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"Britain has never got over the Somme"

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Messages: 1 - 50 of 52
  • Message 1.Ìý

    Posted by FormerlyOldHermit (U3291242) on Tuesday, 29th April 2008

    I heard this phrase recently and it did get me thinking. I think there's some truth in the statement, especially the inter-war period and the Second World War (tactics wise) which was heavily influenced by the effects of the Somme.

    What are your thoughts on the issue? Is the Somme still a scar on the British national consciousness?

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  • Message 2

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 29th April 2008

    One could easily say "France has never got over Verdun."

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  • Message 3

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by Mark (U2073932) on Tuesday, 29th April 2008

    Probably the most influence it had on the British army was to never ever again order untried and inexperienced units (pals and chum battalions) to WALK across open ground in front of machine guns - whether they were supposed to be destroyed or not.

    The Somme, Passchendale (spelling?), The Michael offensive, Cambrai counter attack - all these battles, and the horrific casualty lists that accompanied them - merely backed up the British loathing of large armies, standing or otherwise. i.e. the gried brought on family and friends with so much death.

    Seem to have lost the plot a bit - but I hope I've made some sense!

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  • Message 4

    , in reply to message 3.

    Posted by JB_In_Bournemouth (U11805687) on Tuesday, 29th April 2008

    Why should we get over it?

    What it means is that pre-1916, the British were much like the Americans are now. We were more religious, a lot more sentimental, unquestioningly patriotic (and entirely intolerant of anyone who questioned this state of mind,) and confident that we were right because of who we were.

    For all the pain and terror it caused, the Somme set in train a cultural shift that made us what we are today: Cynical, agnostic with a small 'a', and bound to each other not for Queen and country but out of loyalty to our family, friends, community and 'mates,' for whom we would still go to the last ditch, but not because we reckon God's on our side.

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  • Message 5

    , in reply to message 4.

    Posted by Lyra (U2293272) on Tuesday, 29th April 2008

    No, I don't think that we have got over the Somme, or the First World War actually. The First War is remembered in a very different way to the Second. We remember the Second War as the nation pulling together against fascism. We remember the First War for the staggering huge loss of life - for reasons we find difficult to comprehend today. You don't get over that quickly, nor should you. Believe me, I'm Scottish and we're not over Culloden yet!

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  • Message 6

    , in reply to message 4.

    Posted by Trooper Tom Canning - WW2 Site Helper (U519668) on Tuesday, 29th April 2008

    While agreeing with JB whether he is in Bournemouth or Boscombe - that other aspect which was paramount was the horrendous loss of young Officers who were expected to be the leaders of the future - this was obvious in the tactics of the WW2 when the British were accused of slowness to accept casualties - with good reason - we didn't have millions to throw away !

    The cream was lost in the WW1 and not replaced - even to-day although there is a revival of sorts.....

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  • Message 7

    , in reply to message 6.

    Posted by George1507 (U2607963) on Tuesday, 29th April 2008

    That's hard to believe Tom. British fatalities in WWI were about 10% of the mobilised troops, and total casualties were around 33%.

    Compared to most of the other protagonists, Britain got off lightly. French and Russian casualties were more than 67%.

    I'm not belittling what the British, or any one else suffered in WWI, but by the time WWII happened, most of those men who died in WWI would have been in their late 40s.

    Also, since just about every country that fought in WWI fought also in WWII, the effect was similar for all countries. In fact the British may have been better off than the Germans, Italians and Romanians who had greater losses in WWI.

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  • Message 8

    , in reply to message 7.

    Posted by Trooper Tom Canning - WW2 Site Helper (U519668) on Tuesday, 29th April 2008

    1507 George -
    Not really concerned with the losses of others in WW1 - as you say - "the men who fought in WW1 would have been in their 40's by the time of WW2" - exactly my point - the many 2nd Lts. who would have been the Colonels and Majors - had been killed off in WW1 - were missing to carry the load in the Army in the beginning - even Monty - as a Major was left for dead on the battlefield - if you delve into the WW2 casualties you might also find a huge loss in platoon/troop and company/squadron commanders- which happily after 60 odd years we appear to have replaced.
    Cheers

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  • Message 9

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Wednesday, 30th April 2008

    Is the Somme still a scar on the British national consciousness?Ìý
    I think it changed British attitudes to war for generations, it still has echoes today. Earlier WW1 battles (e.g. Mons) should have provided warnings of what was to come, but first Somme (1-07-1916) with 30,000 casualties in a day, most in the first hour, was a horror on the scale of Verdun. (Why there were not post-Somme troop mutinies as there had been post-Verdun mutinies is remarkable)
    The system of local recruitment meant that some English towns and villages lost a third of their fittest young men in a day. When we hear of losses in Basra or Helmand we need to keep some perspective, grievous as these are.

    The slaughter on the Somme affected not just the bereaved and the permanently mutilated, but the survivors who changed their attitudes to gung-ho frontal assaults. Politicians who survived service in WW1 were usually (regardless of party) unwilling to be drawn into such reckless slaughter again. This might, in part, explain our attitudes to Hitler and appeasment 20 years later.

    In the second WW there was the motto "let steel do it", i.e. wait for tanks or bombers to demolish an enemy strong-point, rather than send-in lightly-armed infantry.
    While this was not always an option (eg D-Day, Burma) it reflects a change of attitude which has its origin in experience of the Somme.

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  • Message 10

    , in reply to message 9.

    Posted by TrailApe (U1701496) on Wednesday, 30th April 2008

    In my opinion its a yes and no.

    No the nation never got over it, but yes the British Army got over it.

    The tactics used on the Somme were niave in the extreme. However remember that this was the first real showing of the 'citizen army' and it was necesserily a hasty affair as the French were under the cosh at Verdun and needed the British to do something to take the weight off them.

    So in effect what you had were splendidly optimistic patriotic virgin soldiers going forward in waves - the tactics had to be simple as the troops lacked the training to do anything else and the generals lacked the time to give them the training that they required - if the training existed - note the Germans used similair tactics around this time in the war, so it's not as if our tactics were essentially brainless.

    However, if you put the losses of the Somme to one side, you then have to remember that this was the same citizen army that in 1918 had evolved into a tremendously efficient machine, using combined arms operations that the Germans in 1940 would recognise as blitzkrieg. They accepted the hammer blow of the Germans Operation Michael (which featured the first use of infiltration tactics by the Germans) in the Spring of 1918, fell back but were not routed (a sign of a good army) and then went on the attack leading to the '100 Days Offensive' and the the "Black Day of the German Army".

    I would agree that in popular mythology and the media (now and back then)the first Somme appears as a tragedy, however in real terms the British Army recovered and went on to better things.

    In WW2 the 'engine' of the allies was the productivity of the US and the men of the Red Army, in WW1 the engine of the Allies was the British Empire - productivity and men (British, ANZACS, Canadians and a host of other Empire troops). You cannot take on a major role without sustaining major losses.

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  • Message 11

    , in reply to message 7.

    Posted by Mani (U1821129) on Wednesday, 30th April 2008

    1507George

    "British fatalities in WWI were about 10% of the mobilised troops, and total casualties were around 33%."

    The CWGC puts it at 14% and 41%

    France - 16% aqnd 67%

    Russia - 15% and 56%

    "Compared to most of the other protagonists, Britain got off lightly" Actually, completely the opposite, in regards to fatalities of the allies, only France, Russia, Romania and Serbia are higher...

    The Italian got off a lot lighter, evwen when considering they were fighting on their own soil.

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  • Message 12

    , in reply to message 10.

    Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Wednesday, 30th April 2008

    There was a programme on recently about the Somme, which showed that some units ignored the 'walk forward in lines' order, and did very well. Some ran, some crawled forward to near the wire before the start time, and did break into the German lines with far fewer casualties. The Ulster Div took all its objectives, but had to retire due to no support.
    However, the programme did emphasise the Army learned quickly, and did not repeat the errors willy-nilly. OK - they made other errors, but that is human nature, and by 1918 the British Army was probably the best in the World.
    I think the Somme was the beginning of the Modern Army, and possibly, as was said earlier, the beginning of the Modern Way Of Thinking.

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  • Message 13

    , in reply to message 12.

    Posted by vera1950 (U9920163) on Wednesday, 30th April 2008

    hi,
    I think the Somme has remained in the national conciousness not only due to the number of killed and wounded but the short time it took to reach those figures.Also it may be remembered that the Somme was initiated by the French to take the heat off their troops in Verdun-good reason to loose so many lives?
    The fact that nearly every street in some communities were effected lives on as the the stories have been passed down by the communities .
    The army itself does not forget the Somme as they learned much about the new art of warfare in the 20th century by the mistakes made ,and in fact that could be seen in future offensives.
    The poster who states that the Ulster division was the only ones to achieve their objective on 1/07/16 may like to reasses that as the Manchesters and Liverpools achieved their objective in liberating Montabaun on 1/07/16.

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  • Message 14

    , in reply to message 13.

    Posted by Mani (U1821129) on Wednesday, 30th April 2008

    You mean the scousers stole Montabaun and tried to sell it to the Mancs for an Oz of backy?

    Report message14

  • Message 15

    , in reply to message 10.

    Posted by Mike Alexander (U1706714) on Wednesday, 30th April 2008

    ...the tactics had to be simple as the troops lacked the training to do anything else and the generals lacked the time to give them the training that they required...Ìý
    I've heard several historians claim that the 'simple tactics' (ie strolling across no-man's land) were partly decided upon because of the snobbish attitudes of many on the staff, who underestimated the intelligence and adaptability of the 'lower classes'.

    The bottom line, though, is that they overestimated the impact of the barrage (which, it's reckoned, contained as much as 30% duds, and which generally failed to break the German wire), and underestimated the strength and depth of the German dugouts, and the speed at which their machine-gun teams were able to mobilise.

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  • Message 16

    , in reply to message 10.

    Posted by George1507 (U2607963) on Wednesday, 30th April 2008



    However, if you put the losses of the Somme to one side, you then have to remember that this was the same citizen army that in 1918 had evolved into a tremendously efficient machine, using combined arms operations that the Germans in 1940 would recognise as blitzkrieg. They accepted the hammer blow of the Germans Operation Michael (which featured the first use of infiltration tactics by the Germans) in the Spring of 1918, fell back but were not routed (a sign of a good army) and then went on the attack leading to the '100 Days Offensive' and the the "Black Day of the German Army".

    Ìý


    Trailape, if the British Army had really developed tactics that the Germans would recognise as blitzkrieg, how come the BEF was so badly routed in France in 1940? It seems to me that the British Army developed better tactics to suit trench warfare in 1917 and 1918, but the generals must have spent the next 20 years assuming that trench warfare would be the state of the art forever. German thinking was way ahead by 1939, and in spite of the fact that the British must have seen what happened in the east, they ignored it and expected the Germans to appear with spades again.

    smiley - doh

    Mani, you are right about the Italian casualties. Sorry. My point was that the main protagonists in WWI were all present in WWII, so they were all starting with the same deficiency as it were.

    And one again, let me say that I have the utmost respect for all those that fought in WWI and WWII. I think some of the generals should have been court martialed for their blinkered stupidity, but the men were heroes.

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  • Message 17

    , in reply to message 14.

    Posted by vera1950 (U9920163) on Wednesday, 30th April 2008

    hi,
    very funny ,stereotyping Scouers and Mancs.
    I expect they were roughest of the rough -I expect Montabaun didn,t really mind their social standing all that much nor their attention to ettiquette.
    Our ancestor was one of them on that day and I expect he was rough as well, you know could put upa good fight with rifle, bayonet, fist and pit-clogs.They didn,t really speak the Kings English either and mainly poorly educated but you don,t need to be to fight do you.
    And it was they that did achieve their objective that day.

    Report message17

  • Message 18

    , in reply to message 17.

    Posted by Philip25 (U11566626) on Wednesday, 30th April 2008

    I don't think the Somme has had any impact on British views or the British psyche since 1938.

    The ordeal of verdun certainly impacted on the french in 1940 and contributed to their utter defeat. France was a divided and broken nation even before the german invasion.

    In Britain, I'd argue that a desire to avoid another world war and a repetition of the events of 1916 had some influence on popular support for appeasement uop to Munich, but after that, britain went to war a united country clear that there was no alternative but to confront and resist Hitler.

    I see few references to the Somme in the literature of WWII, except for some fears that the BEF in 1939/40 would be caught in trench warfare again. Writers from Churchill to Alan Brooke expressed that fear. but that was more about tactical responses rather than some deep-rooted concern or memory (though many of the British generals in 1939 had seen service on the Western Front). It doesn't seem to be expressed in any of the contributions to Mass Observation that I have read.

    I'm not even sure how much the British population saw the Somme as a huge tragedy. There was considerable pride in the achievements of the British Army immediately after the war, and its not until the mid-20s that the likes of Graves, Sassoon & Co with their despair and cynicism start to colour opinion.

    So I think Britain "got over" the Somme within 20 years, if there was actually anything to be got over (where is the evidence of its impact on moral?)

    As a test, please cite me one reference or example that clearly shows that someone's view was coloured by the Somme since 1938.

    Phil

    Report message18

  • Message 19

    , in reply to message 17.

    Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Wednesday, 30th April 2008

    wasnt the real tragedy of the Somme that it was the last of the volunteer armies we produced -

    they werent conscripted - they were pals battalions, artists battalions - ALL volunteers who were there because they wanted to be there

    swept up in the hysteria of patriotism - indeed they were the flower of a generation and indeed the lions led by donkeys - badly let down by the fat cats living in chateaux miles behind the line

    after the somme, conscription kicked in as the only way lambs could be led to the slaughter

    attacking a section of the german line that had been stable, where they had time to prepare underground defences - announcing in the press that bank holidays were to be canx for munitions workers

    sacrificing british lives because the French neede a diversion for their attacks - i personally have neve go over the somme !!

    st

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  • Message 20

    , in reply to message 18.

    Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Thursday, 1st May 2008

    Phil
    As a test, please cite me one reference or example that clearly shows that someone's view was coloured by the Somme since 1938.Ìý

    How about Harold Macmillan? Injured at the Somme (bullet lodged in his pelvis, left in no man's land for a day).
    He advised primeministers and eventually became one.
    Try a couple of his biographies, Alistair Horne's or Simon Ball's would do.

    Both make it clear that the awful waste of the Somme slaughter haunted him to his dying day.

    I think a case could be made for saying that his 'one nation' brand of Toryism has its root in the respect he had for the 'common soldiers' he had commanded in the Grenadiers, in the summer of 1916.

    Report message20

  • Message 21

    , in reply to message 15.

    Posted by TrailApe (U1701496) on Thursday, 1st May 2008

    I've heard several historians claim that the 'simple tactics' (ie strolling across no-man's land) were partly decided upon because of the snobbish attitudes of many on the staff, who underestimated the intelligence and adaptability of the 'lower classes'.Ìý

    Mike_Alexander,

    I'm sure your right that some senior Army staff believed this - remember the careers of some of these senior officers started way back in the 1880's, their backgrounds were not exactly 'working class' and there would have been some right duffers in amongst them. I think its probably a mixture of a few things - lack of time to train, lack of a workable doctrine to use in the training and prejudices of some of the senior staff. The Germans, who are often held up as the paragon of tactics, didn't come with anything radically different until 1918.

    Trailape, if the British Army had really developed tactics that the Germans would recognise as blitzkrieg, how come the BEF was so badly routed in France in 1940?Ìý

    1507George, not wishing to appear trite, but Peace and Politicians is what happened. The citizen army was disbanded and the army was handed back to the Blimps. Policing an empire, seducing debs and playing polo is not conducive to running divisional scale exercises combining Armour, Air and Artillery.

    Whilst I'm sure there were some freethinkers amongst the regular army of the 20's and 30's look what happened to the ideas of Liddell Hart and look at the career of Percy Hobart. Nobody wanted to know.

    Which is why, in the Western Desert you have the tally-ho charges of British armour being wrecked on the anti-tank screen of those unsporting Afrika Corp. Arrmour/Infantry/Artillery co-operation was almost non existent until some of the 'professionals' were either killed or sacked.

    Of course they weren't all fox hunting nutters but I think there were enough of them and they had a large say in what was happening in the small proffesional army of the inter war years.



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  • Message 22

    , in reply to message 21.

    Posted by Mani (U1821129) on Thursday, 1st May 2008

    TrailApe/Mike_Alexander,


    The main problem in the Somme was the apparent need for secrecy to an extent that Platoon commanders didn't pass on objectives to the platoon, so when he was hot, nobody knew what to do.

    The Platoon commanders didn't receive orders till just going over the top etc.

    The main man ( and a military legend of the war) who changed all this was Canadian General Sir Arthur William Currie, his principles were what we would recognise now. Every man in the platoon knew everyone else’s job, training for specific objectives (several months for Vimy Ridge). Utilising the creping barrage and counter batteries.

    Report message22

  • Message 23

    , in reply to message 22.

    Posted by TrailApe (U1701496) on Thursday, 1st May 2008

    Mani,

    I never knew that - the lack of awareness of the objectives at section level. No wonder some of the attacks seem to stall. It would be interesting to know if those units that did get to their objectives were the ones that managed to keep the leadership intact.

    Sometimes an officer with a map can come in handy (I'll go and was my mouth out).

    Report message23

  • Message 24

    , in reply to message 21.

    Posted by Darrenatwork (U11744656) on Thursday, 1st May 2008

    With regards to German blitzkrieg, wasn't Guderin(sp?)'s Achtung Panzer based on the writing of Liddel Hart? (not sure if that's what you were saying Trail Ape)

    Report message24

  • Message 25

    , in reply to message 24.

    Posted by Mani (U1821129) on Thursday, 1st May 2008

    Darrenatwork


    The works of Liddell Hart And Maj Gen JFC Fuller more than influenced 'Achtung Panzer' (More so Fuller than Liddell hart).

    Report message25

  • Message 26

    , in reply to message 20.

    Posted by Philip25 (U11566626) on Thursday, 1st May 2008

    "How about Harold Macmillan?...Try a couple of his biographies... Both make it clear that the awful waste of the Somme slaughter haunted him to his dying day.

    I think a case could be made for saying that his 'one nation' brand of Toryism has its root in the respect he had for the 'common soldiers' he had commanded in the Grenadiers, in the summer of 1916."

    All hearsay and authorial speculation/post hoc rationalisation. I asked for EVIDENCE.

    Phil

    Report message26

  • Message 27

    , in reply to message 26.

    Posted by U3280211 (U3280211) on Thursday, 1st May 2008

    All hearsay and authorial speculation/post hoc rationalisation. I asked for EVIDENCE.Ìý

    You asked for sources. I gave you two which demolish your inane argument that 1938 is some sort of arbitrary buffer-point for the perfusion of an idea!

    I'm not your unpaid research assitant.

    Read what I referred you to and get back to me if you still wish to argue that Macmillan was NOT affected, throughout his life, by what he saw and experienced on the Somme.


    Report message27

  • Message 28

    , in reply to message 22.

    Posted by Backtothedarkplace (U2955180) on Friday, 2nd May 2008

    Secrecy and the Somme.

    According to our local paper while the troops were kept in the dark it didnt stop it from becoming common knowledge in the UK long before the actual battle itself.

    Report message28

  • Message 29

    , in reply to message 24.

    Posted by TrailApe (U1701496) on Friday, 2nd May 2008

    Darrenatwork

    Broadly – yes, the Army lost a lot in the 'Peace Dividend' of 1918.

    The pre war army was a small tight knit world that in the main did not lead to free thinking or questioning the status quo. The Army in 1918 was full of the best young minds (the ones that survived) that the country had to offer. As hostilities only they did not have to worry about their career path so did not have to conform to the ‘norm’. Additionally due to the attrition of the pre-war officer corps, there were quite a few non-military minds in position of reasonable seniority at regimental level, so they were in a position to make their views heard. These in conjunction with the more open minded of the prewar regulars were the people that had a hand developing the tactics that led to the final successes of the last few months.

    Unfortunately this war was one of the first ones were the General Staff were not at the sharp end, so there was not a similair cull of these. Of course not all of them were hidebound, but they were a product of a previous era.

    So after the war ended and all of the lawyers, surgeons, industrialists, scientists, butchers, bakers and candlestick makers returned to the Land Fit For Heroes, a lot of the synergy was lost and the Army fell back to their traditional values. To be fair to them, they were there to police the empire, and these experiences were to quote a certain Captain Blackadder, not exactly conducive to training for an all arms battlefield:

    “Well, you see, George, I did like it, back in the old days when the prerequisite of a British campaign was that the enemy should under no circumstances carry guns -- even spears made us think twice. The kind of people we liked to fight were two feet tall and armed with dry grass.

    Now, come off it, sir -- what about Mboto Gorge, for heaven's sake?

    Yes, that was a bit of a nasty one -- ten thousand Watusi warriors armed to the teeth with kiwi fruit and guava halves. After the battle, instead of taking prisoners, we simply made a huge fruit salad. No, when I joined up, I never imagined anything as awful as this war. I'd had fifteen years of military experience, perfecting the art of ordering a pink gin and saying "Do you do it doggy-doggy?" in Swahili, and then suddenly four-and-a-half million heavily armed Germans hoved into view. That was a shock, I can tell you.â€Ìý


    From their point of view it was quite obvious, this war was the War To End All Wars, so a huge continental clash was unlikely to happen again. Those pro-armour activists found themselves out in the cold, who needs Tanks to patrol the Khyber or East Africa or the Gilbert and Ellice Islands?

    Despite this, the Army did modernise, we were a fully motorised army before WW2 broke out and the only horses to be seen were the polo ponies of the officers of Household Cavalry. We did have AFV’s and in most cases they were not inferior to the Pz1’s and Pz2’s. However what we did not have was the doctrine to bind these Tank regiments and Infantry battalions into brigades and the brigades into divisions. This is where Liddel Hart, Fuller, Percy Hobart et al could have made the difference, however they were all on the outside looking in.

    Then throw in the French and you can see why we did not repulse the Germans in France 1940.

    (not dissing the French here, just another factor to add to the complexity of a situation that nobody at high level had really trained for).




    Report message29

  • Message 30

    , in reply to message 28.

    Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Friday, 2nd May 2008

    hi dan

    i mentioned earlier that in uk newspapers the government had asked that the bank holidays were canx for munitions workers - well wot a guess would be needed

    aerial recconaisance might have supplied another hint given the sublety of the britidh high command at that time (dont do it at night - the bosche might think we are afraid)

    st

    Report message30

  • Message 31

    , in reply to message 29.

    Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Friday, 2nd May 2008

    Re: Message 29.

    Trailape,

    "this is where Liddell Hart, Fuller, Percy Hobart et all, could have made the difference"

    Yes, I agree, but I was many times wondering why the father of the French tanks, general Estienne, who was an example for both Guderian and de Gaulle, isn't more mentioned in the english language research?

    See my message 8 in the thread: "Defending the French in their 1940 defeat"

    The URL from the Singapore Army and the one from a French tank fanatic under the Axis forum.

    I did again some two hours research about Guderian and Estienne on the net and found again confirmation mostly on American army sites and of course on French sites from which we aren't allowed to publish here the URL's.

    Warm regards,

    Paul.

    Report message31

  • Message 32

    , in reply to message 31.

    Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Saturday, 3rd May 2008

    Here's the wiki entry on Jean-Baptiste Eugène Estienne:



    Report message32

  • Message 33

    , in reply to message 2.

    Posted by Vizzer aka U_numbers (U2011621) on Saturday, 3rd May 2008

    One could easily say "France has never got over Verdun."Ìý

    Or Germany.

    Report message33

  • Message 34

    , in reply to message 29.

    Posted by Mike Alexander (U1706714) on Sunday, 4th May 2008

    Despite this, the Army did modernise, we were a fully motorised army before WW2 broke out...Ìý
    One of the things that is astonishing is just how far behind we were with air power. Since the middle of the First World War people had been going on about how crucial air power was going to be in the future - and yet by 1939 the RAF was ludicrously under-equipped compared to the Luftwaffe.

    As to the idea of the 'War to End all Wars', I don't think this notion lasted very far into the 1920s. For example, the next world war was anticipated in Germany by Herman Hesse in his novel 'Steppenwolf' (1927), and in England by Evelyn Waugh in his novel 'Vile Bodies' (1930).

    Report message34

  • Message 35

    , in reply to message 32.

    Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Monday, 5th May 2008

    Re: Message 32.

    WhiteCamry,

    thanks for this wikipedia link, which wasn't there some two years ago when I did the original research. (I thinksmiley - smiley)

    But they don't refer as I read in the site to Estienne's concept of combined warfare as the French biotechnician David Lehmann and tank erudite do in his article on Axis forum mentioned in my message 8 from the thread I mentioned in my former message here in this thread. He is still right that the emphasis on General Estienne's so called Blitzkrieg is rather ephemeral in the Anglo-American literature.

    David Lehmann writes:

    "He (Estienne) wants to concentrate all the tanks in a single mechanized corps. This mechanized unit would be very mobile and powerful. This unit would be very closely supported by the aircrafts for reconnaisance and close air support." From further tests you read also that there had to be a close coordination with the infantery but that the infantery had to consolidate the deep intrusions made by the tanks in enemy lines.

    Yes and Guderian studied Estienne, Liddell Hart, Fuller. And he incorporated radio in every! German tank. In the French tanks it was only the leading tank who had radio contact and as for the B1 the tank commander had that many tasks that he hadn't time for his strategy. And the supply for s^pare parts and fuel was also badly organized in comparison with the Germans.

    Yes the Germans coordinated their armies as the British and French had proposed!. Just in Britain and especially in France they wanted not to listen to their modern thinking strategists.

    Also in France for their aviation. I tried to translate the "verdict" from an American army strategist into French about the flawns in their aviation preparation to WWII but up to now I haven't received any reaction on two French message boards.

    Warm regards,

    Paul.

    Report message35

  • Message 36

    , in reply to message 29.

    Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Monday, 5th May 2008

    TrailApe et al

    The impact of the Somme could be seen in the "Never Again" attitude of the General Staff as well as the public. The idea of a Continental commitment, without which no alliance with the French would be credible, was vigorously resisted until as late as 1938 - the first "Continental Plan" envisaged committing a mere two divisions to Belgium, to keep the German Army away from coastal airfields, not to co-operate with the French Army. Whereas staff talks with the French prior to WWI had happened in 1911, second time around they didn't take place until April 1939 - a full seven months after Munich and only five months before war actually broke out.

    As a result, although the Army was rearming with very good kit; the 25lbr was the best field piece of any side, and the A13 MkII superior to the Pz III and IV in everything but reliability, there simply wasn't enough of it. It took nine months from mobilisation for the Army to be able to field a mere three Cruiser regiments in France (plus two in Egypt) and one Matilda II infantry tank regiment.

    And, despite the myths, the tank visionaries were not sidelined by blinkered old buffers. Liddell-Hart was close to the Secretary for War, Hore-Belisha, from well before the war, and stayed in contact with official circles after H-B's departure. On the outbreak of war, Hobart was commanding the Mobile Force (Egypt) - later 7th Armoured - and wasn't sacked until 1940, after repeatedly disobeying his superiors. He was very rapidly brought back from retirement. Fuller sidelined himself by endorsing Mosley's Fascists while on half-pay, which made it impossible to re-employ him.

    It also tends to be forgotten that although Fuller and Hobart made a great contribution to British armoured thinking in the '20s, and Hobart to training in the '30s, both officers believed in the idea of pure tank v. tank battles, to the exclusion of using other arms.

    This was not official British army doctrine but was heartily endorsed by the cavalry as well as the RTC/RTR, which led to the tactics of 41/early 42 in the Desert. The combined-arms tactics, using infantry, anti-tank screens and artillery support, which were pre-war doctrine and were the right answer - as demonstrated by the Germans, and even by the British at Arras in 1940 - didn't manage to re-surface properly until the Alamein battles.

    (I can't resist this - on the outbreak of war, the Regular Army still had two horsed regiments, both in Palestine, and the Yeomanry Cavalry Division was still horsed. It was, though, intended that all these outfits would be mechanised before being committed to operations in general war.

    Britian's real revolution was to mechanise all its logistics vehicles, something neither the Germans or the Red Army would achieve even by 1945.)

    Report message36

  • Message 37

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by toffee142 (U12031649) on Tuesday, 3rd June 2008

    The Somme,just like Third Ypres, is still a scar because of the way the First World War is portrayed;Mud, Blood and Slaughter.Open the majority of books on the First World War and some where some chapter will contain these words. Isn't it about time we focused on the victory achieved in 1918, especially the tactics and success of the last one hundred days, tactics that were used to defeat the Germans in the Second World War, for example at El Alamein, an exact copy of Amiens.Perhaps then, the scar may begin to heal and the sacrifice, although terrible, be remembered and honoured by a nation proud and endebted to all those who served.

    Report message37

  • Message 38

    , in reply to message 37.

    Posted by Trooper Tom Canning - WW2 Site Helper (U519668) on Tuesday, 3rd June 2008

    E.V.
    I agree with you about the British Army being "fully mechanised" by the start of WW2 - not so as my old regiment - 16th/5th Lancers still had horses on the way home from India in late '39 and never saw a Tank until they got home !
    The official doctrine of tank warfare was totaly rejected by the powers that were in the Desert until Monty showed up and started to break up the 'Desert Trades Union' and firing people left right and centre.
    He couldn't do much about the tank leadership as he had no replacements until Medenine when both Lumsden and Gatehouse were fired and Jorrocks led the first British Blitzkreig at El Hamma - complete with DAF cab rank and again after Tedder and Coningham went off to Algiers.
    Takes a great deal of time to eradicate old patterns.

    Report message38

  • Message 39

    , in reply to message 38.

    Posted by Trooper Tom Canning - WW2 Site Helper (U519668) on Tuesday, 3rd June 2008

    Sorry -

    My last message should have been addressed to Lost W/end !

    The olde tyme donkey wallopers had too much to say pre war for the Tanks to get anywhere, probably the main reason we were also behind in Tank developement.

    Hobo was fired in 1940 by Gordon - Findleyson who had no time for him and asked why he had come to Egypt as he didn't want him - took a while to get him fired and Hobo had time to lay the seeds of 1st Armoured !

    Report message39

  • Message 40

    , in reply to message 39.

    Posted by Trooper Tom Canning - WW2 Site Helper (U519668) on Tuesday, 3rd June 2008

    Nordmann;
    Thank you for your compliments and I note that Andrew gave a valid reason for erasing the comment by Lattigo

    G.F.
    you are about to learn something about tank warfare in the history of 8th Armoured Bde - as they were not the most fashionable regiments in the Army with the NOTTS and STAFFS Yeomanry and the 3rd Tanks who produced one of the best Tank Commanders on the British side of the war and was the leader of the most succesful 11th Armoured Div in the NW Europe campaign - "Pip" Roberts ! We in 8th Army got the other one very late in 8th Army - McCreery !
    I think it was after the Battle of Wadi Akirit in Tunisia, when a Brigadier stepped out of his staff car and asked a nearby 3rd tank corporal ' What's going on' ? The corporal answered - "Oh the usual Sir " The Brig then asked " what do you mean the usual" ?
    The corporal then explained - "3rd Tanks versus the 3rd reich - Sir "
    Which just about summed it up at that time ! Soon after that they were on their way home to train and change some regiments for the D day thingi... a wild bunch !

    Report message40

  • Message 41

    , in reply to message 8.

    Posted by Grand Falcon Railroad (U3267675) on Tuesday, 3rd June 2008

    "Not really concerned with the losses of others in WW1 - as you say - "the men who fought in WW1 would have been in their 40's by the time of WW2" - exactly my point - the many 2nd Lts. who would have been the Colonels and Majors -"

    Thats not to mention all of the men that we lost during the war who'd have came back home (as officers) and then retired from HM Forces and gone on to be managers, directors, doctors etc.

    WWI effectively cost us any opportunity of being able to fight another war and exit that war without major losses excluding the obvious victims i.e. the dead, wounded, mentally scared, by almost bankrupting us too.

    Report message41

  • Message 42

    , in reply to message 41.

    Posted by Vizzer aka U_numbers (U2011621) on Tuesday, 3rd June 2008

    It seems that Australia is also having difficulty - although with the associated Battle of Fromelles.



    The Â鶹ԼÅÄ states that the reason behind the excavation is that:

    'Many relatives are anxious for the team to find their loved ones so they can finally be given a proper burial.'

    The question which has to be asked, however, is what have these relatives been doing for over 90 years? Personnally I find all this digging about, poking around and exhumation of war graves etc slightly distasteful. Am I the only one who feels this way?

    Report message42

  • Message 43

    , in reply to message 42.

    Posted by wollemi (U2318584) on Wednesday, 4th June 2008

    #42

    ..exhumation of war graves...Ìý

    No it's not a war grave.
    It's a French farmer's field with a tenant farmer, both of whom have been gracious in having their private property and livelihood disturbed by this dig
    That's the point in the last paragraph of the Â鶹ԼÅÄ article. Now that it appears this is the burial site, then the options are
    1. to leave the bodies in situ, buy the land and erect a memorial..or
    2. exhume the bodies to a cemetery elsewhere and leave the farmer and tenant to get on with farming,

    ..what have these relatives been doing for over 90 yearsÌý

    Probably getting on with their lives and wondering where the burial site was I should expect

    This is a lost mass grave. It was known to exist, somewhere near Fromelles. An Australian major tried to find it in 1920. The Germans initially offered a burial truce after the battle - which was not accepted - then gathered up the bodies of the allies on their side and buried them, first removing identification discs and personal mementos which they sent on to the Red Cross

    The person not mentioned in the Â鶹ԼÅÄ article is Lambis Englezos. He's a Melbourne arts and craft teacher who read about Fromelles and the missing men and has done the 'sleuth' work over the last 6 years to find the burial site, including exploring German archives and British intelligence aerial photos.
    It seems the Germans chose a mass burial site 1 km away from the battle - that's what made it hard to find - as they had a light rail line to transport the bodies. Lambis was able to identify the site from British aerial photos taken 2 weeks before the battle showing undisturbed ground, (so no farming activity) then later aerial photos showing otherwise and with the rail line adjacent
    This is the site the Glasgow team are now digging

    Report message43

  • Message 44

    , in reply to message 7.

    Posted by highchurchman (U7711917) on Tuesday, 17th June 2008

    World War One Losses.

    When I was a child in the late 1930s living in a working class district, It was a much more open and extended society than we live in today. This child was struck in going in my neighbours houses with the number of plaques detailing the Governments sorrow on the death of a husband during the 1st, WW. Also the faded photgraphs in the walls.

    Report message44

  • Message 45

    , in reply to message 42.

    Posted by vera1950 (U9920163) on Wednesday, 18th June 2008

    hi,
    it appears that the lost burial site in Fromelles is causing consternation.Or more to the point the digging up of it.
    Yes it could be left and the occupants lie in peace but I think that they would want to be identified, it was a worry for many of WW1 troops that they would be blown up and scattered over the battlefield with no known resting place.
    The archeologists are likely tofind clues from artifacts that lead the to identify some of the remains.That will lead to those having theirnames removed from monuments to the missing and placed on their own resting place.There may or may not be relatives to then visit the grave-that's irrelevant ,it's the dignity of a proper and fitting burial that matters.
    There are still bodies being found all over the battlefields and they are often removed and reinterred in existing cemeteries.As there are a number on this site it may be more fitting toreinter on site but that will really be forthefarmer and the GWGC to negotiate.The land on which existing cemeteries are by that nation and I woudn't know if that would still be the case.

    Report message45

  • Message 46

    , in reply to message 43.

    Posted by Vizzer aka U_numbers (U2011621) on Thursday, 19th June 2008

    No it's not a war grave.Ìý

    It's not an official Commonwealth of Nations war grave - no. Neither is is a marked war grave.

    It is, however, a war grave as evidenced by the care and dignity with which the German soldiers buried the bodies. If they, who were in the field at the time, were able to afford due respect to the dead then what right have people living more than 90 years later to deny this?

    Report message46

  • Message 47

    , in reply to message 46.

    Posted by wollemi (U2318584) on Thursday, 19th June 2008

    You must be getting less detailed reports

    The Germans dug 8 pits, human remains have been found in 5 pits by the Glasgow team doing the survey. The remains of about 30 bodies were excavated out of the ~400 thought to be buried there, and as well both British and Australian mementos were found.
    In 2 pits the bodies appear to have been laid out side by side, in the remaining 3 pits the bodies are jumbled, suggesting the Germans were in a hurry and threw the bodies into the pit

    At this time no decision is being made until the Glasgow team put in a report, but a mass war grave has been found, it appears to be the one known about and fruitlessly looked for in 1920

    The owner of the property, Marie-Paule de Massiet has offered to donate the land as a memorial. She has been gracious throughout and her offer may well be taken up once all the information is collated

    I'm unclear how this equates to a denial of anything

    Report message47

  • Message 48

    , in reply to message 21.

    Posted by lestan1 (U10890946) on Sunday, 22nd June 2008

    If I can add an Aussie point of view, the Australians never got over Gallipoli or the trenches at the Somme, Ypres etc. Never again would they go into battle for an officer or supreme commander because of his social status. He had to be a good officer first and foremost. Learnt another lesson in WW2 when we were kept in the Middle east instead of defending ourselves from the Japanese.
    We learnt nationality.

    Report message48

  • Message 49

    , in reply to message 48.

    Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 22nd June 2008

    lestan1

    I would agree with you about Australian finding its nationhood in WWI, but you ought not to belittle the Legend of ANZAC with small-minded myths.

    British generals did not get to be generals simply because of birth. The Australians did not seem to mind being commanded by Birdwood.

    And once the Australian Army had matured enough as a national force, in WWII, its generals behaved much the same as British ones - Blamey's constant empire-building (two Field Army HQs for a force of a mere three divisions and a couple of brigades?), in the hope of Field Marshal's baton that MEnzies eventually gave him post war; Bennett's controversial behaviour at Singapore; the bickering over seniority between Lavarack, Bennet and Morshead?

    And, for the umpteenth time, the British did not keep the Australian divisions in the ME. We undoubtedly wanted to, but 7th And 6th Div were put on shipping as quickly as it could be made available, and 9th (which was still refitting after Tobruk and was not battle worthy) only stayed because the US sent a division in its place.

    All the above, incidentally, from Australian sources.

    LW

    Report message49

  • Message 50

    , in reply to message 49.

    Posted by vera1950 (U9920163) on Monday, 7th July 2008

    given that there are thought to be more British dead in the graves of Fromelles than Australians, it is as much a matter for the British public as any one as to what happens.
    Personally I would be in favour of taking the route of identifying as many as possible and giving them an identifiable resting place.The reason being is that it would be what the men would want.It is of lesser importance what governments or archiologists want .The last dignity we can afford these men is to ensure ,.It matters not if there are any living relatives to visit a grave ,there are many visitors to the cemeteries who would see the graves. There is nothing more sad than to look out over the fields of Flanders and walk them knowing it is still the resting place of so many of the fallen or to see the thousands of names on such monuments as the Menin Gate or Thiepval of those with no known resting place.

    Report message50

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