Wars and ConflictsΜύ permalink
Dads army V's the SS
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Message 1.Μύ
Posted by Slimdaddy101 (U2553470) on Tuesday, 7th March 2006
There was a programme on TV last night - the real Dads army. It was a archalogical look at the defensive installations of the homeguard in the UK. However in the last 15 minutes of the programme they done a 'what if' Nazi Germay invaded GB.
In 1974 at Sandhurst they actually carried out war games to see how successfful the invasion would have been. Involved in the wargames were ex-German gererals of the time and their UK counterparts.
Firstly, the air bases would have continued to be attacked by the Luffwaffe. Giving litle respite for the RAF
Secondly (is that a word!?) the Germans would have sealed off the channel with a heavy carpet of mines to prevent access to the Royal Navy, which was in the main at Scapa Flow, giving the German 90,000 invasion force some safety in crossing and landing.
Once the landings had taken place it was recknoned that within a day the Germans would have lost 30% of their strike force but penetrated 8 miles inland, from Dover Brighton.
A week after the landings it was reckoned that the Germans would be suffering from lack of ammunition, lack of heavy armour and mired in a network of defensive fortification that would take a heavy toll. This coupled with major GB reinforcements (from where i was never mentioned) meant doom for the German forces before they even go a sniffter of London.
It was the general agreement that Sealion would have ended in disaster for the German invaders.
Amatuer that I am, I have pondered this before and have always thought that a German invasion in '41 would have spelt disaster for GB.
Work commitments beckon just now.
Any thoughts? -
Message 2
Posted by Mr Pedant (U2464726) on Tuesday, 7th March 2006
I remember someone who was in a local Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ Guard unit saying he thought they were a lot more shoddy than Captain Mainwaring's platoon.
I imagine the quality of Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ Guard units would vary tremendously though, a high proportion would be WW1 veterens. -
Message 3
Posted by jane (U1272878) on Tuesday, 7th March 2006
Hello, my Father was in the Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ Guard in the West Midlands. I remember him saying that they usually went to the Pub at 6pm so Hitler stood a good chance if he invaded after 6 o clock! I think they would have fought very hard if we had been invaded-the idea of this country being occupied was totally alien to them, dismissed as not happening. Even a trip to the pub-well fine,normal life goes on..! Best wishes.
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Message 4
Posted by The Earl of Suffolk (U1888243) on Tuesday, 7th March 2006
Surely the Germans could have dropped supplies by air if they had superiority i.e. ammo, reinforcements, equipment etc.
Also, could the German bombers have launched a massive attack on Scapa Flow & sunk most of the fleet? -
Message 5
Posted by Stoggler (U1647829) on Tuesday, 7th March 2006
They did say on the programme last night that the Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ Guard would have suffered very heavy losses had they been involved in the fight. Also, the Germans didn't recognise them as legitimate combatants so any captured probably would have been killed.
As for reinforcements, Britain's army was stationed all round the country, because as they said on the programme we didn't know where the invasion would have landed. Once the invasion had taken place we could have moved our forces from all over the country into the areas needed to defend the island.
One thing that annoyed me as a Sussexman - the invasion took place in Kent and Sussex, but the programme kept on talking only about Kent and ignoring Sussex - all these Kentish villages would have been destroyed and south-east Kent would be devastated... Brighton just happens to be in Sussex, and Cuckmere Haven (where the beardy archeologist "invaded") is also in Sussex.
If you consider how difficult D-Day was with Naval and air supremacy and a few year's worth of planning, I am not surprised the German invasion would have failed.
Incidentally, did the Germans have "stop-lines" across northern France like we did criss-crossing our country? -
Message 6
Posted by Stoggler (U1647829) on Tuesday, 7th March 2006
Also, could the German bombers have launched a massive attack on Scapa Flow & sunk most of the fleet?Μύ
What was the range of German bombers? Could they reach the Orkneys? -
Message 7
Posted by Slimdaddy101 (U2553470) on Tuesday, 7th March 2006
They could have reached the Orkneys, but the fleet would have been heavily defended by local RAF units making such attacks unwise. No German fighters would be available and if we think back to the US daylight attacks on Germany, they were slaughtered, the Lufftwaffe would have had similar casulties.
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Message 8
Posted by MB (U177470) on Tuesday, 7th March 2006
They could have reached the Orkneys, but the fleet would have been heavily defended by local RAF units making such attacks unwise. No German fighters would be available and if we think back to the US daylight attacks on Germany, they were slaughtered, the Lufftwaffe would have had similar casulties.Μύ
The Germans did attack the Orkneys (wasn't it one of the first places bombed?).
There was the Orkney Barrage where every AA gun would fire for one minute.
When the fleet returned in March 1940 the AA defences of Orkney were said to be deadlier than those of Malta.
MB -
Message 9
Posted by marduk-slayer of tiamat (U2258525) on Tuesday, 7th March 2006
i dont just think it'd be the armed forces and the gaurd fighting, back then we believed the lyric "britains never never never shall be slaves!" to be a statement of divine providence, as if God himself would strike down anyone who invaded this "sceptered isle"
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Message 10
Posted by Slimdaddy101 (U2553470) on Tuesday, 7th March 2006
Despite what the Dads army prograamme said yesterday, It is my humble opinion that Sealion would have had a very real chance of success. Naturally certain factors would have to be met by the Germans for this to succeeed - the neutralisation of the RAF - which could have happened if Hitler never swithed focus onto the UK cities, the mining of the channel - allowing the landings to proceed.
As another contributer said, it would have been impossible to supply troops by the air, as well as dropping troops inland to disrupt supply lines and create havok in the rear.
Britain was for all intents and purposes alone in the war, the Germans were rampant and seemingly unstoppable. If we look at the huge casulties and territories conquered in the East, the Brits could never have sustained such losses. As for the so called 'stop zones'; a few machine guns covering a bridge would hard constitiute a major barrier to the Germans; especially with the Luftwaffe rampant overhead.
I have trouble concieving of any real barrier to the Germans overrunning London. Would the fight continue if London fell? Would the home guard take to the hills to adpot a guerilla campaign?
Would a resistance movement develop? Would attrocoites be committed?
Perhaps a more thought-provoking 'what if' would be- what would happen to the British army abroad if GB fell under the German jackboot? -
Message 11
Posted by Grumpyfred (U2228930) on Tuesday, 7th March 2006
Stukas couls never have reached Scapa and got back again. They were built as short range tactical A/C Scape from France is about 2,000 mile round trip. From Norway you could reach it with Do 17s or H.E 111s
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Message 12
Posted by (( sean )) Free Nordmann (U2053581) on Tuesday, 7th March 2006
Would the home guard take to the hills to adpot a guerilla campaign? Μύ
i didn't see the programme in question. wish i had but i recall a similar programme years ago that spoke about members of specially trained guerilla cells...they may've been home guard regulars who had secret additional orders. they certainly were not regular army (but i cant honesty remember the details) what i do recall, because one existing example was shown, was talk of a series of underground one man bunkers where it was intended they should 'lay doggo' emerging only for acts of sabotage against jerry. -
Message 13
Posted by pop-picker (U1244478) on Tuesday, 7th March 2006
it would be difficult to mine the entire channel and 22 miles isd a long way and the ships of the home fleet wouuldn't need to be that close to the invasion fleet to cause havoc. I seem to remember the figure of 180 in relation to the number of ships in the home fleet that would surely decimate any invasion force
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Message 14
Posted by (( sean )) Free Nordmann (U2053581) on Tuesday, 7th March 2006
re: my message 12...just googled got this:
"Auxiliary Units were created in 1940, made up of men specially selected from retired soldiers, Radio Amateurs and the Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ Guard they were sworn to secrecy and equipped and trained separately. Hidden bunkers were constructed across Britain. The bunkers were located in remote often wooded areas and were designed for the unit to go to ground, at the approach of the invaders. The bunkers were equipped with emergency food and water reserves, heated by kerosene lamps they were fitted with beds and toilet facilities, to be self suffcient. They had escape tunnels which exited some distance from the bunker.
The men of the Auxiliary Units would have used their local knowledge to begin a campaign of harassment and destruction once the enemy had taken over the area." -
Message 15
Posted by MB (U177470) on Tuesday, 7th March 2006
Would the home guard take to the hills to adpot a guerilla campaign? Μύ
i didn't see the programme in question. wish i had but i recall a similar programme years ago that spoke about members of specially trained guerilla cells...they may've been home guard regulars who had secret additional orders. they certainly were not regular army (but i cant honesty remember the details) what i do recall, because one existing example was shown, was talk of a series of underground one man bunkers where it was intended they should 'lay doggo' emerging only for acts of sabotage against jerry.Μύ
I would recommend reading "With Britain In Mortal Danger" by John Warwicker ISBN 1-84145-112-6
Very good description of the Auxiliary Units.
MB -
Message 16
Posted by Slimdaddy101 (U2553470) on Wednesday, 8th March 2006
it would be difficult to mine the entire channel and 22 miles isd a long way and the ships of the home fleet wouuldn't need to be that close to the invasion fleet to cause havoc. I seem to remember the figure of 180 in relation to the number of ships in the home fleet that would surely decimate any invasion forceΜύ
While it may not have been feasible to mine the entire channel - two main belts of mines (at Dover and Cornwall) would have been all that is required to prevent access to the Royal Navy. This coupled with the U-boat menace, which was relatively unchallenged in the seas early in the war as well as from the Lufftwaffe would certainly have caused the Royal Navy considerable cause for concern.
Would GB have been prepared to risk losing its fleet in such a risky venture or save itself for another day. If we think back to Midway, the Japanese fleet was decimated by American airpower and Japan as a belligerant nation was certainly compromised significantly after that -
Message 17
Posted by DocMike15 (U3167117) on Wednesday, 8th March 2006
The study in 1974 gives us a warm glow that we would have prevailed. However, there are many variables that could have tipped the balance. The Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ Guard was not well equiped or organised in the summer of 1940, and many of the defences were hastily and poorly built. Anti-tank weapons were few in number and often really not up to the task. The same could be said for british tanks, which were poorly armed (although well-armoured). Ammo was short, [particularly with regard to heavy weapons. With the RAF pushed back to the Midlands, they would have lost radar coverage, which would mean that the Luftwaffe would have had local air superiority, at least during much of the day, and daylight bombing raids weould have been very difficult. Although the navy would have been in a strong position, there would have been many destroyer lossees to Stuka's, etc (look at Dunkirk). The Aux. Units were in a relatively early stage at this time. This is not to say that the german plan also had meany problems. The battle would have been won by the side with the best kuck and the one who made the fewest mistakes. A tenacious defence of an airfield, or a enterprising german commander (such as Rommel) could have swung it either way. There are many alt history books on the subject - 'All the Kings men' is rather good, for example, but a colunmist some years ago did point out that these books do tend to confirm the timeline, even to the german surrender around 1945. perhasp we like the comfort that we would have won anyway. There is an excellent novel published in the 60's based on a TV play, which took a different view, but its in a minority.
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Message 18
Posted by Turnwrest (U2188092) on Wednesday, 8th March 2006
The Germans had been trying to lay "mine barriers" for weeks before the main onslaught on the RAF. British ships (cruisers from the Nore and Portsmouth, at least 1 battleship from Plymouth, and loads of destroyers) were still bombarding the invasion barges nightly. The RN would have taken heavy losses - but they would have ben worth taking. Sealion was even more of a one-shot than Overlord. Defet it, and the loss of barges would hamstring German industry for 18 months at least, more like 2 years, including stopping U-boat building.
The RAF could only have been "defeated" if it had consented to being defeated - at some point, Dowding would have called a halt to defending the south-east corner (the only area German fighters could reach) and withdrawn Fighter Command northwards, ready to bring them in when / if required. Even Tiger Moths were being fitted with bomb racks to strike at night at the invasion beaches. -
Message 19
Posted by DocMike15 (U3167117) on Wednesday, 8th March 2006
Thanks to Dowding, the RAF was not defeated - but there is a scene in the film, Battle of Britain (based on reality), where Park is arguing with Leigh-Mallory over L-M's covergae for park's airfields. L-M's 'Big Wing tactic was a failure, but if it had been used earlier, with more support from RAF senior commanders, perhaps it would have been a nail in Fighter Commands coffin, since the destruction of the radar chain and the collapse of Parks airfields would have led to the RAF losing air parity over SE England.
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Message 20
Posted by pop-picker (U1244478) on Wednesday, 8th March 2006
found this on some bonkers US page
"At a mine every 100 yards it takes 310 mines per square mile. Even a small minefield in those days took several thousand mines". So the Germans would need a heck of a lot of mines to even partially seal off the channel. Presumably the RAF would be laying mines on the approaches to the invasion beaches as the barges would be so slow they would have a good idea where they were headed, hopefully it wouldn't be a total surprise ? The luftwaffe didn't have anything like the level of supremacy the allies did for d-day. -
Message 21
Posted by Turnwrest (U2188092) on Wednesday, 8th March 2006
RDF played absolutely no part in interceptions and combat once the "bandits" crossed the coast. Chain Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ stations looked to seaward and only to seaward. Over land, the ROC took over reporting etc.
I do, however, agree that the "big wing" would have been disastrous in August / Sept 1940. However, Dowding WAS privy to Ultra information, Park and Leigh-Mallory weren't. Not sure if the additional data might have lead to a rethink in Balbo circles - perhaps not. -
Message 22
Posted by Turnwrest (U2188092) on Wednesday, 8th March 2006
RDF played absolutely no part in interceptions and combat once the "bandits" crossed the coast. Chain Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ stations looked to seaward and only to seaward. Over land, the ROC took over reporting etc.
I do, however, agree that the "big wing" would have been disastrous in August / Sept 1940. However, Dowding WAS privy to Ultra information, Park and Leigh-Mallory weren't. Not sure if the additional data might have lead to a rethink in Balbo circles - perhaps not.
As an aside - if I recall correctly "Dizzy" Allen reckoned that the Germans had achieved a sufficient measure of control of the air over the invasion area, but didn't realise it. -
Message 23
Posted by MB (U177470) on Wednesday, 8th March 2006
RDF played absolutely no part in interceptions and combat once the "bandits" crossed the coast. Chain Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ stations looked to seaward and only to seaward. Over land, the ROC took over reporting etc
....................Μύ
I think in the Battle of Britain they tried to intercept as they approached the coast so CH (and CHL) would be involved.
All the information from CH, CHL and ROC went to the Filter Room where it was combined so they were (hopefully) looking at the complete picture.
The first Ground Controlled Interception was October 1940 so it was before the end of the Battle of Britain though I think it was used mainly for night interceptions.
MB -
Message 24
Posted by DocMike15 (U3167117) on Wednesday, 8th March 2006
Its perfectly true that RDF was not used within the battle area itself, but without the radar stations, the RAF would have been blind to Luftwaffe attacks until they were over the invasion beaches. The remain RAF fighters would have had to keep standing patrols over their own airfields, which would have become, in themselves, much more vunerable to attack. Yes, the ROC would have been useful, but the extra timegap that radar created for Fighter Command, as well as knowledge of height and numbers would have been lost until the ROC picked them up. ROC would also have had to cope with an overloaded communications system, possibly damaged and under air attack. The real nightmare would have been if Luftwaffe Me109 and Stuka squadrons would have been able to establish forward bases near the beaches. A much increased range of operations, reduced waiting time for close support and no radar coverage would have been a very dangerous situation for the RAF.
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Message 25
Posted by Backtothedarkplace (U2955180) on Wednesday, 8th March 2006
Dont belive your website. The maths may be right. but people have a tendancy to get paraniod about mines one or two in the right place and nothing moves till the areas been swept.
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Message 26
Posted by Turnwrest (U2188092) on Thursday, 9th March 2006
Dont belive your website. The maths may be right. but people have a tendancy to get paraniod about mines one or two in the right place and nothing moves till the areas been swept.
Μύ
If the invasion fleet's on the way, you can bet your cotton socks the defenders will move - and they were sweeping the main war channel around the British coasts continuously, so they knew routes into the enemy's unmined areas (you can tell those by the facy that they are full of enemy vessels) -
Message 27
Posted by Italophile (U2460529) on Thursday, 9th March 2006
My specialism at uni was political history and I know very little about military history and even less about military strategy and tactics.
However, if I may venture an opinion, I would say that if the German Forces continued with the Blitzkrieg methods they used in France etc., the Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ Guard would probably not have stood much of a chance. As for any effective use for the army, were they not more or less unequipped in the latter half of 1940 due to the fact that virtually all of it was rusting on the beaches of Dunkirk.
IMO an initial resistance may have been possible against the regular units of the Wehrmacht but I seriously doubt the ability of the British Army, in the condition it was at that time, to effectively resist the Waffen SS and as for Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ Guard v SS, - I'll leave that one up to the imagination.
I believe that next week's programme is going to be concentrating on the more weird and effective Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ Defence participants. Now they may have had a chance! -
Message 28
Posted by Little Enos Rides Again (U1777880) on Thursday, 9th March 2006
Ignoring the air supremacy and navy / mineing issues for the timebeing, surely a big factor would be how quickly the Germans could re-inforce an initial beachead with panzer / tank / heavy artillery support. How practical were the barges at that time for carrying heavy weaponery?
If it was initially just infantry units hoping to secure a beachhead on the south coast then I would argue the German's would of been massacred by any well dug in beach fortifications / defenses by the British not to mention it would be very easy for the British to re-inforce any stretch of coast under attack.
Look at the US casualties on Omagha beach largely (arguably) caused by lack of tank support.
I think the Germans would have to land a sizeable amount of armour and artillery on any beachead to have a meaningful chance of pushing inland.
Any infantry / paratroopers successfully landed would only be able to hold out for a limited time without tank / heavy weapon support. -
Message 29
Posted by Slimdaddy101 (U2553470) on Thursday, 9th March 2006
I find myself in total agreemant with WelshLibrarian. I also take on board Little Enos's comment about lack of heavy artillery and tanks. Of course lacking such armour could be seen as a flaw (although the Yanks did eventually take Omamagh) , however if we look at the German airbourne assault on Crete, The allied troops on Crete (3 British battalions, 2 New Zealanders Brigades, 8 Greek Battalions and 6 Australian Battalions) had been aware of the impending assault through Enigma intercepts, the Germans had been provided with inaccurate intelligence and dropped into stiff resistance of nearly three times the amount of men they were expecting - and yet despite suffering heavy casulties and having no panzers or heavy artillery still took Crete.
Is it not feasible to suggest that The Brits were on the back foot and not exactly well prepared themselves. Against an innovative, determined German assault, which could have quickly overrun RAF bases, allowing for German reinforcements to land, it could have been catastrophic for the Brits. -
Message 30
Posted by Turnwrest (U2188092) on Thursday, 9th March 2006
Carrying heavy equipment isn't the problem. Unloading it is. The Germans would have had no ports of any significance in their planned invasion area - if memory serves half of them dry out at low water. They'd have had to beach the barges and blow the sides out to land anything not man-portable, and they had a handful of "swimming" tanks which might have been carried on the few experimental landing craft they had. Even the landings that the German Army wanted were, according to Raeder, wholly impossible, there just weren't enough vessels to effect them. Given, also, that the "clouds of paratroops" that the British were told to expect weren't available - the Germans had about 7,000 trained paras before the battles in the West began in 1940, and they needed refitting and bringing back up to operational status by the fall of France.
The British army had one fully equipped division, and at least 2 others which were low on artillery, but otherwise tolerably well equipped. The best estimates I've seen suggest that the Germans might, with luck, have landed about the same number of tanks that the British had - and, in 1940, on the battlefield, Matilda Is etc were a match for their German opponents. This would have left about twice as many light tanks on the British side, which the Germans would have had no corresponding armoured force to deal with. The Germans would also have had extreme difficulty in providing fuel for any motorised transport they had, as well as for their armour.
As to the Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ Guard - at the time of the planned invasion, they would have been a minor - very minor - irritant. Most had no firearms, those that did had a handful of rounds including "ball" ammunition for shotguns, just issued. The Germans have ALWAYS regarded the use of shotguns on the battlefield as a War Crime, even if the LDV weren't regarded as francs-tireurs to be hung from the lampposts as in the Franco-Prussian War, as Hitler ordered they should. -
Message 31
Posted by Little Enos Rides Again (U1777880) on Thursday, 9th March 2006
Logically in my opinion Sea Lion was a non-starter for Germany in 1940, I just don't think they had the relevant technology, air domination, tank class or infantry / paratroopers to achieve it (as has effectively been posted).
Wouldn't a better bet have been a U-boat blockade round the UK more U-boats concentrating on sinking merchant ships in the Atlantic to effectively starve us out (from a German perspective
).
The Luftwaffe would of saved a hell of a lot of planes (assuming no "Battle of Britain") , which could have then been used in N.Africa / Russia?
Then perhaps Hitler could of got a negotiated ceasfire or peace with the UK? (Easy in hindsight
) as a result of an expansive U-boat campaign. -
Message 32
Posted by Stoggler (U1647829) on Thursday, 9th March 2006
Hasn't there been much talk over the years by counter-factuals that the barges that would have been used for the invasion were river barges and not suited for open-sea transport? Wouldn't anything but a mirror-like sea have sunk them?
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Message 33
Posted by Turnwrest (U2188092) on Thursday, 9th March 2006
U-boat campaign - yes, might well have worked, but (big but) it would have needed to be set in train long before war broke out, probably by cancelling Salmon & Gluckstein, Bismarck, Tirpitz, Blucher, Prinz Eugen etc and building (at least) Type 7 U-boats. Pre-war the main German U-boat fleet were the "canoes" - Type IIs - which were only marginally capable of operational deployment. For success to be attained, it would also have required that the British should fail to respond by (say) dropping 1 or more KGVs and 1 or more "I" type carriers from the programme, converting more of the V&W types to Wairs or Escort Destroyers, increasing the size and pace of the Hunt & Flower build (both types were intended and would have been more suited to operations in home waters than out in the Atlantic). It would also probably preclude the invasion of Norway, though not, logically, the occupation of Denmark.
One odd effect might have been that the "main fleet" would still have been available for deployment in the Med and the Far East. What deterrent effect it would have had on the Japanese is open to doubt, but I think Mussolini might well have thought better of getting involved in a shooting war. -
Message 34
Posted by Little Enos Rides Again (U1777880) on Thursday, 9th March 2006
U-boat campaign - yes, might well have worked, but (big but) it would have needed to be set in train long before war broke out, probably by cancelling Salmon & Gluckstein, Bismarck, Tirpitz, Blucher, Prinz Eugen etc and building (at least) Type 7 U-boats. Pre-war the main German U-boat fleet were the "canoes" - Type IIs - which were only marginally capable of operational deployment. For success to be attained, it would also have required that the British should fail to respond by (say) dropping 1 or more KGVs and 1 or more "I" type carriers from the programme, converting more of the V&W types to Wairs or Escort Destroyers, increasing the size and pace of the Hunt & Flower build (both types were intended and would have been more suited to operations in home waters than out in the Atlantic). It would also probably preclude the invasion of Norway, though not, logically, the occupation of Denmark.
One odd effect might have been that the "main fleet" would still have been available for deployment in the Med and the Far East. What deterrent effect it would have had on the Japanese is open to doubt, but I think Mussolini might well have thought better of getting involved in a shooting war.Μύ
Well you could argue for all the time and resources the Germans spent on building all those vast pocket battleships and the like e.g. Graf Spee, Bismarck, Scharnhorst, Tirpitz et. That money/time would have been far better spent building U-boats, which were arguably far more effective (benefit of hindsight).
e.g. -
The Graf Spee was scuttled in 1939 After The Battle of the River Plate
The Bismarck was sunk in 1941 & Scharnhorst in 1943?
Also didn't Tirpitz spend most of the war docked in a Norwegian Fjorde (albeit it still carried a very big potential threat) as opposed to engaging anything as The Germans were almost afraid to use it due to British naval / air supremacy. Then it was sunk by the RAF in any event.
So arguably the battleships were of limited worth in a changing era of naval warfare, i.e. the recognition of air craft carriers and air power (again with hindsight).
If all those Battleships were traded for U-boats then I think there is some mileage in a U-boat blockade "what if" against the UK. -
Message 35
Posted by Turnwrest (U2188092) on Thursday, 9th March 2006
U-boat campaign - yes, might well have worked, but (big but) it would have needed to be set in train long before war broke out, probably by cancelling Salmon & Gluckstein, Bismarck, Tirpitz, Blucher, Prinz Eugen etc and building (at least) Type 7 U-boats. Pre-war the main German U-boat fleet were the "canoes" - Type IIs - which were only marginally capable of operational deployment. For success to be attained, it would also have required that the British should fail to respond by (say) dropping 1 or more KGVs and 1 or more "I" type carriers from the programme, converting more of the V&W types to Wairs or Escort Destroyers, increasing the size and pace of the Hunt & Flower build (both types were intended and would have been more suited to operations in home waters than out in the Atlantic). It would also probably preclude the invasion of Norway, though not, logically, the occupation of Denmark.
One odd effect might have been that the "main fleet" would still have been available for deployment in the Med and the Far East. What deterrent effect it would have had on the Japanese is open to doubt, but I think Mussolini might well have thought better of getting involved in a shooting war.Μύ
Well you could argue for all the time and resources the Germans spent on building all those vast pocket battleships and the like e.g. Graf Spee, Bismarck, Scharnhorst, Tirpitz et. That money/time would have been far better spent building U-boats, which were arguably far more effective (benefit of hindsight).
e.g. -
The Graf Spee was scuttled in 1939 After The Battle of the River Plate
The Bismarck was sunk in 1941 & Scharnhorst in 1943?
Also didn't Tirpitz spend most of the war docked in a Norwegian Fjorde (albeit it still carried a very big potential threat) as opposed to engaging anything as The Germans were almost afraid to use it due to British naval / air supremacy. Then it was sunk by the RAF in any event.
So arguably the battleships were of limited worth in a changing era of naval warfare, i.e. the recognition of air craft carriers and air power (again with hindsight).
If all those Battleships were traded for U-boats then I think there is some mileage in a U-boat blockade "what if" against the UK.
Μύ
So do I - but it's worth a new thread, don't you think? -
Message 36
Posted by Little Enos Rides Again (U1777880) on Thursday, 9th March 2006
Yeah it probably is but as we both agree is it worth it....
!!! -
Message 37
Posted by Hasse (U1882612) on Thursday, 9th March 2006
Operation sealion was a dream like Napoleons some 140 years earlier,as long RN was the master of the sea.
But if the Germans had managed by some fluke to put some divisons over in a save bridgehead had you losed.
The Germans had just spanked both yours best and the French behinds,and the GB army including dads was no match.
Since the Germans did behave correct in France,would they probably do it in GB to and respect the old men in uniform.
Hasse -
Message 38
Posted by Little Enos Rides Again (U1777880) on Friday, 10th March 2006
Hasse,
I would go back to my original point of it depends whether they could land sufficient armour to support any infantry / paratroopers.
I would agree that in 1940 the Germans outclassed us in terms of military capability but without sufficient tank support I think any beachhead would be doomed within a couple of days.
I personally think that an amphibious assault of the UK in 1940 was a tad to ambitious fo Hitler and he probably knew it. The logistics of attempting such a scheme in 1940 would be hugely ambitious and very costly in manpower for the Germans. Look at the casualties suffered in Crete, I imagine any attempt on the UK mainland would be a complete blood bath. -
Message 39
Posted by Hasse (U1882612) on Friday, 10th March 2006
Little Enos
Yes as long the RN was the master was Sealeion a pipedream.
In war can flukes happen I admitt the chanses was slim,as both Hitler and German HQ know.If howewer the Germans against the odds had manage to get two or thre divisions over(no lightweight paras),but real divisions at say Dover.
Would you have been doomed,because owning both sides of Pas de Calais,would a joint effort of Luftwaffe,Kriegsmarine and artillery be strong enough to keep RN at bay,and keep the supply line open for more troops and muntion,if the Germans managing to take an airfield or two in England would the disaster come rather quick.
We did know what happenend RN was as usually on their toes and didnt give Wermacht the opening.
Y friend
Hasse -
Message 40
Posted by Turnwrest (U2188092) on Friday, 10th March 2006
Hasse :
I sort of agree with you - but I think they'd have needed more than 2-3 divisions - more like 4-5. Even without RN intervention, they hadn't the resources to lift that many in any timescale that didn't expose them to the risk of being defeated in detail. I think that, as long as the British Army was prepared to resist, an invasion was infeasible. If morale had collapsed, a descent or an occupation might have been possible.
According to his secretary, Jock Colville's memoirs, Churchill reckoned the invasion threat was illusory, but needed it to inspire continued defiance and avert the risk of a negotiated peace.
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