Wars and Conflicts permalink
Wellingtons tactics and French errors?
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Message 1.Â
Posted by Mark (U2073932) on Sunday, 18th September 2005
I am an avid devotee to the napoleonic years. One thing puzzles me about how the peninsula war tactics continued to repeat themselves.
I.e Wellington kept his troops on a reverse slope out of sight of gunners and enemy generals. When the french columns approached the british/spanish/portuguese lines, they would be hammered by volley fire and they would break before they could form into line.
The british could fire quicker than the french, 3/4/5 rounds a minute to the french 1/2. Why didn't the french deploy before they reached the crest so they could meet the british line with their line? They usually had more men, so a firefight could go wither way.
Quicker british muskets against more frenchmen.
I realise waiting under a ridge, would involve being struck by artillery fire, yet the french generals didn't mind losing men so long as they won the day.
It just puzzles me, as the column attack failed time after time, why didn't they attack in line? Another pondry, why Napoleon didn't order the use of rifles. -
Message 2
Posted by arnaldalmaric (U1756653) on Sunday, 18th September 2005
AngelatMons,
It is a question that has various answers. Here is my favourite. The British had a "professional" army. I.e. small in numbers (in comparison) but very well trained / disciplined and reliant on musketry to defeat attacks, not strong on the offensive. In the Peninsula the Portugese troops were trained in the same tactics.
The French in common with all of the other European nations had a conscript army, large in numbers but not so well trained (exception, the period of three to four years after the army Napoleon had assembled for the invasion of Britain in the camps at Boloungue went on campaign against the Austrians and Prussians and Russians). Hence the victories Napoleon won.
Anyway, Napoleons favoured tactics of advancing in column or L'Ordre Mixte (sp?) after an artillery bombardment against all the armies he faced worked. His appointees as Marshalls saw no reason to change these tactics against the British in the Peninsula.
Now here is the point, Wellington saw a certain deficiency in these tactics, he saw that if you arrange your army on a reverse slope protected from the superior French artillery and at the same time deploy troops in skirmish formation to out skirmish the opposing French you have hit upon a bit of a winner. Hence the 95th and 60th Rifles rarely operated as individual battalions but were attached as company strength to other battalions and brigades. Together with the Light Companies within those battalions they were expected to break up and destroy the French cohesion prior to deployment into line.
It worked, Wellington never altered it, despite all (most) of the other European nations moving over to the French system of attack together with Napoleons Corps system.
Several things conspired against Napoleon in the Peninsula, one was he never faced Wellington until Waterloo and so, IMHO, never understood what Wellington was about. Another was he never gave the amount of attention the situation required. (Then again, he was busy elsewhere!). As a result of this Napoleon left it to Joseph and his military commanders who were left free to pursue their own differing agendas.
Napoleon didn't like the rifled musket as he seems to have had the belief that as it was quite a technical weapon for the time his troops and commanders would not be able to use it effectively. Plus it was difficult to manufacture.
I don't think that the average British infantryman was able to fire so much quicker than the average French infantryman. It's just the tactics were different in how you deploy your musketry. As an aside look into the Battle of Minden as to how this may have evolved into standard British military thinking.
Cheers, thank you as it's been an opportunity for me to rant!
AA. -
Message 3
Posted by Hasse (U1882612) on Sunday, 18th September 2005
Angel
Amalrik has it mostly right,Wellington used the centuriies old English tactic that had worked so well and if the enemy whent into it made them nearly invinceble.
to fotify yourself on or slightly behind a hill a high ratio of quick fire,until the enemy was decimated to nothing,from battle of standard,Poiters,Azincourt etc etc.
As Amalric said the main French army couldnt work in a line it wasnt enough welltrained,its much easier to move and work a not fullytrained body in collum than in line.
In Spain didnt the french move with their ordinary speed,and outmanouvred the enemy look at Ulms.
Wellington mostly worked on shorter logistic lines,via RN,the Torres Vedra was a stroke of genius.
Napoleon was an inspired leader and at his best was astounding,look at the retreat from Leipsig he was never better,if his marchalls havent sold him out he very well could have forced a favourable peace.
Wellington was metodical had a good grip on logistic and spared his men,didnt fight until he wanted it,could march away if a battle wasnt in his plans.
So in a short war 9 out of 10 Napoleon,in a long drawn out war its changes to Wellington to the same odds.
IMHO was Wellington the best general,in the Napoleonic wars.
It has maybe a bit with my military training to do,to win(against Soviet)must we take a ten to one toll,wivh makes for secure creativity,like hit and run,Wellington didnt risk if he wasnt pretty sure to win,he biggest risk was Waterloo but if the Preussians had been their in time N would have withdrawn like a scared rat.Wich naturaly would prolonged the war and maybee had left a Bornaparte line on the French throne.
Hasse -
Message 4
Posted by Idamante (U1894562) on Monday, 19th September 2005
I believe the latest thinking on this subject is that British success was due less to firepower than to their use of the bayonet. Traditional 18th century procedure was for both sides to form up in line "in plain sight" and trade volleys until one side finally cracked. Whereas Wellington's British would suddenly appear from behind cover, fire off one volley and get stuck in before the French had recovered from the shock.
If this is correct, using line formations would not necessarily have helped the French (apart from being less of a target for artillery, I guess). A case in point: according to a new book about Waterloo, D'Erlon's famous attack did not use mass columns (as commonly believed) but a a succession of lines - and look where that got him!
References:
Brent Nosworthy: With Musket, Cannon & Sword
Alessandro Barbero: The Battle (Waterloo) -
Message 5
Posted by _A_J_A_ (U1908577) on Monday, 19th September 2005
I can't add much more as our learned friends have given you great answers, as always.
Didn't Wellington once say to a fellow officer, when riding past a regiment of his hard-faced looking troops the night before a battle(Waterloo?) that "I don't know about the enemy tomorrow, but they scare the hell out of me..."
That sums up for me, the ferocity of our fighting men of that era- and also before and since! -
Message 6
Posted by TonyG (U1830405) on Monday, 19th September 2005
Excellent sumamtions above.
Napoleon was a brilliant exponent of the concentration of firepower, but, having a conscript army, he had to use them like a battering ram, using his columns, supported by artillery and cavalry, to hammer a way through the opposition. Most armies could not stand against it. In the Peninsula, the French Marshals seemed incapable of devising any tactic other than the one Napoleon had shown to work, but it did not work against Wellington's army. And I include in this the Portuguese and Spanish troops who fought as part of that army and were British-trained.
At Waterloo, the French did try to deploy from column into line as they reached the crest of the slope, thinking to combat the musket power of the British line. It didn’t work primarily because they could not deploy until quite late due to Wellington's use of the farm buildings as bastions to pour flanking fire into the column, and because the British heavy cavalry caught them before they were fully deployed.
I think your title for this message sums it up. Wellington was a master tactician and the French continually made the same mistakes.
Gaiseric's point about the single volley and bayonet charge is a good one, although I am struyggling to think of many battles where the British confined themselves to a single volley. I think it was a combination of the two things - overwhelm the column with numbers of muskets and then charge when they started to wwaver. With all the smoke on the battlefield, the charge would not be visible until it was almost on the leading ranks of the column.
I'm not ure about the quote. I do recognise it, but whether it was Wellington, or which battle it preceded, I can't recall.
A couple of quotes I am a bit more confident on. Napoleon apparently said, "Wellington fights sitting on his backside", alluding to the fact that Wellington fought a defensive battle at Waterloo and made no attempt to come down off the ridge until the Old Guard were broken. I think this shows Napoleon's lack of appreciation of what Wellington was doing. Wellington is reported to have said "They came on in the same old style and we drove them off in the same old style". He was actually concerned about a possible flanking attack . If Napoleon had tried to turn Wellington's right flank, he would have threatened Wellington's line of march and supply to the coast. To protect that, Wellington would have had to move further away from the Prussians. Fortunately for him, Napoleon relied on sheer weight of numbers and a frontal assault to drive the British off. It had never worked inthe Peninsula and it didn’t work for Napoleon. -
Message 7
Posted by arnaldalmaric (U1756653) on Monday, 19th September 2005
I think the quote is Wellingtons and from before Waterloo. However my favourite of his is "I will tell you the difference between Soult and me: when he gets into a difficulty, his troops don't get him out of it: mine always do." (Stepney Cowell p102, Leaves from the Diary of an Officer of the Guards 1854).
AA. -
Message 8
Posted by steveP (U1775134) on Monday, 19th September 2005
Angels
The previous entries have mentioned the main points as to why Wellington's approach worked. One other point is that the column is much easier for manoeuvring prior to combat. I think general French tactics, other than in the final period of the war when their quality deteriorated so much, was to form a mixed format from narrow columns, prior to closing for combat.
This was important because of Wellington's use of the reverse slope so the French could never be sure where his army was. This was coupled, as mentioned, with the high priority on light skirmishers to suppress the French skirmishers. They had previously made it difficult for opposing armies to operate against the French armies.
As such the French often had to advance in column to close then guess the correct time to switch to a broader formation and often got in wrong. As an example, in the retreat to the defencive lines outside Lisbon Wellington won a victory at Brusco (sp) by such methods. The French had tried to overwhelm what seemed like a small British force on a high ridge, attacking in column to save time. The main British/Portuguese army was there and they were heavily mauled as a result. After this the French reportedly repeatedly had to break their march and form up for a systematic attack on each ridge line in case the British were waiting for them. This considerably delayed their advance and disrupted their operations.
Steve -
Message 9
Posted by TonyG (U1830405) on Monday, 19th September 2005
Steve,
Is it Busaco you are thinking of? -
Message 10
Posted by DaveMBA (U1360771) on Tuesday, 20th September 2005
Oh dear, it's amazing how this nonsense goes on! Put Nosworthy in the bin, where it belongs as he has not even begun to do his research properly (those opening chapters on Marengo and Lodi are unmitigated rubbish, drawn from French propaganda). The stuff about the 1807 allied reaction is nonsense too.
The French used attack columns, originally devised by the Prussians but abandoned by them. The French used a two-company frontage on battalion columns, but the need to use them with trained troops was exposed at Jemappes in Nov 1792. The idea was to get over the last musketry range area in column and then deploy into line to engage at close range, rather than trying to advance more slowly in line. This was part of Guibert's reforms, which were based around a more aggressive approach to smash up Frederician lines with heavier artillery and then these attack columns. Meusnil-Durand proposed the heavy attack columns, which were designed to smash right through and then deploy to three sides. However, it was clear from Jemappes and then Neerwinden that artillery could tear these columns up, so by the time of the great Marchfeld battles of Aspern and Wagram, that is what the opposition did - with infantry in solid thick lines to take any impact. The density of numbers meant that the French were already in columns, but now lacked the room to deploy, making them target practice for the enemy guns. The French with their levee en masse approach could always find plenty of manpower and so were prepared to take the losses to ensure victory.
The reverse slope tactic is actuially Prussian beingd eveloped in 1806 and you will also find it at Wagram, when Austrian infantry were musket range back from the edge of the ridge, but the effectiveness of course depend son the ground. In Spain, it was much more undulating and unsuitable for maintaining large numbers of cavalry or the teams necessary to drag heavy guns (the French used the Gribeauval 8pdr as the heavy gun and the UK shipped 9pdrs). The French army did have a significant veteran component, although the British army was better trained overall and enjoye dshort supply lines to Lisbon - plus they had the support of the locals, who were giving the French a hard time with the guerrilla war.
From the time of Lodi, Nap's approach wa always to grasp a wing or both if possible and then soften up the enemy with artillery before an infantry assault. Hence at Waterloo, he had a big
problem with wet ground.
Wellington certainly exploited the specifics of Spanish terrain, but the Belgian theatre had already been the scene of Allied victories in the 1790s, when numbers had been "fair". IF you look at Peter Hofschroer's work, you can also see that it was the Prussians, who saved his neck and that W has adjuste dthe picture to suit his own ends. He commanded, like Nap, in the old centralised 18th century style and never had anything larger than two corps - his intelligence services were also very good in Spain. Myself, I might make him a corps comamdner, nothing more. -
Message 11
Posted by Hasse (U1882612) on Tuesday, 20th September 2005
Dave
We have had this discussion before,IMO is PH very biased.
The Belgian campaign and Waterlo was a joint venture without the Preussans the English couldnt win and vice versa.
I do admire Blücher for the way he handled is mostly untrained infantry and capable cavalry,to stand up and once more march to Waterloo after the defeat of Ligny.
Everytime it comes up how much better duke Karl of Austria or the invinceble Prussian that "invented" all tricks in the book,compared to how stupid and poor general Wellington was a bit like N called him the sepoy general.
Well the simple fact is Wellington didnt lose a single battle,all other above did get a solid beating,and was some time or the other overrun.
Sports has the same cold logic as war,those who stands victourious after a long season are the best how and why,and what if is irrelevant and the winner take it all
.
Hasse -
Message 12
Posted by DaveMBA (U1360771) on Tuesday, 20th September 2005
I am sure you cold find many minor teams, who do not lose to anyone. It does not make hem the best. I have known Peter for many years and I have yet to see his case seriously damaged - his only argument is that German sources have simply not been considered. Charles is a different matter - for a start, you should not model him like Nap or Wellington as he delegated authority partly on principle and partly because of his own physical weakness. Could Wellington have manged in Charles' situation is a far better question to ask than simply to say "he won".
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Message 13
Posted by steveP (U1775134) on Tuesday, 20th September 2005
<QUOTE' USER='TonyG' USERID='1830405'>Steve,<BR /><BR />Is it Busaco you are thinking of?</QUOTE><BR /><BR /> Tony<BR /><BR /> Thanks. That was the place. Bit busy [ or lazy] and couldn't get the energy to trot upstairs and dig out the name from my source books. Thanks.<BR /><BR /> Steve
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Message 14
Posted by Hasse (U1882612) on Wednesday, 21st September 2005
Dave
If you never lose,ewen fighting the creme de la creme,in war or sport.
You are by defenition not minor,but champion,even without stars.War and sport are mostly team work,and a couple of prima donnas can actually weaken a team.
I´m not personally aquanted with Peter,I give him right in that without the Prussians,would Wellignton lose if he had been folish enough to stand at Waterloo.A thing I´m 99% sure that he wouldnt do.
I also give Peter right that the GB history including this board put more emphasis on W and his part,wich of course is natural.
Well Wellington held the ridge thos crucial hours,until the Prussians at last arrived much later than expected.
Wellintons troops did even break the until then invinceble old guard.
Napoleon and his marchals did break and overran all mayor players armies,untill they was up to the Britts under Wellington.
The facts are simply and clear Wellington won all his battles,whitout having so big odds at his side that any fool would win,most battles was equal or the odds for the enemy.
Whatever he used tricks like Torre Vedra,or got better odds with a superb logistics,is not to his disadvantage as a comander but vice versa,its part of the book to use those things.
Any comander that use all his powers to weaken his oponent and strenthen his own is one that knows his buisness,and its has been in the strategical learnings from Xenofon,Tzun Tzu,Ceasar,Clausewitch uptil todays teachings in any military academi.
Those that only look at how the actual battles are fought are IMO fools,its much more behind.
So the fact that Wellington stood as the only total victor of all that long drawn campaigns,puts him at the top of my list in the Napoleonic wars.
My all out champion is Belosarus or Timur Lenk.
Hasse -
Message 15
Posted by DaveMBA (U1360771) on Saturday, 24th September 2005
You should perhaps consider when W broke out of Portugal - erm, 1809 and 1812. So, it was not down to his tactical brilliance, any more than his victory at Waterloo. He never fought the Grande Armee at its best nor did he manage large armies.
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Message 16
Posted by steveP (U1775134) on Saturday, 24th September 2005
<QUOTE' USER='DaveMBA' USERID='1360771'>You should perhaps consider when W broke out of Portugal - erm, 1809 and 1812. So, it was not down to his tactical brilliance, any more than his victory at Waterloo. He never fought the Grande Armee at its best nor did he manage large armies. </QUOTE><BR /><BR />Are you saying it would have been tactical brilliance to have tried marching across Spain and into France in 1810? The Anglo-Portuguese army in Iberia, along with the Spanish guerrillas, tied down considerably larger forces throughout the period. They had no real chance to defeat them all, especially with the fact that would have resulted in further French reinforcements. Wellington's job was to do what he could, keeping a sizeable proportion of the French army tied up in Spain and he did that damned well. [Your argument is a bit like saying the Finns lost the Winter war because they didn't march on Moscow]. He made use of the advantages available to him, the intelligence supplied by the Spanish, logistical support by the navy etc, just as any good general would. He may never have been tested as a commander of an army of continental size but that was more due to the limitations imposed by Britain's condition. <BR /><BR /> Steve<BR />
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Message 17
Posted by Hasse (U1882612) on Saturday, 24th September 2005
SteveP
Hear hear
.
David its not the first time you rant against Wellington.He had his faults as all have.
As previous said he fullfilled his assignemts,with great elan and in proffesional way.
Furthermore you always says that he couldnt cope with more than a corps or not,have you no idea off.
About the grand armee,do you seriously think that he could beat half a million french with just 50 thousand.If that your criteria for that you call him a lousy general because he didnt fight against odds ten to one,are you really out of whack.A general that make battle against such odds ismt worth his stars if it isnt last ditch defence.
If Wellington had been in comand of say Borodino or Leipzig would he IMO probably do just a grand jobb.
One of Wellingtons greatness,was to bend the odds in his favour before battle.
Hasse -
Message 18
Posted by DaveMBA (U1360771) on Saturday, 24th September 2005
Hang on a second, you said his claim to fame was that he won every battle he fought. Well, if he never gave battle in circumstances, where the odds might have bene against him (unlike pretty much every allied General facing the Grande Armee), then that does not make him a brillinat general, does it? If you think he fulfilled his missions, fine, but that is neither the same thing nor "greatness".
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Message 19
Posted by Hasse (U1882612) on Sunday, 25th September 2005
Dave
Its one part of his greatness that he could manouvre his enemies in a position to give battle with the odds against them.
To outmanouvre the enemy so that they are beaten beforehand is one of the mayor defenitions of a great general,according to Tzun Tzu and military academies all over the world.The point of war is to winn it not making good shows,same goes for battles.
To reach your objectives and always winning,tieng down bigger manpower than yourself have,takes a really good general,Welllington was the only general in the N war including N himself,that acchieved that.
Wich makes him the best in the N wars.
Hasse -
Message 20
Posted by TonyG (U1830405) on Sunday, 25th September 2005
Hasse,
For devotees of Hofschroer, that appears not to be playing fair. What you are supposed to do is tackle overwhelming odds in unfavourable situations and certainly don't use any troops who are not exactly the same nationality as the general. You should also allow the enemy to do exactly what they want.
To retreat, leading the enemy into a barren wasteland and build a massive fortification like Torres Vedras (keepng it a secret from everyone ntil the last moment) is clearly not the mark of a great general. I mean, you might actually win a war, that way. -
Message 21
Posted by DaveMBA (U1360771) on Sunday, 25th September 2005
We4ll, I suggest you do a little reading on the whole period, especially the 1796 campaigns in Germany and Italy to see the best Generals at work overcoming the odds.
Your argument for Wellington's "greatness" is that he won battles - now you are saying, it was because he refused to give battle. He did nothing in 1810-11, while only breaking out in 1809 (when he was driven back) and 1812, when others were doing the main fighting elsewhere. The numbers of troops he "tied down" were relatively small compared with the huge armies Nap had to assemble to fight to the east and W also had local support, irrespective of his own actions. If tying troops down is a mark of skill, you will find that the insurgenets in Iraq probably number 20,000 and tie down down 150K US and 10K other troops. -
Message 22
Posted by Hasse (U1882612) on Sunday, 25th September 2005
TonyG
You are right
,its very unsportly to winn the easiest way.
Hasse -
Message 23
Posted by Hasse (U1882612) on Sunday, 25th September 2005
Dave
I have read my own writings in this discusion.
I never said that Wellington never did battle,but that he diddnt give battle without being pretty sure that he would win them.
YES that is one off hallmarks of a good general.
As you suggest rush blindly into battle,straight on regardles of odds,arent good generalship,even if you winn now and then against the odds.
One of N best moments was the battle of Ulms,when he outmarched and outmanouvred the Austrians,so they didnt know right from left.
That isnt cheating,thats good generalship.
Bellosarus did likewise when the Phartians invaded,east of the Byzantic empire,he marched around and with them refusing giving battle against the odds,until the Parthians was forced to withdraw.
Wellington worked likewise,whatewer you think is that in all military cirkels considered brilliance,and good tactics.
Suck in your enemy give fight on your own conditions,have the enemy to react for your movements not act,and you will win often with light causalities,hallmarks of a superior comander.
Iraq and Spain cant be a comparison,in Spain would the French unmercifull kill anyone and his whole village that showed any form of recistanse.
In Iraq could the allies,shoot anyone that showed a weapon regardles on how many innocent it would harm.They could and can do it,but they would never never use tactics like that.
But for all I know,and I seriously doubt that you have a better insight,could those that fight against the US and GB soldiers have a genius for war in their high command.
As I have said untill tiredness,the only thing that counts in the long run is if you always win your battles,against an equal foe you are by all standards great.
The only general who did that in the N wars was Wellington.
Hasse
PS I have now and then studied the campaigns and battles of the N wars from many angels for nearly 40 years,and can without shame say that I know and understand(the last I doubt that you do)the tactics behind most of the battles. -
Message 24
Posted by steveP (U1775134) on Sunday, 25th September 2005
<QUOTE' USER='DaveMBA' USERID='1360771'>We4ll, I suggest you do a little reading on the whole period, especially the 1796 campaigns in Germany and Italy to see the best Generals at work overcoming the odds.<BR /><BR />Your argument for Wellington's "greatness" is that he won battles - now you are saying, it was because he refused to give battle. He did nothing in 1810-11, while only breaking out in 1809 (when he was driven back) and 1812, when others were doing the main fighting elsewhere. The numbers of troops he "tied down" were relatively small compared with the huge armies Nap had to assemble to fight to the east and W also had local support, irrespective of his own actions. If tying troops down is a mark of skill, you will find that the insurgenets in Iraq probably number 20,000 and tie down down 150K US and 10K other troops. </QUOTE><BR /><BR />Dave<BR /><BR /> Hes has given a good general reply but I will just pick up a couple of points. <BR /><BR />a) Wellington generally had about 30-40k men during most of the Peninsula war. During most of this period the French had about 150-200k minimum forces in the region. True many were tied up seeking to hold territory and suppress, often with great brutality, Spanish resistance. However that was not Wellington's fault. As Hes says a good general makes use of circumstances to turn situations to his advantage. Wellington did this by good use of the Spanish for intelligence gathering about French movement and despite some problems got more assistance out of them than probably most other foreign commanders operating in the region would. He also played a part in reforming the Portuguese army, which helped him considerably in the latter campaigns.<BR /><BR />b) You say that Wellington did nothing between 1809-1812. That suggests you know relatively little about the conflict. He had to build up his forces from a relatively low level, including reconstructing the Portuguese army. Also to recapture border fortresses lost at the start of that period, without which any attack into the interior would have failed. This again included building up a siege train from scratch and several battles. All of which he won, albeit some were close. During this period the French had a clear advantage in cavalry, which greatly restricted his ability to pressure the offensive.<BR /><BR /> Steve
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Message 25
Posted by arnaldalmaric (U1756653) on Sunday, 25th September 2005
SteveP, well said, may I just add a few further considerations.
Wellington commanded the only British force that could be spared from garrison duties throughout the Empire. If he lost a battle (badly enough) then that would be the end of a British presence on the continent for some time to come. With the end of a British armed force on continental Europe what would have happened to the Portugese and Spanish resistance to the French? What would have happened to the various alliances that Britain was making and funding without the presence of British troops?
I'd suggest that without British troops on the continent engaging the French the answer to my questions listed above would be very different as to what actually happened. So it's a bit of a wonder with that responsibiltiy he (Wellington) fought a battle at all!
(Steve, BTW it is Hasse who is making such excellent points on the behalf of Wellington).
I think one of the hallmarks of a Great general is that you don't lose when you have chosen to fight, avoiding battle up until that point is perfectly acceptable. Using the ACW as an example Lee was tactically the better General than Grant (IMO), however it is Grant who is the "better" general (IMO) as he used the resources at his command, maintained his aim and didn't lose. (Even when Grant lost, he didn't allow it to affect his overall thinking, e.g. The Wilderness). Lee at Gettysburg chose to fight and lost, he could have chosen several other options but chose to fight, having done so you must win to be considered great.
DaveMBA, you obviously have much to say on the subject of the Napoleonic period, rather than attack Wellington why not advance some discussions of your own?
Cheers AA. -
Message 26
Posted by steveP (U1775134) on Sunday, 25th September 2005
<QUOTE' USER='Arnald Almaric' USERID='1756653'>SteveP, well said, may I just add a few further considerations.<BR /><BR /><BR />(Steve, BTW it is Hasse who is making such excellent points on the behalf of Wellington).<BR /><BR />Cheers AA.</QUOTE><BR /><BR />Arnald<BR /><BR /> Oops! Thanks for pointing that out. Sorry about mixing you up Hasse and Hes. Not paying enough attention. <SMILEY TYPE='sadface' H2G2='Smiley#sadface'/><BR /><BR /> On the point about if Wellington's army had been destroyed. I think we would have raised new ones. We had the population and the wealth. However whether the will would have been there, I have read there might have been doubts on that. Furthermore, as you say it would have weakened our political impact in establishing the alliances that ultimately brought Napoleon down. In the end I think he was too dangerous and destructive to have survived but it might have added years and many deaths to the suffering, as well as given an even greater conservative backlash to the following years.<BR /><BR /> Steve<BR />
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Message 27
Posted by DaveMBA (U1360771) on Monday, 26th September 2005
Hes needs to do some serious reading if he thinks he has any grasp of the Wars - since they were fought acros the period 1792-1815 and involved mostly large battles and campaigns east of the Rhine. As for myself, I am a published author on the subject!
I know you have all been brought up on the Anglo-French version of what happened, but there is plenty of nonsense in that. My point about Wellington is that he did not win battles under difficult circumstances - if you read up on the much bigger 1796 Germany campaign, you will see how the smaller army triumphed by the correct use of the Manoeuvre of the central position and the road network. As for Ulm, aside from the interesting command questions it raised, the plan was based on Schulmeister's deception and the proper use of the german road network (hence the French violation of Prussian neutrality). I don't criticise N or W for using int and deception, but it demonstrates the central fault in this simplistic approach of "he won, therefore".
Wellington never commanded big armies and thus there is no clear evidence about how he would have got on in the big European battle sand campaigns. The circumstances of Spain were peculiar to it, but you cannot claim greatness, when you leave your enemies to do the fighting and only venture out when they are engaging the main man and his army. Such was N's system of rule - contrary to received wisdom there was no delegated corps command - that coordination in Spain went to pot making it as easy for W to pick off French armies as for N in 1805. The insurgents in Iraq are holding down a much larger US force - that should tell you something and if you want to know about massacres and the horrors of it, look at Goya's sketches, while Terry Crowdy's Osprey Warrior on French Imp Infantry will tell you all about what the French had trouble with in Spain.
Wellington was a typical late 18th century commander, running a small well-trained army as a centrally contolled force on the offensive when the A team were away. The well-documented foul-ups in 1815 show his coordination with his allies left a lot to be desired. -
Message 28
Posted by Hasse (U1882612) on Monday, 26th September 2005
Dave
You have no idea of what I study or not,I´m no author like you but an officer wich gives me the edge on tactics over you.
Furthermore do I live in Scandinavia and have non whatsoever bias or favours of the involved countries(with the exeption of Russia,our main foe for aprox 800 years),and my German is equal to my English.
Granted that eastern theatre is bigger involving more men so what,N or his marchals did more or less whatever they liked,with the Austrian,Russian and Preussian armies.
Until N made the strategic mistake actually two,first attacking Russia whitout taking acount the winter,two leaving Moscow(their was in Moscow food enough for the winter) in wintertime marching back over already plundered soil,and starving the Grand Armee to death.
The only army that actually did win over the French until Leipzig,was the English under Wellington.
Your invinceble Preussen was easy put down in a quick campaign 1806,remember battles like Jena and Auerstädt,your darling Blücher gives up 7 nov.Especially was Jena a good example how N outmanouverd his foe.
About Ulm the inderect or Napoleon approach,to hold the enemy with a small detacment at the front while marcing the the main force to attack in the rear,was used much earlier one example that springs to my mind is Alexander and the battle of Porus.So to claim that tactical movement to the preussians are groosly history falsification.
To be frank their is only one mayor Preussian invention of making war,but that is a great one the general Staff.
So facts stands,the two giants of the N wars are N himself and your hate object W.N did lose two mayor win or die battles Leipzig and Waterloo,the last with W as the allied general that did bear the brunt of the battle.
Wich among other things makes W the best in the long run.
Personally the third best in those wars are the Russian Koutoshov or Massena.
Hasse
PS you should study some basic in tactics and strategi about how making war,trye Tzun Tzu simple but good,or Clausewiths rather boring and havent standed up so good against time,or some standardtexts from any good bookstore or if you prefer it in German from the Bundeswehr. -
Message 29
Posted by steveP (U1775134) on Monday, 26th September 2005
<QUOTE' USER='DaveMBA' USERID='1360771'>Hes needs to do some serious reading if he thinks he has any grasp of the Wars - since they were fought acros the period 1792-1815 and involved mostly large battles and campaigns east of the Rhine. As for myself, I am a published author on the subject! <BR /><BR />I know you have all been brought up on the Anglo-French version of what happened, but there is plenty of nonsense in that. My point about Wellington is that he did not win battles under difficult circumstances - if you read up on the much bigger 1796 Germany campaign, you will see how the smaller army triumphed by the correct use of the Manoeuvre of the central position and the road network. As for Ulm, aside from the interesting command questions it raised, the plan was based on Schulmeister's deception and the proper use of the german road network (hence the French violation of Prussian neutrality). I don't criticise N or W for using int and deception, but it demonstrates the central fault in this simplistic approach of "he won, therefore". <BR /><BR />Wellington never commanded big armies and thus there is no clear evidence about how he would have got on in the big European battle sand campaigns. The circumstances of Spain were peculiar to it, but you cannot claim greatness, when you leave your enemies to do the fighting and only venture out when they are engaging the main man and his army. Such was N's system of rule - contrary to received wisdom there was no delegated corps command - that coordination in Spain went to pot making it as easy for W to pick off French armies as for N in 1805. The insurgents in Iraq are holding down a much larger US force - that should tell you something and if you want to know about massacres and the horrors of it, look at Goya's sketches, while Terry Crowdy's Osprey Warrior on French Imp Infantry will tell you all about what the French had trouble with in Spain. <BR /><BR />Wellington was a typical late 18th century commander, running a small well-trained army as a centrally contolled force on the offensive when the A team were away. The well-documented foul-ups in 1815 show his coordination with his allies left a lot to be desired. </QUOTE><BR /><BR />Dave<BR /><BR /> You may be a published author but what you says make me seriously doubt your judgement. I'm very much an amateur historian and glad to say I have no military experience. [No offence to Hasse or any other military personal on this board. I admire them greatly for what they do and am just very thankful I can live in peace and comfort as a result].<BR /><BR /> You repeatedly say that Wellington only attacked when his main enemy is away. {Not clear from that if you mean Napoleon in person or the Grand Army]. As Hasse has said he would have been bloody stupid - or words to that effect - to have tried to engage the Grand Army with the forces he had. In terms of fighting Napoleon it was not Wellington's fault Napoleon avoided the theatre after 1809. The Spanish resistance did cause serious problems for the French and although that was largely a problem of the French making Wellington made use of it by his skilful intelligence gathering.<BR /><BR /> You say that he didn't attack between 1809 and 1812. I suggest you actually read some history of the period and you will find the British army was on the offensive for most of the time. limited offensives because of the need to regain the border fortifications but they were actually doing the attacking. Furthermore there were serious problems, from the unreliability of the Spanish regular forces to the difficulty of obtain supplies. Napoleon’s incompetence in refusing to allow clear direction of the war in Spain, except at a distance by himself seriously weakened the French but again that was no one else's fault.<BR /><BR /> Napoleon and the earlier revolutionary armies had considerable advantages over their earlier opponents. Virtually unlimited numbers, revolutionary fervour, the willingness and ability to live off the land, greatly increasing their mobility and making the corps suspect possible. That helps explain Napoleon's successes but does it really detract from them? If not why should Wellington's use of weaknesses in the French system detract from his performance.<BR /><BR /> As we have both said the two men did met in battle once. While the French were somewhat inferior in numbers they probably had a edge in quality and Napoleon’s favourite interior position. They made serious mistakes, chiefly down to their C-in-C. However Wellington still held together a polyglot force of highly variable quality and ultimately defeated Napoleon's crack Guard. He may never have commanded a 'large' army but given the emphasis he placed on organisation I think you are rash to assume from that that he could not have done.<BR /><BR /> Steve<BR />
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Message 30
Posted by arnaldalmaric (U1756653) on Wednesday, 28th September 2005
<QUOTE' USER='steveP' USERID='1775134'><QUOTE' USER='DaveMBA' USERID='1360771'>Hes needs to do some serious reading if he thinks he has any grasp of the Wars - since they were fought acros the period 1792-1815 and involved mostly large battles and campaigns east of the Rhine. As for myself, I am a published author on the subject! <BR /><BR />I know you have all been brought up on the Anglo-French version of what happened, but there is plenty of nonsense in that. My point about Wellington is that he did not win battles under difficult circumstances - if you read up on the much bigger 1796 Germany campaign, you will see how the smaller army triumphed by the correct use of the Manoeuvre of the central position and the road network. As for Ulm, aside from the interesting command questions it raised, the plan was based on Schulmeister's deception and the proper use of the german road network (hence the French violation of Prussian neutrality). I don't criticise N or W for using int and deception, but it demonstrates the central fault in this simplistic approach of "he won, therefore". <BR /><BR />Wellington never commanded big armies and thus there is no clear evidence about how he would have got on in the big European battle sand campaigns. The circumstances of Spain were peculiar to it, but you cannot claim greatness, when you leave your enemies to do the fighting and only venture out when they are engaging the main man and his army. Such was N's system of rule - contrary to received wisdom there was no delegated corps command - that coordination in Spain went to pot making it as easy for W to pick off French armies as for N in 1805. The insurgents in Iraq are holding down a much larger US force - that should tell you something and if you want to know about massacres and the horrors of it, look at Goya's sketches, while Terry Crowdy's Osprey Warrior on French Imp Infantry will tell you all about what the French had trouble with in Spain. <BR /><BR />Wellington was a typical late 18th century commander, running a small well-trained army as a centrally contolled force on the offensive when the A team were away. The well-documented foul-ups in 1815 show his coordination with his allies left a lot to be desired. </QUOTE><BR /><BR />Dave<BR /><BR /> You may be a published author but what you says make me seriously doubt your judgement. I'm very much an amateur historian and glad to say I have no military experience. [No offence to Hasse or any other military personal on this board. I admire them greatly for what they do and am just very thankful I can live in peace and comfort as a result].<BR /><BR /> You repeatedly say that Wellington only attacked when his main enemy is away. {Not clear from that if you mean Napoleon in person or the Grand Army]. As Hasse has said he would have been bloody stupid - or words to that effect - to have tried to engage the Grand Army with the forces he had. In terms of fighting Napoleon it was not Wellington's fault Napoleon avoided the theatre after 1809. The Spanish resistance did cause serious problems for the French and although that was largely a problem of the French making Wellington made use of it by his skilful intelligence gathering.<BR /><BR /> You say that he didn't attack between 1809 and 1812. I suggest you actually read some history of the period and you will find the British army was on the offensive for most of the time. limited offensives because of the need to regain the border fortifications but they were actually doing the attacking. Furthermore there were serious problems, from the unreliability of the Spanish regular forces to the difficulty of obtain supplies. Napoleon’s incompetence in refusing to allow clear direction of the war in Spain, except at a distance by himself seriously weakened the French but again that was no one else's fault.<BR /><BR /> Napoleon and the earlier revolutionary armies had considerable advantages over their earlier opponents. Virtually unlimited numbers, revolutionary fervour, the willingness and ability to live off the land, greatly increasing their mobility and making the corps suspect possible. That helps explain Napoleon's successes but does it really detract from them? If not why should Wellington's use of weaknesses in the French system detract from his performance.<BR /><BR /> As we have both said the two men did met in battle once. While the French were somewhat inferior in numbers they probably had a edge in quality and Napoleon’s favourite interior position. They made serious mistakes, chiefly down to their C-in-C. However Wellington still held together a polyglot force of highly variable quality and ultimately defeated Napoleon's crack Guard. He may never have commanded a 'large' army but given the emphasis he placed on organisation I think you are rash to assume from that that he could not have done.<BR /><BR /> Steve<BR /></QUOTE><BR /><BR /><BR />Hmmh, As I suspect that I know who DaveMBA is I won't challenge him, except to say that I have enjoyed and learnt much from his writings and so cannot be Boulart from the fine messageboards of the TMP.<BR /><BR /><BR />If I am correct, DaveMBA, is a serious historian (this is a compliment DaveMBA), who likes too come and challenge. Nothing wrong there, in fact I applaud a historian who can cope with the internet.<BR /><BR />SteveP, I agree with you.<BR /><BR />Cheers AA.<BR />
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Message 31
Posted by arnaldalmaric (U1756653) on Wednesday, 28th September 2005
Oh, DaveMBA, could you as a published historian put some comment upon my own personal theory that Wellington had so much success in Spain as he outskirmished the French. as well as deploying the main battle line out of sight?
I will fully agree that it may be a bit Sharpeish, but doesn't it have a ring of truth?
Cheers AA. -
Message 32
Posted by DaveMBA (U1360771) on Saturday, 1st October 2005
I don't know the detail on tactics in Spain, but the general view now seems to be that to the extent that French troops had the training to conduct attack column deployment (the problems with it were obvious as early as Jemappes), there appears to have been a problem with getting the distance right - it thus makes sense that to make this more difficult, you screen your own movements and positions more effectively.
I respect anyone's modern service (and can include a few years RN Reserve service myself, which do not make me an expert on nelson's navy), but Hasse is making a big mistake in attempting to emulate Boulart's claims about his modern service. The tactics, equipment and training are completely different from 200 years ago. If he has been reading books for the past 40 years, then much of what he has read will have been the third had retelling of mythology, much of it driven by the shift in UK attitudes to Germany and France in the period 1870 to 1945. It is simply nonsnese that the Frenchw ere first defeated at Leipzig in 1813, since their first defeat was at Neerwinden in March 1793 and French armies were regualrly beaten at battles like Wurzburg, Novi, Second Caldiero and Aspern. This battle at Neerwinden is interesting in that it was a fair fight where (contrary to Boulart!), Austrian gunners ripped up the French - it is no coincidence that Jemappes, the first French victory of the wars in Nov 1792 is just 30 miles from Waterloo and is where they attacked in vastly superior numbers, but having had their attack columns shot up, reformed into a mass column and smashed through.
Indeed, we can see the goalposts moving here - Wellington was originally the best because he won - now it is that he only fought when he could win, used better intelligence, tricked his allies etc. There is nothing wrong with that (aside from the trickery), but in Sparrow: Secret Service, she notes on p.414 that Edmonds founder of MI5, noted that N and W's successes were largely down to good int networks - he noted the failures in 1812 and the same can be said of Marengo or in W's case, the run-up to Waterloo. Thus to understand whether a General was any good requires a great deal more investigation than whether he won.
Wellington was an 18th cemntury General, commanding small armis of larger than 2 corps (contrary to myth, Steve, the French did not pave thw ay for the corps system as it was just an additional level of army management above a division as the French system did not allow for delegation of power). In Spain and eben at Waterloo, he could fight with his men in lines (there is however nothing new in the 2-deep UK line as this appears in the Austrian 1769 regs) - compare that with the big Imperial battles, where the debsity of men is so much greater and it is physically impossible for the French to deploy htese dense formations into line. There were nearly 1000 guns and about a third of million men at Wagram - this is industrial warfare foght on huge battlefields, where C3 is a whole differenyt gane from the central control exercised by Nap in 96 or Wellington in his battles. Wellington never faced the problem that the Austrians had in Germany in 1796 of a smaller army in four components spread over southern Germany, from which they emerged victorious (and from which Jomini drew many of his so-called Napoleonic principles). Wellington's army was small and well-trained - the latter not unlike the GA of 1805, but he never faced a comparable French army. He was on short supply lines and had local support - at Waterloo, the French artilelry was delaye dgetting into action due to rain and it was just as case of hanging on until Blucher arrived - contrary to myth, Steve, a big part of the Guard was unavailable against the British as it was already committed to fighting the Prussians around Plancenoit by mid-afternoon. As for defeatingthe Guard, well, look at the truth of the alleged heroics of the Guard at Marengo and bear in mind that the Old Guard did actually manage to maintain 2 squares at Waterloo. -
Message 33
Posted by DaveMBA (U1360771) on Saturday, 1st October 2005
Interesting book coming out in Nov, which is quite relevant. Mary McGrigson: Wellington' Spies looks at hte 3 main men working for W in Spain - all are of Scottish descent, so one must be Colquhon Grant.
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Message 34
Posted by steveP (U1775134) on Tuesday, 4th October 2005
Dave
I don't know about the goalposts moving. I was just objecting to what I saw as unjust and rather unbalanced criticism.
You say that Wellington wasn't great because he never managed mass armies of the sort of size the continental powers used. Couldn't the same be said about Alexander, Hannibal and Belisarius who commanded small armies for their time?
You have also suggested that he only fought when he could win. That could be said to be a measure of a good general. Given that this still often meant fighting against forces of, albeit marginally, greater size that is quite an impressive record. And while, with the possible exception of India, he never defeated massively larger forces as the commanders mentioned above did they often had a considerable qualitative advantage. Whatever you say about the French Imperial armies they were often well led and very tough fighters.
It is true that much of the Imperial Guard was committed against the Prussians at Waterloo. However the final breaking of French moral was still triggered by the defeat of their final attack against Wellington's forces, including the failure of the Guard there. I would disagree with your comment that he never faced a comparable army. Napoleon’s last army was largely volunteers, mostly veterans from his previous campaigns who had been unable to adjust to the end of the imperial period. In comparison Wellington's allied army was very much a mixed force and caused him, from what I have read considerable concern about its quality. Napoleon and his generals made a lot of mistakes on the day and the weather helped. However he still did a considerable job holding the position until the Prussians arrived in force.
Steve
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