Wars and Conflicts听 permalink
could Iraq been a more effective foe??
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Message 1.听
Posted by mik366 (U2920296) on Monday, 9th January 2006
during the 1990/91 gulf conflcit could Iraq have proved a more effective force agaist the coalition forces?? any one got any ideas on how this???
cheers mike -
Message 2
Posted by U2907000 (U2907000) on Monday, 9th January 2006
If this is history then it most be catagorised as the more recent sort. What is more it is hardly a good idea to give a way tips to any of the US and UKs potential foes about how best to outsmart them. And finally the force on the allied side at that time was so overwhelming and Saddams military and industrial infrastructure had been so thoroughly destroyed so it is really quite difficult to contemplate anybody in Saddam shoes to in any way prevent the inevitable, at the most drag it out for some time.
And interesting aside is that Osama-bin Laden actually proposed to King Fahd that he and his men could do the job, after they came back from aghanistan. When Fahd declined the offer, Osama moved to Sudan. Knowing how determined arab nationalists at the moment are putting the worlds most powerful military machine on a sewere test in Iraq, and coming fresh from Aghanistan with high morale after in the most spectacular way having kicked the mighty Soviet army out, it is highly likely that they would have succeeded in this relatively minor job --- and at only a fraction of the cost. -
Message 3
Posted by expat32 (U2025313) on Monday, 9th January 2006
And interesting aside is that Osama-bin Laden actually proposed to King Fahd that he and his men could do the job, after they came back from aghanistan. When Fahd declined the offer, Osama moved to Sudan. Knowing how determined arab nationalists at the moment are putting the worlds most powerful military machine on a sewere test in Iraq, and coming fresh from Aghanistan with high morale after in the most spectacular way having kicked the mighty Soviet army out, it is highly likely that they would have succeeded in this relatively minor job --- and at only a fraction of the cost.
听
Hi Alf,
Would you like to rethink your conclusions in the above paragraph. I thought the first half of your post was pretty good.
Cheers. -
Message 4
Posted by DL (U1683040) on Monday, 9th January 2006
Well,
Speaking from the perspective of an ex-squaddie who went through the 1st Gulf War, no, not a chance. They had over-confident leadership and cast-off Soviet era Russian equipment for the main. So, they were equivalent to a Soviet Army from about 1975, and they were opposed by the army which had trained to fight World War III in Western Europe. Basically, they were outclassed and outfought from the moment the ground war opened. Yes they were a very large powerful army, and were unsurpassed in the Middle East (with the exception of the Israelis), but they were basically up against the best armed forces in the world.
Firstly, the air campaign was highly effective, causing disruption and destroying equipment as well as shattering morale. It must have been hell to know that everytime you heard a jet engine, it was guaranteed to be an enemy, not a friendly plane. Apache gunships did their part by picking off command and control vehicles and destroying defensive strongpoints. The effect that the air campaign had was pretty obvious from the way that Iraqi soldiers began to surrender en masse as soon as they found someone to surrender to.
We all thought at the time that they would put up stiff resistance and we expected chemicals to be used freely on the battlefield, but neither of these events happened. I guess it is all very well having a few thousand T55s and T72s, but up against M1 Abrams and Challengers firing DU rounds, they simply had no chance. I personally witnessed an engagement between T55s and Challengers where the Challengers were using Night vision gear, which the Iraqis had very little of, so the T55s were firing blindly at targets which they couldn't see (and even if they could see them, they were out of effective range anyway) while the Challengers simply picked off the tanks without even slowing down.
Add in the factor of Chobham armour (in M1s, Challengers and British Warriors) there were many instances where the Iraqis did score a hit, but the round simply bounced off the armour.
I may well be biased as one who fought in that campaign, but my opinion is that the army which assembled in Saudi Arabia to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait was one of the most effective and powerful fighting forces ever assembled. Credit must also be given to General Franks, the US commander who devised the battle plan. He planned to defeat the Iraqis comprehensively and totally, with as few casualties on his own side as possible, and he accomplished his aim (although IMO his battle plan borrowed very heavily from Von Manstein!!!) almost completely-the plan was to encircle and destroy the Republican Guard completely, some of them got away.
So basically, from the moment the UN resolution was passed to kick them out by force, they had no choice but to retreat (impossible in that part of the world-face saving is very important in the Middle East) or to be defeated. Saddam's only hope was to drag Israel in to the war (hence the missile attacks on Israel) and force the Arab contingents to break from the coalition. That failed even though I suspect the Israelis must have been itching to bomb Baghdad!
Cheers
DL -
Message 5
Posted by U2907000 (U2907000) on Monday, 9th January 2006
Colin Powell was unwilling to commit US forces, having the traume of Vietnam burned and stamped into his soul. It was Brent Scowcroft(National Security adviser) who from day one insisted that America had to liberate Kuwait, and little by little Powell came around to this.
Osama was a hero all over the arab world, small boys being given the name. The US was as I have stated not sure if it was worth it, the wobbly Bush Sr. hardly had any idea of his own, it was Scowcroft who decided that the US had to do it, and he together with James Baker (Foreign Secretary) began the ingeneous building up of a record-braking 90 nation + coalition, which decisively and cleverly included all the arab countries. -
Message 6
Posted by DL (U1683040) on Monday, 9th January 2006
If this is history then it most be catagorised as the more recent sort. What is more it is hardly a good idea to give a way tips to any of the US and UKs potential foes about how best to outsmart them. And finally the force on the allied side at that time was so overwhelming and Saddams military and industrial infrastructure had been so thoroughly destroyed so it is really quite difficult to contemplate anybody in Saddam shoes to in any way prevent the inevitable, at the most drag it out for some time.
And interesting aside is that Osama-bin Laden actually proposed to King Fahd that he and his men could do the job, after they came back from aghanistan. When Fahd declined the offer, Osama moved to Sudan. Knowing how determined arab nationalists at the moment are putting the worlds most powerful military machine on a sewere test in Iraq, and coming fresh from Aghanistan with high morale after in the most spectacular way having kicked the mighty Soviet army out, it is highly likely that they would have succeeded in this relatively minor job --- and at only a fraction of the cost.
听
Alf,
You are joking aren't you? We're talking about Saddam Hussein's Iraq here, where you only needed to be suspected of being anti-Saddam to wind up in a mass grave.
If al-Qaeda attempted to start anything in Iraq, the terrorists, their families, their neighbours and everyone connected would have wound up in a hole in the desert! Terrorism is a complex way to fight a war, and it only works against conventional armed forces. Against Saddam's well established Mukharabat organisation, they would have been rounded up and shot sharpish. This was a totalitarian regime, with a combination of local popular support, and complete fear of being rounded up. A totally different situation to that in Afghanistan (a highly unpopular Communist regime, reinforced by a foreign power).
The Soviets in Afghanistan faced the same problem that Western forces do now (and do in Iraq)-they are considered "Un-Islamic" and so the Jihadi element aids recruitment as well as inspiring fanaticism. The Religious element to the war (attempting to raise it to the level of a "holy struggle") is the factor which defeated the Soviets, and would not have worked against Saddam for the simple reason that they can't say it is a holy Jihad to free our "Muslim Brothers and Sisters" since they would be directly and undeniably attacking Muslims.
I haven't heard of any "offer" by bin Laden to free Kuwait, but I'd doubt its authenticity since had al-Qaeda done this, they would have been a bigger threat to the Saudi Royal family than Iraq! Very doubtful. Bin Laden is only supposed to have got mad with the US after the first Gulf War, because of the fact that there were still US forces based in the "holy" land of Saudi Arabia. Shame he didn't take on Saddam, he'd have been dead long before we'd heard of him.
DL -
Message 7
Posted by DL (U1683040) on Monday, 9th January 2006
Colin Powell was unwilling to commit US forces, having the traume of Vietnam burned and stamped into his soul. It was Brent Scowcroft(National Security adviser) who from day one insisted that America had to liberate Kuwait, and little by little Powell came around to this.
Osama was a hero all over the arab world, small boys being given the name. The US was as I have stated not sure if it was worth it, the wobbly Bush Sr. hardly had any idea of his own, it was Scowcroft who decided that the US had to do it, and he together with James Baker (Foreign Secretary) began the ingeneous building up of a record-braking 90 nation + coalition, which decisively and cleverly included all the arab countries.听
Alf,
Colin Powell was the US Chief of General Staff if my memory serves me correctly. A serving soldier. As such, he has no say on whether the country commits its armed forces. He takes orders from his country's government, he can't be "unwilling" to take orders.
Also, if you knew anything about the US army by 1990, it was a VERY different army to the demoralised mess which emerged after Vietnam. If Powell was psychologically affected by Vietnam to the extent where he didn't trust his own army, he would never have risen so high in the military.
You are way off the mark.
DL -
Message 8
Posted by expat32 (U2025313) on Monday, 9th January 2006
Colin Powell was unwilling to commit US forces, having the traume of Vietnam burned and stamped into his soul. It was Brent Scowcroft(National Security adviser) who from day one insisted that America had to liberate Kuwait, and little by little Powell came around to this.听
I wish I could respond to this post with a bit more time, but I have to get to work. Alf you are right on with this. Colin Powell was promoted over other better qualified Generals because of our Affirmative Action policies in the US. He did NOT want to commit to Kuwait at all. In addition he advised Bush SR to stop the war way way to early. I would have given anything to hear the big bear's reply to him, but we will never know because ole Swartzkop (sp) was too much of a professional to make it public.
Cheers. -
Message 9
Posted by U2907000 (U2907000) on Monday, 9th January 2006
Thank you for bringing this up about US troops on holy Saudi Soil, and reminding me. In retrospect it was a huge blunder to do it, so those in the US who were reluctant to commit US troops may have ahd a 6 th. sense that thsi was dangerous and not in the US long term interest. Those troops became the REASON why Osama turned on America!!! Thank you DL for bringing it up!!! This is SOOO important!!
Had Osama and his men done the job of ousting Saddam from Kuwait (DL I think you misunderstood, I (and Osama) was only talking of ousting Saddam from Kuwait like they did the mighty russian army from aghanistan) then no 9/11, I am most certain, no attack on US Cole, no East african bombings.
P:S: It was Osama himself who said this to Robert Fisk, the ONLY western journalist who have interviewed him. I shall try to find the exact link. In the meantime I have this Robert Fisk story from 2002. Note that the US troops have since been removed from Saudi.
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Congratulations, America. You have made bin Laden a happy man.
THE INDEPENDENT
Robert Fisk - 22 January 2002
>And whether we like it or not, many Saudis believe that American troops are occupying their country, that the very presence of US soldiers in the Kingdom is a crime. King Fahd, of course, invited the Americans into Saudi Arabia in 1990, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. President Bush senior promised the Arabs they would leave when the threat of Iraqi occupation was over. But they are still there.<
***
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Message 10
Posted by U2907000 (U2907000) on Monday, 9th January 2006
What I mean is the US should have lived up to its promise of leaving Saudi IMMEDIATELY after having liberated Kuwait. By not doing so they provided fuel for all the traditionalists in the arab world, not just Saudis. Saudi Arabia is special by being the caretakers and custodians of the holy cities Mecca and Medina, holiest of holy in the muslim world, which any muslim has to visit at least once in his lifetime.
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Message 11
Posted by U2907000 (U2907000) on Monday, 9th January 2006
Here I will have to correct Expat, who wrote:
>in addition he advised Bush SR to stop the war way way to early.<
As I have sketched out the purpose of the war was to oust Saddam from Kuwait. This everybody had agreed on in the 90 nation + coalition that Baker so painstakingly had assembled. A promise was given to the arabs in exchange for their crucial support: a peace process should be started as soon as the war was over, between israelis and palestinians. James Baker delivered as a matter of course, when he in June 1991 forced Yithak Shamir to the negociation table in Madrid, later to be continued in Oslo and signed in Washington in september 1993. To say that the US could have continued to Bagdad at that time, is non-sense. This would indeed had made the US look foolish in the eyes of the world, it would look unpredictable, unable to hold word, - not the role the US government at the time felt was worthy of the country which just have won the cold war and was emerging as the worlds only superpower and prime upholder of order. And HAD they advanced to Bagdad, " we would probably still be stucked in a quagmire" as Brent Scowcroft, that remarkable and clever man, said in an interview in 1996. -
Message 12
Posted by DL (U1683040) on Monday, 9th January 2006
Good point Alf,
I stand well and truly corrected on Powell, how on earth can someone with that opinion have reached such a high rank in the US army!!!
I would expect that the concern of the Saudis was that bin Laden may well have been a key figure in ousting the Russians from Afghanistan, but he was a very VERY loose cannon. Had he used his mujahideen to liberate Kuwait, the chances of an army of Islamic Fundamentalists handing back Kuwait to its ruling families are pretty slim indeed. So, this would have left the Saudis with a massive problem, an extremist Islamic state on their doorstep. Not exactly what they want really.
It takes little additional imagination to imagine the spread of fundamentalist Islam into Saudi, with the objective of overthrowing the Saudi Royals and having an Islamic Republic. There was no way that the Saudis would have allowed this to happen IMO. Had the Mujahideen been involved in liberating Kuwait, we would have seen a very different world than today. Who knows how the Middle East would look now!
Scary.
DL -
Message 13
Posted by mik366 (U2920296) on Monday, 9th January 2006
fisrt of all i would like to thank you all for your responses!
to answer Alf-Ventress question about if the 1990/91 conflict consititues 'history', i think we can all see that this period has huge significance for us today and surely is one of the most studied fileds in contemporay military histroy!!
also i am not looking for people to suggest 'tips' for the enemies of the US and UK as he suggests, rather i was hoping for aome analsis of the methods Iraq used during the conflict.
The ones that strike me are Saddams use of hostages, his use of propaganda and pre war negotaitions with soviets and France, involvement on Israel and the genreal use of terror in out of theatre operations. all of these could of been used to much more effect! and in so made Iraq a mroe effective foe!
I think on the political level the involement of Israel would have been the most effective method, yet on the stratgeic military level i think it has been shown that it was the wide open western flank that should have been addressed in order to make Iraq more effective!
i would appreciate any ones views on the above, and any ideas that i have missed??
thanks mike -
Message 14
Posted by U2907000 (U2907000) on Monday, 9th January 2006
>I stand well and truly corrected on Powell, how on earth can someone with that opinion have reached such a high rank in the US army!!!<
Here is the story:
(I wholeheartedly recommend this interview with this wise pragmatic former Air Force General, Brent Scowcroft, who has now critisised the son of his best friend - something he did not feel he could earlier.You should at least bookmark it to read later)
*
T-H-E...N-E-W-Y-O-R-K-E-R
BREAKING RANKS
What turned Brent Scowcroft against the Bush Administration?
by JEFFREY GOLDBERG
Issue of 2005-10-31
>Shortly before the National Security Council meeting began, General Colin Powell, who was then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told General Norman Schwarzkopf, 鈥淚 think we鈥檇 go to war over Saudi Arabia, but I doubt we鈥檇 go to war over Kuwait.鈥 For the moment, at least, Powell鈥檚 assessment reflected the President鈥檚 mood. Minutes before the meeting, Bush had told reporters that he was not contemplating an armed response. Scowcroft had been listening to the President as he spoke to the press, and the comment immediately struck him as unwise. 鈥淩ight at the beginning, I believed that it鈥濃攖he Iraqi invasion of Kuwait鈥斺渨as intolerable to the interests of the U.S.,鈥 he told me recently.
At the time, Scowcroft, a retired Air Force general, was notably hawkish on the Iraq question, more so than the Secretary of State, James A. Baker III, and perhaps even more so than Dick Cheney, who was Bush鈥檚 Secretary of Defense. Scowcroft believed that if Saddam鈥檚 aggression was left unanswered it would undermine the international rule of law; it would also, he thought, compromise America鈥檚 standing in the world at a moment鈥攖he end of the Cold War鈥攖hat was otherwise filled with promise.
Scowcroft is a prot茅g茅 of Henry Kissinger鈥攈e was his deputy when Kissinger was Richard Nixon鈥檚 national-security adviser. Like Kissinger, he is a purveyor of a 鈥渞ealist鈥 approach to foreign policy: the idea that America should be guided by strategic self-interest, and that moral considerations are secondary at best. But Bush and Scowcroft also spoke expansively about the possibilities for America in the Cold War world, about a New World Order built on benign but resolute American leadership and multilateral co枚peration. The United States, Bush said in 鈥淎 World Transformed,鈥 a book that he later co-wrote with Scowcroft, had a 鈥渄isproportionate responsibility鈥 to use its power 鈥渋n pursuit of a common good.鈥 Iraq鈥檚 invasion of Kuwait was a direct challenge to Bush鈥檚 understanding of America鈥檚 role in the world.
There were initial doubts among some of Bush鈥檚 advisers. Colin Powell, like many military men shaped by the experience of the Vietnam War, was disinclined to send American troops into battle, and he cautioned the National Security Council against imprudent action. 鈥淢y first questions had to do with defending Saudi Arabia, and the importance of having a clear political understanding first of what we were doing,鈥 Powell told me recently. 鈥淏rent immediately saw that the invasion had to be reversed. He was a little further forward on the need to do something.鈥
Scowcroft argued unyieldingly for intervention, and his view prevailed. Within days, Bush announced, 鈥淭his will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait鈥濃攁 burst of fortitude that commentators later attributed to a comment from Margaret Thatcher (鈥淒on鈥檛 go all wobbly on us, George,鈥 she reportedly told him). Scowcroft, whose modesty may be pronounced to the point of ostentation, loyally insists that the President arrived at his decision alone, but several of Scowcroft鈥檚 former colleagues said that it was Scowcroft鈥檚 firmness, along with Thatcher鈥檚 prodding, that strengthened Bush鈥檚 resolve to confront Saddam. Scowcroft is 鈥渘ot a blowhard,鈥 the senior Bush told me in a recent e-mail. 鈥淗e has a great propensity for friendship. By that I mean someone I can depend on to tell me what I need to know and not just what I want to hear, and at the same time he is someone on whom I know I always can rely and trust implicitly.鈥< -
Message 15
Posted by U2907000 (U2907000) on Monday, 9th January 2006
And the link:
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Message 16
Posted by U2907000 (U2907000) on Monday, 9th January 2006
DL I only included this about Osama as an aside, but it is quite interesting if he really could have done it.
It is off course mighty difficult to see how one could launch an invasion into Kuwait without using Saudi as a stepping stone, but at least they could have gotten out quickly, as far as I understand George Senior promised this himself - for all it is worth (1.read my lips, no more taxes only to raise taxes. 2. Urging shias to rise giving them the strong impression that the US would come to the rescue, which they couldn't as I have sketched out above).
By not getting out they really provided Osama and Al Queda with its greatest motivating factor for all the terror that we have seen since, and that they have taken responsibility for. The other motivating factor is US support for Israel, but Osama being a Saudi Citizen it is likely to assess that this reason ranges higher than the other. -
Message 17
Posted by Idamante (U1894562) on Monday, 9th January 2006
during the 1990/91 gulf conflcit could Iraq have proved a more effective force agaist the coalition forces?? any one got any ideas on how this???
cheers mike听
What if, after invading Kuwait, Saddam's army had carried on into Saudi Arabia and nabbed all the military bases there? That would surely have made life a lot trickier for the coalition, wouldn't it?
This is just off the top of me head, I look forward to being shot down in flames... -
Message 18
Posted by mik366 (U2920296) on Monday, 9th January 2006
i considered this idea too, yet it seems to me that in doing this Saddam would, though likey gain intial success in the long term these actions would secure his defeat and ultimate polictal downfall. Strategicly the US, indeed most of the develpled world would not stand by and let Iraq take control of a 3rd of the worlds oil! This would allow him to much control and so it seems that the world would commit to the defeat of Saddam with much more effort on their part and i doubt that Saddam would be able to remain in power, as he did after 1991!
thanks for your input though fella! -
Message 19
Posted by DL (U1683040) on Monday, 9th January 2006
during the 1990/91 gulf conflcit could Iraq have proved a more effective force agaist the coalition forces?? any one got any ideas on how this???
cheers mike听
What if, after invading Kuwait, Saddam's army had carried on into Saudi Arabia and nabbed all the military bases there? That would surely have made life a lot trickier for the coalition, wouldn't it?
This is just off the top of me head, I look forward to being shot down in flames...
听
Oooh tricky one!
Interesting "what if?" concept though, so I can't see anyone being shot down in flames.
I'd say that it becomes very tricky if Saddam has control of Saudi as well! You'd be looking at long term he would end up losing, there is no way that the world would let him have control of all that oil! But things become very tricky. You have two options militarily, a seaborne invasion the likes of which we haven't seen since D-day, or possibly a land attack from either Yemen or (dare I suggest it) Israel.
It becomes very complex politically though, as I doubt the presence of an Arab army in Israel would go down well in Israel, nor would Arab coalition mambers be too happy about it. The only other solution would be a land invasion through Turkey, Jordan and Syria (who could no doubt be persuaded to assist with promises of US economic aid/arms). We would however have the horrible prospect of fighting from the North of Iraq, right down to liberate Kuwait and Saudi, with massive economic and environmental damage (imagine what happened to Kuwait's oilfields multiplied by 100!!!). This could of course lead to Saddam being able to attempt to portray himself as the defender of Islam-the Islamic world would not stand for a US/UK armoured force smashing through Medina and Mecca. With the right propaganda he could tear the coalition apart, and maybe even create allies in the region.
However, if he failed to do this, we'd have an even more one-sided battle with Iraqi forces spread thinly, and just as vulnerable to western weapons superiority. If he succeeded, we could see a serious escalation of the conflict to encompass the entire middle east. IMO, the only real solution would be a sea-borne invasion. Either way, if Saddam had taken Saudi Arabia, we'd be looking at World War III in my opinion.
Cheers
Good post!
DL -
Message 20
Posted by U2907000 (U2907000) on Monday, 9th January 2006
He actually had some rationality, and only opted for Kuwait because it in his opinion is an old iraqie province carved out by the british in the 1920'iea when iraq in turn was puy together taking 3 provinces. He really thought he could get away with it. Now Kuwait is so small that he had it round up in probably half an hour.
For him ever to contemplate going into Saudi, there would have been amble time to bombard his forces from the air. And what you say about the difficulty of launching a seaborne invasion really does not hold, because Saudi Arabia is so vast, that nothing would be easier than finding an isolated desert to get ashore. But again Saddam is far from stupid, this Kuwait adventure was all about him gambling that nobody would bother to do anything about it, and indeed as we have seen, many of the keymembers of the US administration were reluctant to do anything in the beginning. -
Message 21
Posted by U2907000 (U2907000) on Monday, 9th January 2006
To quote from this memorable interview with Scowcroft again:
>At eight o鈥檆lock on the morning of August 2, 1990, President George H. W. Bush assembled his National Security Council in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Thirteen hours earlier, Saddam Hussein had sent his Army into Kuwait, and the Administration was searching for a response. Brent Scowcroft, the President鈥檚 national-security adviser, has an unhappy memory of that first meeting. The tone, he says, was defeatist: 鈥淢uch of the conversation in those early moments concerned the stability of the oil market. There was an air of resignation about the invasion.鈥<
'
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Message 22
Posted by marduk-slayer of tiamat (U2258525) on Monday, 9th January 2006
during the 1990/91 gulf conflcit could Iraq have proved a more effective force agaist the coalition forces?? any one got any ideas on how this???
cheers mike听
i dont htink the iraqi's could have proven a difficulty to the coalition as a whole, as they didnt have the motivation or training, and they had(if im right, which im probably not) outdated russian tanks and planes. against that we had vast technological superiority, air and naval superiority, better generals, and best of all, we had the british army!seriously though i dont think they could of had a chance rreally -
Message 23
Posted by expat32 (U2025313) on Monday, 9th January 2006
Hi DL,
Alf,
Colin Powell was the US Chief of General Staff if my memory serves me correctly. A serving soldier. As such, he has no say on whether the country commits its armed forces. He takes orders from his country's government, he can't be "unwilling" to take orders.听
The Chairman of the JCS ( the position that Powell held) is as you know the highest ranking soldier on active duty. The President is the Commander in Chief. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can鈥檛 make policy. It is his responsibility to implement the policies of the President. As a result The Secretary of Defense and the President rely heavily on the CJCS for advice of a military nature. Powell advised the President not to oust Saddam from Kuwait, of course once the President made up his mind against Powell鈥檚 recommendations, that was that. I would say he advised Bush SR to end the war too early. Not to necessarily go all the way to Bagdad, but to hammer at least the Republican Guard into the desert floor.
Also, if you knew anything about the US army by 1990, it was a VERY different army to the demoralised mess which emerged after Vietnam. If Powell was psychologically affected by Vietnam to the extent where he didn't trust his own army, he would never have risen so high in the military.
You are way off the mark.
DL听
Well I can understand your reasoning with this, but Colin Powell was no General Franks or Schwarzkopf. The Powell doctrine was overwhelming force. General Franks was as you know about the opposite. He also had more up to date weapons. Powell was a perfumed prince. Franks was a war fighter. Powell = politician, Franks = as soldier with the necessary social graces.
When Powell was a one star General, he got a really poor efficiency report from his Division Commander. This is normally the kiss of death for career progression, but Powell had friends in high places due to his Washington assignments. He was primed and babied along the way because he was a promising minority. This is our affirmative action policy in action (which I am not entirely against) I guess he would have made a decent Battalion Commander.
Cheers, Matt. -
Message 24
Posted by DL (U1683040) on Tuesday, 10th January 2006
Hi Matt,
Well, I must admit that I have learned quite a lot from this thread. I find it incredible that an officer can have no confidence in the fighting capability of his troops, and this alone should have resulted in Powell being told to hand in his uniform and go off to write bad novels. If a man in a position of leadership doesn't have confidence in his men, then that is his fault, since the ability of his men is due to the training and development of these men. Training an army is the responsibility of the men in charge.
He is a disgrace to his uniform and his men. I must admit that I agree with you that he will have influenced the premature end to the war (and the resultant mess that Iraq has become as a result), and so should accept responsibility for Saddam remaining in power. Reason why? If he influenced the war ending before the job was done (IMO just like Eisenhower stopping at the Rhine and saying, OK boys, we kicked Hitler out of France, lets go home-unthinkable.) and before the coalition could totally wreck the Republican Guard, then the burden of guilt for the failed uprising in 91, the slaughter of all those victims of Saddam's rule from 91-2003, the dead of the 2003 war and ongoing conflict lies at least partly on his shoulders.
An example of how not to be a general. With regards to all the Gulf War generals, Powell can only be seen in a bad light. Schwarzkopf, good organiser, managed to run an army made of 91 countries. A feat unsurpassed in organisational skill. Franks, master tactician, and excellent leader, his aim from day one was to wipe out the enemy and suffer minimal casualties on his own side. OK so he may have pinched his battle plan from Manstein or Guderian, but he did Blitzkrieg better than the Germans, and more than that, he cared about getting his men home. I have nothing but respect and admiration for the man (an example of positive discrimination working well-the man had lost a leg in Vietnam, and if he were British, would have been retired on a war pension there and then).
Cheers
DL -
Message 25
Posted by Alf-Ventress. (U2907150) on Tuesday, 10th January 2006
Now I have found the story, I told you about, the one about Osama offering his services to King Fahd:
>Bin Laden's story was as instructive as it was epic. When the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the Saudi royal family - encouraged by the CIA - sought to provide the Afghans with an Arab legion, preferably led by a Saudi prince, who would lead a guerrilla force against the Russians. Not only would he disprove the popularly held and all too accurate belief that the Saudi leadership was effete and corrupt, he could re-establish the honourable tradition of the Gulf Arab warrior, heedless of his own life in defending the umma, the community of Islam. True to form, the Saudi princes declined this noble mission. Bin Laden, infuriated at both their cowardice and the humiliation of the Afghan Muslims at the hands of the Soviets, took their place and, with money and machinery from his construction company, set off on his personal jihad.
A billionaire businessman and himself a Saudi, albeit of humbler Yemeni descent, in the coming years he would be idolised by both Saudis and millions of other Arabs, the stuff of Arab schoolboy legend from the Gulf to the Mediterranean. Not since the British glorified Lawrence of Arabia had an adventurer been portrayed in so heroic, so influential a role. Egyptians, Saudis, Yemenis, Kuwaitis, Algerians, Syrians and Palestinians made their way to the Pakistani border city of Peshawar to fight alongside him. But when the Afghan mujahedin guerrillas and Bin Laden's Arab legion had driven the Soviets from Afghanistan, the Afghans turned upon each other with wolflike and tribal venom. Sickened by this perversion of Islam - original dissension within the umma led to the division of Sunni and Shia Muslims - Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia.
But his journey of spiritual bitterness was not over. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, Bin Laden once more offered his services to the Saudi royal family. They did not need to invite the United States to protect the place of the two holiest shrines of Islam, he argued. Mecca and Medina, the cities in which the Prophet Mohamed received and recited God's message, should only be defended by Muslims. Bin Laden would lead his "Afghans", his Arab mujahedin, against the Iraqi army inside Kuwait and drive them from the emirate. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia preferred to put his trust in the Americans. So as the US 82nd Airborne Division arrived in the north-eastern Saudi city of Dhahran and deployed in the desert scarcely 400 miles from the city of Medina - the place of the Prophet's refuge and of the first Islamic society - Bin Laden abandoned the corruption of the House of Saud to bestow his generosity on another "Islamic Republic": Sudan.
Our journey north from Khartoum lay though a landscape of white desert and ancient, unexplored pyramids, dark, squat Pharaonic tombs smaller than those of Cheops, Chephren and Mycerinus at Giza. "The people like Bin Laden here," Kashoggi said, in much the way that one might comment approvingly of a dinner host. "He's got his business here and his construction company and the government likes him. He helps the poor." I could understand all this. He had just completed building a new road from the Khartoum-Port Sudan highway to the tiny desert village of Almatig in northern Sudan, using the same bulldozers he had employed to construct the guerrilla trails of Afghanistan; many of his labourers were the same fighters who had been his comrades in the battle against the Soviet Union. The US State Department took a predictably less charitable view of Bin Laden's beneficence. It accused Sudan of being a "sponsor of international terrorism" and Bin Laden himself of operating "terrorist training camps" in the Sudanese desert.<
**'
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Commentary:
There is nothing like knowing the thoughts of your opponents, which is why it is important to know this story, about how it was the CIA that urged the Saudis to come up with an army who could fight the soviets, and that Osama took charge, since no saudi princes would. -
Message 26
Posted by DL (U1683040) on Tuesday, 10th January 2006
Interesting stuff Alf,
It could be deduced that maybe the Saudis understood more about the nature of bin Laden than the West did. Equally it could be said that both the US and bin Laden underestimated the other's capacity for violence.
The US could never in its darkest dreams imagined a terrorist attack so horrific as 9/11, and had it done so, I am sure that they would have been more alert to the danger. It does however make me wonder, since years before 9/11, one of the US's most popular novelists, Tom Clancy wrote a novel depicting a fictitious war with the US and Japan, which ended with a vengeful airline pilot flying a 747 into the Capitol building (which was incidentally on the list of targets for 9/11's hijackers-the target that Flight 93-the one which fought back, and crashed in a field was intended for). It does make me wonder whether bin Laden's planners have a taste for Tom Clancy novels!
However, I doubt that bin Laden would have expected the US to respond with such ferocity and anger, and maybe he thought that it would have caused the US (under a President who was, at that time perceived to be weak) to withdraw into isolationism. I would guess that bin Laden is not a student of Western history, and this weakness in his knowledge let him down. Even Yamamoto, while planning the Pearl Harbor attack knew that the act he was planning was only likely to anger the most powerful industrial nation on earth. His words on hearing the news of the successful attack were "I fear we have merely awakened a sleeping tiger", and he knew that Japan was doomed to lose the war. Had bin Laden beware of this aspect in American nature, maybe he would have thought twice, since to bring down such a massive destructive force on yourself is insanity of the highest order.
It does strike me as odd, how all events in this chapter of history seem to be linked, rather like the analogy of chaos theory-a butterfly flaps its wings in the Himalaya, and this air current eventually causes a hurricane in the Caribbean. All these events, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the first Gulf War, the growth of al-Qaeda and bin Laden's influence throughout the 90s, minor terrorist incidents against Western target, the continued presence of US and UK forces in Saudi Arabia (as a safeguard due to the unfinished nature of the first Gulf War-Saddam not removed from power) causing further antagonism to Islamic fundamentalists, then 9/11, the war in Afghanistan and bin Laden disappearing off the Radar, finally the removal of troops from Saudi, and the invasion of Iraq, now the war between al-Qaeda inspired factions in Iraq and the Western occupation troops, and continued terror attacks from dozens of bin Laden inspired groups, all out for one thing, to destroy US interests.
A long continual chain of destruction. I wonder what will finally stop it? Or will this one just run and run?
Cheers
DL -
Message 27
Posted by Alf-Ventress. (U2907150) on Tuesday, 10th January 2006
It is one long tale of horrendous shortcomings and shortsighted decisions on part of the United States, this young country who does not understand the middle east. Generally americans thinks that there is just 2 kinds of people in the world, americans and those who wants to be americans. It is obvious that before (and if) they ever becomes that, some serious banging of heads are going to be done, as the americans are now learning the hard way in Iraq.
It really all began in 1953 when Mossadeh came to power in Iran. He nationalised an anglo-persian oilcompany, the british complained to Washington, and the CIA staged a coup and put the Shah on the trone. Now his secret police was exceptionally brutal. This compared to a rapid westernisation encompassing 6 lane freeways on pillars, greatly alienated a very traditional population, and was the reason cited by all with knowledge of the subject, for the islamic revolution in 1979. Then the americans backed Saddam and encouraged him to battle Iran, and provided satelite photography
for him showing iranian positions, as well as all kinds of weapons and munitions, including gas-grenades -and the gas he got from american and, it has just emerged ,dutch companies. It ended in a stalemate in 1988, and Saddam being so encouraged and well stocked in weapons then in 1990 felt inclined to invade Kuwait, where he got evicted in February 1991.
The long string of short-sighted decisions came full circle when the americans invaded Iraq in 2003, against the sound advice of such notable peronalities, as the former National Secrity adviser, Mr. Brent Scowcroft,- the architect of the first Gulf War. This time the architects were the neo-conservatives initiating a war without the support of such important organisations like the UN or the EU , with their own agenda, fighting for their own ends. In Richard Perles word: "So that there never should be another Holocaust." Given the fact that Saddam was a threat to no one, it really kind of shows the danger of having un-elected biased personalities tt close to power, so that they can manipulate the worlds sole superpower into fighting Israels Wars. There was also a strong desire among this group not to let the arabs have the final word about the goals of the war, as they had in 1991, when the arabs managed to get the promise of a peace process between the israelis and the palestinians in exchance of their support, which they got, when that process started in Madrid in June 1991.
Trouble is, the arabs strong concerns about this war has been proven right. So if we did not know it before, we have now all learnt that the pragmatic approach of Scowcroft is the most sensible. In other words: If you cannot get the support of the wider world and particularly the arabs, DONT venture into any wars in Arabia, or it is doomed to fail. -
Message 28
Posted by DL (U1683040) on Tuesday, 10th January 2006
One slight error there Alf,
The whole situation regarding the level of mistrust towards the West in the Arab world is (although the US are doing a great deal to encourage this lack of trust) not something to be blamed totally on the US. It goes much further back than that.
In 1917, the British Army encouraged the Arab tribes to unite under the leadership of Feisal, to fight against the Turkish Ottoman Empire alongside the British. They were encouraged to fight, to revolt against their Turkish masters, and even reached the extent of Islamic scholars in Mecca and Medina proclaiming Jihad against the Turks (which was utterly bizarre considering the Turks are Muslims, and the Arabs allied themselves to Britain and France-Christian nations). In return for their assistance in the war, they were promised independence if the allies defeated Turkey and Germany (Read TE Lawrence for the in depth version).
Meanwhile, back in Europe, a gentlemen from Britain named Mr Sykes met with a French bloke called Monsieur Picot, and they drafted a document called the Sykes-Picot agreement, which was essentially an Imperialist carve-up of the Middle East. This agreement created the nations we see in the region today. At Versailles, when the victors decided the fate of their defeated opponents, the promise of independence for the Arabs was totally forgotten. Basically, a colonial carve-up set the course of the turbulent history of the Middle East for the rest of the century. We Brits, and the French are the root cause of the distrust towards the west which prevails to this day. We reneged on a promise of freedom, and instead of independence, we simply exchanged the Turkish colonial master for a British or French one. The US had nothing to do with this. We did it all ourselves.
Granted that the US are exascerbating (sp?) the situation by playing at being the big boy on the block, but it is no different to how we behaved in the early 20th Century. So, it is the Good Old British Empire, along with the greedy French (who would have been speaking German had we not helped the out in 1914-18) who set the stage for the unholy mess that the Middle East has now become. They will not trust our motives in getting involved in their part of the world for generations to come, and who can blame them? We say we come to free them, well, we said that before, and we didn't free them then, we just occupied and exploited, so who can blame them if they think we will do different now? Especially when the "reconstruction" contracts in Iraq were all handed out (without tender) to Bush, Cheney and co's friends? Nothing like self help is there.
DL -
Message 29
Posted by dickyrock22 (U2927734) on Tuesday, 10th January 2006
I think that Sadam and the boys really were'nt up to the challenge when the US became involved in the 1st Gulf war. They just were'nt organised and when the US attacked they just could'nt handle it. I'm not surprised has his power was a product of fear within his own people. They really had no interest in fighting for him or protecting him why should they. I feel the rebel or insurgance in iraq today will cause more damage on the US army than Sadams so called army would ever have hoped to. As this is the people attacking the US and UK soldiers the enemy they cannot see, the invisable enemy and now I feel its the US and UK who cannot and will not be able to handle it. Same thing happened to the British in Northern Ireland. Iraq is just a bigger scale. The soldiers on the ground cannot tell who are innocent people and who are there enemy it is a nightmare situation that many Americans and British will regret ever being involved in. PT Belfast
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