Βι¶ΉΤΌΕΔ

The accused in case IT 95 05/18 walked into the otherwise empty court room flanked by two guards, upright and all but expressionless in a smart dark suit, white shirt and red tie. Peered at by those of us in the press and public gallery - on the same level, but behind thick glass running from wall to ceiling - he took a few papers out of his thin brief case and put on his head phones. He sat down, donned a pair of glasses and waited for the judge to appear.

Radovan Karadzic, captured in Belgrade last month, has been forced to shed the disguise that went with a new identity as a long-haired and bearded practitioner of alternative medicine. He has reverted to the familiar wartime almost bouffant hair-do and steely gaze. Throughout the hearing - attentive, courteous but defiant - he said that the court should do the same.
"I am deeply convinced that this court is representing itself falsely as a court of the international community whereas it is, in fact, a court of Nato whose aim is to liquidate me," he said.

The judge asked him to stand to hear the eleven charges against him. After a few seconds hesitation he did. But the judge didn't get very far. He read out the charge of genocide. Mr Karadzic told him he would not enter a plea because of his attitude towards the court. The judge said that, in accordance with the rules, he would enter a plea of not guilty on his behalf.. So he never read the full charges, of indictment to murder, torture, rape and inhumane treatment.

Later, Mr Karadzic attempted a joke - dry, grim or sick according to your temperament:

"May I hold you to your word?" he asked.

"Which word?" the judge replied.

"That I am not guilty."

"We shall see in due course, Mr Karadzic."

The hearing ended with the focus not on the accused but with something of a ticking off for the defence from the judge. They hadn't updated the charges and weren't planning to do so until the end of next month. The judge - who obviously runs a tight court - was not at all amused.

Mr Karadzic will be here again on 17 September when his allegations about the nature of the court will be heard at some length. The court rose and the judge and most legal representatives left the room. Just Mr Karadzic, his guards and ourselves behind the glass were left. As we shuffled out a lawyer came back in and spoke to Mr Karadzic. I have no idea what was being said but, for a moment, the accused's impassive face broke into a very quick grin of amusement.

• Bookmark with:
• |
• |
• |
• |
• - What's this?

It's rather a strange feeling to be back in The Hague as my first trip after the holidays. I was here, rather fruitlessly awaiting Radovan Karadzic's arrival before my break began. I left before he arrived. Shorn of long hair and beard at his first appearance, he was given 30 days to enter a plea. If he doesn't, the judge will do it for him today. He has already challenged the appointed judge and got him changed.

Although he seems to be co-operating with the court more than his mentor Slobodan Milosevic, he maintains that this is a political court and that he won't get a fair trial. Some I speak to suggest that the rules of evidence and identification are slack and wouldn't do in Britain. But rules vary on such matters all over Europe and those in charge insist that the proceedings are fair.

But is there is a bigger problem with such courts? Karadzic himself has evidently said that "everybody in the world" thinks he is guilty. Few deny that the killings, rapes and torture took place and few deny they were a terrible wrong (some, of course, do and either claim they did not happen on such a scale or were a part of the conduct of war). Few deny that Karadzic was in political control although it's notoriously difficult to establish who gave what exact commands. Historians still discuss whether Hitler actually gave direct orders to instigate the Holocaust even though it was pretty obvious for years beforehand where Nazi policy would lead. Whatever plea Karadzic enters, is anyone in any doubt about the verdict?

More when he appears.

• Bookmark with:
• |
• |
• |
• |
• - What's this?

You can't accuse the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner of lacking a sense of drama. He has branded Russia an "international outlaw" after it recognised the breakaway Georgian regions, and warned of the possibility of more conflicts to come along the Russian/European fault line. He told French radio that he's worried not about a new cold war but "hot" wars: "We fear a war and don't want one".

The UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband has been just as tough, telling Russia it is less trusted and less respected than before, that it is guilty of double standards.

European Union diplomats are well aware that Russia feels a humiliating sense of grievance over the contraction of its sphere of influence since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Consider that three EU member states actually used to be inside the USSR and seven were more or less within Moscow's grip. Consider that all Warsaw Pact members, apart from Russia itself, are now members of Nato. Many of these eastern EU members have been complaining strongly for a while about what they see as Russian provocation and interference, something I reported on last year.

Now for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union , a part of the old empire. The worry of diplomats is that this is not a one-off but that Russia could wield hot war to thaw other "frozen conflicts", as they are know in the jargon. , officially part of Moldova, is the most obvious case.

is the most worrying. Like Georgia, Ukraine is a former Soviet republic aspiring to join the EU and Nato. The split between the pro-Western and pro-Russian factions are deep and bitter. Russia is said to eye the Crimea, part of Ukraine, with particular proprietary interest. Mr Miliband has renewed Britain's commitment to Ukraine, strengthening its links with the EU and building its military through Nato.

But Mr Kouchner also says that the crisis, while regrettable, gives Europe a chance to assert itself. But how? It's true that French President Nicolas Sarkozy, taking the lead while his country chairs the EU, quickly brokered . It is true both the US and Russia saw this as a natural role for the EU. But while the peace holds, the deal is in tatters: the French and most other EU countries believe that the Russians have not kept their part of the bargain. The EU's ambassadors meet tomorrow to prepare for . But it is not clear what they can do.

President Sarkozy has raised some hackles by suggesting that if the were in force things would have been much easier. It's rather an odd red herring of an argument. If the EU were governed by the rules of the Lisbon Treaty there would be a much more powerful high representative, with money and a bureaucracy to help him or her. He or she would probably not have been delighted with President Sarkozy muscling in on what would clearly be the High Rep's job. So Mr Sarkozy seems to be arguing that he shouldn't have been allowed such a free hand, which may or may not be correct.

But of course institutional arrangements would have little impact on a fundamental truth of EU foreign policy: the huge difficulty in agreeing anything beyond bland platitudes.

All the usual reasons apply. It would be weird if 27 countries did not have very different approaches, driven by different history and geographies. Some will say that makes it not worth the effort, others that it is better than the European differences being paraded proudly and openly.

Poland has led the Baltic states in demanding a tough response. Sweden has given strong backing to this position. Britain is at the same end of the spectrum, with the foreign secretary talking about organising a coalition against the Russian action. Germany wants dialogue with Russia kept open, which cynics will interpret as worrying more about lots of lovely oil than the national sovereignty of Caucasian countries. Italy's PM Silvio Berlusconi is evidently telling fellow leaders that he has a personal relationship with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin and will smooth things over.

But it is not this traditional division alone that is hampering firm action. There is the very real question of what the EU or indeed the West can do. I came off the phone to several diplomats rather puzzled about their apparent fuzziness and lack of a plan. My initial feeling was it was rather lame.

Then, as I sometimes do, I tried to war-game in my head the options. What would I say if I was an adviser to an EU foreign secretary? Scenario one went something like this:

Minister: "Mark," (or it could be Marko, Marcus or Marc... this could be any European capital) says the foreign secretary, "you've always said that the Russians are bullies - 'only thing the bear understands is a sharp rap across the snout' I believe was the phrase. What do you advise?"
Adviser: "Clearly a tangible rebuke is needed, a punishment: we could stop them joining the World Trade Organization."
Minister: "But it's in our interest to have them inside a rule-based international organization - and before you say it, the same goes for the partnership agreement the EU is negotiating."
Adviser: "The G7 could stop inviting Russia to G8 meetings."
Minister: "The McCain solution? Russia doesn't seem bothered."
Adviser: "End co-operation with Nato?"
Minister: "That's happened on paper, and what about our supply routes to Afghanistan through Russia?"
Adviser: "Well, at least speed up Nato entry for Georgia and Ukraine. If Chancellor Merkel hadn't blocked it we wouldn't be here now."
Minister: "No. We might not. Or we might be in the middle of world war three, or trying to wriggle out of clear commitments to go to war."
Adviser: "Warn them about the dangers of ignoring national sovereignty by invading another country... they could end up being regarded by the rest of the world just like...".
Minister: "Yes?"
Adviser: "Never mind."

War-gaming the second scenario is much easier.

Minister: "Mark, you've always urged keeping the dialogue open with Russia and not treating her as a pariah: isn't that just appeasement?"
Adviser: "Such a dirty word, minister. Putin is not Hitler. No, our outrage is clear but back channels can also make it clear this is a special case. Russia has special interests here and if it is regarded as a bit of tit-for-tat over Kosovo: well, we agree to disagree on these two cases."
Minister: "But it's not a one-off is it? It is pretty clear they want to push back into the old Soviet space."
Adviser: "It's a one-off if we say it is. If we say it is part of a wider crisis then it becomes so. Do you honestly think they are going to march into Ukraine? We have to keep Nato membership on the table for Georgia and Ukraine, but these things can drag on. When did Turkey first apply to join the EU? 1959 I think."
Minister: "So just let them get away with it."
Adviser: "Heavens, no. Ramp up the rhetoric and warnings. Stand shoulder-to-shoulder with every plucky country in the region. Words like 'illegal', 'disproportionate' and even 'untrustworthy' are helpful, or 'may be deployed within forty-five minutes'."
Minister: "Steady!"
Adviser: "And point out the damage to their stock market."
Minister: "Let the market decide? I like it."

I am sure the foreign ministers have much cleverer and more imaginative advisers than me, so the outcome may be rather different. But one very senior diplomat did point out that, while President Bush is urging EU nations to show some toughness, on Monday the White House didn't have any concrete proposals for action either. Round conference tables in the Western capitals there are no hawks, just different species of dove.

• Bookmark with:
• |
• |
• |
• |
• - What's this?