Wars and Conflicts听 permalink
Operation Market Garden.
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Message 1.听
Posted by Tas (U1753225) on Monday, 12th November 2007
Was Operation Market Garden a failure? Why was it a failure? Is there any way it could have succeeded?
Tas -
Message 2
Posted by Vizzer aka U_numbers (U2011621) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
Hello Tas
Was Operation Market Garden a failure?听
Yes. It was a failure.
Why was it a failure?听
The Allied objective of taking the bridge at Arnhem before the winter was not achieved.
Is there any way it could have succeeded?听
There are 2 main things which would have been necessary for this.
Firstly it could have succeeded if Montgomery had not underestimated the opposition.
Secondly it could have succeeded if Eisenhower had not been forced by his position as Allied Commander In Chief to play piggy in the middle between Montgomery and Patton. Both generals had good plans for ending the war before Christmas 1944. Both plans, however, required 100% commitment from the Allied war effort in terms of logistical support and petrol etc.
In the end Eisenhower split the effort between Montgomery's plan and Patton's. Each plan then only had half the support and resources it needed and so neither plan suceeded. Montgomery was held at Arnhem and Patton was held at the Moselle. -
Message 3
Posted by George1507 (U2607963) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
It was a very ambitious plan which depended on ground forces being mobile enough to maintain a fast paced advance past Eindhoven, the paratroopers all being dropped into the right area and maintaining contact with their colleagues, German defences being sparse and inexperienced, and good weather in England.
As it happened, the ground forces were delayed, the air drops were inaccurate, and many radios didn't work so they couldn't communicate properly, the Germans were well armed and well organised, and then essential reinforcements and supplies were delayed by admin foul ups and bad weather.
All in all it was a severe defeat. Perhaps the plan was just too ambitious - and the defeat effectively ended any hope that the British and Americans would beat the Soviets to Berlin. -
Message 4
Posted by Sabre-Wulf (U2142937) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
Its probably fair to say it wasn't a failure, but wasn't a complete success.
I've always thought the weather played a huge part in the problems.
With the air superiority enjoyed by the Allies then well coordinated air support to take out the German armour and guns would have allowed the infantry/paras to fight on a much more level playing field.
OK, they would have needed working comms for this too, but was that down to the kit or the weather? I can't quite remember. Either way ground attack aircraft around Arnhem in the early days of the Operation could be fairly sure any armour was German, and could have certainly slowed down the rate of reinforcement.
Maybe they should have just used Marines instead of Paras?
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Message 5
Posted by Mani (U1821129) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
Sabre-Wulf
"Maybe they should have just used Marines instead of Paras?"
I accept your challenge of a duel. -
Message 6
Posted by Backtothedarkplace (U2955180) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
Ohh dear, there will be tears before bedtime at this rate.
Well, gentlemen ready your handbags, take twelve paces turn and fire. -
Message 7
Posted by Mani (U1821129) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
No sir! Bags will not do!
Fairy washing up liquid bottles that haven't been cleaned properly.
Filled with water and fire! First to cry looses.
I DEMAND SATISFACTION!!!! -
Message 8
Posted by Sabre-Wulf (U2142937) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
Apologies Mani, just my usual winding up.
I had a chance at the weekend to speak to some veterans who're down here for the 25th Anniversay/Rememberance Day.
Top blokes, and you'll not here another dig from me about the Paras! -
Message 9
Posted by Tas (U1753225) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
I Sabre Wolf, Hi Mani,
This is getting interesting!
What is the difference in the mode of fighting between the Paratroops and the Marines? I thought both were a kind of Commando, troops to be used in the crunch. Could you elucidate a bit further?
No "Gunfight at the OK Corral" boys! Let us settle this amicably by argument. The farthest you are allowed to go is 'polite' name calling.
Tas -
Message 10
Posted by George1507 (U2607963) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
There was a good deal of doubt and uncertainty in the planning phase of Market Garden. Many of the commanders ordered to achieve objectives weren't sure that they could do it. Some communicated this back, some didn't. Some commanders who were reliant on others were not convinced it would all work, so it was a mess from the start.
The planning was done at Moor Park in Hertfordshire, and Montgomery built a huge sand model of the Arnhem area. That wasn't done to scale, and that may have had at least something to do with drop zones being a long way from the Arnhem bridge. -
Message 11
Posted by Mani (U1821129) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
Hi Tas,
Both regiments consider themselves to be the best (other than Special Forces etc)...
Due to this there can be an element of 'friction' between us.
They refer to us as 'Bird Sh1t' we refer to them as Slime/Crap hats etc.
Both are trained to an extremely high standard... -
Message 12
Posted by Sabre-Wulf (U2142937) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
Tas,
I'm sure there'll be plenty of people to correct me, but essentially the role of the RM Commandos and Paras in WW2 was similar - to seize/ hold/neutralise key positions in advance of the main force or to undertake surgical strikes.
The paras would drop in, using surprise and agression to counter their lack of heavy equipment until they linked up with advancing conventional forces.
The Marines would do similar, but tended to do it from the amphibious point of view, securing beach heads etc. Coming in by boat rather than form the air meant they could carry some heavy equipment, and even had their own armour, but still relied on speed of manouver rather than weight of numbers.
Both units were trained to be more aggressive and independant of thought than typically infantry, but unfortunately often got used as line infantry which was a huge waste of their potential. If I remember correctly both the Marines and Paras were still serving in the front line months after D-Day, in roles they weren't designed for.
My dig was never serious, as though some Marines were jump trained they could never have landed sufficient troops from the air that the paras achieved.
Is interesting to note that since the war the role of the RM Commandos hasn't changed much, but I don't know the last time the Paras actually dropped into combat (Mani will no doubt know) and tend to get deployed as "elite" infantry rather than in their original role. -
Message 13
Posted by Mani (U1821129) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
SW,
The last time were were deployed from drop would have been Suez I think? -
Message 14
Posted by Sabre-Wulf (U2142937) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
That's what I would have thought too.
Not sure if move away from parachute drops is down to improvements in radar/AA or increase in Helicopter usage. Or perhaps another element?
Ooh, there's an idea for a new thread.... -
Message 15
Posted by pedrokelly (U1360661) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
If I remember reading the Corneleus Ryan book 'A Bridge to Far', and seeing the film based on the book, correctly, the ground troops, XXX Corp stopped and couldn't go much further just after Nijmagen. Those British and Polish Para's that could be evacuated back across the Rhine did so.
I assume the ground that was taken by the US 82nd and 101st and XXX Corp around Nijmagen and Eindhoven was given up back to the Germans as they withdrew back to the original start line?
The Dutch people suffered terribly that winter and many died of starvation. -
Message 16
Posted by Tas (U1753225) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
Hi Guys, Sabre wolf, Mani,
One thing surprises me. Perhaps you can explain. Why are there so many Marines in our CIA? Are they also taught to be good spies or is it because they already have the highest level of clearance.
Having once gotten the Q Clearance, I know how difficult and expensive it can be just to maintain it. When I retired and wanted to hand back my clearance, they suggested I keep it for a while in case they hired me as a consultant. Apparently to maintain a clearance is a lot cheaper than to start all over again.
Tas -
Message 17
Posted by Sabre-Wulf (U2142937) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
Pedrokelly,
Whilst the Allies failed to liberate Arnhem, they didn't give up the ground they'd won. The line was held and operations were conducted from the advanced postion in the months after Market Garden. They certainly did not go back to the start lines.
Many of the inhabitants of northern Holland did starve that winter, but given the Allies extended supply lines I'm not sure how much more could have been done even if Arnhem had been taken.
The key location for supply was Antwerp not Arnhem -
Message 18
Posted by Mani (U1821129) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
SW,
I'd suggest a combination of all the above!
Also, many drops have proven to be costly! More times than not, we were helecopter dropped...
Tas,
I could not tell you why! I always thought that the entery levels into the US army were far harder than the marines, so I doubt it's an apititude thing? -
Message 19
Posted by dmatt43 (U7656541) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
Th eoperation was a failure with over-confidence (including the victory speech planned by Queen Wilhemina)and the failure to get the intelligence following the Nordpol (also known as the North Pole) affair where the Special Operations Executive agents were turned or killed. It might have been bad luck to have met the Panzer tanks but if the intelligence was there surely a re-appraisal should have occurred.
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Message 20
Posted by Tas (U1753225) on Tuesday, 13th November 2007
Dmatt.
I do not know enough about this operation therefore my questions. However I have heard that intelligence was ignored about the presence of two panzer divisions. These divisions played havoc with the Allied paratroops who were lightly armed.
Is this true? Whence came this intelligence?
Tas -
Message 21
Posted by Sabre-Wulf (U2142937) on Wednesday, 14th November 2007
IIRC the main source of information on the presence of these additional troops came from the Dutch underground.
The informaiton was not comprehensive, and so was treated with a degree of scepticism by the planners.
I also believe that the Dutch resistance was not trusted (I think by the Brits rather than the Americans) because of concerns over double agents, unreliability etc and so a lot of valuable information and assistance was not taken advantage of, to the operations cost.
And sorry to keep harking back to my original point, but with air superiority the presence of these panzers would not necessarily have been a problem. Remember Falaise? It could have been thought that clobbering a couple of Panzer divisions would be a bonus. -
Message 22
Posted by Backtothedarkplace (U2955180) on Wednesday, 14th November 2007
Re the panzer divisions in Arnhem. I think there were some photos confirming their presence which were ignored or down played. Remember the Allies had just chased the German army out of France. It was probably expected that the troops in Holland would run as well. If the attack had been launched quickly then they might the delay in mounting it gave the Germans a chance to re group.
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Message 23
Posted by George1507 (U2607963) on Wednesday, 14th November 2007
I don't think you could say that the Germans in France ran.
In the face of overwhelming ground forces, and with little air support, and while being harrassed by the Resistance they inflicted significant damage to the allies.
When the allies managed to muster their forces they forced the Germans back through Falaise and eastwards from there.
Also remember that more than 80% of the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe, and nearly all of the alite units were fighting the Soviets, not the allies.
My Dad fought in northern France, and he said the German resistance was ferocious, made even harder to overcome by the bocage. -
Message 24
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Saturday, 17th November 2007
The "intelligence failure" is overplayed. Allied intelligence did know that 9 and 10 SS Pz Divs were in the general area - neither were in Arnhem proper - but they also knew that the divisions had suffered heavily in Normandy (they were, in fact, down to a few thousand men each, way below even half strength) and had lost most of their armour. 9SS was under orders to go back to Germany to refit.
The potential threat from German tanks was noy ignored by 1 Abn Corps, or 1 Abn Div. Uruqhart insisted that all the A/Tk guns in the Div were taken into action, and they were, including the two troops of 17lbrs. This had been a lesson learned from 6 Abn's experience in Normandy. -
Message 25
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Saturday, 17th November 2007
Yes, it was a failure, because its goal was to break through into Germany, and it did not succeed in that. To achieve that goal large resources were drawn away from elsewhere, and possibly the war would have ended sooner if Market Garden had not been tried at all, and the reinforcements and supplies sent elsewhere.
The biggest cause of the failure was simply that it was a bad plan. Montgomery and his staff opted for a long advance over a restrictive road network, with few alternative transport options because the surrounding terrain was too low and water-soaked for heavy military traffic. And the series of barriers along the road had to be removed by the airborne forces on a just-in-time schedule. For the plan to work, everything had to go right. For the plan to fail, the Germans had just to hold out somewhere along the road, for there were too few opportunities to bypass pockets of resistance -- and the allied planners ignored some of those options that did exist.
Because, as the saying goes, no battle plan survives first contact with the enemy, Market Garden was unlikely to work. It was the brainchild of an unimaginative and pedestrian commander, who did not really understand mobile warfare. Overall, it is surprising that it worked as well as it did, for Market Garden could easily have been a bigger and more costly failure than it was.
Besides bad planning on the strategic scale, there were numerous problems at the tactical level. Intelligence failures. A shortage of transport aircraft. An inaccurate weather forecast. Serious problems with radio communications. A lack of drive in the units of XXX Corps. Poor drop zone selection. Inadequate preparation of the airborne units. Too many things, but much would have been compensated by aggressive, fast initiatives. These were lacking too. Sometimes one gets the impression that the British troops had had their sense of initiative drilled out of them; that spit and polish had replaced fire in the belly. The Germans were never impressed by British troops on the offensive, although they acknowledged their stubborn and courageous defense.
And Allied staffs did not appreciate that although the Germany army had been forced to run all the way from the coasts of France to the German border, it was not completely defeated yet. In France, Montgomery and Bradley had allowed too many defeated units to get away. And when the Allied advance slowed down because of lack of fuel, what SHAEF correctly called "a number of fugitive battle groups, disorganized and even demoralized, short of arms and equipment" was reorganized in an army capable of putting up a decent fight in an amazingly short time. Allied headquarters still had the feeling that victory was theirs for the taking, when it had already slipped from their grip. -
Message 26
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Saturday, 17th November 2007
MM
Would agree it was a failure, because it did not capture a bridge across the Rhine, allowing access to the Ruhr, and the opportunity to clear the Scheldt estuary from the North (1st Abn Corps was supposed to do this, while XXX swung East). Without Arnhem, the plan failed.
But it was not a bad plan, just a high risk one, and in the context of the situation in late-August /early-September 1944, it was justified. If the US/UK/Can/Fr forces could not get across the Rhine before the end of October, then an assault crossing would not be possible until the following Spring (March, as it turned out). The only opportunity to "bounce" the Rhine was Market Garden. A US alternative plan to go via Aachen was considered by SHAEF (i.e. Eisenhower) and Monty's plan preferred. Patton's ride to the East was impressive, but wasn't offering any chances of getting across the Rhine at a strategically important point (look up Remargen on a map).
You list all the standard "failures". You fail to include the fact that Bradley disobeyed Eisenhower's orders that Hodges's 1st US Army would support the Arnhem operation as a priority, as admitted in Bradley's memoirs. This is the reason Eisenhower diverted US divisions to the post-Market Garden attempt to exploit east along the Lower Rhine - in effect, the equivalent of the US Corps that should have been trying to divert German forces from counter-attacking XXX Corps' thrust.
The Western Allies did underestimate the effort that the Wehrmacht would put into defence of the Rhine line, but they were also influenced by the fact that, for the first time, the Germans were under simultaneous pressure from US/British and Soviet offensives. The "firefighter" panzer divisions could not be in both places at once. -
Message 27
Posted by giraffe47 (U4048491) on Sunday, 18th November 2007
Yes, planning and logistics and weather all played a part, but in the end, battles are often won by the personalities in charge. If the boot had been on the other foot, and Rommel or Guderian (or even Patton) attacking up the Nijmegen road, I think the chances of success might have been somewhat higher.
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Message 28
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Sunday, 18th November 2007
Not convinced. Patton would have faced the same logistic problems - the single road and good defensive terrain.
He undoubtedly would have tried to push on harder on the first day, but with the Zon bridge down, would that have speeded things up. And the failure of the 82nd to take Nimjegen bridge would mean he still had to fight for it. Again, he would probably have tried to press on as soon as across, which might have got him into Arnhem, but he would still have encountered resistance there - the argument that Elst was undefended at the time the Guards crossed Nimjegen bridge is great for the "we were robbed" brigade, but there were still 10SS elements south of the Rhine who could offer a fight in the town itself. 3rd US Army formations were great in the pursuit, but not notably better than anybody else on the Allied side against a determined defence in close country.
And I would be very surprised if Harmel would have risked losing another bridge. -
Message 29
Posted by Tas (U1753225) on Sunday, 18th November 2007
Is there any truth to the stories about the Brits advance was at a leisurely pace and they spent too much time in having tea during this important advance?
Perhaps Patton may not have stopped for tea, possibly for coffee, less time wasted if he took it 'Black.'
Tas -
Message 30
Posted by Vizzer aka U_numbers (U2011621) on Monday, 19th November 2007
Is there any truth to the stories about the Brits advance was at a leisurely pace and they spent too much time in having tea during this important advance?听
This derives from a period earlier on in the year during the Normandy campaign.
There was a lot of misunderstanding at the time (and subsequently) and this has led to this urban myth developing. There is also the fact that 2 separate incidents (in 2 separate wars!) are being confused here.
Firstly let's look at the 'tea' issue. This actually comes from the First World War and the Dardanelles campaign. During the campaign the Anzacs and others (including Brits) were pinned down on the Gallipoli peninsula. In August the Anzacs were order to make an attack in order to provide diversionary cover for a large force of British troops which were being landed at Suvla Bay further up the coast.
Although it appears that some of the British at Suvla did, indeed, brew up a cuppa for themselves while ferocious fighting was taking place elsewhere - there was little else they could do as they had neither orders to do other than to establish control of the beaches nor could they know what was happening elsewhere.
The myth of the 'cowardly tea-drinking poms' at Gallipoli nevertheless took root and has often been repeated notably by the 麻豆约拍 in its 1964 documentary series 'The Great War' and also in the 1981 movie 'Gallipoli'.
Secondly let's look at the 'leisurely pace' issue. This does, indeed, come from the Second World War but from the Normandy campaign.
Allied intelligence and psychological analysis had deduced that, following an Allied landing on the Normandy beaches, the German High Command would react in a predictable manner. The mentality of the Wehrmacht at the time was that it would decide that the best course of action would be an immediate counter-attack on the Allies at the closest point of contact and using the best troops available to them.
In other words the German High Command from Hitler to von Rundstedt to Rommel down would react in one way and one way only - they would seek to hurl the Allies back into the sea at the earliest opportunity. Any delay would favour the Allies.
In practice, therefore, this meant attacking the Allied beach-heads on the east (closest point of contact to Paris and Germany) with the best German troops available and containing the western beach-heads with lesser forces. The Germans hoped to contain the Allies and roll them back off, beach by beach, east to west.
The Allied High Command were aware of this and this was confirmed by studying German intelligence traffic after the landings had been affected. To this end Montgomery had suggested a plan to Eisenhower which was accept and implemented.
The British and the Canadians (who would be on the eastern beaches) would take the brunt of the German assault. In doing so they would seek to lure the Germans into a 'killing' zone no further than a few miles from the coast. The reason for this was that the approaching German armour would be decimated if not annihilated by the guns of the Allied ships offshore.
In other words the British and Canadians in the vicinity of Caen etc were under orders not to break out into open country but to keep the attacking German forces, especially the armoured reserves, within range of the ships' guns (15-20 miles).
These armoured reserves were essentially the Fifth Panzer Army, the 1st (SS) Panzer Division, the 2nd Panzer Division, the 2nd (SS) Panzer Division, the 9th Panzer Division, the 9th (SS) Panzer Division, the 11th Panzer Division, the 12th (SS) Panzer Division, the 17th (SS) Panzer Division, the 19th Panzer Division, the 21st Panzer Division the 116th Panzer Division and (last but by no means least) the elite 130th Panzer Division. The majority of these were sent in (as was expected) against the British and the Canadians on the eastern beaches.
Gerd von Rundstedt later said:
鈥... The enemy had deployed very strong Naval forces off the shores of the bridgehead. These can be used as quickly mobile, constantly available artillery, at points where they are necessary as defence against our attacks or as support for enemy attacks. During the day their fire is skilfully directed by . . . plane observers, and by advanced ground fire spotters. Because of the high rapid-fire capacity of Naval guns they play an important part in the battle within their range. The movement of tanks by day, in open country, within the range of these naval guns is hardly possible.鈥
Another German report said:
鈥楨ven more disastrous than the material effect was the moral effect of the rapid and precisely firing naval guns. Even when not reinforced by continuous air bombing, the drum fire inspired in the defenders a feeling of utter helplessness, which in experienced recruits caused fainting or even complete paralysis. The supporting fire of the warships was extremely accurate and made the movement of strategical reserves impossible within range of their guns.鈥
A 鈥榩ublic spat鈥 developed between Patton and Montgomery (which even made the editorials of some American newspapers) in which the British were criticised for being too cautious and still bogged down at Caen a month after D-Day, whereas the Americans had broken out in the west. It was suggested that the Americans were more gung-ho while the British were more jaded. This belief was repeated in Thames Television鈥檚 1973 documentary 鈥楾he World At War鈥. In retrospect, however, the 鈥榩ublic spat鈥 was almost certainly deliberately choreographed as disinformation for German consumption.
The crucial role played by the Allied battleships and cruisers off the Normandy coast in the month or so after D-Day is one of the great unsung stories of the Second World War. -
Message 31
Posted by englishvote (U5473482) on Monday, 19th November 2007
Tas
Is there any truth to the stories about the Brits advance was at a leisurely pace and they spent too much time in having tea during this important advance?
听
in addition to Vizzers reply, some of the myths about the slow British advance stem from 鈥渉istorical鈥 accounts such as the Cornelius Ryan book 鈥淎 Bridge too Far鈥, and the even less 鈥渉istorical鈥 movie of the same name.
According to the book, after the brave US paras had taken the Nijmegen Bridge the cautious Brits refused to advance because the Germans were in the way.
That is probably a bit unfair on Mr Ryan鈥檚 book, but the emphasis was on a lack of British drive, and how the brave Americans were very eager to reach their British Para cousins at Arnhem.
The truth was that the British armour tried to advance beyond the Nijmegen bride but because of the exposed position of the road in that area they needed infantry support to clear the German anti tank defenses.
Unfortunately the British infantry, of the Guards armoured division was still fighting to clear Nijmegen itself.
If we look at the detail behind the events we can see why the advance was slower than hoped and the reason why a patriot like Ryan would chose to gloss over US mistakes during the operation.
The US 82nd Airborne Division had been given the task of holding the Groesbeek heights and taking the road and rail bridges over the Waal at Nijmegen, as well as the bridge at Grave and other bridges over the canals.
Bereton and Browning were probably giving the 82nd too much to achieve with such limited resources, but neither Major General Matthew Ridgeway or Brigadier General James Gavin the commander of 82nd US airborne chose to question the plan.
In the event it proved too big a task for 82nd airborne to achieve, they were too over stretched trying to hold the Groesbeek heights to commit any troops to the capture of Nijmegen and its two bridges.
There is no doubt that the Americans fought bravely and with great tenacity but their commanders had failed to comprehend their mission objectives.
The whole plan relied on the paratroops taking and holding the bridges, as well as the road. The 82nd failed to even attempt to take Nijmegen bridge, and here the blame must lay with Ridgeway and Gavin.
Operation Market garden was a huge gamble, the risks were accepted because the rewards were also very great. But a risky operation relies on everybody taking the same gamble, unfortunately the commanders of the 82nd chose instead to play it safe.
Gavin had either to land paras on the other side of the Nijmegen bridge and hold until the tanks arrived, or commit enough troops to an immediate assault on Nijmegen and its bridges.
He chose instead to play it safe and hold the Groesbeek heights, which meant that the Guards armoured division not only had to take Nijmegen but also the bridges.
The brave and audacious assault by elements of the 82nd airborne across the Waal in flimsy boats is probably one of the most famous events of the campaign, but also one of the most unnecessary as well. Paratroops arrive by aircraft, and an aircraft can cross the Waal in a few seconds, but instead all of 82nd airborne troops were dropped south of the Waal, leaving the Germans in complete control of the crossing. Which they used to reinforce Nijmegen and send troops to attack the Groesbeek heights.
Operation Market Garden probably did not fail because of just the 82nd鈥檚 mistakes, but history has been very kind to Generals who proved to be not up to the job. -
Message 32
Posted by Backtothedarkplace (U2955180) on Tuesday, 20th November 2007
Apparantly, according to "A Bridge to Far". The question of the route to take in the event of invading Holland from Belgium used to be discussed as a set question at the Dutch staff college pre war. If the canadate chose the route followed by the Allies, he failed.
My Dad was with 30 corps Guards Armoured Division for this he put it down to the fact that they were basicaly following one road. The slightest break either by enemy action or a simple breakdown caused back logs going back miles. In the event of it being enemy action it was practically impossible to deploy properly to deal with it. So even a samll amount of oposition had an effect out of all proportion. -
Message 33
Posted by Tas (U1753225) on Tuesday, 20th November 2007
Dear Vizzer, dear Englishvote, dear Brother,
Thank you for some very informed comments about that campaign. From your comments I have the feeling that the main problem with the Campaign was that the planners did not leave much margin for errors. Every thing had to go precisely as planned at the right time.
In war, more often than not, things have a tendency to go astray. I do not think, again based on your comments, that any particular part of the force can be blamed; many performed heroically in difficult circumstances.
Montgomery had this theory of a strong blow to the Ruhr to destroy the German industry and shorten the war considerably. I think in Patton's Plan of the broad based front, taking Germany methodically, piece-by-piece there was much more room for difficulties occurring. What do you guys think about that. Was Montgomery playing too much the "Brilliant Ace of Alamein?" Was Patton right after all?
Tas -
Message 34
Posted by Trooper Tom Canning - WW2 Site Helper (U519668) on Tuesday, 20th November 2007
There has always been a great deal of rubbish written and said about the failure at Ahrnem - and this thread is no exception.....
Monty was tunnel visioned about getting over the Rhine to the expenses of clearing Antwerp...Eisenhower tried to pacify both Monty and Patton and failed miserably ....
The RAF didn't want to lose too many aircraft and so they avoided heavy concentrations of the notiorious 88mm AA guns with the result that the paras were dropped too far away.....
There was an idiotic decision of the man in charge - the US Gen Brereton to land the whole Corps HQ on day one.....which could have reinforced Urquhart....
The Guards armoured div could not advance in the face of too many A/t guns - 88mms again and their Infantry of the Welsh Div was held up....
A disobedient American Officer took all of the plans for the assault into the air.. was shot down .. the plans were in Model and Bitterih's hand by nighfall thus setting up their defence...
The bad weather held up the Polish brigades drop to reinforce Urquharts men....
The film " A Bridge too far" was based on abook written by a Southern Irishman who had only hatred for all things British - his widow was a consultant for the film - ergo bad news for the Brits all around !....
The whole thing became a nightmare for 1st paras and Monty and Browning still get the blame .... !
Cheers....PS - the intelligence came from overflights of the scene by the RAF.... -
Message 35
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Tuesday, 20th November 2007
Tom
With the greatest respect, I disagree.
Getting over the Rhine before winter was not tunnel vision - 21 AG and 12 AG were both working on it. SHAEF favoured Monty's plan. It was the only possibility of keeping the advance going in winter.
Antwerp was not neglected - prior to Market Garden, 11 Armd Div had tried to get across; 3rd Monmouthshires were trapped on the north bank of the Albert Canal for three days. In retrospect, Monty and Dempsey wished they had committed an infantry division as well. But, as I posted above, the Market Garden plan included an exploitation to the West to clear the approaches to Antwerp.
The RAF and USAAF had unarmoured aircraft which had to fly in straight lines at 600-800ft to drop, easy targets for flak (as the resupply drops later showed). Flying 20 paras per aircraft to the drop zone only to have them die in a crashing aircraft is pointless. The "too far away" DZs were as much the choice of the Abn divisional staffs as the air force.
Brereton didn't decide on the Corps HQ. He wasn't even around on D-day - he was off reccing a different operational idea with Ridgeway. It was Browning's idea to take his Tac HQ into Nimejegen, and while that detracted from the British lift, the aircraft and gliders committed would only have allowed for an extra half-battalion at Arnhem, which on D-Day would have made no difference at all.
Guards Armoured were slow, but there were not that many A/Tk guns. Close Air Support was held up by weather, but the supporting Infantry Division was not a factor until Nimejegen. And it was 43rd Wessex, not 53rd Welsh.
The capture of the plans was of use to the Germans, but once the paras starting dropping, it was a Blinding Glimpse of the Obvious what they were up to, and the crucial German reaction to the drops took place before the plans had been seen by the German staff.
Bad weather was a major factor, and not just for the Poles. It seriously interfered with the second wave of drops for all three divisions, when they were in a build-up race with the Germans. The weak Polish brigade was not really a factor, however brave they were.
Cornelius Ryan was a US citizen of devout Roman Catholic Irish stock, but I defy you to prove he was an Anglophobe - nothing in either "The Longest Day" or "A Bridge Too Far" suggests that. On the other hand, the combination of William Goldman, a confessed Anglophobe, as the film scriptwriter and "Lord" Dickie Attenborough, with a trendy British class-war agenda did bias the film (pity, really, damn good theme tune).
Incidentally, Ryan gave very little emphasis to Omaha in his book - it was Selznik's movie that launched the legend of "Bloody Omaha".
Heigh ho. -
Message 36
Posted by Trooper Tom Canning - WW2 Site Helper (U519668) on Wednesday, 21st November 2007
Lost w/end鈥
I didn鈥檛 think that you would agree with me but you are right 鈥 it was the Wessex Division and not the Welsh 鈥 my apologies. You I take it, have not seen the American version of those two films, as it always astonishes me that British actors can actually stand there and take all that rubbish about how inferior they are against the all conquering American forces鈥. Must be the money they are paid.,
Regarding the writer Ryan 鈥 I don鈥檛 care if he was a southern Irish Lutheran his writings always denigrated the British and his widow consultant was just as bad to allow such discrimination鈥n example 鈥.near the end of the Bridge movie 鈥 we then have two British Lt. Generals and a Lt. Col. Being told by an American Major General to 鈥 get them out 鈥 it鈥檚 quite laughable but gets the message over that a junior American Officer can dictate to superior British Officers 鈥 it couldn鈥檛 happen ! How James Fox, Dirk Bogarde and Michael Caine can just stand there without collapsing in tears is beyond me, at Ryan O鈥橬eil鈥檚 act as the boss of the whole situation, is beyond me.
Monty was obsessed with getting into Germany before the weather broke as this was his constant call for all the supplies to feed 40 divisions in an unstoppable march over the Rhine and into Berlin in August before the German 鈥 as always 鈥 recovered 鈥 Eisenhower let him down badly there 鈥 as he did later after the Rhine crossing when with 32 divisions Monty was within three fighting weeks from Berlin 鈥 he was halted - stripped of Simpson鈥檚 12th Army 鈥 and sent North to Hamburg while the Russians took a further five weeks to get into Berlin - and 40 years of cold war in Central Europe.
Brereton was the boss man of all airborne troops and like the football manager his task is done when the referee starts the game, Browning was the Corps commander unnecessarily on the ground but out of touch owing to the wireless difficulties. Urquhart the divisional commander.
Regarding the slowness of the Guards division after Nemejen 鈥 and the shortage of enemy A/t guns I can鈥檛 fault Lt Col. Vandelour 鈥 he couldn鈥檛 move over a high single road without Infantry to sort out the flanks 鈥 I take it that you have never seen five Churchill Tanks knocked out in less than three minutes by just one 88mm A/T gun 鈥 it鈥檚 not pretty 鈥 and he had less than 55 Shermans A.K.A Ronson Lighters to fight yet another 20 miles 鈥 he could finish up walking !
Oh and yes 鈥 the Corps HQ used up 39 aircraft so by your tally of 20 per craft 鈥 this meant another full battalion of 780 could have been dropped on the first day near Ahrnem, - might have helped -
Message 37
Posted by englishvote (U5473482) on Thursday, 22nd November 2007
Trooper
I think you are being a bit harsh on Cornelius Ryan. I do not think his writings are at all anti British, but he is certainly guilty of emphasising the positives when dealing with US military history.
In his book 鈥 A bridge too far鈥 he has obviously carried out meticulous research and spoken to many of the people who were involved in the operation. But his patriotism shows through with his choice of events to publish.
Americans are often portrayed when carrying out brave actions and when things go according to plan, but he is less selective when recording other nation鈥檚 actions.
So British mistakes as well as heroic actions are recorded, as are German, while American mistakes tend to be ignored or glossed over.
So we read about the brave assault across the Waal in flimsy boats by elements of US 82nd airborne, but the terrible planning and stupid decisions to not land troops on the opposite bank to start with are basically ignored.
Unfortunately all this was massively inflated when Dicky Attenbrough brought his own little minded attitudes into the making of the film.
From what I have read I think Ryan is pretty good if you allow for the bias, in fact Urquhart鈥檚 own book is more critical of the parachute regiment. -
Message 38
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Saturday, 24th November 2007
Tom
Apologies for tardiness of reply
I tend to agree with englishvote. Ryan wasn't responsible for the film. His book has errors about the British (and some about the Americans), but he was a terminally ill man while writing it, dying before it was published, and it was not properly edited. If you have issues with the movie, so do I, in spades - we acn agree on that one (will do a separate post).
On other points. EVERYONE was obsessed with getting across the Rhine before winter - the argument was who should lead. The fact that Eisenhower came down on the side of Monty and then was undermined by Bradley tended to be played down post-war (when Eisenhower was running for President and Brdley was Army CoS).
It was Brownning's decision to take in a full Tac HQ - his perogatives as Corps Commander in charge of the Op. Brereton's fault was that, having given MARKET GARDEN to 1 Abn Cps, he and Ridgeway pushed off to France to recce Ridgeway's proposed XVIII Abn Cps operation in the Aachen area, in support of Bradley's 12 AG. This meant that, during the first three days, the senior officer at HQ 1st Allied Abn Army was the British Maj Gen Gale (GOC 6th Abn Div), who had no authority over XVIII Abn Cps, who were responsible for reinforcing and resupplying the 82nd and 101st.
Browning was out of touch with 1st Abn Div, but so was everyone else. Ironicaly, one of the few concrete contributions his Tac HQ made was that 82nd Div broke both their long-range radios on landing, whereas both of 1st Abn Cps' survived - so they gave one to Gavin.
The 39 a/c could have dropped 790 men - with their small arms and the ammunition in their bandoliers. Gliders were needed for support weapons and ammunition resupply. An airlanding battalion needed around 60 aircraft (one per glider). The "missing" half-battalion was 2nd South Staffs in 1 AL Bde.
Most of a para bn could have got down theoretically in 39 a/c - that required 34 C-47s and 7 glider tugs. But most of Browning Tac HQ went in by glider, towed by British tug a/c which, being bombers, did not have the same paratroop lift capacity as a C-47 transport. A Stirling could manage about 12 paras, for instance. So they Tac HQ lift could not have translated into an additional battalion.
I stand by my earlier comment that an extra half-battalion would not have made a difference in the first 24hrs. The key failure then was failing to get more of the available troops onto the southern route (2nd Bn's route) before it closed, and that was a co-ordination issue, not a troop strength one.
My reference to the Guards' slowness referred to the beginning of the op. They could still call on XXX Cps medium artillery, even when the "Tiffies" were not about. 11 Armd would probably have gone faster - they did in similar circumstances. As to the situation after they were across the Nijegen Bridge, I think it was the right decision to halt (and the infamous Generals' scene in "A Bridge Too Far" did not happen). 5th Gds Armd Bde and 504 PIR were over-extended, and neither Gds Armd or 82 Abn had any reserves to provide, given the situation on the Groesbeck Ridge).
Regards -
Message 39
Posted by Trooper Tom Canning - WW2 Site Helper (U519668) on Saturday, 24th November 2007
Lost W/end
Both you and Englishvote are probably right that I am being too critical of Ryan but I have watched the sad revision of history by mainly American Historians in order to placate the moguls of Hollywood - and increase their incomes by making the American forces into invincible heroes - which as subsequent events i.e Korea Viet Nam, have proven otherwise
the biggest scandal of course was making Bradley into the hero of the battle of the bulge by Ingersoll and Haskins - the Ameriacn public still believe this to be true - as they do with the Bridge movie when the Junior American tells the Senior British Officers to "get them out"
The main tragedy of that debacle was the loss of nearly a whole divison of ten thousand highly trained men at the same time as we in 8th Army were losing fourteen thousand at the Gothic Line in Italy... at a time when we were already short of reinforcements for all theatres.Even the US 5th Army were short of reinforcements - but their problem was different to ours !
Hopefully we learn...but it is a slow process ! -
Message 40
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Monday, 26th November 2007
Tas,
I think in Patton's Plan of the broad based front, taking Germany methodically, piece-by-piece there was much more room for difficulties occurring.听
The broad-front strategy was Ike's, not Patton's.
Patton was as much narrowly interested in his own front as Monty was in his. His obsession with taking the Ruhr stemmed from his experience in WW1, when the AEF was at first pointed at Metz, then a German fortress city. -
Message 41
Posted by dover11 (U10026003) on Monday, 26th November 2007
as a son of an ex para, who was on this op and thank god got out safe and well dad said it was down to poor roads as they were only single track, and bad radios as they didnt work,
-
Message 42
Posted by Tas (U1753225) on Monday, 26th November 2007
Hi White Camry,
I guess at this point perhaps I Can give my impression of Monty. I think Monty was given too much publicity at that time because he was the first winning General, and Churchill needed him to build the morale of the British people and the armed forces.
I think Wavell and Auchinleck were very good Generals, as was Viscount Slim. Monty took all the adulation for him a little too seriously and developed Market Garden as a 'tour de farce' of a campaign to show what a brilliant general he was.
If he had kept to his Alamein strategy of hitting them with the 'mostest' in a very simple way, the Brits may have fared much better.
Tas -
Message 43
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Tuesday, 27th November 2007
Tom
Agree it is a pain for the non-US population to have to live with Hollywood's version of history.
But, they've got the bucks, and if a film causes protests from a few thousand historians and veterans, but still pulls in $$$$$ at the Mid-West box offices, it's a victory for the moguls.
What I find truly repulsive are films that claim to be "true" accounts but actually pervert history. "A Bridge Too Far" is one of these.
It is interesting to read Uruqhart's comments, as recorded in his biography, and even more John Frost's comments in his second memoir "Nearly There". Frost basically admits that the wool was pulled over the eyes of the advisors - the paras were happy with the slagging off of Guards Armoured, without realising that on screen it would translate into "Aristo Brit useless idiots versus Go-ahead Yank heros".
There was a serving Brit military advisor, but key anti-Brit scenes were done in Yugoslavia when he wasn't around, and the full script was never shown to the Brit advisors.
The "villains" of the piece are Goldman (who wouldn't care about what Brits think), Attenborough, who was happy to receive a peerage subsequently, and Gavin, who was an advisor, and knew he didn't say that stuff. -
Message 44
Posted by Trooper Tom Canning - WW2 Site Helper (U519668) on Wednesday, 28th November 2007
Lost W/End.....
Can agree there with your comments that those propaganda films still pull in the mighty dollars and your assesment of the real villians - I have always wondered why Attenborough had his honours but figured he would have bought them in the same way as many others have in the past.....
Hollywood has never been the same since the Walt Disney corporation was sold to a bunch of mercenaries and the era of good family entertainment disappeared.
I detect that the winds of change will blow through the Hollywood Hills shortly as the Mighty buck takea a beating, which is long overdue - even Canadian prices now reflect a lowering, and approaching real value. -
Message 45
Posted by Trooper Tom Canning - WW2 Site Helper (U519668) on Friday, 30th November 2007
I really should respond to Tas' posting #42 to White Camry since no one else has picked it up....." I guess at this point I can give my impression of Monty...."
Of course you have every right and opportunity to do so albeit that it is completely wrong impression and appears to be based on the normal revised American view of all things.
Unfortunately many people still recall the initial efforts of the American troops at Kasserine followed by the revamped efforts under Patton at Gabes and Bizerta and the slow learning curve at Palermo and Messina. Not to mention the nightmare efforts of Clark at Salerno - Garigliano - San Pietro - Cassino - and Anzio.
Some also recall the lecture of Gen Marshal to Gen Alan Brooke...." the best way to win this war is to load up a few divisions on the eastern seaboard - sail over the Atlantic - land at say Cherbourg - then drive over to Berlin ..."
Gen Brooke in the usual understated British way replied .." you may be right that the war could be finished in nine months... but perhaps not in the manner in which we have been planning..."
Therein lay the rub... a complete ignorance of strategy !
The best impression of Monty and what he did and why he did it, is held by the people who served under him, and in that regard he was the very best we had at the time as he took a bedraggled and defeated 8th Army - shook it to life - not with bombastic claims - but with humour. Probably a good example was his " the whole objective of the 8th Army is to kill Germans - even the Padre's - once per day and twice on Sundays ! " How could we not follow such a character ?
It should also be recalled that the American Army had not fired a shot before 8th November 1942 in North Africa. This was contrary to Eisenhowers' son who claimed that Britain did not have a victory until the Americans appeared, even Churchill took this up erroneously and he of all people should have known better....
Most of those victories before El Alamein were also by good British Generals such as O'Conner * - Combe - De Wiart - Neame - the Cunningham brothers, Alan and Andrew - Wavell - Auchinlek -
Bersford-Pierce - Richie* - Horrocks -Gott - Lumsden - a long list indeed.
You really should read Barrie Pitt's " Crucible of War - Volume 1 - ISBN 1- 55778 -262 - 6 ( v1) in this you will read of victories at Tobruk - Beda Fomm - Keren Heights - Ethiopia - Abyssinia - Syria - Taranto( shades of Hawaii)- Cape Matapan - and failures such as the Greece and Crete debacles - and reasons thereof....
After Monty's success at Alam al Halfa you will read only of victories - of Rommels demise at Medenine - even in the US press... and it was this adulation in the US press which caused the deep resentment of Monty in the hearts of most - if not all except Simpson - American Generals who might have been better employed in learning from a true professional soldier - or as Patton himself finally admitted - after he had denigrated Monty publicly - he had learned much
from Monty's lecture at Tripoli !
* O'Conner after release from an Italian POW camp was commanding V11l corps on the left flank of Horrock's XXX corps whereas Ritchie commanded X11 corps on the right flank at Market Garden
Sorry for the lecture but the truth will out
Best regards -
Message 46
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 2nd December 2007
To say that the 8th army was "defeated and bedraggled" when Montgomery took command of it, is a part of the Monty Myth that is at variance with the historical record. It is true that under a series of less fortunate or less competent commanders, the 8th Army had been driven back to the borders of Egypt. However, under the leadership of Auchinleck, it had been able to fight Rommel's advance to a standstill in the first battle of El Alamein.
This was actually more decisive than the second battle, because it left Rommel's forces stranded in the desert at the end of a long and unreliable supply line, at a time when the Axis were also suffering the successful operations of the RN and RAF against their transports across the Mediterranean. While the 8th was close to its base of supply and profiting from an increasing flow of reinforcements and supplies. Rommel understood very well that the position of his forces was now untenable, but he was denied an advance by the 8th Army at Alam Halfa, and a retreat by Hitler in Berlin.
The army Montgomery took command of was well on its way to recovery, with improving morale and combat effectiveness. The tactical reforms initiated by Auchinleck and his staff showed a better understand of the realities of mobile warfare than Montgomery ever possessed. But Auchinleck was denied the opportunity to enjoy the rewards of his work because Churchill and Alan Brooke were tired of him. Montgomery was in effect given the command of an army that had already been turned around and was enjoying a two-to-one superiority over the enemy; more if Rommel's fuel and ammunition shortages are taken into account.
Monty fought the second battle of El Alamein competently, but it is a blemish on his reputation that he sought to exaggerate his own contributions to this success by denigrating the efforts of his predecessors. -
Message 47
Posted by terakunene (U9761462) on Sunday, 2nd December 2007
With the passing of time there are always, sadly, fewer survivors to tell us what they were thinking and this applies to Arnham.
By 1944 the entire UK population had been at war for nearly five years and had enough.
First the Generals.
Montgomery had pulled off El Alamein and D Day with few casualties, certainly by WW1 standards. Probably drunk on his own success he then decided to launch the Arnham attack. There is no doubt whatsoever that it was a failure and Montgomery was lucky to avoid dismissal.
The ordinary fighting man.
The War was expected to be over by Christmas 1944 as Germany was clearly defeated and everybody was looking forward to going home.
Montgomery then decided to launch Arnham and Churchill decided to send manpower to fight Japan. At the time the Japanese had never threatened the UK homeland and weren't seen as a real enemy unlike the Germans who had bombed UK.
It was a resentful Army still in Europe and after Arnhem almost mutinous.
The same applied to the British Pacific Fleet. With the war almost over Churchill decided to send a near mutinous fleet to the Far East when it also is waiting to be demobbed by Christmas 1944. -
Message 48
Posted by Trooper Tom Canning - WW2 Site Helper (U519668) on Sunday, 2nd December 2007
Lets see if I have this right as I am getting on bit and don鈥檛 always catch things first time 鈥 but both you and Mutatis Mutandi were at the battle which is popularly known as the Gazala Gallop which was followed by the loss of Tobruk
and the headlong helter skelter run back to Alamein Station 鈥 and so enjoyed the victory at both Alam Halfa and 3rd Alamein 鈥 whereas I didn鈥檛 join 8th army until much later.
Therefore my recollections are based on hearsay and the reading of books etc.
It does however seem to me that 8th army at the station was a bit bedraggled and certainly defeated inasmuch as we lost the whole 1st South African division plus at Tobruk鈥ome 33,000 men and equipment 鈥 we lost 150th brigade from 50th Division 鈥 201 Guards were cut up badly 鈥 1st Armoured under Lumsden had very few 鈥渞unners鈥 鈥 Ritchie鈥檚 orders at times were confusing leading to the resignation of Godwin 鈥 Austin. Auchinleck finally took over but it was too late as they scuttled back to Alamein where Rommel鈥檚 supply problem became paramount. It appears that only the New Zealanders were in great shape.
At about that time it is true that the 8th were being reorganized with the Australians well rested 鈥 New Zealanders in good shape 鈥 7th Armoured being reinforced with newer Tanks but still without 7th Armoured bde which was recuperating alongside 50th Division away to the south of the line 鈥 5th Indian also recuperating 鈥 as was the 2nd South African while the 44th British Div was just landing to take a reserve place at Alam Halfa 鈥 and the 51st Highland still somewhere around Durban.
Yes Monty did take Auckinlecks plan for Alam Halfa to be his own but he did inflict a telling first defeat on Rommel 鈥 but 3rd Alamein was his victory as were many others until Ahrnem !
It should also be noted that the Armoured forces of 8th Army under Lumsden 鈥 Gatehouse et al were not good as they were still into Calvary tactics, and it was not until after Medenine and Rommel鈥檚 downfall, that they were got rid of and 1st Armoured under Horrocks had the magnificent victory at El Hamma and at the same time both Tedder and Conningham defected to Algiers allowing Broadhurst to come up with the 鈥渃abrank鈥 air support of ground forces which proved to be the answer to many problems later in the war.
If nothing else 鈥 Ahrnem gave 2nd Army room to breathe ! -
Message 49
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Monday, 3rd December 2007
Wouldn't it have made more strategic sense to concentrate on opening Antwerp to shipping?
-
Message 50
Posted by Tas (U1753225) on Monday, 3rd December 2007
I just wish to say that obviously Trooper Tom, Mutandis, Terkunane and White Camry know a lot more about this subject than I. However, let me just say that I had an uncle who was a major in the British Indian army. He fought in North Africa under Auchinleck and he told me that Auchinleck was a very good general and would have given Rommel a very bloody nose if he had been left in Command longer.
Tas
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