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Little Friends

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  • Message 1.Μύ

    Posted by expat32 (U2025313) on Saturday, 19th November 2005

    Bomber Harris or Hap Arnold. So who was correct, or were they both wrong, or in fact were both correct. If this theme is old hat to our more experienced board members, please humor us newbies with your patience. Was in your opinions more accurate bombing in daylight the way to go, or area saturation during the hours of darkness? Does your opinion change after the introduction of the" Little Friends?"
    Cheerz.

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  • Message 2

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by Lord Ball (U1767246) on Saturday, 19th November 2005

    The USAAF was massacred over Europe without protection of long range fighters when they first began daylight bombing raids. At one point, it was seriously considered by the USAAF to take the British advice and bomb at night or just call off their strategic bombing campaign completely. However, once the P-51 was brought into operations the casualty rate dropped dramatically. I think that they were both right in that when they combined daylight and night raids, the allied bombing campaign flattened Germany.

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  • Message 3

    , in reply to message 2.

    Posted by TonyG (U1830405) on Sunday, 20th November 2005

    The RAF get a lot of criticism now for Bomber Harris’s tactics. What has to be remembered is that, in war, the object is to win, and you can only use the tactics and technology available. The RAF had been brought up on Trenchard’s mantra that β€œthe bomber will always get through”. The development of fast single seat monoplane fighters proved this incorrect and early casualties in RAF Bomber Command were horrendous. They had two options – stop attacking Germany altogether, or switch to night raids. This is also what the Luftwaffe did during the London Blitz.

    Switching to night raids meant that the RAF could still demonstrate it was at least still fighting. Imagine the headlines if they stopped flying. β€œRAF too frightened to attack Germany!” Casualties were immediately reduced as night air defences were not nearly as effective as day defences due to lack of numbers of radar-equipped night fighters and the obvious benefits of concealment that darkness gives to attackers.

    This brought the problem that the bombers themselves could not see the target they were supposed to attack. Even if they had, the RAF did not have a bomb sight accurate enough for precision hits even in daylight.

    The USAAF deserve credit for persevering with daylight attacks without adequate fighter protection. As has been mentioned, the P51 was what enabled them to continue the daylight raids.

    Morally, of course, precision daylight raids are what every air force should have tried. However, anyone who fights a war on a moral stance of being fair and decent probably isn’t going to win. Why give the enemy a chance?

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  • Message 4

    , in reply to message 3.

    Posted by expat32 (U2025313) on Sunday, 20th November 2005

    Hi Tony,
    A super well informed post as usual. I would like to point out though that the USAAF was never turned back by the Luftwaffe even prior to the intro of the little friends.

    Cheerz.

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  • Message 5

    , in reply to message 4.

    Posted by TonyG (U1830405) on Sunday, 20th November 2005

    Hi expat. Granted the USAAF kept going. My point is that I don't know how long they could have kept going wihtout fighter escort. If the P51 had not come along, perhaps the USAAF would have switched to night bombing as well.

    As it turned out, of ourse, the combination of RAF by night and USAAF by day kept up a relentless pressure on Germany. To me, this always seemed more a lucky accident than a deliberate design.

    I have to say that, having seen photgraphs of the remains of some German towns after the RAF had carpet bomed them, I always feel rather rueful when I hear British TV talk of the London Blitz. Bad as it was, it was nothing to what Germay suffered at the hands of the RAF. I can understand why Bomber Harris has such a bad name, but as I mentioned above, I don't see what alternative he had.

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  • Message 6

    , in reply to message 1.

    Posted by arnaldalmaric (U1756653) on Sunday, 20th November 2005

    expat, daylight bombing was more accurate, but it's a relative term, both the USAAF and RAF bombing was inaccurate by todays standards.

    It is a happy coincidence (in my view) that they both stuck by their guns and didn't alter their tactics. Looking at the amount of resource Germany had to put into defence against the Americans by day and the RAF by night it tied up huge numbers of personnel and meant that the German armaments industry devoted much of its time to producing AA ammuntion. (Not to mention the large numbers of the feared 88's having to be deployed in their designed AA role, rather than in an Anti Tank Role).

    Where I think they both went wrong was in not assigning a higher level strategy to their efforts. By this I mean they should have concentrated earlier on a specific area of German Industry, probably power (electricity) production in order to have the most effect.

    RAF Bomber Command seems to have become somewhat blinkered during the war as to what it was meant to achieve. By this I mean rather than seeing itself as part of the means to an end, it became, in its eyes, the only means to an end.

    With the USAAF 8th Air Force joining in, they seem, in my opinion, to have been a little jealous of the attention RAF Bomber Command was getting. Understandable attention as Bomber Command was seen as an elite at the time, one reason the danger the crews were in, the other, Bomber Command was the only armed force Britain had that was seen to be striking directly at the Germans. So, I believe that the USAAF came in with a deliberate intent of proving they were different to (and by implication better) than the RAF.

    In summary, and to try to answer your points.

    Early in the Bomber war the only viable option was night bombing, otherwise the losses would have been unacceptable. So, here Harris is correct.

    With Arnold and the USAAF entry into the war then I believe he was right to try daylight bombing, the B17 was different enough to the Lancaster to try it. Also, if he hadn't have tried it would the P51 Mustang (Cadillac of the Sky) have been equipped with the long range tanks? No problem, no solution?

    Where I both feel they went wrong was having presented the Germans with a resource problem of defending attacks by day and night they didn't then switch tactics and all attack by day, or all attack by night, thus swamping the defences the Germans had. Then go back to day and night bombing.

    Both Arnold and Harris seem to have been men who were determined and single minded. (Not bad characteristics in the miltary). Neither seem to have had the flexibility required too adapt to changes. (Of this I'll admit Harris is probably more guilty).

    Cheers AA.

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  • Message 7

    , in reply to message 6.

    Posted by expat32 (U2025313) on Sunday, 20th November 2005

    Hi Arnold,

    Where I think they both went wrong was in not assigning a higher level strategy to their efforts. By this I mean they should have concentrated earlier on a specific area of German Industry, probably power (electricity) production in order to have the most effect.
    Μύ


    Once again Arnold, an interesting and unique post from you. I agree with most of it with the possible exception of parts of the above paragraph. Harris had little time for single target knockout missions. He IMO had the idea in order to shatter German moral he had to hammer the cities. After Goreing's attempt to do the same to the U.K. and fail it’s hard to understand his logic. Then again given his commitment to night bombing he did not always have much of a choice.

    Having just typed this I just remembered the Dam Busters, that brilliant mission must have been a daylight success? On the other hand Arnold wanted and went after when he could, factories, refineries, power plants, and German resources in general.

    Cheerz.

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  • Message 8

    , in reply to message 7.

    Posted by TonyG (U1830405) on Sunday, 20th November 2005

    Hi Arnold,

    Where I think they both went wrong was in not assigning a higher level strategy to their efforts. By this I mean they should have concentrated earlier on a specific area of German Industry, probably power (electricity) production in order to have the most effect.
    Μύ


    Once again Arnold, an interesting and unique post from you. I agree with most of it with the possible exception of parts of the above paragraph. Harris had little time for single target knockout missions. He IMO had the idea in order to shatter German moral he had to hammer the cities. After Goreing's attempt to do the same to the U.K. and fail it’s hard to understand his logic. Then again given his commitment to night bombing he did not always have much of a choice.

    Having just typed this I just remembered the Dam Busters, that brilliant mission must have been a daylight success? On the other hand Arnold wanted and went after when he could, factories, refineries, power plants, and German resources in general.

    Cheerz.Μύ


    Good point on the civilian morale, expat. Goering failed to break the Briutish spirit during the Blitz and Harris likewise failed in the night attacks on Germany. I have a suspicion that he may have used the "morale" angle as bit of spin. The fact was, the RAF cou dnot deliver pinpoint attacks, so he had to justify flattening whole cities somehow.

    As for the Dambusters, that was a night raid. Do you mean to say you haven't seen the film? The difference there was that the bombers were flying low and using special bombs to hit the dams because conventional high level attacks would not have worked. They needed a lot of special training, not to mention the expense of the bouncing bombs.

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  • Message 9

    , in reply to message 7.

    Posted by arnaldalmaric (U1756653) on Sunday, 20th November 2005


    Once again Arnold, an interesting and unique post from you. Μύ


    AA: why, thank you expat.

    I agree with most of it with the possible exception of parts of the above paragraph. Harris had little time for single target knockout missions. He IMO had the idea in order to shatter German moral he had to hammer the cities. After Goreing's attempt to do the same to the U.K. and fail it’s hard to understand his logic. Then again given his commitment to night bombing he did not always have much of a choice.Μύ

    AA: Well here what I was proposing was an all out bomber effort to destroy one single facet of industry. Something it's easy to propose with 20:20 hindsight. My point was both Arnold and Harris had an opportunity to defeat the Germans ability to wage war yet seemed to have passed it up. Again I'll say easy to say with 20:20 hindsight.

    Having just typed this I just remembered the Dam Busters, that brilliant mission must have been a daylight success? On the other hand Arnold wanted and went after when he could, factories, refineries, power plants, and German resources in general.Μύ

    The Dambusters was a night time mission as TonyG has pointed out. Arnold seems to have become fixated on German Industry in general, Harris upon the civilian population in general. Both essential to the war effort, however without a strategy of how too effectively cripple an enemy both will fail.

    I'll sign off now, AA.

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  • Message 10

    , in reply to message 9.

    Posted by DL (U1683040) on Monday, 21st November 2005

    AA,

    Spot on about the Dambusters. 617 squadron can probably take credit for being the world's first effective precision bombing force. After the Dams raid, they carried out dozens of precision ops, including the destruction of the V3 (long range multi-barrel gun for shelling London) site in France, the Tirpitz (actually missed by a 12,000 lb "Earthquake bomb", but it did so much blast damage-Barnes Wallis designed the bomb for this purpose-that is sank the ship anyway), the Bielefeld Viaduct (this time a 22,000 lb "Grand Slam" bomb, which also missed, but didn't need to hit as it caused so much shock damage), and the Kiel Canal (same bomb, same result) and no doubt many more...

    Arnold was indeed obsessed with industrial targets, and Harris with cities, but the campaign against industry, particularly against synthetic oil plants was highly effective indeed, and the Luftwaffe was practically grounded due to lack of fuel from late 1944 onwards. Another point regarding the introduction of the P51 as an escort fighter was that it practically destroyed the Luftwaffe's fighter force. The P51s were often let loose to go and harrass the German fighters and attack them, so basically no part of Germany was safe to fly in! Add to this the introduction of standing air patrols over German airfields (particularly ME 262 bases), and the German losses, not only in planes but in experienced pilots, practically destroyed the Luftwaffe. The standing patrols were somewhat devious, based on the idea that P51s, Spitfires, Tempests and Mosquitos could not fly faster than the ME262s, so they would lurk around waiting for the jets to come in to land, then get em as they came in slow. It wasn't very chivalrous or decent, but it worked a treat!

    Cheers
    DL

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