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Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 1.Ìý
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Tuesday, 2nd May 2006
seem to have had three options in March of 1942. They had staged a wide and highly successful blitz in the Pacific, and were poised on the brink of total success in Southeast Asia. She had, according to their records, achieved all that she set out to do and now her leaders had to figure out what to do next. Her main objective now was to bring the war to an end, and how should she have done that?
Japanese leaders were in something of a bind at that point. They had 3 major options:
1. Go south and attack Australia
2. Go east into the Central Pacific
3. Go west into the Indian Ocean
Obviously, the one they chose was the worst possible one, because it would appear that they tried to do all 3.
If you were playing a war game, and were controlling the Japanese, could you have led them to a satisfactory conclusion? Remember, there were drawbacks as well as advantages to each of these alternatives.Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 2
Posted by jesw1962 (U1726423) on Tuesday, 2nd May 2006
Erik Lindsay: I have played "WWII in the Pacific" as a board game. It is all luck. The side that can get their carriers to sea, turned into the wind and launch first always win. The Battle of Midway was increadibly lucky for us, (the U.S.) there was on skill involved, it was pure luck. The radio on the Japanese scout plane that spotted our carriers was not operating. Thus it took another hour to get to word to Nagomo. In destroying our torpedo bombers the Zeroes were scattered and thus our dive bombers were free to attack. In both of these cases there was no skill involved, just luck. It should be pointed out that maybe the goddess of luck is even handed. She provided Japan luck at Pearl Harbor and us at Midway.
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Message 3
Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Tuesday, 2nd May 2006
4. Apologise and surrender
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Message 4
Posted by jesw1962 (U1726423) on Tuesday, 2nd May 2006
That would have saved a lot of lives.
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Message 5
Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Tuesday, 2nd May 2006
That would have saved a lot of lives.Ìý
and it was inevitable - however long it took
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Message 6
Posted by wollemi (U2318584) on Wednesday, 3rd May 2006
The question had me wondering - March is autumn in this part of the world!
Japan had considered an invasion of Australia but it was beyond their capability so by March the focus was on isolating the continent from the US.
Their focus on the Pacific rather than the Indian Ocean had everything to do with trying to sink the US fleet.Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 7
Posted by henrylee100 (U536041) on Wednesday, 3rd May 2006
imo ,they should have gone east to try and seize the Hawaii. Although the spring of 1942 was probably a bit late for that, they should actually have tried to land in the Hawaii in December 1941, i.e. the Pearl Harbor raid should have been followed by an amphibious assault. imho they could have pulled it off at that time. (would have been more problematic in 1942 though)
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Message 8
Posted by jesw1962 (U1726423) on Wednesday, 3rd May 2006
I fully agree. Japan could very easily have taken Hawaii in December 1941. But that is hindsite. Who could ever have believed that we would act so stupid after the initial attack? I think it is well within the bounds of possibility that, if they could have plugged the entrance, they could have captured the fleet.
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Message 9
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Wednesday, 3rd May 2006
You're right...in late 1941 they could easily have taken Hawaii and that would have made the plight of the US quite grave. But they didn't, so forget that.
NOTE........that wasn't the question. Forget what they might have done in December of 1941 and pick it up in March of 1942 after they've accomplished all that they set out to do in establishing their Pacific Empire. What do they do now? What would YOU have done had you been in command of the Japanese forces.
C'mon all you armchair generals (of which I am one). Take a stab at winning the Pacific war for the Japanese......
Where would you go......?????Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 10
Posted by jesw1962 (U1726423) on Wednesday, 3rd May 2006
Erik Lindsay: Actually they still had one item to accomplish from their original strategy. Pull out the remining American Fleet and destroy it. That was to be the "Battle of Midway." As I stated before, luck was with us on that day. IMO from that day on, they were defeated.
If you have had a chance you might notice that most of the people who posted on the "Best and worst Generals of WWII" believed the best generals the allies had were used against Japan.Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 11
Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Wednesday, 3rd May 2006
You're right...in late 1941 they could easily have taken Hawaii and that would have made the plight of the US quite grave. But they didn't, so forget that.
NOTE........that wasn't the question. Forget what they might have done in December of 1941 and pick it up in March of 1942 after they've accomplished all that they set out to do in establishing their Pacific Empire. What do they do now? What would YOU have done had you been in command of the Japanese forces.
C'mon all you armchair generals (of which I am one). Take a stab at winning the Pacific war for the Japanese......
Where would you go......?????Ìý
I would have invaded Hawaii straight after pearl Harbour - and changed the navy codes straight after which would have meant Midway was lost by the USA - and the USA carriers were destroyed -
BUT - there was NO way that the japs could have won - however long it took the USA were going to destroy the japanese expansion bit by bit - if it took long enough to build another 10 carriers - there was NO way the USA could stop till nippon was smashed !! - ESPECIALLY after Pearl Harbour
cant believe Japan ever thought they would keep the upper hand
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Message 12
Posted by henrylee100 (U536041) on Thursday, 4th May 2006
You're right...in late 1941 they could easily have taken Hawaii and that would have made the plight of the US quite grave. But they didn't, so forget that.
NOTE........that wasn't the question. Forget what they might have done in December of 1941 and pick it up in March of 1942 after they've accomplished all that they set out to do in establishing their Pacific Empire. What do they do now? What would YOU have done had you been in command of the Japanese forces.
C'mon all you armchair generals (of which I am one). Take a stab at winning the Pacific war for the Japanese......
Where would you go......?????Ìý
I think I'd have still gone after Hawaii, the Pearl Harbor base was key to US operations in the pacific, so I think in order to really cripple the US navy in that theater gain genuine naval supremacy there something simply had to be done about that base. Capturing it would have been the ideal solution because that in theory might have allowed Japanese carriers to operate against the US west coast and the Panama Canal. But if capturing it handn't work I'd have at least tried to have its installations and facilities destroyed by repeated air raids and keep it that way so that the Americans couldn't use it either.
Also I believe that if the Japanese were really serious about taking on the US, they should have tried and done something about the Panama Canal, I think theoretically they had the resources, the carriers and all they could at least have tried to air raid it with carrier based aviation. Again they had a pretty huge army so in theory they could have landed a sizable force in Panama and provided they'd have first captured Hawaii and managed to keep Pearl Harbor operational for their own use, they could have held out in Panama for quite a while. And if they were smart enough they could also have tried to make use of the anti gringo sentiment that exists in Latin America, like they could have promised Columbia that they would allow them to have Panama back, or some such thing.Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 13
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Friday, 5th May 2006
I think I'd have still gone after Hawaii, the Pearl Harbor base was key to US operations in the pacific, so I think in order to really cripple the US navy in that theater gain genuine naval supremacy there something simply had to be done about that base. Capturing it would have been the ideal solution because that in theory might have allowed Japanese carriers to operate against the US west coast and the Panama Canal. But if capturing it handn't work I'd have at least tried to have its installations and facilities destroyed by repeated air raids and keep it that way so that the Americans couldn't use it either.
Also I believe that if the Japanese were really serious about taking on the US, they should have tried and done something about the Panama Canal, I think theoretically they had the resources, the carriers and all they could at least have tried to air raid it with carrier based aviation. Again they had a pretty huge army so in theory they could have landed a sizable force in Panama and provided they'd have first captured Hawaii and managed to keep Pearl Harbor operational for their own use, they could have held out in Panama for quite a while. And if they were smart enough they could also have tried to make use of the anti gringo sentiment that exists in Latin America, like they could have promised Columbia that they would allow them to have Panama back, or some such thing.Ìý
C'mon, ol' boy. Your geography could, I think, use a little polish...Columbia isn't adjacent to Panama. But that's beside the point....you offer the first real ''March 1942 alternative'' that's popped up so far on this board. However, I think by March, Hawaii was too heavily fortified to have been taken by the Japanese, and it was much too far away from their home islands, and too close to the US for them to have taken a shot at it.
My own personal opinion is that had they taken a really serious crack at moving west into India, the Bay of Bengal and possible the Red Sea, things may have been very touchy indeed for the allies -- especially the British. Somerville's Pacific fleet, while it had 3 carriers, was a paper tiger only. His carriers could handle about 75 aircraft total, which matched about what a single Japanese carrier toted around. Furthermore, the aircraft aboard the British ships were obsolete stringbags with the occasional seafire. They would have been slaughtered by the acrobatic Japanese. Somerville, despite being an aggressive personality, knew Britain couldn't afford to lose his entire fleet - which would have happened had he been fool enough to engage Nagumo's fleet - so he stayed near Madascar, well out of harm's way.
Think of the possibilities if the Japanese attack west. The Indian population had no love for the British. The Burmese hated the British and a sizeable number of them actually joined the Japanese in the fighting....
Had the Japanese gotten into the Red Sea in 1942 and landed a sizeable fighting force in Sinai or on the Egyptian coast, things could have gotten very hairy indeed for the 8th army, particularly if the Japanese swept up toward the Middle Eastern oil fields. Let's not forget that Rommel was to the west of the 8th army and Russia was not in good shape in the north.
Take it from there....and see if you can win for the Axis.....they are definitely in a very advantageous position at this point.
There are some disadvantages that need to be considered......
Now have at it gents....where are all the military historians???
C'mon guys....this could be interesting...and a lot of fun....Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 14
Posted by wollemi (U2318584) on Saturday, 6th May 2006
Well I'm not a guy but...
WW2 Japan did not exactly arrive in the Asia Pacific bearing chocolates and flowers. Colonialism in the region was definitely past its use by date and there were scattered nascent independence movements, but Japan just looked like more of the same
I'd really be sceptical of a great deal of support in India if they had been invaded by Japan. India had contributed 1 million armed forces to WW1 and over 2.5 million to WW2. That's an immense sacrifice. I think in Burma most remained with the allies or swopped to the allies
Perhaps it was more a case of the lesser of 2 evils or the (colonial) devil you know..Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 15
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Sunday, 7th May 2006
seem to have had three options in March of 1942. They had staged a wide and highly successful blitz in the Pacific, and were poised on the brink of total success in Southeast Asia. She had, according to their records, achieved all that she set out to do and now her leaders had to figure out what to do next. Her main objective now was to bring the war to an end, and how should she have done that?
Japanese leaders were in something of a bind at that point. They had 3 major options:
1. Go south and attack Australia
2. Go east into the Central Pacific
3. Go west into the Indian Ocean
Obviously, the one they chose was the worst possible one, because it would appear that they tried to do all 3.
If you were playing a war game, and were controlling the Japanese, could you have led them to a satisfactory conclusion? Remember, there were drawbacks as well as advantages to each of these alternatives.Ìý
Definitely the Pacific. That's where they could have won the real war - if they could find the US carriers.
For the 20 years before Pearl Harbor both the Americans and the Japanese gamed a war centered around a surface battle near the Philippines; in one US wargame the "Japanese" side even won. In support of this strategy FDR, fancying himself a battleship man, ordered the US Pacific Fleet to shift base from San Diego to Pearl Harbor in 1940, on the theory that such an advanced move would save the fleet time when things went critical.
Too bad he didn't reckon that he also put the fleet that much closer to a carrier strike force, and that much further away from a continent of air cover. Pearl Harbor was a package waiting to be kicked.Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 16
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Sunday, 7th May 2006
The Doolittle raid stimulated them into trying just that, and you see what happened. I don't think that was their best option. Can you expand a little on that idea?
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Message 17
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Monday, 8th May 2006
The Doolittle raid stimulated them into trying just that, and you see what happened. I don't think that was their best option. Can you expand a little on that idea?Ìý
The Doolittle Raid reminded the Japanese of the raw fish in their sushi: the American flattops were still working and, unless sunk, would continue to be the one Allied direct threat to them throughout the war. Hence, the need to finish what they left undone at Pearl Harbor.Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 18
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Tuesday, 9th May 2006
Right! And they walked straight into Midway. That's not exactly what I had in mind when I asked if you could take the Japanese from their authentic high water point in March-April 1942 to a victory.
I guess this is a waste of time...but I was hoping to stimulate a few military enthusiasts into some speculation.....Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 19
Posted by jesw1962 (U1726423) on Tuesday, 9th May 2006
Erik Lindsay: I have war gamed that time in WWII in the Pacific. If Japan wins the Battle of Midway, she has a good chance of taking Hawaii. With Hawaii she can at the least destroy the Panama Canal. Since most of the U.S. industry is inland, there isn't much she can do about her production and oil production. But, if she has Hawaii and can rebuiild some of the battleships there as aircraft carriers, she has a good chance of stopping the Americans. Since she never had any intent of invading the U.S., but just wanted secure oil and rubber supplies, there is an even chance she could have negotiated that. The main thrust of the U.S. was to stop Hitler.
As I have said, the battle of the Pacific was strictly who spotted whom first, got their carriers turned into the wind, and then launched. I think Japan made the correct choice in going after the remaining carriers of the U.S. fleet. Had her luck held, who knows.Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 20
Posted by henrylee100 (U536041) on Wednesday, 10th May 2006
C'mon, ol' boy. Your geography could, I think, use a little polish...Columbia isn't adjacent to Panama. But that's beside the point....you offer the first real ''March 1942 alternative'' that's popped up so far on this board. However, I think by March, Hawaii was too heavily fortified to have been taken by the Japanese, and it was much too far away from their home islands, and too close to the US for them to have taken a shot at it.
Ìý
a point of information, Columbia is adjacent to Panama, I just looked at the world map in the next room and historically Panama used to be a province in Columbia, then the Americans wanted to build the canal and own it, but the Columbian gvnt said no, so the Americans arranged a local independence revolution in Panama and made it into a country.
I doubt that even by March 1942 Hawaii would have been so fortified that determined japanese shock troops couldn't have taken them. Plus at that time the Japanese still had more flattops than the americans. I think Midway was a move in that direction and a logical one at that, it's just that it went so hopelessly FUBAR on them. If it hadn't they could probably have island hopped to Hawaii by late 1942.
y own personal opinion is that had they taken a really serious crack at moving west into India, the Bay of Bengal and possible the Red Sea, things may have been very touchy indeed for the allies -- especially the British. Somerville's Pacific fleet, while it had 3 carriers, was a paper tiger only. His carriers could handle about 75 aircraft total, which matched about what a single Japanese carrier toted around. Furthermore, the aircraft aboard the British ships were obsolete stringbags with the occasional seafire. They would have been slaughtered by the acrobatic Japanese. Somerville, despite being an aggressive personality, knew Britain couldn't afford to lose his entire fleet - which would have happened had he been fool enough to engage Nagumo's fleet - so he stayed near Madascar, well out of harm's way.
Ìý
I don't think the Japanese would have been exactly welcome in india with their imperial ambitions and all. Plus moving in that direction would have probably ended up with them getting bogged down in the jungle in the Indian subcontinent. It has to be said their land army wasn't as tough as it was cracked up to be. After all they were never able to bring their Chinese campaign to a conclusive end, there were always bands of insurgents roaming China. Their short encounter with the Red Army at Khalkin Gol and Khasan were disastorous, and the Red Army wasn't in its best shape at the time either, they'd just had their purges and they basically screwed up in the Finish campain one year later, securing a territorial victory at the cost of extremely high losses, yet they were able to beat elements of the Japanese Kwantung army with little hassle.
On the other hand their fleet was still in its prime and at the time, even with the Doolitle raid, the US was still a rather soft target. And yes in the long run going west could have been cool, but I don't think it would have been wise for them to have gone west while leaving the US to recuperate in the rear. Once they hit Pearl Harbor there was no turning back, they simply had to somehow get the US out of the way. Going west for them would have been somewhat like Hitler's drive to the east with Britain in the rear.
The middle east oil fields do look attractive but imho there was just too much ground to cover. Alternatively of course they could have gone straight for those oil fields, by passing India by sea and landing a expeditionary force in Saudi Arabia. As you point out the British fleet there was no match for the Nagumo task force, so it could have been disposed of in a single decisive battle. Yet they'd still have to face the US sooner or later. After all the US was key to the allied victory in in terms of supplies and mass produced equipment. So in the long run their gains in the west wouldn't have done them much good, on the other hand , had they managed to somehow knock out the US, disposing of Britain would have been trivial. The USSR might have been trickier and would have taken longer because of the vast territories but with the Wermacht's help it could have been feasible.
So March 1942, while there was still a chance and while the US shipyards hadn't yet started churning out carriers like pancakes, imho they simply had to throw everything they had against it. Their problem, imho, was indecisiveness and unclear strategic objectives, they were too much into this bite and hide mentality , in essense Pearl Harbor was a bite and hide op, basically a show put on to try and shock the enemy into surrender. Obviously it didn't work and it could never have worked. March 1945 wasn't too late yet, but it's just that lady luck turned her back on them at that point.Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 21
Posted by cmedog47 (U3614178) on Wednesday, 10th May 2006
Regarding an invasion of Hawaii, I feel certain that in March 1942 it would have been a failure, and probably Dec, 1941 as well.
MacArther was still holding out in the Philippines in March. He had only about 16,000 US Regular troops and 12,000 Phillipine scouts--the rest of the Phillipine troops were unreliable. He was 200 miles from Japanese held territory and 8000 miles from the US.
Hawaii was already garrisoned at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor with 43,000 US Army regulars, plus additional Marines and Navy. I do not know the numbers of the latter. I don’t know the numbers in March 1942, but it was certainly no less than the Dec 7 figure as I have found references to severe housing problems that spring due to the buildup. Coastal defenses already constructed included coastal guns in all sectors of Oahu. There were 5 major airfields. I have no idea of the number of aircraft stationed there, but it doesn’t too much matter. Without the unlikely event of simultaneous seizure of all airfields, the US could do something it couldn’t do in the Philippines: send aircraft directly from the states. B-25’s and B-24 could ferry directly from the US and P-38 fighters with modification. Production was already ramped up of these aircraft. The Islands were well supplied with fuel.
It should be noted that there are many Hawaiian Islands, with extremely forbidding terrain favorable to defense, and potential locations for additional airfields built quickly in the cane fields. The Japanese were not experienced at amphibious assaults on capable enemies, and would not likely have attempted or successfully executed such an assault on Pearl. They would more likely have landed forces elsewhere. In any case, they would have been in the back yard of a enemy that was burying them in productive capacity and far from home. If they took one or two of the Islands, while they were doing so their enemy would be reentrenching in the rugged terrain of the other Islands, building airfields, and ferrying in aircraft with which they wreck havoc with the Japanese Navy and deny them the air superiority so needed for further amphibious operations. The terrain is a defenders paradise that would funnel attacks into narrow chutes. The Hawaiian Islands would have turned into a quagmire for the Japanese that would have drained them of resources while a Pacific fleet was rebuilt. Their long supply lines would have been much more vulnerable to US subs operating out of the West Coast.
Japan ruled out an invasion of Hawaii because it would fail. The best they could hope for at that point was what they tried: a destruction of the US fleet and capture of the Midway airfield. Even then, they would likely have been surprised at the cost. I doubt they had any idea how costly it would be for 5000 troops to take the small island and it’s 2000 prepared defenders, given light air and naval bombardment. They had been lulled into complacent feelings of invincibility killing hapless Chinese for 4 years.
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Message 22
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Wednesday, 10th May 2006
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Losing wasn't what they had in mind, either. Until the last air attack that battle could have gone either way, given the poor air coordination by the Americans. For that matter, it could have gone the other way if the Japanese hadn't led with their flattops; that wa leading with their chins.
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Most historical speculation is a waste of time but at least it can amuse.Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 23
Posted by cmedog47 (U3614178) on Wednesday, 10th May 2006
Midway could easily have gone either way, in fact, when examining the battle in detail, it is suprising that it went so well for the US. It was generally a good plan, a bit too intricate in detail, and executed with a few operational flaws, but even so, ought to have succeeded.
If it had succeeded, a massive build-up would have followed throughout the Hawaiian archipeligo. With American air transport to the Islands, the Japanese would not have been able to stop it. Efforts to extent their land holdings there more than a few of the peripheral Islands would have drained them even faster, while the Navy recostructed. As they had already achieved their main objectives of the attack on the US, I think they would have held firm, with the same historical results a bit later, or they would have kept trying to take small bites hoping to intimidate the US into surrender, with the same historical results a bit later, but with a bloody US defensive campaign in the Hawaiians in the interval.
The US defenders would have had to collapse on a grand scale for the invasion resources that Japan could move across the Pacific to suceed against against Hawaii. Even with the Japanese belief that that this is what they would do, they didn't mount such an invasion. Even with the immediate collapse of the Phillipine Army, the US in the Phillipines was delaying the Japanese time table holding out longer than expected, the Japanese were having to call in unplanned reinforcements for that operation. They were suprised at the tenacity of the American air attacks at Midway in the face of complete defeat--remember 8 unsucessful flights went agaist the Japanese fleet that morning with nearly complete annihilation of 7 of them and no results to show for it--yet the attacks continued relentlessly with no hesitation by men or officers.
Hawaii was not a colonial outpost either, unlike the Phillipines, where the US had fought a long and bloody rebellion, the 400,000 + civilians were loyal patriotic Americans, even among the large Japanese immigrant population, the Japanese agents had been largely unsucessful in finding potential collaborators. Unless you have seen Hawaii, you cannot appreciate the defense potential of the terrain. With the advantage of many more troops than MacArthur had, a loyal population, steep mountainous terrain, multiple defendable airfields and direct air access from the US mainland, extreme supply lines from Japan, scant paratroop and amphibious experience by Japan, multiple large islands sufficient to serve as bases of operations, and the belief by the defenders that they were defending home, the Hawaiian Islands would not have gone the way of the Phillipines or Singapore.
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Message 24
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Wednesday, 10th May 2006
OK. Here's my opinion. This is how I take Japan to victory in March of 1942.
Yes, I think Hawaii was out of the question. The US increased both army and air strength after Dec 7th and I seriously doubt if even all six of Japan's fleet carriers could have achieved aerial supremacy over an area as great as the one the Hawaiian Islands cover. The Panama Canal was too far away for a successful invasion, although a single submarine's semi-suicide attempt to damage it might have succeeded. However, it would have been repaired rapidly and such an attack likely could not have been successfully repeated.
As far as Midway was concerned, let's not forget that it was fought only because the US had broken the Japanese naval codes, knew what the Imperial Navy was going to do, and was geared up to fight at that time. The US Pacific Fleet didn't HAVE to fight Midway (which is what Yamamoto hoped), they CHOSE to do so...and luckily (boy, was it ever) they won. But the point is that Yamamoto didn't FORCE that battle....it took place only because the Americans decided to fight then. They could fight when and where they wanted to....something that Yamamoto didn't desire at all. The ''big, decisive battle'' that he wanted so badly was not something he could bring about when he chose.
IMO an attack on Australia was impossible simply because the country is so huge and Japan's army wasn't all that big. But they wouldn't have to occupy the continent...they could simply isolate it by occupying New Caledonia and building an airfield on Guadalcanal or someplace else in the Solomons.
An attack into the Indian Ocean had the best chances, I think. Japan wouldn't have had to actually TAKE India, they could take Ceylon, then just bypass the sub-continent. Who could stop them? Attacking the British in the Persian Gulf would have been a breeze because as I noted above, the British Fleet in that area was nothing for them to fear. If Somerville had been foolish enough to challenge Nagumo his fleet would almost certainly have been destroyed. If Britain could be brushed aside in the Persian Gulf Japan could threatened the Soviet armies in the south, and those troops were already being hammered by the Germans in the west. Turkey might well have ben forced to join up with the axis powers and the tripartite pact's objectives might have been achieved. The loss of the Middle Eastern oil fields would have been a terrific blow to Britain and a huge boon to Hitler, and it's doubtful if the US could have provided enough oil to keep Britain fighting, considering the U-Boat successes in the Atlantic in 1942. All that, after more than two years of constant defeat on all fronts, might well have broken British resolve to continue fighting.
All that was needed, I think, was for the Axis powers to coordinate their strategic aims. The African campaign was teetering back and forth, and the Germans were gearing up to launch a huge offensive against the Russians as soon as the spring mud dried up. An offensive into the south toward the Caucasus would have harmonized nicely with Japan's assaults in the Persian Gulf. If the Germans, Italians, and Japanese could have synchronized assaults in the Middle East and southern Russia, Britain MIGHT have been forced to seek a peace. And with Germany hammering at the gates of Moscow and Stalin unable to shift troops from Siberia because of the Japanese threat, Russia might well have collapsed also. Stalin's grip on the USSR was very slippery in early 1942 and a successor might have sought a separate peace with Hitler.
If all these things had happened, the US would have been faced by enemies on too many fronts for even that mighty nation, fully geared to war, to handle.
There are other sides to that scenario, of course. Despite all the setbacks, there is a possibility that Britain, allied with the US and Russia, would not have broken. Observers were convinced she would break in June of 1940, and she didn't (although that was very, very close). With the US bolstering her, and Russia determined to remain in the war, Britain might have kept a stiff upper lip. Even if she didn't, Japan would have been at the end of an extremely long supply line and would have needed all the aid she could get from Germany and Italy, and Hitler was so confident of victory that he had not turned the manufacturing potential of France and Germany onto an 'all-out' war effort. Had he done that, his total production probably might have been great enough to keep his armies supplied and to help supply Japan's war machine, but that would take time, and is an awfully big ''if''.
Nevertheless, I think, an all-out assault into the west was the only way Japan could have achieved success in the Pacific war she launched in December.
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Message 25
Posted by clankylad (U1778100) on Wednesday, 10th May 2006
The isolation (not invasion) of Australia to protect the Southern flank of the advance would be my choice. This could be achieved by occupying the islands of the South Pacific and possibly New Zealand.
Striking West into the Indian Ocean could have terrifying effects on the British in India and the Middle East, but Britain wasn't Japan's main foe.
Going East towards Hawaii, whilst potentially depriving the US of a major base still leaves another major base, Australia, dangerously close.
I think the emphasis for Japan must be the consolidation of a strong defensive position to meet the inevitable US counterattack.Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 26
Posted by henrylee100 (U536041) on Thursday, 11th May 2006
I still think that in principle they could have taken Hawaii, at least partially, in Dec 1941 if the Pearl Harbor attack had been immediately followed by a large scale landing. Then keeping on to the islands would have been a question of maintaining air supremacy over the islands.
Problem with the Japanese paccific campaing is, imho, that from the very start it was more of a gamble rather than a seriously thought through long haul kind of effort. At least judging from the appearances it was as if they planned to "shock and awe" the opposition into surrender by a series of succeful surprise attacks. When it didn't work, it seems like they didn't have any other trump cards up their sleeve.
It has to be conceded that with the rough terrain and all the additional troops, taking Hawaii in 1942 would have probably been beyond a challange for the Japanese military/navy. Probably if they'd have had some kind of crack paratroop formations and the kind of resolve that the Germans had in their early campaign, it could still have been possible. As I see it, the success of a military op isn't always determined by the number of troops alone. When the Germans went into Norway in 1940, they were hopelessly outnumberd, the British had a far superior navy, the expeditionary corps they landed at Narwik was several times bigger than the german troops facing it, yet still under the influence of recent German successes and buying into their perceived invincibility, the British command eventually ordered a pullout. Imho in March 1942, the Japanese in the pacific still had the advantage of shock and awe and perceived invincibility. Although it has to be said the Doolitle raid surely (+ the Phillipines campagn falling behind schedule) underminded that image, especially the fact that far as I know none of the planes were actually shot down over Tokyo.
The western scenrio, imho, is still rather far fetched, too many things would have needed to have gone a certain way for it to have been successful.
An attack into the Indian Ocean had the best chances, I think. Japan wouldn't have had to actually TAKE India, they could take Ceylon, then just bypass the sub-continent. Who could stop them?
Ìý
their own overextended supply lines, it terms of logistics moving into the Indian ocean would have been a lot more of a challange than attempting to take central Pacific, imho. Who'd have stopped the Brits from deploying subs operating from the subcontinet to sink Tokyo expresses supplying the troops in Ceylon and the Gulf?
Attacking the British in the Persian Gulf would have been a breeze because as I noted above, the British Fleet in that area was nothing for them to fear
Ìý
I think if the Japanese had succeffully taken Ceylon, the Brits could have deployed more ships in the Indian Ocean, not that it could have deployed a lot, but it could have been enough to slow down the Japanese advance there. Plus while moving troops into the Persian Gulf by sea may not have been too difficult, waging a war against the brits there might not have proved that easy. I suspect they'd have put up a little more resitance there than they did at Singapore. Don't think Britain could have been brushed aside just like that.
All that was needed, I think, was for the Axis powers to coordinate their strategic aims. The African campaign was teetering back and forth, and the Germans were gearing up to launch a huge offensive against the Russians as soon as the spring mud dried up. An offensive into the south toward the Caucasus would have harmonized nicely with Japan's assaults in the Persian Gulf. If the Germans, Italians, and Japanese could have synchronized assaults in the Middle East and southern Russia, Britain MIGHT have been forced to seek a peace. And with Germany hammering at the gates of Moscow and Stalin unable to shift troops from Siberia because of the Japanese threat, Russia might well have collapsed also. Stalin's grip on the USSR was very slippery in early 1942 and a successor might have sought a separate peace with Hitler.
Ìý
as you point out the German east front offensive in the summer of 1942 was in the south, so technically they were not at the gates of Moscow. And I doubt that a Japanese campaign in the gulf, even provided that it was successful, could have had any real influence on the outcome of that German east front offensive, which ended in the Stalingrad debacle, unless Japan openly attacked the USSR.
If all these things had happened, the US would have been faced by enemies on too many fronts for even that mighty nation, fully geared to war, to handle.
Ìý
the main strength of the US was its intact industrial base, so in theory with neither Geramns nor Japanese having means of delivery blows to US mainland, the US could still have held out ad infinitum. If Japan attacked the USSR, the US could have struck a deal with Stalin, allowing US troops to use soviet territory which would have provided US airforce with airfields to launch air raid against Japan, plus access to China, an inexhaustible source of manpower. Plus it has to be said that your scenario assumes that the allies are just sitting there watching the events unroll. If the Japanese had committed the bulk of their navy and military in the gulf and in the indian ocean, the US could have launched succeful attacks against them in the Pacific, after all the US still had a few operational flattops.
Nevertheless, I think, an all-out assault into the west was the only way Japan could have achieved success in the Pacific war she launched in December.
Ìý
probably the way things stood, there was really no way for them to prevail in the pacific campaign. If they'd have really wanted to go west after British colonies, they shouldn't have attacked the US. I take the main idea was to take the Philipines, as the Philipines had the natural resources that Japan needed so they decided to remove the US pacific fleet from the picture. Unfortunately they never made any provisions from what would happen then, once they had the Philipines. Probably it was an underestimation of US industrial might or their resolve to fight or both. Japan and the US were in different categories and thus from the very start Japan never had any real chance againt the US in an open all out military campaign in the Pacific. The only chance they might have had was if they'd have pulled some sort of a daring op, or several of them threatening the US mainland, like a landing in Sanfransico or LA or some such thing (or at least in Mexico and then advance north into the US). It's not that US military couldn't have handled that it's that for a while they might have been so stunned by such a direct attack that they might have forgotten they could handle it allowing the Japanese time to gain territory. Unfortunately the Japanese didn't have that kind of an army. If they could have taken Rommel's African corps and put it on US mainland, then I think they could have had a chance to make th eUS sue for peace. They thought that Pearl Harbor was a stunning blow but in reality it was little more than a mosquito bite.Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 27
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Thursday, 11th May 2006
<>
How major a base is a sparsely populated desert continent cut off from its only allies?Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 28
Posted by cmedog47 (U3614178) on Thursday, 11th May 2006
Erik,
I think you are basically right, the Japanese might theoretically been able to win if, by gaining the Middle Eastern oil fields, they had forced Britain out of the war early. The US could not have done anything meaningful to Germany without Britain in the war. They would have sought an armistice with Germany to end that part of conflict. If the axis had hung together and refused a separate peace, the US might have settled for a negotiated peace with Japan, especially as Japan could afford to assuage their feelings over pearl harbor and making some concessions as long as oil supplies were guaranteed. It would almost certainly have destroyed the sitting US president politically of course to do so.
The complete domination of Europe by Germany and the collapse of Britain might have so discourage the American people that the "Fortress America" attitude might have grown even stronger counteracting the need for revenge against the Japanese to a degree.
Some are making the same mistake the Japanese made, greatly overestimating themselves and greatly underestimating the US's ability to quickly militarize their society and economy and their psychological reaction to attack. The belief in the soft undisciplined westerner was not just a miscalculation, but a central part of their racist ideology as demonstrated by it's persistence despite repeated challenge. They kept being surprised over and over by the same fact, the Americans willingness to fight, even after repeated demonstrations.
The intensity of the resistance at the Phillipines was an unplanned surprise. It is often said that they didn't plan for the prisoners because they didn't expect so many to surrender--but that is because they expected to get to kill more of them. They had to call in unplanned reinforcements and the operation took much longer than they planned.
Then the audacity of the Doolittle Raid shocked them.
Then the repeated unescorted nearly suicidal attacks of obsolete torpedo planes and bombers at Midway.
Then the failure of the Marines to crack in the face of massive "banzai" attacks at Guadacanal.
KurtLink to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 29
Posted by clankylad (U1778100) on Thursday, 11th May 2006
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How major a base is a sparsely populated desert continent cut off from its only allies?
Pretty major, I'd say. Because Japan did not secure the South Pacific, Australia was not cut off. US forces could be moved there (and were) and Japan got a hiding in the South Pacific as a result.Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 30
Posted by folgore (U3957252) on Thursday, 11th May 2006
Once the japenesse had lost at Midway , it was purely a matter of time .holding guadalcanal airbase would have made supply to australia more problematic but the sheer size of America's industrial might would have prevailed in the end .
Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 31
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Friday, 12th May 2006
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A major base, indeed, once the Yanks got there to use it as such but the Japanese cutting off Australia wouldn't have knocked the Yanks out of the war.Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 32
Posted by clankylad (U1778100) on Friday, 12th May 2006
"A major base, indeed, once the Yanks got there to use it as such but the Japanese cutting off Australia wouldn't have knocked the Yanks out of the war."
True, but I wasn't saying it would. I don't think that anything the Japanese could have done would have knocked the US out of the war. All I'm suggesting is that I think Japan's best bet was to get into a strong position to fight a defensive war, and I think the isolation of Australia would have been the best way to go about that.
Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 33
Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Friday, 12th May 2006
probably the way things stood, there was really no way for them to prevail in the pacific campaign. If they'd have really wanted to go west after British colonies, they shouldn't have attacked the US. I take the main idea was to take the Philipines, as the Philipines had the natural resources that Japan needed so they decided to remove the US pacific fleet from the picture. Unfortunately they never made any provisions from what would happen then, once they had the Philipines. Probably it was an underestimation of US industrial might or their resolve to fight or both. Japan and the US were in different categories and thus from the very start Japan never had any real chance againt the US in an open all out military campaign in the Pacific. Unfortunately the Japanese didn't have that kind of an army. If they could have taken Rommel's African corps and put it on US mainland, then I think they could have had a chance to make th eUS sue for peace. Ìý
I agree with you that if Japan really wanted to establish an Empire in the Pacific, it was a mistake to attack the US. They wanted the oil of the Dutch East Indies and the Rubber of Malaya and that was all. I doubt if the US would have gone to war to protect British or Dutch colonial interests. I agree that the Japanese were probably concerned about leaving the Philippines on their flank if they attacked the Indies and Malaya, but they could probably have gotten away with it.
The only chance they might have had was if they'd have pulled some sort of a daring op, or several of them threatening the US mainland, like a landing in Sanfransico or LA or some such thing (or at least in Mexico and then advance north into the US). It's not that US military couldn't have handled that it's that for a while they might have been so stunned by such a direct attack that they might have forgotten they could handle it allowing the Japanese time to gain territory.Ìý
That kind of attack never would have succeeded and Japan never would have tried it. That was never an option for the Imperial Army or Navy. They never had any intention of invading the US. What they wanted was to defeat the US in their idealized ''single decisive battle'' and then negotiate a peace with the US from a position of strength. They had misjudged the entire attitude of the US and Britain. They had beaten Czarist Russia in a single decisive battle and had knocked them out of the Russo-Japanese war. They had seen that happen on several occasions and were convinced that was the way to beat the US....and they were wrong.
They thought that Pearl Harbor was a stunning blow but in reality it was little more than a mosquito bite.Ìý
It might have been a real blow if Nagumo had sent in a third strike and wrecked the repair facilities and fuel dumps, but he didn't do that. It's hard to blame him...at the time, he thought he was pulling the Eagle's tail feathers and felt lucky to get away with all his ships and the loss of only 29 a/c. No one realized at that time the US was a paper tiger...her military was reckoned by international observers to be about on a par with Sweden's...but her economic potential prior to the depression had been the greatest in the world, and her industrial potential was known to be impressive, so Nagumo was cautious -- probably overly so.
Please understand...I do not content that an attack into the west would have been successful. There were a lot of 'if's' and 'buts' about it...there was, for instance, no guarantee that even if it were successful it would knock Britain or Russia out of the war. There is no reason to believe that semi-sane people like Hitler and Mussolini would have made any effort to coordinate their attacks with those of their allies. I merely point out that IMO that was their only hope. As I said, they couldn't take Australia...an attack on New Zealand was out of the question without taking Australia, so forget that....They could have made things more difficult by isolating Australia, but that wouldn't have won the war for them. Attacking into the east didn't work....as I said, we have to remember that the Battle of Midway wasn't a battle that Yamamoto precipitated. It happened because the US commanders knew he was coming and had decided to take a defensive stand. They didn't HAVE to fight him then...they simply chose to.
He was almost forced into heading east because after an incredibly successful series of conquests that gained them all they could possibly want, they had to decide what to do next. Nagumo took his fleet into the India Ocean and the Bay of Bengal and ran amok. He destroyed merchant shipping, attacked ports all along the east and west coast of India without significant reprisal and generally raised hell in the area. He humiliated the British completely and brushed the Dutch aside as if they didn't even exist. His fleet headed home filled with accomplishment and puffed up with victory, yet two days before they docked, Tokyo was bombed. What good did all the victories do them...of what value was it to humiliate their enemies and conquer all the foreign territory they wanted if they couldn't protect their home islands?
That's what led them to head for the US fleet...but it was something Yamamoto could only HOPE for....the US fleet could fight when and where it chose...he couldn't force them to fight his battle....
Actually, in my humble opinion, there was really no good option for Japan in March/April of 1942. They had beaten a tiger unconscious, but he was waking up. Now they had him by the ears and didn't dare let go...Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 34
Posted by stalteriisok (U3212540) on Friday, 12th May 2006
My thoughts are - WHY did Japan even think of attacking the US - although the US had tried to chivvy the japs into war - stopping of scrap being taking to japan etc - it was always a shaky operation
by taking the british and dutch possessions they probably had secured the oil and raw materials they needed - would the US gone to war for colonial posessions ?
UK and the dutch never had the strength to reply to japanese aggression - europe and north africa were the priorities for the uk and the dutch were shot anyway
I still wonder why they attacked the US - they attacked them in the one area where the US were always going to be able to compete with them - and obviously dominate them - the pacific
whatever the japs did they could NEVER put the US out of the war - even landing troops on the mainland would not make the slightest difference - can u imagine 30000 troops landing anywhere near a US city - they would be outgunned by the civilians let alone the military
STLink to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 35
Posted by cmedog47 (U3614178) on Friday, 12th May 2006
I guess they thought that if they attacked only the British and Dutch, the US would enter the war positioned in their rear (Phillipines) and with the initiative. It would have been the sensible thing for the US to do, but I don't know how Roosevelt would have swung it. Probably just pushed the proxy war we were already fighting with the Japanese sort of like we were with Germany--by assistance to the allies in the East that would have bordered on overt war. With active material assistance and convoy escort from a US that was not attacked, the UK in the Far East could have been a much harder pill for the Japanese to swallow. We already had the flying tigers in China, and at the very very least would have ramped up aid to all the allies in the East considerably. They probably made the most rational decision given the parameters they were working with.
They weren't stupid just miscalculating regarding the American psychological regarding war, and unwilling to consider what in retrospect was clearly in their best national interest: backing off in China.
My knowledge of Japanese pre-war politics is superficial, but I get the impression that even that was not so much an unwillingness of a particular leader, but that they were in the grip of a militaristic political dynamic such that cessation of war was no longer politically possible. Political assassination had become a common tool of political resolution, therefore whoever advocated a policy opposed by the most militant faction, was in constant danger of being killed, and all that might result from their moral courage would be getting replaced my someone more militant.
KurtLink to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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Message 36
Posted by White Camry (U2321601) on Monday, 15th May 2006
"A major base, indeed, once the Yanks got there to use it as such but the Japanese cutting off Australia wouldn't have knocked the Yanks out of the war."
'True, but I wasn't saying it would. I don't think that anything the Japanese could have done would have knocked the US out of the war. All I'm suggesting is that I think Japan's best bet was to get into a strong position to fight a defensive war, and I think the isolation of Australia would have been the best way to go about that.'
After six months the Japanese *did* go into a strong position to fight a defensive war. But they found it a rather difficult strategy to maintain with the U.S. freely picking which islands to attack.Link to this forum: Japanese options, in the spring of 1942. The Japanese
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