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British Army 1914-18

• Message 1.Ìý

  Posted by Plank (U1462986) on Monday, 13th February 2006

  Historian Christopher Bassford:
  
  The performance of Britain's small professional army in 1914, as personified in the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), was impressive. Its leaders, with a few notable exceptions, were certainly not stupid men, and whatever errors they made were matched or exceeded by their counterparts in virtually every other European army.
  
  It was the British army and nation that stood up best to the moral, political, and military stresses of the long struggle, and it was British arms that led the victorious campaign of late 1918. After all, in ninety-five electrifying days from 8 August to 11 November 1918, the British army in France fought nine great battles, equal to or exceeding any of its operations in the Second World War, capturing as many guns and prisoners as the French, Americans and Belgians put together.
  
  Going on with a less calibre Historian who is very well respected:
  
  1. Lack of staff officers trained correctly.
  2. Hindsight is the killer of all battlefield analysis.
  3. Vast expantion of army, inexperience of handling it.
  4. The fact that the German army was far more advanced on orgainsational skills of a large army from pre war.
  5. The Germans were dug in on ground of their choosing in alot of instances.
  6. The french were for much of the war pulling the strings of British GHQ and thus effecting certain attack policy.
  7. The mental set/attitude of the Victorian officer.
  8. Just because hundreds of thousands died does not mean that they did not care.
  
  (Even so) The casualty rate in the Austro-Hungarian Army was an incredible 90% (as a proportion of the total number of men mobilized). For France and Russia the rate was 76.3%, for Germany it was 64.9%. In stark comparison the same rate within the British and Empire forces was 35.8% (Source: National Archives).
  
  Ultimately I have to agree with John Terraine who blamed the Germans, sitting up there on ground of their choosing, behind deep concrete emplacements prepared over many months. The Generals in fact were merely doing their duty, which was succinctly summarised by Field Marshall Bill Slim: "… the commander has failed in his duty if he has not won victory … for that is his duty. He has no other comparable to it."
  
  Finally I venture to suggest that our collective national memory of WW1 would be enhanced if the school curriculum focused upon the 100 days of the opening campaign in 1914 (Mons, Le Cateau, Marne, Aisne etc) then contrasted these with the ‘Hundred Days Campaign’ of 1918: Amiens, Albert, Scarpe, Havrincourt, Epehy, Hindenburg Line (the greatest victory and feat of arms in British Military history) Flanders, 2nd Le Cateau, Selle, Sambre. But who recalls those victories now?
  
  True, there is an ongoing story of success missed by inches, but as has already been stated, the learning curve was steep and treacherous and the technology to conduct a successful breakthrough wasn't available. That is NOT to deny that the successful British generals (Plumer comes to mind) gained successes beforehand by careful planning - it is when this careful planning had to be sacrificed to careless decisions from senior commanders or politically motivated haste from allies that things came unstuck.
  
  Haig certainly got some things very wrong, and made some terribly costly mistakes, but others (on BOTH sides) did as badly or worse (often much worse) and ultimately I think he did better than most.
  
  
  

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• Message 2

  , in reply to message 1.

  Posted by Mark (U1347077) on Monday, 13th February 2006

  While you make valid points, there is the Somme offensive. While an attack was necessary to support the British allies and the expanded British Army was barely trained, I hardly see walking men towards prepared positions for five months as commendable. Further, the French achieved their objectives on the first day - yet our commanders were unwilling to learn things like a creeping barrage from the French.
  
  Yes, by 1918 the British Army was experienced and better led but the daily loss rate was still higher than in 1916. Worse, the only way the commanders learned was through trial and error - which is fine as long as its not killing people. It is hardly genius to notice that if you lose tens of thousands of men at Ypres and Passchendale in frontal assaults in sinking mud then your plan needs modification.
  
  Time and again, opportunities were wasted - Messine Ridge and Cambrai for example.
  
  In my opinion, the British General Staff learned far too slowly and the cost was hundreds of thousands of lives.

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• Message 3

  , in reply to message 2.

  Posted by Plank (U1462986) on Monday, 13th February 2006

  Your comments are wrong (like many a folk on this forum). They walked on that first July day because the week long barrage was supposed to have destroyed the tenches. No one knew how elobarate the German defences were. In that they were hiding underground and only needed to come out when the barrage lifted and man the machine guns.
  
  Rawinson wanted a 'Bite and hold' assault. Where terrain is held until gunas and men are brought up. Haig wanted more sufficent gains and this stems another problem of not marrying the two together during the campaign
  
  The French did not employ the "creeping barrage."
  Besides the front they attacked was weaker and shorter. They had far more guns per mile than the British did. The "creeping barrage" came in on August from Englishman Artillery man Henry Horne.
  
  The French Army was quite different in terms of experience. All men were liable for military duty in peacetime. By the time the Somme got underway, the French had already been involved in the prolonged campaign in the Artois region, as well as Verdun. So plenty of time and reason to hone their small unit infantry tactics.
  
  The British had success in the south. In the North is where the casualties came from. This is because counter battery and supressing fire techniques were exployed better in the south and stopped the German artillery causing the most casualties. 68% of casualties in the Great War came from artillery.
  
  By the Sommes end in November, the Germans suffered more deaths than the British, with roughly the same or more divisions than the British had.
  
  The German figures are included in a German Medical report.
  
  I don't agree with your other blind points either. But for times sake i won't get into individual battles.
  
  Take it easy.

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• Message 4

  , in reply to message 3.

  Posted by Mike Alexander (U1706714) on Tuesday, 14th February 2006

  No one knew how elobarate the German defences were. In that they were hiding underground and only needed to come out when the barrage lifted and man the machine guns.
  Ìý
  
  No one knew how duff the British shell supply was either. The proportion of dud shells was enormous. In most areas, the barrage failed to break the German wire entanglement, merely lifting it off the ground, and dropping it back in place intact.
  
  It is also thought that the 'walking attack' was due to the military elite underestimating the intelligence and adaptability of the predominantly working class (and admittedly undertrained) troops of 'Kitchener's Army'.

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• Message 5

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  Posted by DocMike15 (U3167117) on Tuesday, 14th February 2006

  Perhaps instead it was the failure of a high command who failed to put all the evidence available together (the depth of the german trench system, etc) together with an inability to learn lessons from earlier battles. Despite the backlash against the 'Lions led by Donkey's' view of the western front, the fact remains that the british made mistakes, and then contained to make the same mistakes again and again. True, they were always to be at a disadvantage do to the germans dominating the ground (because of their ability to withdraw from an unfaviouable line), but this does not excuse the use of attrition as a tatic. Ultimately, most commanders seem to have little or no imagination as what to do, but instead seemed to realy on 'one more push'.

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• Message 6

  , in reply to message 1.

  Posted by rufus_dawes (U2940090) on Wednesday, 15th February 2006

  no thread on ww1 would be complete without an australian perspective so here it is:
  
  the professional british army who were thrown into the initial battles of ww1, such as mons and the marne deserve all the accolades they were given. they brought glory upon themselves as well as their regiments in the way they fought a far superior force to a standstill. that i believe is beyond dispute.
  
  what is constantly disputed and for good reason i believe, is the way in which the humble soldier was treated (whether they were britsh, australian or german it matters not).
  
  campaigns such as galipolli, fromelles, the somme etc etc etc demonstrated time and time again that a huge void existed between those who did the actual fighting and those who were supposed to do the thinking for those men.
  
  whilst we could say that all men tried their best, the very number of casualties inflicted in this war is a sad indictment on many high ranking officers who were given the responsibility of those men's lives.
  
  if a school curriculum does allow for a closer inspection of ww1 as suggested,i firmly believe that whilst the victories of the british EMPIRE should be investigated and analysed, far more emphasis should be placed on what impact or cost these victories ultimately came at.
  
  by all means promote those individuals whose deeds and valour deserve it, but also do not be scared to look the truth in the eye and say their were many who were wrong.
  
  to ignore a balanced and objective view of this conflict is to deny justice to all those who suffered and died at the hands of a callous few.
  
  

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• Message 7

  , in reply to message 3.

  Posted by Mark (U1347077) on Wednesday, 15th February 2006

  I am aware that the plan was to blast the German trenches apart and a third of British shells failed to explode and there were very few heavy calibre guns and that German losses were equally heavy - given the percentage due to artillery, this seems unsurprising. Also, that the weather tended to be exceptionally bad for the Battles around Ypres.
  
  If the French did not use the creeping barrage then I stand corrected - I had the information from a TV program.
  
  I still fail to see how two years - mid 1916 to mid 1918 - with no progress can be seen as in any way indicate a clever strategy. If the over-all aim was attrition then it worked and given all the factors perhaps it was the only way but it hardly seems an effective means of winning.
  

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