out fought by Hipper and redeemed himself by luring Sheer onto Jelicoe.
The earliest signals sent to Beatty, seemed to suggest that the HSF were still in the pass, because Sheer's flagship was still reported to have been stationed there. The British monitors, in this instance had failed to do their job, or at least failed to use their imagination,(as Sheer had transferred Flagships)Β
The civillian members of "Room 40" knew exactly where Sheer was and it wasnt in harbour"!The problem was that the RN officers in charge didnt trust their non naval bretherin,nor the the intelligence they gave.Sheer used the call sign "DK".When he sailed,this id was transferred to a shore staion.The civillians knew this,the RN officer (Jackson)in charge either didnt or didnt believe them .So when the RN officer(Jackson) asked "where is DK " the civillians would have to answer in harbour!If he had mentioned that he wished to tell Jelicoe of the HSF position the civillians would have understood what was being asked of them annd informed him that although "DK" was in harbour Sheer may well not be. -
Message 17
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Wednesday, 25th June 2008
</quote>There was a mention made earlier about the Hood being sunk by the Bismark. Again better gunnery was suggested</quote>
More that it wasnt a complete mismatch.Hood was a 20 year old ship whose weaknesses were well known throughout the RN.She had the preverbial "glass jaw" she had a hefty punch but couldnt take one.There is a cruel irony that almost 25 years to the day that a ship called "Hood" which is thought to be invincible is sunk in the Denmark Strait."25 years earlier Admiral Hood was commanding a ship called "Invincible" at Jutland which blew up with virtually all her crew.....
Spooky.
Vf -
Message 18
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Wednesday, 25th June 2008
Sorry that should have been WAS a complete mismatch,not wasnt!
Vf -
Message 19
Posted by Amphion (U3338999) on Monday, 30th June 2008
Interesting reading VirtualIF.
Having now completed the book which inspired the original question, I am still brought back to the question of complacency!
First off, the idea of 'A new trafalgar,' and/or comparing any of those commanders at sea that night with being the 'new Nelson,' personifies the whole of the Admiralty for living in the past.
It seems to be a problem that arrises in all top-brass commands. That when it comes to the crunch 'of war', then these men, who for the most part ascended to their rank through the 'old school tie' system, were totally incompetent when it came to using a) first of all, the inteligence at their disposal. b) secondly, sending and understanding simple instructions to one another.
(although there was a question that when Sheer was heading for the safety of the Harbour and cutting a swathe through the British Light Cruiser squadron, that the reason signals weren't given to the C-in-C, was that to do so would give away of the Flottilla's to enemy attack, bearing in mind that the British weren't confident about facing their enemy in the dark, and of course, the threat of possible submarines.)
But that raises another question. Why were the Germans so better at night fighting than the greatest Naval Fleet in the world???
I couldn't help but feel, as I read the chapter in the book, re; the years of squabbling between Beatty and his supporters and Jellicoe and his supporters, that it was a case of conkers in the school yard, even if that schoolyard might be Eaton or Harrow. Although it does smack as taking sides, the decision of the Government to make Seatty an Earl 5 years before Jellicoe. Should we read this as some kind of admittion on the part of the Government??? -
Message 20
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Monday, 30th June 2008
Amphion,
Why were the Germans so better at night fighting than the greatest Naval Fleet in the world??Β
For the same reason the Japanese were a generation later: they trained for 24 hours of fighting, knowing their most likely opponent trained for only 12. If they couldn't get the advantage in the daytime, they'd get the advantage at night. -
Message 21
Posted by notfat (U1659575) on Monday, 30th June 2008
I would also include the notion that commanders should be allowed to use initiative, as Tryron proposed. As mentioned, rigid obedience to orders proved disastrous. Resisting firing on the enemy when they were spotted at night simply because orders were not given. Jackie Fisher said orders should not be obeyed in war (or similar).
-
Message 22
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Tuesday, 1st July 2008
I would also include the notion that commanders should be allowed to use initiative, as Tryron proposed. As mentioned, rigid obedience to orders proved disastrous. Resisting firing on the enemy when they were spotted at night simply because orders were not given. Jackie Fisher said orders should not be obeyed in war (or similar)Β
<Smiley>
Re Tyron
I know what you are trying to say but Admiral Tyron isnt such a great example to use.Its true that he did wish for officer to be more flexible in undertaking there duties,but you have to also bear in mind that Tyron,was a big man and a big personality.He also didnt suffer fools gladly and made the very people he was trying to inspire afraid to "come to the fore" in case they suffered from his wraith.
In some ways this is the supreme irony of his death and the loss of HMS Victoria.Firstly the fleet was using the "TA" system which was Tyrons creation,the flagship would raise "TA" and the other ships would follow the flagships movements.The idea was cut down on the need for signalling and a more rapid deployment.
(On this occassion the two lines of battleships were to turn inwards,HMS Camperdown to turn in sequence with the flagship,"TA" was raised.)
Secondly such was Tyrons reputation,that his men were were loath to question his orders,stifling initiative.Thirdly when Tyrons bridge officer did query his terrible decision he was "sent away with a flea in his ear".The rest is history...HMS Victoria is rammed by Adm Markhams HMS Camperdown.
When Tyron got his reply for why Markham had not commenced his turn, his reply was beautiful in its simplicity
"Because I didnt understand your signal"
Vf -
Message 23
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Friday, 5th September 2008
"The Germans cry aloud: "We've won!"
But yet it seems a curious view,
When those are conquerors who run,
And those the vanquished who pursue"
****
I think the New York Times got it about right.
"The German fleet has assaulted its jailer, but it remains in jail". -
Message 24
Posted by Mikestone8 (U13249270) on Friday, 5th September 2008
Many people expected a new Trafalgar, but that missed the point of the naval situation. Jellicoe didn't NEED to win. All he needed was to prevent the Germans winning a decisive victory, and keep the Grand Fleet more or less intact. This he achieved convincingly.
At least, that was the position as far as Jellicoe knew.
In fact, destruction of the HSF would have made a big difference to the u-boat war the following year. If the Grand Fleet had no longer been needed in the North Sea, its destroyer screen would not have been needed either, so could have been released for convoy escorts. The additional destroyers (about 100) would have been enough to allow convoying to be introduced at once, thus effectively crippling the u-boat campaign from day one.
Of course, in the end it "didn't matter", as the u-boats were defeated anyway. But if they hadn't been (and it was a close-run thing), historians now would probably blame it on the failure to scotch the HSF - and of course it did matter to the merchant seamen who got drowned between February and August 1917, many of whom might have lived had their ships been in convoy.
Obviously, Jellicoe couldn't read the future, and it would be absurd to blame him for not forseeing all this - no one did. But I fear, had things gone otherwise, that wouldn't stop a lot of armchair strategists from doing exactly that. -
Message 25
Posted by Philip25 (U11566626) on Friday, 5th September 2008
One of the main problems with Jutland is the way in which news of the battle became public.
The Germans rushed to maike known what had happened and made outlandish claims, but were first in the field (as it were).
The British were more cautious, and coming second in the news stakes were assumed to have done so because they had come off worse.
In the end it was always difficult for the British to make the case that notwithstanding greater losses of ships, they had won a strategic victory.
A further complication was the continuing dispute between Jellicoe (a man of Wellingtonian restraint and understatement) and the more flambuoyant Beatty (who also had a lot to justify and defend in his handling of the battlecruisers). Jellicoe's replacement by Beatty soon after the battle seemed to confirm that Jellicoe was being penalised for his handling of the battle.
But there is no doubt in my mind who "won" Jutland, Pyhrric though the victory might have been. Another Trafalgar (or Tsushima - and Jellicoe did brilliantly cross his opponent's "T") would have been great, but was not to be.
As soon as the HSF saw the GF in line of battle it turned tail and fled - that is the whole of the story.
Phil -
Message 26
Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Friday, 5th September 2008
the winner was the navy who - whatever happened at jutland - was prepared to continue to give battle
the rn was - after a bloody nose , the germans werent
bit like the falklands where the rn took horrendous losses - but kept going for it - the argies stayed in port
throughout its history the rn has a history of going for it
st -
Message 27
Posted by Philip25 (U11566626) on Friday, 5th September 2008
It's called "the Nelson touch" - he signalled at Trafalgar, "engage the enemy more closely".
Phil
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