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What has been the Greatest Military Blunder?

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Messages: 1 - 50 of 68
  • Message 1.Β 

    Posted by GreatKhan1 (U9943587) on Monday, 8th October 2007

    Ok, so history and war has been full of errors and mistakes that people have lived to regret,(if indeed they had that priviledge afterwards). So my question is, what do people think ranks as the worlds greatest military hiccup. I have one or two ideas. In my opinion some of the greatest mistkes revolve around the idea of attacking one country, Russia. Both Hitler and Napolean fall into this catagory and unfortatly both lived some while longer to comtemplate their 'errors'. However, millions of fighting men as well as civilians never got the chance think about this error made by their leaders. Both then went on to lose their respective wars.

    Any other suggestions?

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  • Message 2

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by tony_19680 (U5835599) on Monday, 8th October 2007

    The Gallipoli landings in 1915 must count as one of WW1 greatest blunders. In particylar check out the The River Clyde Landing.
    In Gallipoli 250,000 allied soldiers were killed for not tactical or strategic gain.

    The invasion of Russia wasn't a blunder in the sense that it was Hitlers ambition for living Space. Luckily for western Europe it was to big a mouthful to take.

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  • Message 3

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by ceegar (U5411333) on Tuesday, 9th October 2007

    Hi,

    Napoleons march on Moscow has to be up there with the greatest of blunders. The total failure of this scheme brought his Grand Armee to its knees and prompted Frances (Napoleons) enemies to band together and unite against him knowing that his army no longer had the ability to stop them.

    Ceegar

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  • Message 4

    , in reply to message 3.

    Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Tuesday, 9th October 2007

    Not sure if you could count these as "military" blunders, both are really political misjudgements, but the consequences to the states that undertook them were severe.

    Austrian declaration of war on Serbia.
    Paraguayan declaration of war on Brazil in what became the War of the Triple Alliance.

    Perhaps closer to true "military" blunders - Pearl Harbor and Germany's decision to implement "unrestricted" submarine campaign in WWI .

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  • Message 5

    , in reply to message 4.

    Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Tuesday, 9th October 2007

    Then there was that bit where LBJ sent troops into a war which he didn't want to win. Go figure.

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  • Message 6

    , in reply to message 4.

    Posted by Scarboro (U2806863) on Tuesday, 9th October 2007

    The "political" misjudgements are true military blunders at the strategic level. I would suggest that Hitler's failure to focus all efforts on Britain before starting in with Russia was a huge blunder. (A blunder for which I am thankful mind you.)

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  • Message 7

    , in reply to message 6.

    Posted by craigd1973 (U2853338) on Tuesday, 9th October 2007

    "I would suggest that Hitler's failure to focus all efforts on Britain before starting in with Russia was a huge blunder".

    Napoleon made the exact same mistake although his western front was in Spain and Portugal.

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  • Message 8

    , in reply to message 7.

    Posted by Brevabloke (U1685837) on Tuesday, 9th October 2007

    The Nuremberg raid in 1944 - the loss rate was (I think) worse than 10% and more men were lost in those 7 hours than in the whole Battle of Britain.

    At the moment reading "Tail End Charlies". Great book.

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  • Message 9

    , in reply to message 2.

    Posted by Allan D (U1791739) on Wednesday, 10th October 2007

    In Gallipoli 250,000 allied soldiers were killed for not tactical or strategic gain.Β 

    Whilst the actual figures at Gallipoli are the subject of some dispute the number of Allied deaths were certainly not that high. One website gives these figures:

    Australia: 18.500 wounded and missing - 7,594 killed.
    New Zealand : 5,150 wounded and missing - 2,431 killed.
    British Empire (excl. Anzac) : 198,000 wounded and missing - 22,000 killed.
    France : 23,000 wounded and missing - 27,000 killed.
    Ottoman Empire (Turkey) : 109,042 wounded and missing - 57,084 killed.
    Furthermore 1.700 Indians died in Gallipoli, plus an unknown number of Germans, Newfoundlanders and Senegalese



    The terms "killed" and "wounded" presumably also includes those who died by drowning and were also victims of disease and sickness such as dysentery and malaria which proved more destructive than the enemy. It has been estimated that almost 66% of total Allied casualties were due to the latter cause rather than enemy action.

    The Dardanelles Campaign was a good idea that was imperfectly executed due to the lack of experience with what became known in WWII as amphibious operations. The Dardanelles were certainly a failure from a military point of view, whether it was a blunder is open to debate.

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  • Message 10

    , in reply to message 9.

    Posted by VF (U5759986) on Wednesday, 10th October 2007

    From a naval point of view the Dardenelles was an unmitigated disater.Churchill (the gifted amateur)had been much impressed by the Germans destruction of the forts of Liege by gunfire,he believed that the power of the RN could do the same.Unfortunatly he either misunderstood,or ignored the differences between a howitzer,with its high firing angle and a large calibre naval gun with its low firing one.Secondly ships do not come off well against forts,Nelson himself stated that:

    "Anybody who attacks a fort is an idiot"


    Unless you get a direct hit its very difficult to knockout a fort,and "spotting"for fall of shot is much harder than it is at sea.Conversely a ship sits "as bold as brass" on the water for all the world to see,its entirely exposed andthe fall of shot is easily marked with a large spout of water.Admiral Fisher (who was against a purely naval born operation)had been at Alexandria in 1886 on board the the HMS Inflexible,for hours they fired thousands of shells at the Egyptian forts only knocking a couple out.

    In addition the Turks had mobile howitzers,not much use against a battleship,but deadly enough against the minesweepers.And this was the crux,the minefields had to be cleared before the RN could progress to the Sea of Mamara,but the minesweepers couldnt sweep the mines because of the fort and howitzer fire and because the mines were not swept the battlefleet couldnt proceed....
    There was a lot of critisism of the minesweeper crew,a lot who were reservists or volunteer fisherman in converted fishing boats for turning away under fire.But as one wag put it

    "They could be no more expected to clear the mines than the Grand Fleet being sent into the North Sea to catch fish"

    Then you have the "battlefleet" itself,mostly very old warships fit for the knackers yard.Ok the "Queen Elizabeth"superdreadnought was there,but initially she was forbidden to enter the straights and was ordered not to fire broadsides as not to wear out her barrels.The comanding RN officer,Admiral Carden had been the superintendant at the Malta Dockyards,and been given command on the isistence of the Government foreign office than the Admiralty.A better man was available(Admiral H Limpus),who knew the Turks well,the Dardenelles well and the tactics which would be best place to find success.However the UK government believed that his appointment would inflame the Turks.As Churchill put it:

    "It now appears that Turkey can not only injure our whole naval position by a flagrant breach of neutrality about Goeben,but is also to have a veto over admiralty appointments as well"

    And the farce continues up to and on the day of battle.
    HMS Agamemnon's captain decides that during action it would be a good idea to paint the un-engaged side of his ship as he was out of range of the Turks...He wasnt and unsuprisingly the Turks cant believe their luck and pummel the ship causing three casulties with seven direct hits.
    On the day itself Bouvet is sunk,then HMS Inflexible is mined and has to sail back to Tenedos(were she is beached).HMS Irresistable is then mined and HMS Ocean is sent to assist in towing her to saftey.HMS Ocean states that she cant as the water is too shallow,when asked by the commanding officer of the forward attck squadron how deep the water is she replies 90 FEET!.In the meantime HMS Ocean sails firing wildly in circles at anything and everything.At which point the HMS Ocean is instructed withdraw...At which point she herself is mined.

    The French themselves lose the Suffren and Gaulous to severe damage.

    The loss of the ships themselves probably wasnt so much the issue,they were old and ready for scrapping,in any case the RN had a plentifull supply of "old wood" to replace them.But this was a big dent to morale and pride,no matter that it was latter discovered that the Turks had virtually exhausted their ammunition and were on the point of collapse,they held the field.


    An abject disaster for the RN and Carden.....


    Admiral Duckworth,the last British Admiral to attempt to force the Dardenelles(who successfully forced the staights in 1807 only to come a cropper at Constantinople and pummeled on the way back)must have looked down on them and smiled knowingly.......

    VF

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  • Message 11

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by Rootless Cosmopolitan (U5638156) on Wednesday, 10th October 2007

    Not keeping one eye on the 'nomads' was usually fatal to Empires from China to Persia to Rome.

    On the battlefield many spring to mind but how about the battle of Stirling Bridge (for the English) or Agincourt (for the French).

    Operations Barbarossa and the battles of Kursk and Stalingrad and, for us, Market Garden in Europe and the British surrendering to Nippon at Singapore was a humanitarian disaster that was self-inflicted.

    Many battles are won in ways that are militarily perfect operations but are strategic and diplomatic catastrophies, like Pearl Harbour.

    Far more people are killed off of the battlefield (stats suggest and illustrate it as high as 3 to 1) by their own governments so a lack of military intervention has arguably killed more people than actual military action.

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  • Message 12

    , in reply to message 10.

    Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Wednesday, 10th October 2007

    Perhaps the greater blunders of the Dardanelles campaign had already happend?

    If the British had offered the Turks the use of 2 or 3 of the predreadnaughts they used for the attack when they took over Osman I & Resoudieh (still more if they hadn't taken them over in the first place), might the Turks have been noticeably less keen on the German alliance?

    If Troubridge had attacked Goeben and succeeded in at least damaging her, would the Turks have beeen etc etc (side speculation - if Archy Barchy had disposed the battlecruisers SENSIBLY, wouldn't Troubridge have had sufficient force to take Goeben out of the war - semi-permanently at least?)

    If the British fleet hadn't bombarded the Gallipoli forts earlier, the Turks might not have realised how lousy their existing state was, so the later attempts might have been successful. Not that I'm convinced that a naval force in the Marmora would have been decisive - to become decisive, they'd have had to force the Bosphorus to join the Russians in the Black Sea)

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  • Message 13

    , in reply to message 12.

    Posted by VF (U5759986) on Wednesday, 10th October 2007

    Gis-bil-ga-mes


    Interesting point,if the two turkish dreadnoughts had not been incorparated in to the grand fleet as HMS Agincourt and Erin,then maybe they wouldnt have been so amenable to the SMS Goeben,and not came up with what one historian claimed was "a truly byzantine soultion,could they not sell us these ships"?

    On Troubridge,I always felt a little bit of sympathy for him,he was caught between the "devil and the deep blue sea".At Jutland the ineffectivess of the armoured cruiser to cope with heavy calibre shells was highlighted.Indeed Fisher who slaughtered Troubridge for his conduct obviously forgot his maxim thatthe armoured cruiser was "too weak to fight,too slow to run away".I agree with you about Milnes conduct and performance,it was quite appalling,he was the man in charge and the one who made the dispositions.There is a school of thought that Troubridge could have fought a battle a' la River Plate,but this ignores the fact that the Troubriges cruisers were slower than the Goeben(where as Harwoods cruisers were not slower than Graf Spee)and that there was no gaurentee that even the heaviest guns in his arsenal,the 9.2inch gun would cause any significant damage to the battlecruiser.

    Of course this "non action" had further implications..At Coronel Adm "Kit" Cradock took on a supereior german force (Von Spee's crack pacific squadron) with an inferor squadron.Whilst Cradock was undeniabley brave,is it possible that Troubridge displayed maybe a different type of courage in not forcing an action he could not win?

    As for the action against the Turkish forts,I think its an indication of Adm Cardens ability,patchy, slow moving and without any real zeal...

    VF

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  • Message 14

    , in reply to message 13.

    Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Wednesday, 10th October 2007

    Concur.

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  • Message 15

    , in reply to message 14.

    Posted by Nik (U1777139) on Wednesday, 10th October 2007

    Back then anyone could take on Ottomans - the problem in the Kallipoli campaign on the part of the British was purely political going back to the age-old isssue (dating at least since the 18th century): "why should anyone dissolve the Ottomans - they seemed to do their work just nicely for so long". Wrongly so (or so...), some of the British diplomacy decided on a campaign that though serving certain objectives of war, inherently it would give a hard spinal tap (... to 11!) to the for-so-long crippled Empire of Ottomans.

    Do not forget that a main objective for the British was to weaken the Ottomans in the Middle East where all the oil was - not to weaken them in the west. The passage could be simply passed any time by british fleet there was no need to do all that costly effort. However, in that way the mass of the Ottoman army was mobilised in the west leaving practically empty the east, easy prey to the few arab families that allied with dear Lorence. In that aspect the Kallipoli campaign was quite successful.

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  • Message 16

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by bill (U9416906) on Wednesday, 10th October 2007

    The decision by the Nazi High Command to stop bombing airfields and concentrate on Blitzkrieg. How much longer could the RAF in southern England have continued to challenge Luftwaffe air supremacy if the pounding had continued. Would German air power in the south have opened the route for a successful inavasion later in the war?

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  • Message 17

    , in reply to message 16.

    Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Thursday, 11th October 2007

    millwallbill,

    The decision by the Nazi High Command to stop bombing airfields and concentrate on Blitzkrieg. How much longer could the RAF in southern England have continued to challenge Luftwaffe air supremacy if the pounding had continued. Would German air power in the south have opened the route for a successful inavasion later in the war?Β 

    Setting aside the likelihood of the Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ Fleet arriving to bust up the German beach party, there was still No. 12 Group just outside the Dorniers' range to consider.

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  • Message 18

    , in reply to message 15.

    Posted by VF (U5759986) on Thursday, 11th October 2007

    Gallipoli was more about trying to force a more direct route to Russia.There was Archangel in the North,but that was icebound for many months of the year.If the Western Allies could control the Dardenelles they could give the Russians more direct support and keep them in the war.


    VF

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  • Message 19

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by craigd1973 (U2853338) on Thursday, 11th October 2007

    A few more to consider;

    1. Custer at the Little Big Horn
    2. Lee ordering Pickets charge at Gettysburg.
    3. Prussia deciding to take on Napoleon single handed in 1806.
    4. The blunder between Ney and Napoleon over Derlon's corps during the waterloo campaign.

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  • Message 20

    , in reply to message 18.

    Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Thursday, 11th October 2007

    True - but if the Ottomans stayed neutral, supplies could get through without having to control either strait. There was a ban on warships passing the Dardanelles, but merchant shipping should have been allowed through freely.

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  • Message 21

    , in reply to message 19.

    Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Thursday, 11th October 2007

    Was Custer at LBH really a blunder, rather than an accident? Didn't he just stumble across the encampment?

    Report message21

  • Message 22

    , in reply to message 21.

    Posted by VF (U5759986) on Thursday, 11th October 2007

    Hi Gis-bil-ga-mes

    If the Goeben hadnt had made it to Constantinople,then yes.As it was she did turn out to be the "ship that changed the world"

    Report message22

  • Message 23

    , in reply to message 21.

    Posted by craigd1973 (U2853338) on Thursday, 11th October 2007

    "Was Custer at LBH really a blunder, rather than an accident? Didn't he just stumble across the encampment?"

    He may have stumbled upon the camp but I believe he was supposed to wait for the arrival of other forces before attacking.

    He just went charging in without any real idea of the numbers he was facing.

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  • Message 24

    , in reply to message 23.

    Posted by GreatKhan1 (U9943587) on Thursday, 11th October 2007

    Ok, it's true that Custer did charge in at Little Big Horn, but he did wait for reinforcements which never actually came. This was due to the rift that had developed between Custer and his deputy Frederick Benteen, who just sat with his cavalry detachment until it was too late. So despite Reno suffering heavy casulties and Custers regiment being wiped out, Benteen's men hardly recieved a scratch.

    So Little Big Horn, a blunder yes, but more in the case of the bitter Benteen rather than that of Custer who went down fighting like a true soldier.

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  • Message 25

    , in reply to message 24.

    Posted by craigd1973 (U2853338) on Thursday, 11th October 2007

    GreatKhan1

    Yes I agree but the other forces I was referring to were actually those under Generals Gibbon and General Terry which were on their way to the Little Big Horn. Was Custer not supposed to wait until these forces arrived before attacking?

    I think this was the major blunder of the campaign. He wanted the glory for himself so went charging in and failed spectacularly.

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  • Message 26

    , in reply to message 25.

    Posted by Triceratops (U3420301) on Thursday, 11th October 2007

    Hi Craig,

    There was no definite plan for a rendezvous on any specific date at the Little Big Horn, simply because no-one was 100% certain that was where the Sioux and Cheyenne were.
    They were believed to be there following the result of a recce by Major Reno and plans were laid on this assumption.Custer fought at LBH on 25th June 1876 and since then there has grown up this story about Custer arriving a day early. If this was the case, then the Terry-Gibbon column was a day late as they didn't appear until the 27th.
    It might be worth looking at just what Custer's orders were.


    Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River
    Montana Territory
    June 22nd 1876
    Lieutenant-Colonel Custer,
    7th Cavalry


    Colonel:
    The Brigadier-General Commanding directs that,as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit
    of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement,and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal,energy and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy.
    He will, however,indicate to you his own views of what your actions should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them.
    He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Bighorn,he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the Tongue, and then turn towards Little Horn, feeling constantly to your left, so as to preclude the escape of the Indians to the south or the southeast by passing around your left flank.
    The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Bighorn. As soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of course its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise, but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly enclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible.
    The Department Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock's Creek, and that you should endeavour to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon's column with the information of the result of your examination. The lower part of this creek will be examined by a detachment from Colonel Gibbon's command.
    The supply steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far as the forks if the river is found to be navigable for that distance, and the Department Commander, who will accompany the column of Colonel Gibbon, desires you to report to him there not later than the expiration of the time for which your troops are rationed, unless in the meantime you receive further orders.
    E W Smith
    Captain, 18th Infantry
    Acting Assistant Adjutant General Β 


    No mention of any date for a meeting of the two commands on the LBH. In fact, if Custer had carried on to the Tongue, Terry and Gibbon would have confronted the Indians first.

    Trike.

    Report message26

  • Message 27

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Thursday, 11th October 2007


    Letting the Royal Navy regain control of the Fleet Air Arm in 1937

    Report message27

  • Message 28

    , in reply to message 27.

    Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Thursday, 11th October 2007

    I'd say that was only undoing the April Fool joke, and was thus rectifying (too late) the major blunder.

    Report message28

  • Message 29

    , in reply to message 26.

    Posted by craigd1973 (U2853338) on Friday, 12th October 2007

    Hi Trike

    Thank you for that. very interesting.

    Although no date for a rendezvous is specified in the order, the order does suggest the strategy was to try and trap the indians between the converging columns of Custer, Terry and Gibbon at LBH.

    The order seems to give Custer license to act as he sees fit in the presence of the enemy. He chose to attack without any real idea of the force he was up against with the results we all know.

    Craig

    Report message29

  • Message 30

    , in reply to message 29.

    Posted by Triceratops (U3420301) on Friday, 12th October 2007

    Hi Craig,
    Although no date for a rendezvous is specified in the order, the order does suggest the strategy was to try and trap the indians between the converging columns of Custer, Terry and Gibbon at LBH.Β 
    Agreed.


    The order seems to give Custer license to act as he sees fit in the presence of the enemy. He chose to attack without any real idea of the force he was up against with the results we all know.Β 

    Yes it does, and Terry must have known that given the chance, Custer would follow the trail across the Wolf Mountains and attack directly.
    It's been suggested that Terry's order was made to cover himself. If Custer attacks and wins, Terry can claim credit for allowing him freedom of action,if Custer loses then Terry can blame him for not obeying instrucions.(before becoming a soldier in the Civil War,Alfred Terry was a lawyer for 12 years)

    Have you seen this site?



    Trike.

    Report message30

  • Message 31

    , in reply to message 20.

    Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Friday, 12th October 2007

    Isandhlwana must rate up there = 1200 british/native soldiers with modern weapons decimated by soldiers armed with immense courage and short stabbing spears and leather shields

    st

    Report message31

  • Message 32

    , in reply to message 31.

    Posted by vera1950 (U9920163) on Sunday, 14th October 2007

    hi lots of excellent suggestions for greatest military blunder ,all equal in their own way. can`t help thinking though that the greatest ones of all -we haven`t been allowed to know about!

    Report message32

  • Message 33

    , in reply to message 31.

    Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Monday, 15th October 2007

    stalteriisok,

    Isandhlwana must rate up there = 1200 british/native soldiers with modern weapons decimated by soldiers armed with immense courage and short stabbing spears and leather shields Β 

    Matched only by Zulus letting the other half of Chelmsford's army walk home right before their eyes, within touching distance. Apparently, the Zulus thought these were the ghosts of the troops they'd just slaughtered.

    Report message33

  • Message 34

    , in reply to message 33.

    Posted by highchurchman (U7711917) on Monday, 15th October 2007

    The Isandhlwana campaign must rate high in blunders. Splitting the command and Chelmsford swanning off into the hills with a reduced force was an idiots move .As was, not forming the second half of the contingent in to a lager. Further Pulleines spreading out his men over such a wide area so that they became easy pickings for the Zulu Impis was another sad mistake.The area was vast and the soldiers were to widely spread to combat the warriors effectively. But, most of all, I think, the refusal of Chelmsford and his advisors to take King Cetswayo and his men seriously was the major mistake.

    LFD

    Report message34

  • Message 35

    , in reply to message 33.

    Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Monday, 15th October 2007

    whitecamry

    interesting about the ghosts - but the zulus had to split the belly of the enemy dead to release the spirits and then go home to service their wives within 24 hrs

    zulus didnt do tactics - a BIG battle and home for the benefits was a good day = else they could have ambushed the columns

    got to be a bad day at the office lol

    st

    Report message35

  • Message 36

    , in reply to message 35.

    Posted by highchurchman (U7711917) on Tuesday, 16th October 2007

    zulus didn't do tactics,Β 
    Stalterisok.

    But, Zulu's did do tactics, it was just that they had tactics suited to a different kind of warfare. They had tactics particularly suited to African warfare not to European struggles.
    The supreme instance is the "Horn of the Buffalo" system of surrounding and then crushing your opponent
    this is what they did so successfully at Isandlwana. It was not their only success by any means. The trouble was British overconfidence. They too had brave men and even better arms, they even had tactics. It was sense they lacked, certainly initially. What tactics they had, tactics that sprang from experience they ignored. I.E. lagering, pulling down tents when attacked, forming square and not splitting forces. All these well tried actions they failed to put in to practice at this battle against this formidable enemy.

    Report message36

  • Message 37

    , in reply to message 20.

    Posted by Killfacer (U8855584) on Tuesday, 16th October 2007

    heres a less obvious (and more interesting one).

    The War of the Triple Alliance:
    Paraguay delcared war on Brazil, Argentina and Uraguay. One of the worst military decisions of all time. The triple alliance obliterated the Parguayan army and then when the Paraguayan army turned to guerilla warefare, the following war cost thousands of lives. Some people estimate that becuase of the war just under 90% of the paraguayan population died. Obviously this is an over exaggeration but the truth is fairly close, most people beleieve it to be around 300,000 of its 550,000 who died. This is in my opinion one of the most disatrous wars ever.

    Report message37

  • Message 38

    , in reply to message 37.

    Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Tuesday, 16th October 2007

    I mentioned that one in message 4 of this thread - yes, a real no-brainer by the Paraguayan Great Green Cheeses.

    Report message38

  • Message 39

    , in reply to message 36.

    Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Tuesday, 16th October 2007

    hi luckyfredsdad

    sorry - bit ambiguous in my last post

    i meant to say that the Zulus werent a tactical beast - all they wanted to do was fight - the tactics of ambush, night attacks, attacking soft targets - the columns, werent in their physche - it was all "steam in lads" in a confrontational battle - ie enveloping the enemy onto the loins of the buffalo - a bit lacking against martini henrys !!!

    I always think that if the british had been a bit more ambitious and confident AND innovative , the whole war could have been won with 1000 mounted infantry - a sack full of bullets and sandwiches - engage the impi - dismount and decimate them - on the horses and do the same again and again (re Boer commandoes)

    how could Zulu infantry armed only with stabbing spears have coped with that ?

    my "favourite" moment of the war is - after clearing the Zulus from Hlobane - a tense and vicious fight , the British victors descended the mountain, only to walk slap bang into the main impi trotting past the mountain - prize for the words uterred by the first person to spot them lol

    could have been "Oh sh:t"

    Saying all that - Isandhlwana was an ABSOLUTE disaster

    ST

    Report message39

  • Message 40

    , in reply to message 30.

    Posted by craigd1973 (U2853338) on Wednesday, 17th October 2007

    Trike

    Thanks for the link. Very good web-site. Only had time for a quick browse so far but it is very comprehensive and I was particularly interested in the photographs.

    Regarding the order from Terry, I do not know enough about him to decide whether he intentionally tried to cover himself by this order although I can understand the allegation.

    Craig

    Report message40

  • Message 41

    , in reply to message 34.

    Posted by craigd1973 (U2853338) on Wednesday, 17th October 2007

    Luckyfredsdad

    Re your post on Isandlawhana, I am no expert on this area and it does seem to be a huge blunder.

    Was Chelmsford reprimanded for this blunder in any way? Was he relieved of command? I have read many criticisms of Chelmsford from posters on previous threads on Isandlawhana but I don't recall anyone mentioning what his punishment was, if any.

    Thanks
    Craig

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  • Message 42

    , in reply to message 41.

    Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Wednesday, 17th October 2007

    I think there is a danger of overstating the importance of Isandhlwana. Can the loss of 3,500 (or some similar figure - authorities vary) really be equated with the 19,000 plus killed /d.o.w. on the first day of the Battle of the Somme or the butcher's bill at Dieppe? One list I've seen puts it at about no. 30 in terms of casualties in land battles of the C17, C18 & C19.

    Report message42

  • Message 43

    , in reply to message 42.

    Posted by highchurchman (U7711917) on Wednesday, 17th October 2007

    Danger of overstating the importance of IsandhlwanaΒ 

    Umungal.

    You are of course correct there's no comparison between the Somme and Isandhlwana, for us in Britain. To us ,or at least myself it is an interesting historical curiosity. I gather my grandfather was there as a young boy. Not in the battle but in the war. Also I was taught about it in pre war English schools.

    But for the Zulu people it was a far different thing. They suffered in a brutal attack by outsiders on their own country. Their cattle was stolen by the Army and their krals were burnt and their whole way of life was overturned as was their freedom. A free country was dismembered and its people made to serve western capital. There are other ways of looking at events than our own.

    Report message43

  • Message 44

    , in reply to message 41.

    Posted by highchurchman (U7711917) on Wednesday, 17th October 2007

    Msg41.
    Craigd1973


    Chelmsford wasn't repremanded as far as I can remember. Whilst the first half of the war was disastrous for British Arms, or at least those few who fought in the war.He was relieved of his command , but ignored the orders and achieved victory before his successor,(Garnet Wolsely) appeared. Chelmsford went on to win the war. He explained himself to Q.Victoria and things were let slide by the establishment, who were after all dealing with and for, one of their own.But the establishment wasn't altogether stupid,Chelmsford wasn't called on again to serve the Crown.

    Report message44

  • Message 45

    , in reply to message 44.

    Posted by highchurchman (U7711917) on Wednesday, 17th October 2007

    Msg41

    Craigd1973.

    The whole campaign, but the first half in particular, is interesting if only because it shows the inadequacy of the British Army at that time. It was full of very brave men, who one could invite home to tea, with utter confidence that all the spoons and other silver would be still there when they left, but who didn't have a clue otherwise. There was a discussion some weeks ago on these boards regarding the ability of the British Army to take on, as it were, the Yanks. I cannot see the British Army, even with Grandad Howarth as a senior NCO, coming off successfully in that issue. Look at our display in the Boer War. It would have been going on yet had it not been for the Zulu intervention right at the end.

    Report message45

  • Message 46

    , in reply to message 43.

    Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Wednesday, 17th October 2007

    True. There would also, perhaps, have been the view of those who had been displaced, relatively recently and with great loss of life, by the Zulus themselves

    Report message46

  • Message 47

    , in reply to message 46.

    Posted by highchurchman (U7711917) on Wednesday, 17th October 2007

    msg 46
Urnungal.

Dear Colleague,

:Who have been displaced relatively recently and with great loss of life by the Zulus themselves.:


can you be less cryptic please?
LFD.

    Report message47

  • Message 48

    , in reply to message 47.

    Posted by Sambista (U4068266) on Wednesday, 17th October 2007

    The Zulus were recent interlopers into that area, having displaced an earlier population, the so-called San or Bushmen, almost wiping them out in the process. They had taken the territory in the same way that they lost it, by violence.

    Report message48

  • Message 49

    , in reply to message 47.

    Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Wednesday, 17th October 2007

    luckyfredsdad

    like your posts re Zulu war - my thoughts exactly

    it was a war that should never have been fought -

    BUT if was - it should have been an easy win - rifles against spears - 800 yards killing range against 6ft - how good were we ??

    its agreed 1000 dead against 60000 casualties on the first day of the somme is not strictly comparable - but its the same mentality - incompetence and should not have happened

    and we still think the british army is the best in the world - why ?????

    st

    Report message49

  • Message 50

    , in reply to message 48.

    Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Wednesday, 17th October 2007

    Urnungal

    yes indeed - but at least it was a "natural" progression of people in their own country - our agression was for a different reason

    they had done nothing wrong before being wiped out

    st

    Report message50

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