Wars and Conflicts permalink
Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
This discussion has been closed.
-
Message 1.Â
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Thursday, 13th September 2007
I never have believed that Midway was the turning point of the Pacific War, and I am personally surprised that so many people insist that it was. Midway was a decisive battle, but it was not a true turning point. When it was over, the Japanese were still firmly on the offensive throughout the Pacific. Their troops were still advancing in the Solomons, New Guinea, and on the Chinese mainland, and they still had firm control over Hong Kong, Malaya, Indo-China the Mariannas and their other island conquests. They still planned to invade New Caledonia and were in the process of building an airfield on Guadalcanal to impede, or altogether stop, the flow of materiel and military personnel between Australia and the US.
I have said it before and I have not changed my mind. I am convinced that the true turning point of the Pacific War was not Midway, but the Battle of Guadalcanal. Midway did stop the Japanese Navy in its tracks and forced the military minds in Japan to alter a lot of their preconceived notions of American aggressiveness and determination. It was decisive, no doubt about it. But to my way of thinking, a true turning point requires that the positions of the involved combatants be reversed.... the one on the defensive before the battle moves to the offensive and vice-versa.
That didn't happen after Midway whereas it did after Guadalcanal.
Reflect: The American invasion of Guadalcanal was an offensive move on the part of the US in its initial phase, but from the month of August, when the invasion occurred, until early November, the American forces involved were forced to take a defensive position both on the island and at sea nearby. The early naval engagements off Guadalcanal resulted from offensive action on the part of the Imperial Navy, and were very definitely Japanese victories. Meanwhile, the US forces on the island had to fight desperately against attack after attack by Japanese army and marine units.
It was only in mid-to-late November that the success of the US forces in defending their positions on the island and at sea was such that they were able to finally take the offensive.
That was when everything changed. From that time on, the US assumed the offensive everywhere and the Japanese were forced onto the defensive.
That was the when the positions of the two major combatants turned 180 degrees. The loss of the carriers and especially of their irreplaceable aircrews and maintenance personnel at Midway obviously had a profound effect on Japanese ability to pursue the war, but it was not the turning point.
Any argument?
Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 2
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Thursday, 13th September 2007
I think it could be argued that the Battle of Midway was when the balance of power /in daylight/ changed. Aircraft carriers could and would dominate a battle area, but with the technology of 1942, they did only do so in daylight.
Hence Midway determined the pattern for the early battles of Guadalcanal, which were characterized by Japanese control of the night, and American control of the day. This gave both sides an opportunity to bring in supplies and reinforcements, and permitted the battle to become as long as it did. Without the battle of Midway, the Japanese might have been in control of the seas around the Solomon islands all around the clock, and US victory on Guadalcanal might have been impossible.
I think that Midway does have a special status. The outcome of the vast majority of the battles that were ever fought reflected the balance of power, instead of changing it. Guadalcanal too developed into a battle of attrition, hence it was finally decided by the superior industrial power and logistical skills of the US vs. Japan, and in part by factors that played far behind the front lines. In the end it confirmed what most people already knew, and Yamamoto famously had predicted, the superiority of the US in a long war.
But Midway was fought well before US industry came up to speed, at a time when Japan still benefited from its pre-war advantage, and the result of the battle went against the grain in that a nominally weaker force defeated a stronger (but VERY badly deployed) one. As such it did change the course of events, instead of merely confirming a trend. Perhaps "turning point" goes to far; but at Midway the war at least entered a turn. It exited the turn six months later, when USS Essex was commissioned. These two points mark the slow reversal of the naval power balance in the Pacific.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 3
Posted by Mani (U1821129) on Friday, 14th September 2007
Erik,
Do you think the consequences of midway would have been felt immediately?Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 4
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Friday, 14th September 2007
Post #2:
It is true that by mid-October aircraft from Henderson field pretty well controlled the approach areas to Guadalcanal during the day, whereas the Japanese surface fleet dominated the seas at night. However that was not the case during August and September when the US marines were strictly on the defensive and had no air cover at all. Adm. Frank Fletcher pulled his carriers out of range of the Guadalcanal area just 48 hours after the invasion had taken place and the transports, although still not unloaded, left shortly afterward. There was no air cover at all for those marines for several weeks after the initial invasion and the Japanese bombers, flown from bases on Buin and Bouganville, attacked them at will.
That is precisely my point. It took more than a month for the US to provide a/c for Guadalcanal, so for that entire period, the US forces on the ground and at sea were on the defensive, absorbing attack after attack from Japanese ground, sea, and air forces.
------
Post #3
Yes, I think the losses at Midway affected everything the Japanese did afterward. Had they not lost those ships and crews, the invasion of Guadalcanal probably would not have taken place as early as it actually did. If it had, the Japanese a/c that continually attacked the marines on Guadalcanal would not have been flown from the land bases so far away. They'd have been flown from carriers, and their activity would have been much more effective. What's more, Fletcher would have a very good reason to keep his ships well away from the island.
The entire progress of the war would have been different had it not been for the smashing US victory at Midway. That battle changed the entire picture in the Pacific -- but strictly speaking, it was not the pivotal point...that occurred 6 months later at Guadalcanal.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 5
Posted by arnaldalmaric (U1756653) on Friday, 14th September 2007
Erik.
Well count me in for disagrement.
If you like look at the score 4:1 in Carriers at Midway. (USA vs Japan).
Reverse the score?
The USA loses 4 Carriers and the Japanese lose one. Aside from the fact that the USA did not have 4 Carriers at the time in the Pacific theatre?
So, bear with me, if the USA had lost the Enterprise, Yorktown and Hornet at Midway the USA could not have hoped to defend the Pacific from the Japanese.
Australia may have been a realistic option for the Japanese if the American Fleet had been defeated at Midway.
Sorry, Erik,I see your point that It was decisive, no doubt about it. But to my way of thinking, a true turning point requires that the positions of the involved combatants be reversed.... the one on the defensive before the battle moves to the offensive and vice-versa.Â
Without Midway being a victory for the USA there was little or no chance of Guadalcanal?
One has to come before the other? So, I think Midway was the point when the USA started winning.
Look at it another way Erik. Point out a defeat for the US Navy post Midway. That must be a turning point?
AA.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 6
Posted by Mr Pedant (U2464726) on Saturday, 15th September 2007
Had the Japanese won there there the US would have lost carriers and planes allowing the Japanese a period of uncontested expansion and consolidation.
The Americans could easily replace these material losses but the loss in human expertise in seamen, airmen and senior officers might have been a bigger blow.
When they returned they may be disadvantaged in this respect, in addition they might return before they have an overwhelming material advantage and due to a variety of factors have their fleet defeated again, giving the Japanese more time for mastery.
I'm not disputing the will of the US but if things had turned out differnetly it must have had very severe consequences for the war in both the Pacific and Europe.
I think it's been shown that Hawaii would have been very difficult, if not impossible for the Japanese to crack, but perhaps a lengthy blockade could soften it enough and draw the US forces into a fight before they were ready??Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 7
Posted by netherdutch (U5703301) on Saturday, 15th September 2007
The US still had other carriers, most likely they would have moved more forces from the Atlantic until their shipyards were running at full speed.
Again there were a lot of ships left and the American training program was far superior to that of the Japanese. One only has to look at the later naval battles when the Americans had dozens of carriers and were able to provide well trained pilots for all of them. Any harsh losses in the Pacific would have resulted in more transfers from the Atlantic. After all many in the American public advocated a Japan first strategy.
As time passed though, the American advantage was not just quantity but quality. American carrier planes would eventually become far superior to Zeros. American army equipment was also superior, especially in tanks but also included basic infantry equipment. The Japanese tanks were even worse than the Italians.
The Essex class carriers were superior to almost every Japanese carrier. The Japanese carrier force was a mish mash of different classes, often converted from other ship types and rarely were compatible in terms of repair parts. Many of the Japanese carriers held smaller amounts of aircraft than their American counterparts. If the Japanese were smarter they would have picked a class of carriers (like the Shokaku class which were fairly good) and build all their carriers to that specification.
I dont see how under any circumstances, Japan could have ever won, not when they invaded so many lands they had to protect.
The Japanese did not have the ships to maintain and supply such a blockade considering their commitments elsewhere. The Americans would have caused many losses via submarine and island based aircraft if they had tried a blockade.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 8
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Saturday, 15th September 2007
I think in the long run the Japanese would have lost the war,one American naval historian once stated that
"Tactically Pearl Harbour was a masterpiece,strategically it was a disater"
In the event Midway ensured that the war finished sooner rather than later.I the Americans had lost at Midway,it would have been very difficult to have made any sort of landing in Guadalcanal because of a lack of Airpower.The Americans had already lost the USS Lexington,the USS Yorktown and the sea plane carrier USS Langley.USS Saratoga was damaged at the time leaving the carrier force as USS Enterprise,USS Hornet and USS Wasp (I believe that the USS Ranger was in the Atlantic).Now if the Japanese had managed to sink either Hornet or Enterprise the cupboard would have been very bare and indeed the US were to lose both Hornet and Wasp in the Guadalcanal area.An interesting question would be how well the "Cactus Squadron" would have done if there had been no naval support.Would they have been able to be supplied with fuel and munitions?Or would the ground troops get food.Taking the worst case scenario for the Americans if they had lacked carrier support would we have seen a "Fletchers Express" rather than a "Takanaka's Express"?
If Midway had been lost the Amercans would have had to wait for the construction programme to come on swing.Initially they may have had to rely on the "Independence"class converted cruisers before the first of the "Essex" class were commissioned.Another point worth highlighting was that it was not just the loss of ships and aircraft that devastated the Japanese,it was the loss of so many "crack"pilots.Wether or not the Japanese in the event of a Midway victory would have been able to address this is a matter of conjecture.What was for certain was the fact that the Japanese could not outbuild the US and there planes were likely to be outmoded by the US as well.
Was the Battle of Midway a turning point?Difficult one.It certainly stopped the rot and stopped the Japanese in there tracks.In my opinion as Ive stated above if the Americans had lost Midway it would have been extremely difficult to have held Guadalcanal,if at all.
The US "comeback" may have had to wait till middle to late 1943 and started elsewhere.
Maybe Churchill had the best line,(from a much later battle)
"This is not the end,its not even the beginning of the end,but perhaps the end of the beginning"
VFLink to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 9
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Saturday, 15th September 2007
<quote userid=</quote>Look at it another way Erik. Point out a defeat for the US Navy post Midway. That must be a turning point?
</quote>
OK, AA. Let’s see. On August 9th, 1942 at the Battle Of Savo Island: The US fleet entered the battle with 6 heavy cruisers. 3 light cruisers, and 8 destroyers. The Japanese had 5 heavy cruisers, 2 light, and one destroyer. At the end of the battle, 4 US heavy cruisers had been sunk, 1 light cruiser and two destroyers had been seriously damaged. Japanese losses - none. Two of the Japanese heavy cruisers had been hit by shellfire.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
October 25th - Battle of Santa Cruz: US strength —2 fleet carriers, 1 battleship, 3 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 14 destroyers; Japanese strength — 2 fleet carriers, one light carrier, one escort carrier, 4 battleships, 9 cruisers and 28 destroyers. At the end of the battle — US losses: I carrier sunk and the other seriously damaged, battleship damaged, 4 cruisers damaged, one seriously, one destroyer sunk. Japanese losses - none; both fleet carriers damaged, one seriously
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
On November 13th, 1st naval battle of Guadalcanal: The US entered the battle with 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 8 destroyers. The Japanese came in with one very old battleship, one light cruiser, and 9 destroyers. By battle’s end, both US heavy cruisers and one light cruiser were heavily damaged (San Francisco had her stern nearly blown off and Portland had a hole in her side you could drive a tank through), one light cruiser was sunk, 4 destroyers were sunk and one badly damaged. The Japanese battleship was damaged, two destroyers were sunk and one slightly damaged by shellfire. (The Japanese battleship was sunk by a/c the following day, heading up the slot).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
November 30th, Battle of Tassafaronga; US strength, 4 heavy cruisers, one light, and 4 destroyers; Japanese strength, 8 destroyers. Results, US - one heavy cruiser sunk, 3 very badly damaged (one so heavily damaged that she had to be scrapped); Japanese losses, one destroyer.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
(Nearly all those losses to the US were the result of long range torpedo attacks by the Japanese destroyers. That oxygen-powered torpedo the Japanese had designed was a marvel, and no navy had anything to match it until the late 1950’s. British, German, and US torpedoes had an effective range of 4-6,000 yards and a water speed of about 30 knots. The Japanese Long Lance torpedo could travel 20,000 meters at 48 knots and 40,000 meters at 36 knots. When their ships were torpedoed by Japanese destroyers 20 miles away, US commanders were convinced they had hit mines.)Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 10
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Sunday, 16th September 2007
Let me add a corollary to the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands (above) because I think it adds to my claim that the Japanese offensive mindset didn't change until after Guadalcanal. The US carrier Hornet was sunk in that battle and the Enterprise was very heavily hit. In view of the fact that the Lexington, Yorktown, and Wasp, had already been destroyed by the Japanese, that meant that Enterprise was the only US carrier left in the Pacific Fleet at that time, and she was in drydock.
The day would come, of course, when the US would build a dozen fleet carriers and fill the Pacific with warships... but in November of 1942, the Japanese Combined Fleet was still the largest and most formidable in the world.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 11
Posted by Mr Pedant (U2464726) on Sunday, 16th September 2007
The Pacific War's interesting in so many respects but the mismatch between the sides, and the foolish audacity of the Japanese makes it particularly fascinating to see what they could have done to win.
And the more I read on here, the more it seems there was nothing.
Good job they didn't share the torpedo technology with the Germans anyway!Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 12
Posted by arnaldalmaric (U1756653) on Sunday, 16th September 2007
Erik,
Okay. However the real strength of the Pacific War was the ability to establish air superiority?
That the Carriers needed the other ships, that neither sides risked Carriers in your examples does not disprove my point or strengthen yours.
Actually, possibly the Santa Cruz Battle was the turning point?
I'll go away and think.
Cheers, AA.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 13
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Sunday, 16th September 2007
<quote userid=</quote>Okay. However the real strength of the Pacific War was the ability to establish air superiority?
That the Carriers needed the other ships, that neither sides risked Carriers in your examples does not disprove my point or strengthen yours.
</quote>
I'm not completely sure what you're driving at here AA, so I'll have to interpret it subjectively. I will assume you're suggesting that without air superiority, neither side could win. I have no argument with that (if that's indeed your point).
Neverhtless, accepting that premise, I do not see how, in any way, it weakens my original assertion. During the first month to month and a half following the invasion of Guadalcanal, the Japanese had air superiority and surface-fleet superiority, while on land the marines fought desperately to maintain their positions against attack after attack by Japanese marines and army units. All aspects of the Japanese military were on the offensive. It wasn't until August 20th that the marines got some air support, and while those planes were brought by a carrier (Saratoga), the carrier didn't stick around. The US a/c flew out of Henderson Field -- and the Japanese air attacks didn't stop.
How do these observations detract from my contention, and in what way do they endorse yours?Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 14
Posted by arnaldalmaric (U1756653) on Sunday, 16th September 2007
Erik,
It means I have to go away and think.
In the interim I would suggest that you have to look at maps of the Pacific and see the vast blue stuff that is the sea?
Erik,
I can argue this against you until the cows come home, I think that I will learn nothing, and you will learn, well about the same?
I will have to go away and think.
AA.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 15
Posted by cmedog47 (U3614178) on Sunday, 16th September 2007
Let's look at it this way: What if the Marines had been overrun in August on Guadacanal? It could as easily happened as not.
Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 16
Posted by Mutatis_Mutandis (U8620894) on Monday, 17th September 2007
That is precisely my point. It took more than a month for the US to provide a/c for Guadalcanal, so for that entire period, the US forces on the ground and at sea were on the defensive, absorbing attack after attack from Japanese ground, sea, and air forces.Â
Actually the first aircraft landed on Henderson Field on August 12. Granted, this was a Catalina, and the equipment required for a functional base was still lacking; this was shipped in on the 15th, together with 110 men to service the aircraft. The first F4F fighters and SBD dive-bombers arrived on the 20th.
To underline the point, the escort carrier USS Long Island had set out on the 2nd of August, several days before the landing, carrying aircraft destined for Guadalcanal. Their arrival was delayed by inadequate pilot training, which required some changes in the planning at the last moment.
Even with a small number of fighters on Henderson field, the Japanese were no longer able to bomb "at will". If Midway had turned out differently, the Kido Butai could have easily crushed the defenders. As it was, Japanese land-based bombers operated at long range, and even for the very long-ranged A6M2 fighters a trip to Guadalcanal was extremely risky. This made the survival of the Marines possible and extremely complicated Japanese planning.
My point is that Guadalcanal was essentially a complicated and long drawn-out amphibious operation, for both sides, and the outcome of such a battle is determined by the ability of each side to bring in materiel and reinforcement to the beach. For operational purposes, Guadalcanal was all beach and no hinterland, as the island held very few resources of any military value; everything had to be shipped in. The destruction of the core of Japanese naval power at Midway allowed the USN to bring in supplies, such as the airfield equipment that arrived in the 15th. If the Japanese had held naval superiority in day and night the battle would have ended after Savo with a US surrender. (It might still have, if Mikawa had bothered to destroy Turner's transports.)
As it was, the Japanese could only bring in reinforcements as night and they were quite bad in bringing these to the front line, having insufficient engineering troops and lacking heavy machine tools. It was this basic inequality that enabled to US to hang on the Guadalcanal, despite shortages of everything and a string of naval defeats.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 17
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Monday, 17th September 2007
Would the Americans even been in the "mindset" to have gone to Guadalcanal if they had suffered a crushing blow at Midway?
Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 18
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Monday, 17th September 2007
Erik Lindsay,
>> On August 9th, 1942 at the Battle Of Savo Island: ... 4 US heavy cruisers had been sunk, ... <<
To be pedantic, 3 US cruisers and one Australian cruiser sunk.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 19
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Monday, 17th September 2007
True...military history books printed in the US sometimes forget the enormous contribution made by the ''down-under'' military forces during the Pacific war. I suppose that's somewhat understandable considering the huge effort devoted by America to that conflict. Still, it was an error. Sorry about that.
Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 20
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Monday, 17th September 2007
<quote userid=</quote>Would the Americans even been in the "mindset" to have gone to Guadalcanal if they had suffered a crushing blow at Midway?</quote>
Probably not, but that is not the contention. Assuming that Midway occurred as it did, it is my submission that it was not THE turning point in the Pacific War. That took place 6 months later at and around Guadalcanal.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 21
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Monday, 17th September 2007
Hi Erik
Ah, I see where you going now.Its an interesting point,as Guadalcanal was possibly the first time(I think) that the Americans had launched any sort of offensive land campaign, post the Phillipines debacle.I would be interested to know if you believe that the Japanese(as the Germans did in WW1)thought that the American Army was not up to much? (especially after the Phillipines).
On Midway,I think its significance was that it meant the war would be finished in 1945 and not 1946/47,so yes I think you have a point about it not being the definitive turning point.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 22
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Tuesday, 18th September 2007
I'm not sure about the Japanese high command, VirtualF, but there is no doubt that the people of Japan and probably every soldier and sailor in the Japanese military was conditioned to believe that American and British soldiers were weak and too luxury-loving to show any determined fighting ability. Some of the articles published in Japanese newspapers during the early days of the war emphasize this repeatedly, some to a point of absurdity. The Japanese soldiers and officers - all the way up to colonels and lowest-ranking generals, had been told such stories throughout their training, and the ease with which they blitzed through the Pacific seemed to confirm them.
Consider: the British resistance at Hong Kong was non-existent, in Malaya it was spiritless and the Japanese soldiers fighting them felt it was far easier than they had expected. The RN, after a listless, half-hearted defiance, ran away and hid in Madagascar for months. In the Philippines, American resistance was disorganized and although it held out longer (Corregidor), didn't appear to the Japanese to be any more resolute than the British or Dutch. The few combined Dutch, American, and Australian warships that tried to put up an organized resistance were beaten so easily that the Japanese high command could hardly believe it.
With only 6 army divisions and less than half their available naval strength, they easily had taken every pre-war objective, had done so in half the alloted time, and with far fewer losses than anticipated.
Fuchida, in his writings, says that one of the major flaws that the Japanese had in those early days was underestimating the American enemy. He attributes the defeat at Midway primarily to what he calls "Victory Disease" -- essentially am unwarranted trivialization of the American fighting-man's ability to wage war with determination.
The Germans held that attitude throughout the war. One German writer stated during the fighting in France in 1944 that the American soldier was wonderfully equipped and could fight with determination and unsuspected violence when on the offensive, but that the British sodiers were far more resolute in defence. He suggested that American soldiers tended to give up defensive positions far more easily than either the British or Germans, and that an agrgressive threat would usually initiate a quick surrender.
Both the Japanese and Germans were obviously underestimated the American fighting man.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 23
Posted by wollemi (U2318584) on Tuesday, 18th September 2007
The misconceptions were equally on the allied side - at least initially. Allied troops were led to believe that the Japanese were poor fighters and would be no match. That, even just after Pearl Harbour, priority was placed on the European War rather indicates that allied leaders shared this perception of the Japanese. I think this was an unwise move - it simply gave a green light to the Japanese and confirmed their belief that the allies were not determined to fight
It should also be remembered that countries in the Asia Pacific - India Australia and NZ in particular - had been at war for 2 years and had already deployed their forces to the European War. The region in 1941 and the first months of 1942 had very limited defences as proven by the JapaneseLink to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 24
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Wednesday, 19th September 2007
Yes, you're completely right, wollemi...it worked on both sides. I remember reading in comic books (I was just a little kid) and seeing in movie serials how Britain and America had little to fear from a country that built their a/c out of wood and paper, and had ships made of tin, easily bent. Not only was our opinion of their equipment coloured by bigotry, but they were personally viewed as diminutive people with vitamin deficiencies, buck-teeth and thick glasses without which they couldn't see their hands.
Looking back on all that today, I realize that Americans and British had only contempt and bigotry as bases for their evaluations, whereas after tearing through the Pacific with undreamed-of ease, the Japanese had personal experience to support the propaganda they had been fed.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 25
Posted by cmedog47 (U3614178) on Wednesday, 19th September 2007
Not entirely bigotry. I don't know about their eyesight, but they were in face small and malnutrition was common among working class Japanese. The other common characterization was that they were cruel and virulently racist--which experience bore out even more than anyone dared imagine.
Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 26
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Thursday, 20th September 2007
It is true that western denigration of the Japanese prior to the war wasn't entirely racist. We had reason to believe some of the things that were said....for e.g., the notation ''made in Japan'' usually indicated that whatever the item was, it would be poorly made, flimsy and short-lived. Many of the Japanese suffered from beri beri because polished rice was their food staple, but then that was also true of the Chinese and Poynesians, and they were not necessarily viewed as vitamin-deficient. They were short in stature, also true.
However European newspapers talked about the ''gutty little Japs'' after Tsushima, and during WW1 they were often treated by RN personnel as if they were pleasant little pets. The rather contemptuous way they were handled during the naval limitations treaty negotiations was reprehensible, and probably didn't help our attitude toward them any when they dumped it unceremoniously.
During the war, they were referred to as ''little brown monkeys'' and ''squint-eyes'' or ''gooks''.
I haven't been to Japan since 1953 and they were quite subdued then. However, it's my understanding based on what friends have relayed to me after visiting Japan that they are terribly bigoted. They sneer at all Pacific peoples and particuarly the Koreans hom they view pretty much the way American southerners viewed blacks in the early 20th century. They aren't quite as disdainful of the Chinese because they recognize that much of their culture has its roots in Mainland China, but they still think they're an inferior people.
I guess they're human -- just like we.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 27
Posted by Hornswoggler (U7459367) on Thursday, 20th September 2007
Reply to #9
Ironically, the idea for the oxygen-powered torpedo was picked up by Japanese naval engineers on visits to the UK. It almost goes without saying that the Admiralty had turned down the proposal for what could hae been a British Long Lance - these were the successors of the same people who turned down steam turbines until a publicity stunt forced their hand.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 28
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Friday, 21st September 2007
It's my understanding that the British rejected that torpedo as too difficult to design, dangerous to build, and impractical to store. I gather the tubes transporting the pure oxygen to the combustion chamber, and the chamber itself, had to be very carefully made and maintained. The early tests the Japanese conducted during development were .. mm.. interesting.
It was the presence of those torpedoes in their storage bins on the huge heavy cruiser Mikuma that made certain that ship's destruction at Midway. Both Mikuma and Mogami (the so-called ''gyp'' cruisers) were heavily bombed on June 6th as they were leaving the battle area, but Mogami had jettisoned all her torpedoes and, although heavily damaged, survived the attacks. Mikuma hung on to hers, and a bomb set them off when it exploded nearlby, blowing the unfortunate ship nearly in two.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 29
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Monday, 24th September 2007
Hi Erik
Its worth pointing out that Hong Kong was considered to be undefensable by the British Cheifs of Staff pre-war,and given the lack of resources in that area its not suprising that Hong Kong fell.
Malaya as you pointed out was a different story certainly on land.Too much was placed on Singapore as a "Gibraltar of the East".It was nothing of the sort,it was a large base with big fortifications but no residual fleet,more importantly the aircraft based in Malaya were second line units and there were not enough of them.The British lost the psychological Battle of Malaya of as well as the physical one.Yamashita himself stated that on meeeting Percival he was so forceful because he was virtually out of supply and had to end the battle a.s.a.p as he was on the point of withdrawl.He bluffed Percival into surrender.
On the Rn's performance I think you are a little harsh.Following the sinking of POW and Repulse the RN were (rightly)concerned about the threat of airpower.The British did not have any frontline aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean,the best they had in fact was HMS Hermes.Now with the best will in the world HMS Hermes,a tiny vessel with a very small aircraft complement was not going to hold off Nagumo.Indeed she was later swamped by aircraft off Ceylon and sunk in minutes.The cruisers Dorsetshire and Cornwall suffered the same fate.Now that leaves a collection of ships were the battleship Warspite(built in 1915) is the most modern ship in your armoury your other "principle"warships are the "Revenge"class.What quite are these ships meant to achieve?They could stay in the Indian Ocean and be sunk by aircraft without ever seeing a Japanese ship or they could withdraw.Bearing in mind that the RN was fighting in the Atlantic,the Artic and the Mediterrainian its not suprising that the admiralty husbanded their forces rather than using them on suicide patrols in the hope of bringing the Japanese into action.Indeed it was just that sort of manouvre that lead to the destruction of Force Z.
As for ABDA led by Doorman,it was a mish mash of different ships of various sizes and capabilities.They had little time working with each other and again had little or no airpower.They were facing a coherent well trained enemy with a fantastic "super weapon" in the "long lance".I do not think it was for the lack of trying that the RN,US Navy etc failed but the lack of good frontline vessels and crucially airpower.
regards
VFLink to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 30
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Monday, 24th September 2007
It is true that I was being harsh, but the significance of the statement was that the once powerful RN --rated even by the Japanese as the finest fleet in the world -- was unable to defend what was at one time considered the jewel in the crown of the British Empire. Nagumo's Carrier Striking Force ranged up and down the coastlines of India with impunity, blasting shipping to and from East and Western trade centres and terrorizing merchant fleets throughout the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal.
I agree that Somerville had no choice but to remove his ships from danger, and that Madagascar was the logical place to take them, but that's not the point. The crux of the matter is that the RN's vessels ran away, leaving the entire sub-continent unguarded. What had happened to Britain's ability to protect her Empire? Her stated reasons for taking and governing India was to bring enlightment to that badly-governed country and to shield her against all foes...and the bottom line is that she not only wasn't able to do that, she was not even in a position to try.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 31
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Monday, 24th September 2007
Erik
To be honest britain was in no position to defend the eastern borders of her empire.She had niether the money or the resources to fight in pacific and cover waters nearer to home.As for the RN itself well I believe that its failures as such were multifaceted.At the end of WW1 the Grand Fleet had around 40+ dreadnoughts plus additional battlecruisers of various ages.In addition she had vast collection of cruisers of varing size and capability.The 1921 Washington Treaty changed all that at a stroke of a pen.
Now of course a lot of these ships were obscelscent and would need replacement,but the addded "sting" for the British was that under the terms of the treaty the RN would only have HMS Hood and the two Nelson class ships as replacements.Whilst these 3 vessels were welcome additions they did not make up for the lack of numbers.The RN, unlike either the Americans or the Japanese had had at least 3 Oceans to cover at the minimum as her "possesions" were far flung.
Of course it could be argued that the rentrenchment had first been instigated by Fisher in his tenure as first sea lord up till 1910 with the formation of the Grand Fleet to face Germany in "home waters".The big difference of course between WW1 and WW2 was that apart from Von Spee's squadron there was no other combatitive nation outside of Europe.In addition the RN had a multitude of 2nd line vessels such as pre dreadnoughts and armoured cruisers to patrol on foriegn service.With Japanese (disciples of the British,and in their opinion later succesors)as allies the pacific was not a problem and niether was the Indian Ocean.
Post WW1(1919 I think) Jellicoe was sent on a survey to assess the needs of the RN to defend the empire.Interestingly he recognised that Singapore should be fortified,BUT to be a deterent a substantial fleet should be based there.Of course Washington change all this,with a battleship fleet of only 15 vessels,it would be foolhardy to split them between the Atlantic,the mediterainan and the Pacific.Of course the hope was that the RN would never have to fight 3 different navies at the same time-the situation in 1942.
The Washington "ideal" was understandable,millions of lives had been lost,millions of pounds of pounds spent on an arms race that is considered to have been instrumental in starting WW1,but it did set the stage for later events.(in any case Britain could not afford another arms race)
By WW2 the rearmament had restarted,but the Britain of 1939 was very different to that of 1914,both economically and in terms of industrial output.For that reason you see the core of the RN remained old,Churchill was spot on when he commented that
"We are fighting this war with the ships of the last"
Its also woth noting that agressors are always better prepared than their victims.As for the Empire the righting was already on the wall previous to 1939,India would get independance,and without India the British empire was not a superpower.
VFLink to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 32
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Tuesday, 25th September 2007
Additional- board closed before I could finish !
The RN were in the process of rebuilding,but to be honest it was a little too late.The massive arms manufacturers had shrunk and any new construction was going to take time.Its worth noting that the only new carrier the RN possessed was HMS Ark Royal.HMS Eagle,Furious,Courageous,Glorious and Argus were all WW1 era ships and all conversions.The carriers coming "on stream" were to be armoured carriers with reduced aircraft complements.The rationale behind this? Well the Admiralty(rightly) believed that the UK's carrier force would end up operating well within the range of land based bombers.The other BIG problem was that the FAA's aircraft were uniformly rubbish...slow underpowered and obselete.The RAF had control of the FAA till the late 1930's and basically gave them the scraps,which is ironic as the RNAS of WW1 was the "founding father"of the RAF...and they say that blood is thicker than water.!
Its interesting to note the specifications of the later carriers,the eventual Ark Royal IV and Eagle eventually completed in the 1950's and the planned "Malta" class.These were the ships that were designed to fight a war in the East.
The truth in 1942 was that the RN could hold its own in the Medeterrainan,it could battle in the Atlantic and the Artic with the the Canadians.But the truth was that we couldnt fight in the Far East as well,it was a "sea too far".
If the RN had had the strength of WW1 then yes,I think you would have a point.But we didnt,knowhere near it in fact.Thats why Churchill sent HMS Prince of Wales to Singapore,he hoped that it would send a signal.
Unfortunatly the Japanese understood exactly what kind of signal it was......
A desperate one.
VfLink to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 33
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Tuesday, 25th September 2007
I agree with all you have said, but as I noted earlier, that's not the assertion. WHY the RN couldn't protect India and its Far Eastern possessions isn't in dispute.... the simple truth of the matter is, that for whatever reason, the RN was not capable of offering any significant opposition to the IJN, and it was supposed to.
The British Navy had been touted (however correctly or incorrectly) for more than a century as the world's premier naval power and even the Japanese believed it to an extent. I don't think the foundering of the army forces on Malaya and Singapore shocked the world nearly as much as the failure of the RN even to retard the Japanese naval juggernaut. No matter the reason, the fact remains that when the Japanese were running amok throughout the Indian Ocean and the East Indies, the RN could stop it.. in fact, could not even slow it down.
WHY the British Far Eastern Fleet ran away and hid, no matter how advisable, is not at issue. The fact remains that it did.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 34
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Tuesday, 25th September 2007
erratum: the line
<quote userid</quote>the RN could stop it</quote>
should read ''the RN could NOT stop it'' Sorry.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 35
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Tuesday, 25th September 2007
A good General always knows when to withdraw"
VfLink to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 36
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Tuesday, 25th September 2007
VF
At the risk of diverting the main argument.
RAF control for the FAA between 1918 and 1937 was NOT the reason for the weakness of RN aircraft design in the early war period. During the '20s and early '30s, FAA aircraft (like the Flycatcher fighter and the Shark torpedo bomber) were as goo, or better than their contemporaries. It was the RN, dominated by "Big Gun" Admirals who decided that they wanted restricted-performance multi-purpose aircraft such as the Swordfish (hardly more capable than the Shark it replaced), and that all aircraft, including fighters, must have at least two crew so they could act as spotters for the Battle Fleet. Only at RAF urging in 1939 did the RN agree to accept a few Sea Gladiators.
It was also not the RAF who dictated that Ark Royal's lifts, and those of the Invincibles, would be SMALLER than those on Eagle, Glorious and Courageous, and barely able to accomodate the Swordfish, let alone anything with more performance. Eagle's great asset in 40-42 was the fact that she alone of the surviving carriers could strike Sea Hurricanes down to her hangar deck (Courageous and Glorious had the same capability, but they had been thrown away through poor naval decision-making in the first half of '40, Glorious taking the pilots and aircraft of 45 Sqn RAF with her).
And the RNAS was not the founding father of the RAF. That was the original bi-service RFC of 1912, from which the RNAS opted out, only to be re-ensnared in 1918, when the idea of a unified service was reimposed, this time independent of the other two. The RAF was the product of both services(look at the uniform and rank braid) and the sum was greater than its parts.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 37
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Tuesday, 25th September 2007
Hi Lostweekend
Thanks for correcting me.I suppose im a bit Navy biasedLink to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 38
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Tuesday, 25th September 2007
Incedently Im led to believe that the small size of Ark Royals small lifts was as much dictated by her actual method of construction or more pertinantly where her load bearing members were.
On the conversions the stressors were contained on there maindeck,on Ark Royal Im almost certain that this was changed to the hangerdeck(this was certainly the case in Illustrious class and was a major weakness,in the fact that the deck could and did "warp"if the damage was sufficient,certainly both HMS Illustrious during the war and HMS Formidable post war suffered this kind of damage)
Hence because of this to reduce the possibility of losing rigity and strength of the hull itself the "openings" were kept to the minimum size.This was obviously not a concern in an converted vessel for the reason mentioned above and hence larger lifts.
The "covered wagons" (except Eagle and Argus)also had secondry flight decks to launch planes directly from the hanger itself.Indeed I believe at one point the Japanese tried to go one better and have a flight deck on each hanger in a double hanger arrangement.Must have been interesting to have been a flight coordinator!
VfLink to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 39
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Wednesday, 26th September 2007
Correction:I meant flight deck rather than hanger deck!
Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 40
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Wednesday, 26th September 2007
Yes, in the armoured British carriers of WW2 the flight deck was the ''strength'' deck. i.e. the deck around which the others had to be able to flex. That armour was both a strength and a weakness of those ships ... they were not significantly damaged by the kamakize a/c that smashed into them during the late Pacific battles. They were able to sweep the debris from the deck and continue flight operations as if nothing had happened, but something - at the time apparently insignificant - did happen. The huge explosions warped those armoured decks; not much, but of consequence. It threw off the ships trim and made it very hard to handle, consequently it had to be repaired. Unfortunately, simply straightening out that armour was virtually impossible. The warping had actually stretched the metal which meant it had to be completely replaced. Replacing the ''strength'' deck meant the other decks, which were designed to bend repeatedly around the strength deck and therefore mated to it, had also to be replaced, and that meant tearing the entire deck arrangement apart and replacing it all. The upshot was that it cost more to put the ships on top line than it would have cost to scrap and replace them.
Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 41
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Wednesday, 26th September 2007
VF
That's the usual reason given for the lifts, but it's a bit of a condemnation of naval thinking - they concentrated so hard on the ship's robustness that they neglected the main armament? Can you imagine a battleship admiral accepting 9 inch guns instead of 14 inch so that the hull can be stronger?
Also, it is remarkable how the lifts could be made larger in the Indom, Implac and Indefat, and retrospectively in the Invinc and Vic, once actual comabt came into the equation.
Erik
I read what you posted, but that's the Essex-Class mafia retrospectively finding reasons to criticise the Armoured Fleets after the embarrasing Okinawa comparisons. Haven't got time tonight, but will come back tomorrow.
(and apologies, have diverted the thread. I diagree with your OP - Midway was the first battle where the Allies (USN in this case) both stopped the Axis advance and seized the initiative. Gualdacanal was the first step in the offensive, not the turning point)
Cheers
LWLink to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 42
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Wednesday, 26th September 2007
Hi Lostweekend
To be fair I think the RN were still "learning there trade" on this one(the idea of a "closed" hanger).Ark Royal was the first carrier designed keel up for almost 21 years,and there is an inevitablity that there would be design issues.On the follow up "Illustrious" class I think that they had learnt from the Ark Royal design and how to maintain the ships ridgity.I take your point that if you had an effective CAP then hopefully you wouldnt need such an armoured hangar,but the Aircraft Carrier concept had not been fully developed by war experience when these ships were laid down and there was a feeling that the "bomber would always get through".
Hi Erik
Its interesting that the RN learnt the limitations and short fallings of the Illustrious class and abandoned the same type of armouring for the "Audacious " class.A telling point about the illustrious class was it took 7 years to refit the "Victorious" post war,it was no easy job.
Regards to you both
VFLink to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 43
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Thursday, 27th September 2007
Hi, LostWeekend.
I read your comments, and I don't believe my post #40 is an apologia for the designers of the Essex class.
The Essex class ships were not unarmoured. They had an armoured deck. The designers of the Essex class put the armour on the hangar decks instead of the flight decks, making the hangar decks the ‘’strength’’ decks. According to what I’ve read, this design had a lot of advantages. The wooden decks were much lighter and lowered the vessel’s centre of gravity. That reduced stability problems considerably, and since they were not the strength decks, the designers could use wider elevators without weakening the overall structure. Also, it permitted those ships to carry more a/c. The American commanders expected to have hordes of first-class a/c available, and visualized the launching of enormous air strikes from their ships. Also, they assumed that the best defence was to carry a large number of fighters for their CAP and hoped that most attacking bombers would not get through the fighter screens.
Not armouring the flight decks meant that they could be easily damaged, of course, but they were willing to risk that. Turned out they were right.
The British armoured the flight deck instead and they had good reasons. If the armour is strong enough, damage is minimal, casualties will be lighter and repairs easier. The RN didn't have the financial resources to design and build masses of a/c suitable for carrier service so the number of available a/c would be small anyhow, and if the armoured flight decks kept bombs out of the interior of the ships, they'd be less likely to lose what a/c they had.
As I’ve already noted, the negatives are that with all the weight on the uppermost deck the ship's stability was a big problem and the size of the elevators was limited. Also, according to what I've read, that design meant that the hangar and lower decks had to be inside the hull girder. I’m no engineer and I didn’t know what that meant, so I asked a friend who had served in the RCN as a Lieut. Cmdr in WW2. He told me that as it turned out, that arrangement tended to weaken the hull structure and although the kamikaze strikes appeared to do almost no damage, they actually did a great deal. They not only warped the flight decks, they deformed the hull thus impairing the integrity of the entire ship. He said there was no way anyone could have known this. It was unexpected and surprised everybody, but it happened.
To confirm it, all you have to do, he said, is check the ships’ histories. The armoured carriers were scrapped almost as soon as the war ended and it wasn't because they were worn out by long service. According to the dockyard records, the workers considered the hulls and decks irreparable.
The Essex class ships, on the other hand, although apparently heavily damaged by the kamikaze attacks, were reparable and many were kept in active service for years after the war was over.Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 44
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Thursday, 27th September 2007
erratum: <quote userid=</quote>Also, according to what I've read, that design meant that the hangar and lower decks had to be inside the hull girder.</quote>
That should read " had to be inside the hull girdle" (not girder)Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 45
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Saturday, 29th September 2007
Hull Girdle? Sounds like something John Prescott might wear.
Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 46
Posted by LongWeekend (U3023428) on Saturday, 29th September 2007
Erik
The USN put in a lot of effort analysing why the RN armoured carriers were more robust off Okinawa - no British carrier had to leave the line, whereas every Essex-Class hit did. The USN lost the equivalent of a whole Carrier Task Group as a result, although none were sunk. But the analysis was aimed at justifying (super) large carriers against smaller, more flexible units in the defence (sorry, defense) debates of the 50s and 60s. Your RCN friend, I would suggest, was exposed to the USN propaganda.
One thing seized on was the post-war fate of the British carriers. I accept that battle damage to the armoured carriers did complicate repairs. But the problems you describe relate to Invincible and Formidable, both of whom had suffered an incredible amount of damage from 1940 onwards. The kamikaze hits in 1945 were merely the straw that broke the camel's back. Formidable was a wreck when she came home, even though earmarked for conversion, and it was decided immediately post-war that Invincible (of Taranto and Malta fame)would not be modernised.
However, Victorious was modernised. What did for Indomitable, Implacable and Indefatigable was not the kamikaze damage of '45, but the cost of removing and replacing double hangar decks in the face of financial stringency, a reduced carrier requirement, and the availability of the two Audacious/Eagle and the four Centaur hulls, which could be completed to modern standards more cheaply than converting the wartime carriers.
The USN argument about the Essexs is interesting, but perhaps the key fact to bear in mind about the USN's real opinion is that the Midways and Forrestals had armoured decks (yeah, I know, the Forrestals' decks were just (3 inches of) steel, not armoured)
Cheers
LWLink to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 47
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Saturday, 29th September 2007
Okay, LostWeekend....
I'm certaily not enough of an RN historian to argue most of those points with professional accuracy. I can, however, dispute one of them. Cmdr Wakeland was certainly no fan of the USN and in fact had some pretty miserable experiences aboard a USN escort carrier in 1944, so he'd not ever permit himself to be caught up in American propaganda.
Lacking the necessary expertise, I resorted to rummaging through the university library and came up with the following comments re the refurbishing of the Victorious:
''Victorious was surveyed, found to be in reasonably good condition and rebuilt. ..... The Victorious conversion was one of those tragedies that was almost comical. The original plans did not include re-engining the ship; this was a decision taken late in the rebuild process by which time most of the hull work (about 80 percent) had been completed. A machinery survey showed that the boilers had only about ten years of life left and it was decided they should be replaced. This meant that a lot of work had to be undone and then redone. The awful bit is that she was still within that ten year period when she was prematurely decommissioned. The Ship's Cover is pretty sulphurous in places. Another tragedy is that this monumental mess disillusioned the fleet with any sort of rebuild program (which had echoes in all sorts of places including the Type 15 program).
Another point which should be brought up is that the armored box hangar on the RN aircraft carriers was restricted to a height of 16 feet maximum and was as low as 14 feet in the upper hangars on the Indomitable, Implacable and Indefatigable. This restricted the use of the F4U Corsair fighter in the 14 feet hangars. This also hampered the usefulness of the British carriers postwar as aircraft grew in size. By contrast, the USN carriers had a hangar clear height of 20 feet in the Lexington class, 17 feet 3 inches in the Yorktown class and 17 feet 6 inches in the Essex class. This greater height allowed the Essex class to easily adapt to the much larger postwar jet aircraft.
The planned refits of the Implacable and Indefatigable would have seen the two hangars merged into one which would have made these ships much more capable. Sadly, the problems with the Victorious rebuild killed that plan off. In retrospect, they should have gone through the upgrade process first; as ships, they were much better than the first four armored carriers and were in good condition.''Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 48
Posted by Tanked (U6379478) on Saturday, 29th September 2007
From this discussions it seems that the Essex design enabled it to have a longer peace-time service life, but in the middle of a war with Kamikaze aircraft striking your carriers off Okinawa, then I think its clear that the RN carriers had better survivability- surely in the middle of such a battle your mind would be on if your ship is strong enough to survive, not it's service longevity in the future.
Link to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 49
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Sunday, 30th September 2007
I think Tirpitz summed it up best
"A warships first duty is to stay afloat"
In defence of the Illustrious class they were designed for the percieved threat of the time and its worth pointing out that they all made it through to the end of the war.Ive read the article that Erik's quoted and and it does raise them interesting observations,however I did find it to be a little harsh on occasion,Illustrious may have not had a direct hit to her armoured deck to test the theory,but I believe she took 8 direct hits and still made back to Malta,only to be damaged again.Now that is no mean feat there are plenty of incidences of ships being sunk after recieving half that number of bombs.
Also the article also doesnt comment really on how the Americans would have got on in the Med.And Im talking 1941 here,not 1943,so you would be talking about a "Lexington"class vessel or a "Yorktown" as opposed to an "Essex"
Another reason perhaps that the ships were not considered worth conversion is the fact that by 1945/6 you had a large number of "Collossus"class vessels completed,and the "Centaur" class keels laid down.There is always the age old problem of "putting old wine into new bottles".Its has on many occassions been the case that converting/refitting old warships for new generation technology has turned out to be very expensive and more involved than originally thought.
I can see the logic in not even contemplating converting the remaining vessels(As Erik points out the article claimed that the Indefatigable class were considered for conversion - by making there two hangers into one large one).HMS Hermes was not that much smaller than the Victorious(in fact Im sure that her deep load displacement was around 28000 tons)niether were the Albion,Bulwark or Centaur.The truth was that because of the increase in weight and size of jet aircraft and the additional fuel requirements small carriers would not be able to maintain the same airgroup sizes as they had before.In addition the RN had HMS Eagle and HMS Ark Royal as their principle fleet carriers and with the greatest will in the world a converted "Illustrious/Indefatigable" would not be a superior ship to HMS Eagle.In any event the RN couldnt afford a substantial carrier force,"Sandys Axe" in the 1950's was the first blow the 1966 defence act was the suppossed "coup de grass".Maybe if the UK had had the US muscle then you would have seen the "Implacables"converted as the "Essex"class were.Personally I wouls have rather had the "Malta" class
VFLink to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
-
Message 50
Posted by VF (U5759986) on Sunday, 30th September 2007
or should that be "new wine into old bottles"
VfLink to this forum: Midway was not the turning point in the Pacific War
About this Board
The History message boards are now closed. They remain visible as a matter of record but the opportunity to add new comments or open new threads is no longer available. Thank you all for your valued contributions over many years.
or  to take part in a discussion.
The message board is currently closed for posting.
The message board is closed for posting.
This messageboard is .
Find out more about this board's
Search this Board
Â鶹ԼÅÄ iD
Â鶹ԼÅÄ navigation
Â鶹ԼÅÄ links
Â鶹ԼÅÄ Â© 2014 The Â鶹ԼÅÄ is not responsible for the content of external sites. Read more.
This page is best viewed in an up-to-date web browser with style sheets (CSS) enabled. While you will be able to view the content of this page in your current browser, you will not be able to get the full visual experience. Please consider upgrading your browser software or enabling style sheets (CSS) if you are able to do so.