Wars and Conflicts听 permalink
Lessons of war
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Message 1.听
Posted by Andrew Host (U1683626) on Friday, 26th October 2007
Hello all,
Building on Urnungal's question here:
To what extent did the US military try to learn from the lessons gained by her allies prior to her entry into the war?
It strikes me that the British and French could have told the US all about the permeability of the Ardennes forest -any yet as Urnungal points out they seemed to fall into the same error prior to the Battle of the Bulge as her allies did in 1940.
That they got a severe mauling at Kesserine could just be put down to inexperience - but how forgivable is this when fighting alongside allies who knew the enemy through bitter experience?
Your thoughts?
Andrew -
Message 2
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Friday, 26th October 2007
Over confidence perhaps?
And maybe they under-estimated the ability of the Germans in both Kasserine and the Ardennes.
In both occassions the Germans appeared to be "on the ropes".
Also maybe the US were advised and warned by their allies....Doesnt mean they will actually take any notice of it.
VF -
Message 3
Posted by Backtothedarkplace (U2955180) on Friday, 26th October 2007
Hi Andrew,
Some mistakes you have to make for yourself.
Yes the Americans could, and did learn a lot from the British and others. But what you have to remember that up to that point the British record isnt that glorious. Also different armed forces have different cultures, what works for one wont always work for another. The Americans got handed a spanking at Kasserine, but within a matter of days were back where they started and with the knowledge they needed to make sure that it never happened again.
As for the Ardennes in 44 The allies thought they had the Germans on the run. That the war was almost over, and that the Germans were not in the position to take the offensive on anything other than a local level. The troops in the Ardennes were enough to deal with any local attack. There was little in the way of Sigint to warn anyone that the attack was going to be massive, even though some intelligence officers on the ground were advising that it might be likley. It ran against the percived knowledge. So it was ignored.
In any event, what happened was that the little that ws left of the German armour was destroyed. If the Germans hadnt have attacked, it would have been available to boost the defences of Germany against the coming invasion. This was hard enough fighting as it was, with better troops and tanks it would have been a nightmare. -
Message 4
Posted by RainbowFfolly (U3345048) on Friday, 26th October 2007
Hi Andrew,
It might be also interesting to ask the same question for WWI, to see if their approach in learning from their allies experiences in WWII was different from that a couple of decades before, i.e. had they ummm... "learnt to learn better"...
Cheers,
RF -
Message 5
Posted by englishvote (U5473482) on Friday, 26th October 2007
Andrew
It strikes me that the British and French could have told the US all about the permeability of the Ardennes forest -any yet as Urnungal points out they seemed to fall into the same error prior to the Battle of the Bulge as her allies did in 1940
听
I would disagree with your assumption that the French made an error regarding the Ardennes in 1940, it was well protected and should not have resulted in the catastrophe that followed.
And I would also agree with Dan鈥檚 summing up of the situation regarding the Ardennes in 1944.
In 1942 the US army was inexperienced, I believe the American term is 鈥淕reen鈥, but they on the whole fought well and indeed better than many nations that had been in the war for much longer.
By late 1944 the US army had massively improved, and the Battle of the Bulge shows that the US Army was a better fighting unit than the German Army.
Instead of the Ardennes in late 1944, I would put forward D-Day as an example of wasted US lives because the US military did not listen to the British.
Undeniable the US military could have learnt more from listening to their allies, but this probably has more to do with internal US politics than failings within the US army.
One mistake stemming from US political interference that effected the US army was the failure to adopt the British 17pdr tank gun. Instead pressure from political bodies more concerned with US industry profits ensured that the US army adopted the inadequate US 76mm tank gun. -
Message 6
Posted by Andrew Host (U1683626) on Friday, 26th October 2007
Hi RF,
Absolutely--anyone care to offer their thoughts?
The caricature in both cases seems to be that the US turned up late with an 'it's alright-we're here now!' attitude and proceed on their own lines impervious to the sensibilities and experience of her allies.
But surely commanders in the field would have been keen not to risk their men and materiel needlessly by neglecting the advice of their experienced peers? -
Message 7
Posted by Andrew Host (U1683626) on Friday, 26th October 2007
Hi Englishvote,
Isn't it odd that as late as D-Day the exchange of ideas between UK and the US was poor? Surely after their joint experiences in Sicily and Italy they would have been more of one mind on amphibious landings and breakout? What do you think was the reason?
Cheers
Andrew -
Message 8
Posted by englishvote (U5473482) on Friday, 26th October 2007
To explain why the US and British military were still failing to communicate fully even in 1944 would need to examine not just the internal workings of both military and political systems but also such diverse aspects as human nature and nationalism.
But to simplify it all, US generals are more of a political animal than their British counterparts, they had other concerns than just fighting a war. They would not want to appear to be the subordinate of the British, and to have people back home think that the Brits were running the war.
Also Monty had a remarkable ability to annoy just about anybody, he may have been the allies best General but he was no politician.
Even more powerful reasons from the US point of view was the fact that they were supplying the majority of the men and materials and Britain had not been doing very well until the US came along to help.
After all the British army had made many mistakes and continued to do so, so why should the US army just accept the British knew what they were talking about.
On Omaha beach this independence of thinking costs 2,000 American lives, but in 1917 the US feeling of superiority and their ignoring of the lessons learnt on the western front led to very many more American dead.
Pershing鈥檚 early na茂ve attacks had all the splendour of the earlier French attacks of the Neville offensive and resulted in the same carnage. -
Message 9
Posted by HO_CHI_MINSTER (U3392683) on Friday, 26th October 2007
By late 1944 the US army had massively improved, and the Battle of the Bulge shows that the US Army was a better fighting unit than the German Army.
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I dont believe the above sentance. It flys in the face of everything i have ever read in regards to WWII. In many books i have read the Germans considered our commanders(Amercian and British) as inept. Especially in the invasion of Europe.
The allies beat the Germans by sheer weight of numbers and resources. If the Germans had had the same resources as the Allies then imo their was only one winner,and that would have been Germany. -
Message 10
Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Friday, 26th October 2007
A better example of the Americans (or perhaps it would be more accurate to say AN American) failing to take British experiences into account was the "New Happy Time" offensive of the U-boats on unconvoyed merchant ships off the lighted coast of the USA.
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Message 11
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Friday, 26th October 2007
That was what the U Boat Captains called The Second Happy time. Admiral King stated (He was Anti British) There was nothing the British could teach him. It was suggested Hitler should have awarded him the Knights Cross for his services to Germany.
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Message 12
Posted by Andrew Host (U1683626) on Friday, 26th October 2007
Hi Grumpyfred,
Yes-I was thinking of King too.
In the interests of balance how about specific examples of *good* co-operation between the allies? -
Message 13
Posted by abrazier (U3915690) on Friday, 26th October 2007
Transfer of atomic research from the UK to the USA?
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Message 14
Posted by englishvote (U5473482) on Friday, 26th October 2007
Andrew
In the interests of balance how about specific examples of *good* co-operation between the allies?
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That would be all the rest of the events during the world wars!
In fact Britain and the USA co-operated remarkably well during WW2, even up to the point that it infringed on each nations nation security.
Britain and the USA were willing to stick their necks out to support each other, in fact the USA was co-operating on a very large scale with Britain even before the USA was even in the war.
As for the US navy鈥檚 attitude during WW2 it is obviously a different picture from the US army attitude of co-operation.
The US navy knew that they were top dogs in the Pacific and resented any British involvement in what they regarded as their 鈥減ond鈥.
Only Presidential insistence got the US navy to accept the Royal navy participation in the Pacific theatre in 1945.
This was a an ongoing attitude from long before WW2, Britain had seen the USA as a threat to the Empire during the 1920鈥檚 and the US navy saw the Royal Navy as a threat to their dominance of the Pacific. -
Message 15
Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Friday, 26th October 2007
The cavity magnetron being transferred to the US?
WWI - Adm. Bayley was known as "Uncle Lewis" by the captains of the US destroyers on his station.
Jellicoe and later Beatty seem to have had good relations with Adm Rodman. -
Message 16
Posted by abrazier (U3915690) on Friday, 26th October 2007
I think at the tactical and operational level British and American commanders co-operated and respected each other pretty well. I remember reading about an RN carrier in the Pacific trading cases of Whisky for stores (even I think a complete Grumman Avenger or two), something Admiral King would have been apoplectic about.
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Message 17
Posted by englishvote (U5473482) on Friday, 26th October 2007
Having just reread some of my comments on here it may appear that I have been criticising the USA, I am sorry if that is the case it was not intentional.
In fact the USA has been Britain鈥檚 closest ally, especially during WW2.
Mistakes were made by both sides and ego鈥檚 sometimes got in the way of co-operation, but on the whole the USA was and hopefully will remain Britain鈥檚 closest ally.
If we compare the relationship between Britain and the USA during WW2 with the relationship between France and Britain during WW1, well there is just no comparison. But then again France have always been the traditional enemy, so co-operation with them always goes against the grain. -
Message 18
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Friday, 26th October 2007
<quote userid=</quote>In many books i have read the Germans considered our commanders(Amercian and British) as inept. Especially in the invasion of Europe.</quote>
That's not what I have read. The things written by German historians that I have perused would seem to indicate quite the opposite. The overall attitude seems to be that the the German army lower-echelon leadership and organization was considerably better than either the British or American, but at the high command levels it was unrealistic and deficient.
More than one German author has stated that Patton was a tremendous field commander -- one even went so far as to state he was a combination of Kesselring and Rommel -- clearly an exaggeration, but indicative of the impact that he and his army had on them. Bradley was praised somewhat also, but more as a General who cared about his men and was a good organiser than as a field commander.
Jodl stated that in his opinion Montgomery was the only allied commander who never made a mistake. High praise indeed. But he then proceeded to moderate that by noting that the reason was because Monty never did anything until he had overwhelming force at his disposal -- and then moved very slowly, taking no chances (Jodl stepped very slowly forward, carefully putting one foot before the other, as he told allied leaders this, illustrating his point).
One German Lt Col (can't recall his name) who had been the victim of an American attack during the allied advance across France stated that he was shocked by the violence and perfect combined-arms-coordination that his men had to confront. He noted that the American military had learned a great deal since he had grappled with them in Sicily.
A point about the losses at Omaha on D-Day... In the opinion of many post-war observers, that was due at least in part to arrogance on the part of American Army commanders involved in the planning. They sneered at the British ''funnies'' and refused to utilise them (probably because they didn't think of them themselves). Also, Marshall had suggested to Ike that he might want to talk to some of the US marine commanders who had a barrel of experience in amphibious operations in the Pacific and could probably help a great deal in the preparations. Ike was all for it, but his subordinate commanders talked him out of it saying like;
''those goddamned marines have gotten all the publicity they need''
''We'll run this ourselves''
''We don't need their advice'' and
''why should we help them increase their appropriations?''
As someone above has already noted, American commanders may have been more political than British ones, and many were arrogant, self-centred bastards as well, trying to gather to themselves all the credit and public praise they could. To hell with the men, as long as they, themselves, were glorified. -
Message 19
Posted by wollemi (U2318584) on Friday, 26th October 2007
The US Navy indeed saw the Pacific as their 'patch' and rightly so. The US is a Pacific nation and was brought into combat in WW2 by an attack from another Pacific nation. It had firmly resisted active engagement in the European War for 2 years and might have continued to do so if Japan had not drawn them into the war. (I'm not clear why this makes the US Britain's 'closest ally' as described on another thread!)
There is little doubt that King's view was for immediate vigorous prosecution of the Pacific War and he was not alone - so did other allies in Asia Pacific region. His reputation in doing just that is a fine one.
The problem for the British Pacific Fleet - when it finally arrived in December 1944 - was that Japan was already in retreat and there were a lot of logistical problems to get the BPF up to speed to cover the vast southern oceans. -
Message 20
Posted by englishvote (U5473482) on Friday, 26th October 2007
Wollemi
I do not disagree, but why did the US navy resist using the Royal Navy, surly the more ships the better, even if it was just to save American lives by putting British sailors in the front line.
I do not criticise the US for trying to keep Britain out of the Pacific so that it would become their sphere of influence.
I do not criticise the US for building their Empire after the Second World War from the remains of the British Empire, the same way I do not criticise Britain for building it鈥檚 empire.
What I do find strange is the failure of the US to use all the resources available to them to defeat Japan, and their failure to realise that Britain was not going to be in competition with their ambitions after the war. -
Message 21
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Saturday, 27th October 2007
The R A Fs Desert Airforce also led the way in ground support. Much copied later by the U S, and given no credit at all for their part in the victory in North Africa by Monty who liked to claim it was all down to him and the 8th. (I am not decrying the 8th Army though."
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Message 22
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Saturday, 27th October 2007
Englishvote: I do not disagree with you when you say 鈥樷 the more ships the better鈥欌 but that鈥檚 not the way the US pacific commanders saw it. To their way of thinking, they had prosecuted the Pacific war without any significant aid from any ally but the Australians and in their amphibious march across the central Pacific they'd done it pretty much alone. Consequently they didn鈥檛 want the British Fleet stepping in at the end, when the Japanese were literally beaten to their knees, and claiming some of the glory. It was selfish arrogance on the part of the US commanders, true, and to my eyes downright petty, yet I can see their point.
That said, the British Pacific Fleet did the tasks that were assigned to them by the US commanders, and did them very well indeed. They were given work that was sort of out-of-the-mainline-of-action, but was tough, and essential. Upper US-echelon people wanted to keep them in the background, people like King, Halsey, and especially MacArthur. More subordinate US admirals such as Kincaid and Mitchener were highly cooperative and did everything they could to aid the British fleet. When British commanders found their fleet-trains inadequate to refuel the fleet in mid-ocean, US tankers came to their aid and not only provided the necessary equipment but also the fuel. Not just refueling, but re-provisioning and ammunitioning so far from port was something Brits were not properly equipped to handle. The RN was used to operating in the Atlantic where ports of supply were relatively close by, and had not paid enough attention to, or build adequate shipping for, supply in the open oceans of the Pacific. Consequently the RN really wasn鈥檛 ready to deal with either the problems or the distances involved when operating in the vast Pacific. (It鈥檚 worth noting, I think, that the Admiralty apparently didn鈥檛 profit from American experience in these matter any more than US army generals learnt from their British counterparts in Europe about fighting the Germans).
There鈥檚 a very good book entitled 鈥樷橢ngage the Enemy More Closely鈥欌 by Correlli Barnett that describes the operations of the RN throughout the war, including, in some detail, the work of the British Pacific Fleet from the time it joined in 1944 until the surrender. It鈥檚 worth reading. -
Message 23
Posted by netherdutch (U5703301) on Saturday, 27th October 2007
I think another reason behind American reluctance to allow the Royal Navy a role in the Pacific War was due to the bitterness of Admiral Ernest King, commander in chief of the American fleet. On May 18, 1942 he had asked the British to provide one of the 3 carriers it had operating off of Africa for the Pacific. The British turned him down and he was angry and felt slighted by the Royal Navy after the help the Americans had given in the Atlantic. Roosevelt had to force King to accept Royal Naval units in 1944 (Weinberg's "A World at Arms" 333)
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Message 24
Posted by englishvote (U5473482) on Saturday, 27th October 2007
Erik I pretty much agree with you, but I also would like to point out that Britain had been a bit busy fighting Germany and Italy as well as putting a lot of resources into Burma.
Britain and the Empire only had a finite amount of resources and I have to say that the Pacific backwater was never going to be top of the list.
Obviously this was different for the USA, after all they are a Pacific nation. Unlike the USA, Britain could afford to ignore the Japanese advances into the Pacific and could certainly use the resources that would have been wasted in the Pacific to better use in Europe and Burma.
But when the end came in Europe and resources could be sparred Britain did send forces into the Pacific, and much more would have followed if an invasion of Japan had been necessary.
As I said before I find it strange that high ranking American admirals would try and keep the Royal Navy away from the battle.
Were they so consumed and caught up in glory hunting that they required American dead rather than British dead?
But of course the front line US navy was happy to have any allies willing to stand by their side. Of course you are correct that the Royal Navy performed very well even though it was not really equipped to operate in that theatre. -
Message 25
Posted by wollemi (U2318584) on Saturday, 27th October 2007
#24
Britain and the Empire only had a finite amount of resources and I have to say that the Pacific backwater was never going to be top of the list听
Whose list? Britain's or the Empire's?
I would agree with some of your post
The US is a Pacific nation whilst for Britain the Pacific War was a backwater. THe reality was that much of the British Empire was also in the Asia Pacific being invaded/attacked by Japan and had the same perspective as the US Navy.
The US Navy was not insular when it came to cooperating with allied navies, RAN ships were attached to the US Fleet throughout the Pacific War from before Coral Sea in early 1942. They've always acknowledged the presence of Australian ships and the 2 navies got on well and were interoperable
I think the US Navy also had something of a point to prove about their credibility after the attack on Pearl Harbour -
Message 26
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Sunday, 28th October 2007
Wollemi,
Half the problem was what could the RN spare?
The KGV's were needed (supposedly)to counter Tirpitz,Scharnhorst et al,and the last of them were not completed till late 1942.The Nelsons tended to be spilt between the 麻豆约拍 Fleet and the Med,The Queen Elizabeths were stationed at Alexandria ,again to cover the Mediterrainian.The remaining class of battleships,the Royal Sovereigns were decripet old tubs,who's only uses were as convoy escorts or for shore bombardment.They were too slow for fleet work and to be honest would have been murdered if they came up against the Japanese.
The same problem occurs with the carriers.The Illustrious class predominantly served in the Mediterrainian and Atlantic/Artic,two of the class are out of service for long periods due to battle damage.Ark Roayal had been sunk,Eagle was too old and slow to be sent east,Furious and Argus were simply too old!Again the Implacables were not commisioned till late 1042 and were needed to cover for damaged vessels.The RN were building carriers as fast as they could but the Collosus class only just started to commission as the war ended,the Majestic class never made niether did the Audacious class.
We didnt have the concept of a "fleet train"nailed down as well as the US either.Now considering the US went on a strategy of "island hopping" how just exactly were the British supposed to assist the US when they don't even have the ships in the first place,and even if they did were not equipped to carry out the mission in the first place?
The fact is the RN were fighting in the North and South Atlantic,the Artic ocean,the Mediterrainian,the North Sea and trying to patch (unsuccesfully)a squadron in the Indian Ocean.If the French hadnt have fell in 1940,the UK may have been able to send a force to the Pacific,with the French Fleet covering the Med.As we know that didnt happen,and the UK and Empire suffered the "biggest overstretch in history"
Given the politics of some of the American staff its hardly likely that they would feel that their prestige would be threatened by the relatively small Australian Navy.And lets be honest in the early days of 1942 the US Navy needed as many ships as they could muster.By the time the BPF turns up the US navy is a all conquering monster of the Pacific,who doesnt want the RN there!
Somebody earlier mentioned the US 6th battle squadron under Admiral Simms.He had an excellent relationship with Beatty and Jelicoe,he assimilated into the Grand Fleet,applied British signals and practices.But do not forget,at the time the Grand Fleet was the most powerful battlefleet the world had then seen,role on 28 years and the role had been reversed,and boy didnt they(US)let us know it.
VF -
Message 27
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Sunday, 28th October 2007
"Implacables were not commissioned till late 1042 and were needed"
Sorry 1942! Dont think the Normans would have made it across the channel 24 years later if the saxons had an aircraft carrier! -
Message 28
Posted by Mark (U2073932) on Sunday, 28th October 2007
Just the fact the americans didn't use Hobarts funnies on D-day says a lot!
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Message 29
Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Sunday, 28th October 2007
You have also omitted to mention that Courageous and Glorious had been lost before the outbreak of war in the Far East.
I don't disagree with your comments on the RAN's cooperation with the USN, but don't forget that the RN had lost one battleship, one battlecruiser, three heavy cruisers, one carrier, seven destroyers and several minor vessels to the Japanese by mid 1942, and the size of the fleet train that the BPF had was dictated not by its own operational needs, but by the available mercantile tonnage which could be spared.
I am also of the opinion that the British had not envisaged having to fight the Italians without having the French as aliies.
Finally, it is worth bearing in mind that the LCT and LST designs were heavily British influenced, and the Liberty ship was a British design, but the LSTs were left to the US to build (as were most of the escort carriers) not because the British didn't see a need for them, nor that they didn't want them - losses in the Battle of the Atlantic had so overcommitted British shipyard capacity that they had no alternative way of producing the vessels, unlike the LSTs which were built largely by structural steel companies, railway workshops etc. -
Message 30
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Sunday, 28th October 2007
To be honest Urnagal,I was working on the RN's capacity of 1941-1942,so I did as you say ,omit the Glorious and Courageous.
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Message 31
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Sunday, 28th October 2007
I think we really do need to clarify a couple of points here.
<quote userid=</quote>Given the politics of some of the American staff its hardly likely that they would feel that their prestige would be threatened by the relatively small Australian Navy.And lets be honest in the early days of 1942 the US Navy needed as many ships as they could muster.By the time the BPF turns up the US navy is a all conquering monster of the Pacific,who doesnt want the RN there!</quote>
As far as I can discern from the reading I have done and the people I've spoken with, the US navy never felt threatened by the Australian navy or its commanders. Cooperation between the two forces was always smooth and congenial. Aussie ships and their crews were handled virtually the same way as the US vessels and crews by the task force or flotilla commanders. (US officers were always delighted to party aboard an Aussie ship. American vessels were ''dry'' whereas there were always alcoholic libations to be had aboard the RAN ships.)
You ask how the RN vessels could be expected to assist the USN in the Pacific when they didn't have the means to do so. That is one reason often given by upper echelon USN admirals for not particularly wanting the RN there...the USN had not only to provide equipment and supplies, but ships and men as well. To me, that seems to be a reasonable enough deal -- swapping a little oil, ammunition etc. for the use of several warships and the men to fight them -- but those commanders didn't think so. They seemed to feel that it was an unnecessary imposition. They got along quite well without them and didn't need the additional 'headache'. Their feeling was that if the RN vessels couldn't maintain themselves, then why come at all?
It is certainly true that the British were fighting on several fronts; in France, Italy, Africa, Burma, and of course, the Atlantic. But I feel it necessary to point out that they weren't fighting in any of those zones alone. Aussie and NZ forces were always there beside them as were Canadian, Polish, Free French and a few others. When the US and Russia joined in, Britain was anything but alone...and let me add that the by 1942 the US was also involved on those same fronts plus the Central and South Pacific, Alaska and China too.
Several on this board have noted that Britain wasn't a Pacific power and I challenge that. It had been Britain's boast for a century that the sun never set on its empire. It had colonised vast territories in southeast Asia, including India, Burma, Hong Kong and the Malay Peninsula. Also Australia and New Zealand were considered part of that Empire, so it's incorrect to dismiss the Pacific war as not being something that should particularly concern Britain... at least, not as much as Africa and the Middle East, for instance. The fact that Britain COULDN'T come to the aid of these Pacific interests is certainly true, but it doesn't eliminate British responsibility for those territories. Britain took them over with a political pledge not only to ''enlighten'' them, but to protect them as well. That she couldn't do it doesn't extinguish the responsibility. -
Message 32
Posted by wollemi (U2318584) on Sunday, 28th October 2007
Yes Erik is correct - resources were sent from the Empire to the European War right from the outset in 1939 and continued over the critical 1940/1941 until Russia joined in. It's one reason why the Pacific War was in such trouble at the outset, the region had been stripped of its limited defences
I think there was a common feeling in the region that after Pearl Harbour the Asia Pacific was all but handed to the Japanese. The Europe First concept was little more than a green light to the Japanese to continue their march across the region and for the Japanese High Command to rub their hands with glee.
The 'only show in town' was the US Navy and limited local defences The US Navy had only one object in mind - to defeat Japan - and had no interest in the people of the region, they just needed bases to achieve their aim -
Message 33
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 28th October 2007
By the time when a significant British fleet could be made available to support the offensive against Japan in the Pacific, it wasn't needed any more, as the USN already possessed a massive superiority over the Japanese fleet.
It was there for a political purpose, to signal British presence to the end of the war. And also to help the British to regain a foothold in their former colonies, something the US government didn't really like. The Allies were deeply at odds over the future of Asia, both the former European colonies in Asia but also the role of China. Top-level USN commanders may have taken modeled their position after that of the political leadership, which for the most part wanted to reduce European colonial influence in the Pacific.
Still, the British contribution could have had some interesting potential uses; a handful of carriers with armored hangar decks and squadrons of fast-climbing, heavily-armed Seafires could have been very useful as a picket forces to protect the rest of the fleet from Kamikaze attacks. But the British fleet was slower and its presence was a logistics headache, and it just wasn't needed.
At a lower level, technical cooperation and exchange of information was good. British carriers operated US-built aircraft supplied under lend-lease, and the RN learned a lot on carrier aircraft design. In the other direction, the USN benefited greatly from British radar technology, and after the war it would incorporate British innovations such as the angled deck. Perhaps the most significant, even before the USA went to war the intelligence services exchanged extremely sensitive information on Japanese and German codes: In early 1941, Purple was traded for Enigma.
The same seems to have happened in the air force. At the time of Pearl Harbor, US combat aircraft came of the production lines with self-sealing fuel tanks, armor plate, increased armament, gun turrets: All the result of British information on combat experience in Europe. The RAF sent over not only reports but also combat-experienced officers, technical staff, plans and licenses for equipment, captured German arms -- and the information was eagerly used.
But at the higher staff level, the USAAF stubbornly refused to accept the lesson that unescorted daylight bombing resulted in unacceptable lessons. It was not until late 1943, after Schweinfurt, Regensburg and a series of other bloody and unsuccessful operations, that it accepted the need to adopt other tactics. Even then, it went its own way, with some justification. And both air forces still tended to give their own interpretation to the list of strategic priorities agreed in combined staff meetings. -
Message 34
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Sunday, 28th October 2007
I think that any statement that Montgomery "never made a mistake" says more about Jodl than about Montgomery. Jodl was a competent staff officer and had nerves of steel, but particularly imaginative he was not. His willingness to serve as the compliant right-hand man of an increasingly erratic Fuhrer also says a lot.
Reality is that in the eyes of many modern commentators, and more to the point in the eyes of his US contemporaries, Montgomery did make serious mistakes. He always tried to break through the enemy lines by using overwhelming forces. Sometimes that worked, as at El Alamein, the crossing of the Rhine, and on the beaches of Normandy, and sometimes it resulted in a bloody defeats, as at Caen and Arnhem. The tactic in itself was often justifiable, although one of his (British) critics felt that Montgomery was an "ironmonger".
Where his US colleagues saw wrong was that after that breakthrough had been achieved, often at quite high cost, Montgomery was often reluctant to exploit it in full and (if you forgive the cold expression) extract the maximum profit from his high initial investment. After El Alamein and again at Falaise, Montgomery allowed too many Germans to run away so that they could fight another day. IIRC even Bradley felt that this was not how he had been thought to fight wars at staff college, and Patton's feelings about it were probably not fit to print. There was a real and bitter professional disagreement there.
As for US generals being more political, it probably depends on time and place. At the staff level, Marshall regularly felt outmaneuvered by his counterparts on the Imperial general staff, who played the political game with considerable skill. At the level of field commanders, British officers seems to have been less inclined than their American colleagues to consider political demands. -
Message 35
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Sunday, 28th October 2007
Erik,
We've had this debate before,the British"Empire was already in its twilight years by the outbreak of war.If it had the strength of 1914 it would have coped,as it was by 1942 it couldnt,The RN did well to fight and succeed in the oceans it could.If Britain had shed all responsibility they wouldnt have sent Prince of Wales,Repulse,Hermes and the two County class cruisers east.As it was India was probably still the Jewel in the crown.
Its interesting to note that if the AngloJapanese alliance had not been broken on the insistence of the US at Washington(treaty) the pacific war may never had turned into the conflict it did. -
Message 36
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Sunday, 28th October 2007
Wollemi,
Thankfully for the UK ,the commonwealth did come to our aid in 1939.But at that point we were not at war with Japan or Italy,the French hadn't collapsed at that point either.
For the Japanese Dec 1941 was a perfect time for them,Russia looked shaky and likely to collapse,the Uk was on its kneens,France was occupied,China was hanging on,but had lost vast swathes of land.Bearing this in mind its no wonder that South East Asia fell like a pack of cards.They had little to fear from the British,few concerns about the Russians and had a cunning (if in the long term foolish)plan for dealing with the US.
The US was the "only show in town" but then again it only had one theatre to perform in! -
Message 37
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Sunday, 28th October 2007
"It is certainly true that the British were fighting on several fronts; in France, Italy, Africa, Burma, and of course, the Atlantic. But I feel it necessary to point out that they weren't fighting in any of those zones alone. Aussie and NZ forces were always there beside them as were Canadian, Polish, Free French"
From a naval point of view you do not really hear that much about the Polish Navy,the New Zealands navy was also quite small and the Canadians fleet was tied up in the atlantic.In terms of the last few posts how exactly are these 3 small navies going to turn the tide in the pacific?The free French navy at that point consisted of very old battleships,a very slow aircraft carrier and a very large submarine!
I do not remember any one in the course of these posts claiming that it was a case of Britain alone.What was said was that the RN didnt have the capability to fight in 4 oceans,a quite different point. -
Message 38
Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Monday, 29th October 2007
I'd add the fact that the Netherlands were occupied to your list, VF. The Netherlands East Indies contained significant reserves of oil, which the Japanese needed perhaps more than all the other raw materials put together. The melancholy history of ABDA and even more so of ABDAFLOAT are relevant here, if rarely considered. First time for centuries that RN forces went into battle under a foriegn admiral, with minimal common doctrines, language difficulties, incompatible ship types, wrong flagship etc.
I wonder if the experience was one of the reasons the USN were reluctant to get the RN too deeply involved? For example, the batsmans signals to an incoming aircraft were opposite - the USN pilot receiving a "You are too high" from an RN batsman would read it as "you are too low". -
Message 39
Posted by wollemi (U2318584) on Monday, 29th October 2007
#36
VirtualF
SE Asia did indeed fall 'like a pack of cards' but the ominous signs were ignored, particularly by London. Japan had already made its move into SE Asia well before Pearl Harbour. It was the fall of France in mid 1940 when they took the first step to control the border of French IndoChina with China, then mid 1941 when they tightened their hold on IndoChina.
The British Empire was invaded by Japan, not Germany. Prioritising British - and Empire(!)- resources on the European War during 1942, when Russia and the US were already involved there, was hardly a defence of the Empire falling like a pack of cards to Japan
I would agree with #33, the BPF was largely political. -
Message 40
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Monday, 29th October 2007
Urnungal
Yes your right,an oversight on my part
.
I'd fully agree with with you about the ABDA debacle in the Java Sea,it was a mixture of nationalities with different protocols and experience in ships of varying capability.
Would it still have been in the minds of US Navy 3 years on?Well possibly but,to be fair the ABDA task force as you pointed out was led by Doorman at Java Sea and not the RN.
On your last point,I always got the impression that the RN adopted a lot of the US practices in certain areas,such as ship to ship signals etc?
Is that correct?
VF -
Message 41
Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Monday, 29th October 2007
VF : Yes, Britain adopted US voice procedures, signal codes etc. pretty much lock stock and barrel - most of them can still be recognised in modern NATO practice. I suppose one could argue with some justification that the degree of interoperability achieved by NATO is the real payoff for WWII experiences in this field. If so, the lessons were learned. It has to be borne in mind, though, that learning the lessons of the last war doesn't always pay off in terms of the next one.
One minor point - HMS Victorious did operate for a period (as USS Robin) with Saratoga's task group in 1943, when the USN was short of carriers. -
Message 42
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Monday, 29th October 2007
Wollemi
Just exactly would you have done?
You have an enemy you have fought for two and a half years.You closest Ally has collapsed in 6 weeks,the only other ally in Europe is be pummelled by the German Army with and dire straights.Your own country is losing more ships than it can replace and you rely on the merchant fleet for survival.You have 2 major stategic points to cover (Gibraltar and Suez) to defend and a large sea (Mediterranian) to keep open.
You are tasked also with providing cover to supply your ally (Russia) with US lend lease.
To do this you have approximately
13 battleships/battlecruisers
7 carriers
40-50 cruisers
200 -300 destroyers
70 subs
300 escort vessels
Now you can just about cover you responsibilties in the North/South Atlantic,The Mediterranian,The Artic,The North Sea.
Then you have a third enemy (Japan) then launches an assualt against the US and your bases in S.E Asia.As mentioned before you have deployed the limited forces you have against the countries you are actually at war with,not the one who is threatening.You send what you can.
In these circumstances what would you have done??
Do you strip the 麻豆约拍 Fleet and leave Tirpitz et al a free reign,Do you abandon the Artic Convoys and leave the last European mainland Ally on his own.Perhaps you abandon the Suez canal and the link to the to the east and abandon North Africa,and the Middle East?.Or do you cut back on atlantic escorts and risk starvation?
Ive listened to Erik's argument that,"yes there are reasons behind the RN's weaknesses but its still your responsibility".
Im sorry Eric but you cannot avoid the history behind it.Post Washington Treaty the RN was expected to cover an empire which covered two fifths of the land of the planet and four oceans with less than a quarter of the capabilty.In addition you have to break an long standing alliance with a upcoming power in the very region you are struggling to cover.
To take this out of the equation is folly,
to say the RN should have had more ships (in the face of treaty cuts)is like saying
"And If my granny had wheels she would be a skateboard"
They didnt have the capability and couldnt have the capability!
I would be interested to hear what you would have done differently.
VF -
Message 43
Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Monday, 29th October 2007
The British could, perhaps, have turned to the US and said something like "If you want to supply Russia, you will have to do it without us".
Once Italy was in the war (pehaps Lumley Lyster's Taranto plan might have had an effect if carried out), the Med became a continuous drain on RN resources. Could the British have stood on the defensive on the borders of Egypt? Would that have noticeably reduced the demand for ships? Would it have prevented German intervention in North Africa? If it did, would it have allowed them to launch Barbarossa earlier in the year?
There were errors aplenty, but few of them were unforced. In hindsight, it may be argued that Sydney should have been the Pacific Ocean main base rather than Singapore, and that the guarantee to send the Main Fleet east was unrealistic except if France or Italy were allied to the British (or both were resolutely neutral) in any scenario which had Britain pitted against Germany and Japan. Unfortunately for many millions of people, that luxury was denied to the leaders of the time. -
Message 44
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Monday, 29th October 2007
Hi Urnungal
"HMS Victorious did operate for a period (as USS Robin) with Saratoga's task group in 1943, when the USN was short of carriers."
I believe that USS Wasp also helped deliver fighters in the "Med",so there was co-operation as part of the big plan.
I can see were both Wolemi and Erik are coming from,but in naval terms I cannot sea what else the RN was expected to do.I was reading the excellent Australian "Sea Power" website and the it would appear that the RAN and austrailan people were actually pleased to see the BPF and raised money by subscription to help build up infastructure to serve it.In their words not mine it
"Australia had been under 'American occupation' since 1942 and many Australians were delighted to see the British fleet"
The RN came when it had the capability to do it. -
Message 45
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Monday, 29th October 2007
"In hindsight, it may be argued that Sydney should have been the Pacific Ocean main base rather than Singapore, and that the guarantee to send the Main Fleet east was unrealistic except if France or Italy were allied to the British (or both were resolutely neutral) in any scenario which had Britain pitted against Germany and Japan. Unfortunately for many millions of people, that luxury was denied to the leaders of the time."
Quite
VF -
Message 46
Posted by cmedog47 (U3614178) on Monday, 29th October 2007
Regarding Omaha beach, a major cause of the American difficulties was that they encounted the experienced 352nd German division where they expected inexperienced second and third line troops. There were other problems with execution, but the quality and strength of the defeners was a major suprise, and it would not have gone so badly without that.
What was not revealed until many years after the war, the 1980's I believe, was that the British had learned of the movement of that division into that sector a few months before, but made the deliberate decision not to inform the Americans lest a change in invasion plans of security breaches in the invasion planning staff itself tip off the Germans to the code-breaking.
So the problem at Omaha wasn't what the Americans wouldn't listen to, but what they weren't told. I am sure that there were other instances of simple hard-headedness--colonels upon promotion become biologically incapable of considering anyone elses opinion as good as their own. But on that matter, there is a smoking gun regarding deliberate withholding of information costing a lot of your allies' lives.
I think that it also may explain some of the other failures to cooperate to the fullest extent possible--when working with another nations forces, no matter how tight the alliance, you must remember that their officers are sworn to obey another authority, and if that authority orders them to lie to you, betray you, ignore your orders at critical moment, or withhold information, then they will do so and you have no recourse. A military officer is trained to make the men and machines under his command move to his will, and only wants to depend on those forces that he can rely upon to do so. -
Message 47
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 30th October 2007
KurtBronson,
What was not revealed until many years after the war, the 1980's I believe, was that the British had learned of the movement of that division into that sector a few months before, but made the deliberate decision not to inform the Americans lest a change in invasion plans of security breaches in the invasion planning staff itself tip off the Germans to the code-breaking.听
Where was that published? -
Message 48
Posted by cmedog47 (U3614178) on Tuesday, 30th October 2007
I don't know.I assume you mean a reference reporting that British intell knew of the 352nd's movement as the rest of it is extensively reported. Of course without a reference, I might have gotten a brain cell out of whack and dreamed it up, but I don't think so. I once got a stack of about 15 books on D-day and went through them in preparation for a massive multi-weekend wargaming session. It was somewhere in there. The earlier histories have a lot of the story wrong as so much of the information was not available yet. Some of the books written in the mid-80's changed their storey incorporating recently released information while other continue to cite older sources.
Liddel Hart's book on the Normandy invasion, for example, was written without knowledge of Ultra, yet is still often cited.
The 352nd had been moved in March, 3 months before the invasion. Given the detailed information that the codebreakers were obtaining on the assigned locations of midlevel officers, it is almost inconceivable that an entire division would be missed in such an important operation, but the D-Day invasion planners did not have it. It is unfortunately a necessary part of codebreaking that some of the information be withheld from operational officers and some of the advantages to be obtained left unused. Otherwise, the pattern of success itself will reveal that the codes are not secure and the entire operation ruined. -
Message 49
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 30th October 2007
With all the supposed inter-Allied co-operation it's incredible that the Americans wouldn't have heard about the 352nd.
-
Message 50
Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Tuesday, 30th October 2007
Two weeks before D-Day, Allied Intelligence officially confirmed that the 352.ID had moved up to reinforce the Omaha Beach areas. According to __??__, this move was formally published on June 3rd in the 21st Army group weekly Neptune Intelligence Review and circulated to all senior American Cammanders. -SB
From the Jewish Virtual library.
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