Wars and ConflictsÌý permalink
Stalingrad
This discussion has been closed.
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Message 1.Ìý
Posted by FowPah (U1746998) on Tuesday, 8th November 2005
Of all the events during WWII this battle seems to hold such a grim fascination.It really was a desperate struggle of epic proportions.
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Message 2
Posted by Lt_Henson (U2436367) on Tuesday, 8th November 2005
i agree. i am currently working on a novel based as stalingrad as the background. it is truely awsome and horric what hapenned there. i found out many facts and stories in my research. i have no doubt that it would do the same to any man as it did to a teenager like me.
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Message 3
Posted by Dirk Marinus (U1648073) on Wednesday, 9th November 2005
Yet at the same time I think that it is amazing that although many people know about Stalingrad, and yet so few know about what happened in and around Leningrad.
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Message 4
Posted by OUNUPA (U2078829) on Wednesday, 9th November 2005
Why do you think that things look so sadly,Dirk?
The most famous place of L. is the Smolny Institute .But it was fast becoming not so much a bastion of the Marxist revolution as one of the corruption of the party elite during WWII.
Zdanov&Co didn't like to waste their time. -
Message 5
Posted by DL (U1683040) on Thursday, 10th November 2005
OUNUPA
If I remember correctly, the Leningrad Party bosses were purged by Stalin shortly after the end of the siege, Stalin having lost trust in them because they were no longer under direct control? Something about them being isolated from the CPSU for too long, and actually developing "free thought" on how to govern their city?
I am speaking from memory so apologise if I'm wrong on this, but I think the NKVD shot most of them. Some reward for holding out against the Germans for 900 days! I would hardly think "corruption of the party elite" could be an apt description of winning against all the odds, more likely it was Stalin's excuse for shooting those who were successful. There are similarities with his treatment of Zhukov, who got shunted out of the limelight pretty quickly and was only rewarded for his outstanding Generalship after Stalin's death.
DL -
Message 6
Posted by OUNUPA (U2078829) on Thursday, 10th November 2005
'I',DL
Stalin settled into the country mansion of a former oil magnate.
Trotsky had ,in his time,one of the most resplendent estates in the country,it had once belonged to the Yusupov.
Lenin occupied,before his death, the estate of General Morozov at Gorki,just outside Moscow.
The slogan 'loot the looters' in action so to speak-'Hamlets' of their revolution.
Bribe-taking,thefts and the sale of public property were endemic within 'bosses of Leningrad'.Almost anything could be purchased from corrupt officials:FOODSTUFFS,tobacco,alcohol,FUEL,guns and permits of all kinds.
The wives and mistresses of the party bosses went around with a jeweller's shop-window hanging round their necks.
AS for Zhukov -a former lower-ranking Nicholas' officer(what in the West would be called NCO)he desperately tried to launch an offensive in Rzev(during the battle of Stalingrad)to push west towards Baltic countries.IT WAS SUPPOSED TO BECOME THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE FOR STALIN'S PLAN IN 1942,but not that Stalingrad.
Zhukov liked to 'keep his men on their toes'by ordering midnight attacks,despite the obvious lack of strategic preparations for nocturnal fightings.Many of such 'assaults' destroyed the whole Stalin's armies.An example of trying to fight a 20 century war with tactics more appropriate to the Crimean War.There were vague romantic notions of repeating the scorched-earth tactics of General Kutuzov which,in Tolstoy's version at least ,had so brilliantly entrapped Napoleon's troops in the winter wastelands of Russian Empire. -
Message 7
Posted by DL (U1683040) on Thursday, 10th November 2005
Strange one this.
I always thought that Stalin's army was practically destroyed by the German attacks in 41, since most of the senior officers in the Red Army had been shot by the NKVD! As a result the army had no effective leadership, and as Blitzkrieg rolled into Russian territory, Stalin's order to "Stand and fight" condemned millions to a slow death in German captivity, as "standing and fighting" suited Blitzkrieg tactics perfectly. They simply go around, encircle the army which is standing, then the army is cut off and withers on the vine!
This happened on numerous occasion in 41, most notably Kiev.
Zhukov, whilst not the most careful with the lives of his men, was undoubtedly one of the great Generals of WW2, and once Stalin realised that the best thing to do was to let his generals plan the battles, things rapidly improved (a lesson Hitler never learned).
I can hardly see Zhukov, or any other of the Red Army's Generals using Crimean War tactics! If you just look at Kursk, for example, the Germans thought they were carrying out a big offensive, when really it was just one huge ambush! Miles and miles of defences, minefields, ditches and tank traps. Hardly Crimean War stuff.
Losses amongst troops were horrendous on all sides, and these losses were antagonised by Stalin repeatedly ordering two armies, and two generals to compete to reach the objective first.
Example? Berlin. I think 300,000 Soviet troops died in the battle for Berlin, most killed un-necessarily as Stalin had Zhukov and Koniev literally racing to take Berlin before Mayday.
Zhukov's tactics in the Great Patriotic War were poor to start with, admittedly, but once the Soviet Union had sufficient equipment to fight back, he was an outstanding general.
DL -
Message 8
Posted by OUNUPA (U2078829) on Thursday, 10th November 2005
.....to take Berlin before the Western Powers,DL.
Although without the help from the West(USA&UK) Stalin was doomed to the defeat.The problem was particulary with regard to munitions..The Stalin's armaments industry ,which could have kept the army supplied was run down by the first months of war.
Other question-the number of NCOs was never enough..The officer corps below the lewel of captain was almost completely wiped out,while a new generation of NCOs was hastily trained to replce 'em.
You are right,not all the commanders were so incompetent or cruel.But there was a growing feeling anong the soldiers that so much blood need not be spilled,if the officers thought less of thenselves and more of the safety of their men you know. -
Message 9
Posted by FowPah (U1746998) on Thursday, 10th November 2005
Did anyone see the programme about Russia's race to Berlin?It suggested the real imperative was to gain access to nuclear secrets in Berlin.
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Message 10
Posted by Mark (U2073932) on Thursday, 10th November 2005
Hello,
I am currently writing a novel based around Verdun (similar horror of close quarter combat, massed artillery...) do you think soldiers could come out of it better men or scarred for life?
I'm just trying to get a mixed ending for all the characters. -
Message 11
Posted by Lt_Henson (U2436367) on Thursday, 10th November 2005
Both. My Great uncle died at Arras.
Verdun was the french stronghold right? -
Message 12
Posted by Mark (U2073932) on Thursday, 10th November 2005
Verdun was a French fortress town, targeted by Falkenhayn as the area to bleed France white. Falkenhayn knew the french army would use every man to hold Verdun. The french however brought up massed armies and artillery and started to bleed the Germans to death. It was without equal in horror, carnage and the ultimate will to win a battle by having fewer corpses than the enemy. A knew style of war.
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Message 13
Posted by DL (U1683040) on Friday, 11th November 2005
OUNUPA,
There was no need to race to Berlin to take it before the British and US did, it had already been agreed by Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill that the Russians were to take Berlin, and then after the war was over, the city would be divided into 4 zones, Russian, US, British and French (although what the French did to deserve it I don't know, all they did was surrender and then blame the British), so there was no need to rush into assaulting the city. The truth is that Stalin wanted the city taken before the Soviet holiday of Mayday, and didn't care less how many troops died to take the prize for him. Naturally Zhukov and Koniev wanted to be the commander who took Berlin, so they were happy to keep pushing.
I suspect you are right regarding the NCO corps of the Red Army, so many units were totally wiped out that experienced men didn't usually survive too long, so pre-war NCOs would have non-existent by 1945. With respect to mid level and senior commanders in the Red Army, they were undoubtedly careless with their mens' lives on many occasions, but again, this is understandable since the penalty for failure in Stalin's army was a bullet in the back of the neck, so they would be reckless, in order to survive. The war in Russia was probably the most horrific and brutal in history (and hopefully will never be seen again), and it is hard even to imagine the horror of such a war, so it is very difficult to judge those involved by standards of our "civilised" age.
Cheers
DL -
Message 14
Posted by OUNUPA (U2078829) on Saturday, 12th November 2005
If frankly,DL,I don't trust to Frenchmen very much.
As for Stalin,as it seems to me he didn't trust to anyone and anything not to say to the Britts or the Americans.His beloved saying was :'No man...then NO PROBLEM'.
You've mentioned into your previous posts to me about Stalin's purges.Here comes to the mind the name of Tukhachevsky who liked in his time to blame Stalin for the military Stalin's errors during the war with Poland in 1920.This is the real reason of his fate....Tukhachevsky's Western Army had rushed ahead towards Warsaw,understimating the determination of the Poles to defend their capital and cutting off his own troops from their supplies .The South-Western Army(Stalin) had failed to support 'em,continuing to advance in the opposite direction towards L'viv,which Stalin seemed determined to take at all cost.The result was that Tukhachevsky's southern flank became exposed ,allowing Pilsudski to launch a counter-offensive and drive the Reds back....Poles had rallied to Pilsudsky.NATIONALISM PROVED ONCE MORE a more potent force than their bloody 'international Communism'!HERE IS THE ROOT of Reds' defeat! -
Message 15
Posted by FowPah (U1746998) on Friday, 25th November 2005
Anyway back to Stalingrad.
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Message 16
Posted by arnaldalmaric (U1756653) on Friday, 25th November 2005
Gulo gulo, sorry can't do the copyright thing.
As a reader of histories of the 2nd World War, I can appreciate your frustration when a topic or thread goes off piste.
I take it you've read Beevor and his work Stalingrad. If you haven't it is very good.
In my opinion the Battle for Stalingrad shows up the difference between Stalin and Hitler. Both were unpleasant leaders, however Stalin was the least unpleasant.
It was a grinding battle, far worse than anything the Western Allies faced, together with, if you didn't do your duty you were a dead man. I like to think that I could face combat, but I also like to think that I would survive. The situation the German, Austrians, Roumanian and Italians were in at Stalingrad are beyond my imagination.
Cheers AA. -
Message 17
Posted by Lt_Henson (U2436367) on Wednesday, 4th January 2006
I think the only thing established is not to trust a frenchman and that all they did was surrender and blame the Brits.
Oh and that the race to berlin was organised by the leaders.
thats what I'm getting here. -
Message 18
Posted by LittleHill (U3038272) on Tuesday, 24th January 2006
Hitler told his men to catch stalingradfirst and for any cost because it beared the name stalin but they naerly got it
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Message 19
Posted by henrylee100 (U536041) on Wednesday, 25th January 2006
<quote>
Although without the help from the West(USA&UK) Stalin was doomed to the defeat.The problem was particulary with regard to munitions..The Stalin's armaments industry ,which could have kept the army supplied was run down by the first months of war.
<quote>
this is a gross misconception, bud, you just have to look at the soviet wartime production figures, I don't remember exactly but in 1943 alone already they churned out over 11 thousand AFV's. In the same period the Germans managed to manufacture some 6500.
Actually they were making more stuff already in 1942, that coupled with ample human resources led to a situation at Stalingrad and especially Kursk as well as in later battles where the soviets could afford to use their whole army as shock troops, i.e. they could carry on their ops with little regard to the losses they suffered.
The first few months of the war: for one during those first few months western supplies were rather limited, for second unlike western European states the USSR had vast territories over which it could afford to retreat almost endlessly without actually losing the war because there was always territories they could continue retreating to. If if Moscow had fallen in 1941 the Germans would still have been cooked eventually and even if the western powers had not supplied a single can of canned meat, the soviets would still have been able to fight back.
It's curious though, because ultimately the Germans had at their disposal practically the whole of the continental europe and yet for some reason they failed to mobilize enough resources for mass military production. Probably it was a cultural thing, the germans never really got around to mass employing women in factories which the soviets did from the very start of the war. There were factories in Germany, according to Albert Speer, that kept making cosmetics up to late 1944, something that was unthinkable for the USSR where everything was poured into the war effort, women and 14 year olds working 12 hour shifts without holidays, while all the capable males were drafted into the armed forces, in other words it can be said that in a way the Germans fought with one hand tied behind their back, metaphorically speaking and they never really got around to untying it. -
Message 20
Posted by henrylee100 (U536041) on Wednesday, 25th January 2006
Hitler told his men to catch stalingradfirst and for any cost because it beared the name stalin but they naerly got itÌý
it wasn't just the name, at the time the Russians were getting most of their oil from the Caspian basin and Stalingrad was an important transportation hub on the way from the Caspian to the Urals, so capturing it would have cut an important supply line, far more important than the allied convoys by the way. Not that it would have spelled the end for the USSR, naturally there were alternative routes, but it definetely would have made things a lot harder. -
Message 21
Posted by Michal_the_curious (U2948103) on Wednesday, 25th January 2006
HENRY,
How then will you explain the fact that in the first months of German attack Stalin was so kind and wiling to cooperate and later, when it was clear that Soviets would win, he completely changed?
The Soviets managed to move some of their factories behind the Ural, but in those first months they were barely able to make a stand. They lost too much equipment in the first years of war. No guns, no planes and very few tanks couldn't stop the Germans.
IMHO, if the Germans had captured Moscow, the Soviets wouldn't have been able to drive them back. They managed to do so just because there was Moscow behind them and there was no place to retreat if they lost it.
Michal -
Message 22
Posted by ritesh (U1886080) on Wednesday, 25th January 2006
I don't know why?. But, i always think that russians always had this defense\counter attacking mentality , the sycthian tactics they had employed from the times when being tormented by genghis khan to Napolean being lurred till Moscow then pushing him out of Russia and finally germans under Hitler making thier way up to Moscow, Unsuccesfull and then drive back,allude to a fact that perhaps this mentality will allways salvaged them from tormentors past. Accompanied that by the vast lands that russia had, the almost harsh winter of Russia.
Its my conception about thier ways, I might be wrong in my assessment! -
Message 23
Posted by jesw1962 (U1726423) on Wednesday, 25th January 2006
It should also be pointed out that in 1941 there were millions of people who wanted Stalin gone. He had just completed the worst Holicaust in History against the Volga River Germans. So as the German Army drove into the Ukraine and the Baltic States, tens of thousands of soldiers surrendered and joined the German Army. Enough in fact to form five German Field Armies. They were of tremendous aid to the Germans. In fact if the SS had just been even slightly civil, IMO, the outcome might have been very different.
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Message 24
Posted by henrylee100 (U536041) on Thursday, 26th January 2006
HENRY,
How then will you explain the fact that in the first months of German attack Stalin was so kind and wiling to cooperate and later, when it was clear that Soviets would win, he completely changed?
Ìý
There were other reasons for his complete change. For one in the first months of the war he was probably panick stricken, because ultimately it was him he screwed things up by ignoring sound intel reports, some of which even gave the exact date of the German attack, and explicitly banning the troops from prepping for action so as not to provoke the Germans. (He was probably plotting to move in and liberate Europe himself but the summer of 1941 was a bit too early for him) The first months of the war were a total mess, broken down communications, delayed news and that kind of stuff, so no wonder he started courting the west, who woudn't have in his shoes. But Stalin's lack of faith in Russia's ability to sustain the heavies of blows and carry on does not mean the country did not have that ability at the time. It had had it before Stalin and it probably still has it today. After all Stalin was an ethnic Georgian, chances are he never truly comprehended the vastness of Russia himself, thus his panick in the fall of 1941.
The Soviets managed to move some of their factories behind the Ural, but in those first months they were barely able to make a stand. They lost too much equipment in the first years of war. No guns, no planes and very few tanks couldn't stop the Germans.Ìý
you're forgetting the vast spaces of Russia that the Germans had to traverse before they could ever get to Moscow, it's about 1.5 thousand kilometers from Brest to Moscow and the equipment that the Red Army did have before the war didn't just all get wiped out in the first couple of days. In fact already in the summer of 1941 the first German tanks started getting knocked out by Russian T-34 in the area between Rovno and Lutsk and it's West Ukraine, a really far cry from Moscow. Later sundry German memoirists talked a lot about how Russia was driven to the edge of the abyss in 1941, but such statements are wishful thinking on their part than anything else. Even if Barbarossa had gone on schedule and been carried off 100%, the Germans would still have occupied no more than 20% of the Russian territory. The whole Barbarossa plan was flawed from the very start and consequently doomed, they were planning to occupy European Russian and stop there, they never even thought of going beyond the Urals, that's how small time their arian lebensraum thinking really was.
IMHO, if the Germans had captured Moscow, the Soviets wouldn't have been able to drive them back. They managed to do so just because there was Moscow behind them and there was no place to retreat if they lost it.
Michal Ìý
Napoleon thought so too and how did he end up? He did take Moscow btw, never did him any good though. In fact in 1812 the Russians torched Moscow, the whole city, just as Napoleon moved in, with no supplies and a hostile population all around him he had no choice but to go back all the way to Paris. Had the Germans managed to capture Moscow, which no doubt would have taken them lots of lives, and stopped there, they'd have eventually ended up the same way as Napoleon had done some 130 years before them, back home with Russkies all around them (and that's what actually did happen anyway) -
Message 25
Posted by henrylee100 (U536041) on Thursday, 26th January 2006
HENRY,
How then will you explain the fact that in the first months of German attack Stalin was so kind and wiling to cooperate and later, when it was clear that Soviets would win, he completely changed?
Ìý
There were other reasons for his complete change. For one in the first months of the war he was probably panick stricken, because ultimately it was him he screwed things up by ignoring sound intel reports, some of which even gave the exact date of the German attack, and explicitly banning the troops from prepping for action so as not to provoke the Germans. (He was probably plotting to move in and liberate Europe himself but the summer of 1941 was a bit too early for him) The first months of the war were a total mess, broken down communications, delayed news and that kind of stuff, so no wonder he started courting the west, who woudn't have in his shoes. But Stalin's lack of faith in Russia's ability to sustain the heavies of blows and carry on does not mean the country did not have that ability at the time. It had had it before Stalin and it probably still has it today. After all Stalin was an ethnic Georgian, chances are he never truly comprehended the vastness of Russia himself, thus his panick in the fall of 1941.
The Soviets managed to move some of their factories behind the Ural, but in those first months they were barely able to make a stand. They lost too much equipment in the first years of war. No guns, no planes and very few tanks couldn't stop the Germans.Ìý
you're forgetting the vast spaces of Russia that the Germans had to traverse before they could ever get to Moscow, it's about 1.5 thousand kilometers from Brest to Moscow and the equipment that the Red Army did have before the war didn't just all get wiped out in the first couple of days. In fact already in the summer of 1941 the first German tanks started getting knocked out by Russian T-34 in the area between Rovno and Lutsk and it's West Ukraine, a really far cry from Moscow. Later sundry German memoirists talked a lot about how Russia was driven to the edge of the abyss in 1941, but such statements are wishful thinking on their part than anything else. Even if Barbarossa had gone on schedule and been carried off 100%, the Germans would still have occupied no more than 20% of the Russian territory. The whole Barbarossa plan was flawed from the very start and consequently doomed, they were planning to occupy European Russian and stop there, they never even thought of going beyond the Urals, that's how small time their arian lebensraum thinking really was.
IMHO, if the Germans had captured Moscow, the Soviets wouldn't have been able to drive them back. They managed to do so just because there was Moscow behind them and there was no place to retreat if they lost it.
Michal Ìý
Napoleon thought so too and how did he end up? He did take Moscow btw, never did him any good though. In fact in 1812 the Russians torched Moscow, the whole city, just as Napoleon moved in, with no supplies and a hostile population all around him he had no choice but to go back all the way to Paris. Had the Germans managed to capture Moscow, which no doubt would have taken them lots of lives, and stopped there, they'd have eventually ended up the same way as Napoleon had done some 130 years before them, back home with Russkies all around them (and that's how they ended up anyway) -
Message 26
Posted by henrylee100 (U536041) on Thursday, 26th January 2006
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Message 27
Posted by henrylee100 (U536041) on Thursday, 26th January 2006
I don't know why?. But, i always think that russians always had this defense\counter attacking mentality , the sycthian tactics they had employed from the times when being tormented by genghis khan to Napolean being lurred till Moscow then pushing him out of Russia and finally germans under Hitler making thier way up to Moscow, Unsuccesfull and then drive back,allude to a fact that perhaps this mentality will allways salvaged them from tormentors past. Accompanied that by the vast lands that russia had, the almost harsh winter of Russia.
Its my conception about thier ways, I might be wrong in my assessment!Ìý
imho you're right in your assessment, except that most of the time they seem to do it subconsiouslly, they never plan it, first they lose for real and then they fight back for real. -
Message 28
Posted by henrylee100 (U536041) on Thursday, 26th January 2006
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Message 29
Posted by henrylee100 (U536041) on Thursday, 26th January 2006
It should also be pointed out that in 1941 there were millions of people who wanted Stalin gone. He had just completed the worst Holicaust in History against the Volga River Germans. So as the German Army drove into the Ukraine and the Baltic States, tens of thousands of soldiers surrendered and joined the German Army. Enough in fact to form five German Field Armies. They were of tremendous aid to the Germans. In fact if the SS had just been even slightly civil, IMO, the outcome might have been very different.Ìý
you definietly have a point there, but it wasn't really the SS being uncivil, it was all those racial supremasit ideas of Hitler's that the nut wanted implemented ASAP. All the SS did was kill the jews, they had their einzazgruppen that would round up all the jews in an area and shoot them. And as far as the jews go, sad but true they were never much liked in either Ukraine or Russia so the third reich's anti jewish policies would never have put off the local non jewish population. But there was the plan Ost, under which the local non jews began to be shown the darker aspects of life and from there on things began to go from bad to worse for the Germans in the east, so much so that in the spring of 1945 the Russian Liberation Army division found itself fighting SS in Checkoslovakia (sadly most of the RLA soldiers were then captured by the advancing soviet troops and eventually ended up either being executed for treason or at the very least serving very long time in Siberia). Both Napoleon and Hitler ultimately made the same mistake, they alienated the locals instead of making friends with them, thus forcing them to choose the lesser evil, i.e. their local dictator (the tsar or the general secretary Stalin).
On guy once told me about the stats he saw for the number of guerillas vs the number of polizei (collaborators) for some of the regions in Russia and Belorussia. In the fall of 1945 guerillas were virtually non existant while the numbers of collaborators were soaring, but soon as plan Ost began to be implemented in 1942, there was soon a reverse situation. -
Message 30
Posted by LittleHill (U3038272) on Thursday, 26th January 2006
Spot on henry
And you just proved my point with a bit extra info.
Thanxs. Hitler told his men to catch stalingradfirst and for any cost because it beared the name stalin but they naerly got itÌý
it wasn't just the name, at the time the Russians were getting most of their oil from the Caspian basin and Stalingrad was an important transportation hub on the way from the Caspian to the Urals, so capturing it would have cut an important supply line, far more important than the allied convoys by the way. Not that it would have spelled the end for the USSR, naturally there were alternative routes, but it definetely would have made things a lot harder.Ìý -
Message 31
Posted by henrylee100 (U536041) on Friday, 27th January 2006
A small correction to a previous message
the following
On guy once told me about the stats he saw for the number of guerillas vs the number of polizei (collaborators) for some of the regions in Russia and Belorussia. In the fall of 1945 guerillas were virtually non existant while the numbers of collaborators were soaring, but soon as plan Ost began to be implemented in 1942, there was soon a reverse situation.
Ìý
should have "in the fall of 1941" rather than "in the fall of 1945"
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