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If Medina-Sidonia had taken his Armada

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  • Message 1.Μύ

    Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Sunday, 1st January 2006

    into Plymouth when he had the opportunity ... when the wind was blowing into the harbour and thus preventing Hawkins and the English from leaving, he probably could have wreaked havoc on the English fleet. The question I have is:

    If he had done so and had landed the troops present on board the Armada's ships, could he have taken England with the army he had -- without Parma's help?

    I've often wondered why he didn't do that. I know his second-in-command (name escapes me) wanted to, but Medinia-Sidonia turned him down...don't know why....

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  • Message 2

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by PaulRyckier (U1753522) on Tuesday, 3rd January 2006

    Re: Message 1.

    Eric,

    What a splendid "What if".

    Perhaps first we have to speak about the armies. I read for the Spanish Army: 150 ships, partly war ships, partly merchant ships, manned by a 30,000 men but I didn't find out how many were sailors. By the annexation of Portugal they had the Portuguese ships too, and those of Naples, perhaps galleys. On a French site I found: the English ships were finer, more manoeuvrable, with a heavier artillery. On an English site I read nearly the same: handling their ships expertly, and using long range guns...out-gunning and out-manoeuvring the ennemy...

    So the English could use whole other tactics than the Spaniards, I will use it further in my text.

    On the Spanish fleet there seems to have been only 40 pilots for 130 ships (due to the sources the Spanish fleet varies between 120 and 150) and that source asks: if they were familiar with the weather and the seas of the English Channel.

    The English fleet under Admiral Lord Howard would have had 197 ships, of which 34 were in the Navy and the rest were armed merchant ships.

    One has to consider for the tactical situation of 1588 that Sidonia had no friendly ports in the Channel, France being not a "friends" nation. And Holland with the help of the English the ennemies too. Only the Governor of Calais, Giraud de Mauleon was Catholic and hostile to the English and sympathetic to the Spaniards. Only Dunkirk and Sluis were in Spanish hands. I (being from Ostend) found only after more than half an hour research that Ostend was in "Staatse" (Calvinist) hands in 1588: Only conquered in 1604 by Spinola. It is unbelievable that in Dutch texts they speak from the "pirates" from Dunkirk and Nieuport acting for the Spaniards against the Dutch ships and in "Belgian" texts about the "pirates" from Ostend and Sluis (Sluis already turned hands in the meantime) from the Protestant "Watergeuzen". BTW. Antwerp was in that year already in Spanish hands but the Scheldt was closed by the "Watergeuzen" and their stronghold at Vlissingen.

    Even Parma was not able to manoeuver freely on the Flemish coast: "But it was too risky for the Armada to approach closer than Calais- The Dutch had removed naviagation markers and buoeys from the treacherous sandbanks all along the Flemish coast. Meanwhile the Spanish fleet had to wait-crowded together anchored in the strong tidal currents of the narrow seas close to Calais-waiting for Parma." "Shallow-drafted Dutch and English gunships lurked in the sandbanks off Dunkirk to harrass Parma's barges if his army set out to sea- one reason why he kept his barges hidden in the Flemish canals.

    There seems to have some friction between Parma and Sidonia, because Sidonia had the command. But I think that is clap-trap and the connections were more due to the difficult approach of the Flemish coast and the "Watergeuzen" masters of the Flemish coast and the waters near that coast and the difficult and long contacts between an army at sea and and army on land, not to forget the constant orders from a monarch, not in touch with any field reality. Both were excellent commanders and had proven that. I think besides all the former mentioned difficulties, as mentioned about Philip II, who thought that God guided him, he was the real cause of the catastrophy.

    To come back on the better trained and equipped English fleet and their better tactics. Gravelines 8 August 1988 ( 29 July for the English not changed to the Gregorian calendar) and perhaps at Plymouth too. The artillery of the English was more powerful and the Spanish, desorganized by 8 fire ships, tried to approach and to enter the English ships, but those stayed always away by their higher manoeuvrability.

    To close: the Spanish fleet was not defeated when they escaped to the North and they were about even with the English about 60 warships at each side.

    Now to your question Eric.

    I don't think with Parma nearly "jailed" with his twenty units? fleet on the Flemish coast by the Dutch and the English, it would have been wise to land near Plymouth and make a bridge head or to make havoc in the English fleet in Plymouth mentioned all the above. Altough you can be right perhaps when the fleets are in a narrow harbour and the Spanish could use their entering techniques? And it seems that the Spanish ships had a lot of "land" guns on board, who were more accurate on firm ground in for instance a bridgehead?

    Nearing closing time I have to end. My strategy would have been if I was Philip II (smile), divide the fleet into two groups, one group while they were in cresent formation and in open sea not that vulnerable for the English trying to make a bridgehead with the "fleet" army in the Island of Whight and with the other more war fleet going to Dunkirk and trying to enbark the army of Parma and than sail back to the Island of Whight to enlarge the bridgehead and bringing always more troops to the island as a base for the invasion of the mainland.

    Kind regards.

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  • Message 3

    , in reply to message 2.

    Posted by Euergetes (U2891066) on Thursday, 5th January 2006

    Hiya,

    I've just read a fantastic book on the Spanish Armada if you're interested. It's called:

    The Confident Hope of a Miracle by Neil Hanson
    (ISBN 0-552-14975-6).

    Much of what Paul has said is mentioned in the book (God I sound like the Author's agent!!)But there are also lots of other things that he mentions..

    Basically, the Armada was doomed to failure from the moment Philip decided to punish Elizabeth for the execution of Mary Queen of Scots and for her support of the Dutch.

    The first problem that the Spanish had was supplies. Drake's attack on Cadiz was followed up by attacks all along the Spanish coast and against the mackeral & herring fleets which were virtually eliminated. Fish provided the staple diet for the Spanish fleet so food became a problem even before the fleet sailed. There were also shortages of flour and meat (due to corrupt officials buying mouldy/rotten foodstuffs) and barrels (so water/wine was limited).

    Leadership was also an issue. Medina-Sidona was given the command when Don Alvao de Bazan, marquis of Santa Cruz died. Don Alvao was Spain's finest admiral. His second in command also died shortly after. Medina-Sidona only received the command because of his noble lineage and he write to Philip begging to not be given command. He has little navel experience. He is also hampered by Philip II. Philip issues explicit instructions to Medina-Sidona which he could not deviate from. The key instruction was that he was to sail to Parma and not make landfall in England.

    Navy: The English ships were 2-3 generations more advanced that even the newest of the Spanish ships. They were more manouverable but not necessarily lighter. The Ark Royal I think was comparible in size to M-S's flagship. They could sail into the wind and outperformed the Spanish in every respect.
    The weaponry they used were culverins and demi-culverins. Mostly manufactured in Calais (until lost to the French) and then in the Kentish Weald. The gun industry in Kent was one of the largest in Europe. It meant that the English used a standard shot type. The Spanish by contrast had to import (well beg, borrow and mostly steal) her cannon. Believe it or not, the English also sold the Spanish cannon.... They Spanish ordanance were different shapes and sizes. Some cannon could only be loaded by sailor climbing over the side with the cannonball. The English could fire every 4 minutes, the Spainish twice an hour.
    The English expected to fire at range and sink the ships with gunfire. The Spanish expected to grapple and engage hand to hand. To do this the armada had over 17,000 soldiers.
    A big mention also has to be made to the 'Sea Beggers' of the Spanish Netherlands whose shallow draft gunboats made sure that not only could Parma not move his troops by sea, but he could also not communicate with M-S. They also harried the Spanish after Gravelines sinking a fair few ships

    Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ advantage: The English were better sailors, had superb navigators and knew the English Channel 'like the back of their hand'. At the fighting in the Solent, Hawkins positions his ship in an eddy and encourages the galley to attack him. They the get caught in the current and suffer a terrible bombardment until they are forced to withdraw.

    Deus Vult. Philip believed he would win because he was doing God's Will. Any shortfalls / problems would be solved by divine providence


    With your 'what-if'.. Assuming M-S disobays his direct order and makes for Plymouth. He may well catch some of the English fleet there. The English fleet is split into 2 squadrons - one at Plymouth and one at Dover. I would imagine that they would be able to escape due to their local knowledge of tides / coast. However if the Spanish could close to hand-to-hand ships might well be captured.
    M-S lands an army of 17,000 men, all superbly trained and equipped and more than capable of defeating the English Militia. But, Plymouth is a long way from London - 2 to 3 week march perhaps and SW England at this time is not very fertile. Most, if not all of the food has been requisitioned by the english fleet. There are also food problems in the Spanish fleet.
    So M-S has to march for 2-3 weeks with hungry troops through hostile terrain and then at the end of it fight the English army.
    I'm not sure if it's winnable. if I was going to land, it would have been at Portsmouth.

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  • Message 4

    , in reply to message 3.

    Posted by Erik Lindsay (U231970) on Friday, 6th January 2006

    Hiya,

    With your 'what-if'.. Assuming M-S disobays his direct order and makes for Plymouth. He may well catch some of the English fleet there. The English fleet is split into 2 squadrons - one at Plymouth and one at Dover. I would imagine that they would be able to escape due to their local knowledge of tides / coast. However if the Spanish could close to hand-to-hand ships might well be captured.
    M-S lands an army of 17,000 men, all superbly trained and equipped and more than capable of defeating the English Militia. But, Plymouth is a long way from London - 2 to 3 week march perhaps and SW England at this time is not very fertile. Most, if not all of the food has been requisitioned by the english fleet. There are also food problems in the Spanish fleet.
    So M-S has to march for 2-3 weeks with hungry troops through hostile terrain and then at the end of it fight the English army.
    I'm not sure if it's winnable. if I was going to land, it would have been at Portsmouth.
    Μύ


    Some good points regarding the quality of the troops available to the Spanish on the Armada's ships....
    I think the an important point of the ''what if'' question is being missed, however. With the wind blowing INTO the harbours of Plymouth and Dover, the English ships would not have been able to leave their anchorages and use their superior mobility and armament against the Spaniards. The Armada had the weather gauge totally, and had they sailed into those harbours, they could have grappled with the English vessels and nothing short of the English vessels attempting to warp out of harbour could have prevented it....
    The question isn't really so much ''how could the English ships have defended themselves'' because IMO they couldn't have. You may think differently, of course, and if so, I'd be delighted to hear what you think could have been done. The real question is could Medina-Sidonia have done the job that Philip sent him to do with the troops he had on board his ships, and would Parma have been able to help him at all?

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